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Abstract 
Catherine Mary Tingle 
Ph.D Thesis, September 2000 
Symptomatic Writings: Prefigurations of Freudian Theories and ~lodds of the l\lind in 
the Fiction of Sheridan Le Fanu, Wilkie Collins and George Eliot 
This thesis examines ways in which the writings of Sheridan Le Fanu (1814-1873), Wilkie 
Collins (1824-1889) and George Eliot (1819-1880) anticipate aspects of the works of Sigmund 
Freud (1856-1939). It argues that psychoanalytic theories were a product of their time, finding 
their ancestry in Victorian psychological, philosophical, scientific and social thought, aspects of 
which also informed the work of Le Fanu, Collins and Eliot. 
I foreground Freud's work of the 1890s, especially his Project for a Scientific Psychology 
(1950; written in 1895), the forerunner of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), The 
Unconscious (1915), Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and The Ego and the Id (1923). The 
energy-filled psychical system the Project outlines is informed by nineteenth-century ideas on 
force. I discuss systemic equilibrium in Le Fanu's short stories, the tendency to inertia in 
Eliot's Romola (1862-3) and the mechanics of satisfaction in Middlemarch (1871-2) and Daniel 
Deronda (1876); all these concepts find roots in nineteenth- or pre-nineteenth-century spiritual 
or scientific thought, and prefigure Freud's Project. The association of ideas, a basic foundation 
of psychoanalysis, is discussed with reference to Collins's Basil (1852), The Woman in White 
(1860), No Name (1862) and Armadale (1866). I suggest how Coli ins's knowledge of the work 
of W. B. Carpenter (1813-1885) and Frances Power Cobbe (1822-1904), and Eliot's 
engagement with the ideas of George Henry Lewes (1817-1878) and Herbert Spencer (1820-
1903) are evident in their fictions. Throughout, I show that unconscious mental processes were 
discussed decades before Freud. 
I also consider how Victorian theories and fictions shed light on Freud. Theories of the 
fallibility of memory, which I argue impact on The Moonstone (1868), illuminate Freud"s 
seduction theory episode of the 1890s. That Eliot, Lewes and Spencer equate unity with social 
and scientific progress interrogates Freud's divisive methodology. The emphasis on the value 
of ancestral experience in Eliot's late fiction suggests that we are the product of our 
predecessors. 
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Introduction 
When, from the year 1893 onwards, I plunged into investigations ... of the origin of mental 
dis~ban~e~, it ~oul~ certa~ly never have occurred to me to look for a confmnation of my 
fmdmgs m lDlagmatlVe wntmgs. I was thus more than a little surprised to find that the 
author of Gradiva, which was published in 1903, had taken as the basis of its creation the 
very ~ing that I believ~d myself to have freshly discovered from the sources of my medical 
expenence. How was It that the author arrived at the same knowledge as the doctor - or at 
least behaved as though he possessed the same knowledge?l 
Sigmund Freud's Reading 
Sigmund Freud's reading of Wilhelm Jensen's 1903 novel Gradiva was in many respects 
symptomatic of his complex relationship with sources which were then claimed as supporting 
texts by psychoanalysis. In the fIrst place, he did not find Jeasen's text himself, but was 
recommended it by C. G. Jung, who, in Ernest Jones's telling phrase, 'called his attention to the 
novel,.2 In reading the text, Freud's astonishment, expressed in the above passage, that an 
author could, as it seemed, almost by magic, come to the same conclusions about the mind's 
workings as himself, was not for him an unprecedented feeling. In a letter to the writer Arthur 
Schnitzler in 1906, Freud wrote, 'I have often asked myself in astonishment how you came by 
this or that piece of secret knowledge which I had acquired by a painstaking investigation of the 
subject,.3 In the years following 1906, the time which, according to Freud, heralded the end of 
the 'latency period' of psychoanalysis,4 he was informed more than once that already published 
1 Sigmund Freud, 'Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's "Gradiva'" (1907), in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by James Strachey and others, 24 vols 
(London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953-74), IX, 1-95 (p. 54). The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works will hereafter be referenced as SE. 
At this fIrst reference to the Standard Edition I should note that in this thesis I will be attributing 
its editorship to James Strachey, its general editor, who, it hardly needs pointing out, did not single-
handedly translate and edit all of Freud's works in these volumes. This seems to be common practice-
Frank J. Sulloway and Jeffrey Masson are examples of major Freud scholars that attribute all editorial 
comment to Strachey. Strachey himself made it clear that his was the responsibility for 'the fmal decision 
upon every point whether of the translation or the commentary' (,General Preface', in SE, I, xiii-xxii (p. 
xxi». I therefore cite Stracheyas editor (apart from when referring to volume XXIV, which was edited 
after his death), although strictly technically I should perhaps refer to 'Strachey, and others', exact 
attribution being unclear. 
2 Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Volume II: 1901-1919, Years of Maturity, 3 vols 
(New York: Basic Books, 1953-57), vol II: 1901-1919, Years of Maturity, 341. According to Jones, Jung 
claimed that Freud wrote this essay especially to please him, as they had not yet met by this point The 
essay therefore could be seen as something of a courting gesture, Freud's concession to outside 
influences. 
3 Sigmund Freud to Arthur Schnitzler, 8 May 1906, in Letters of Sigmund Freud (1960), ed. by Ernst L. 
Freud, trans. by Tania Stem and James Stem (New York: Dover Publications, 1992), p. 2S 1. 
4 Sigmund Freud, 'On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement' (1914), in SE, XIV, 1-66 (p. 27). 
This period lasted, according to Freud, 'for more than ten years', and started from about 1896, when he 
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thinkers held various pieces of the 'secret knowledge' of his theories. This circumstance had 
much to do with the fact that, as opposed to the state of 'splendid isolation' which he claimed to 
have undergone in the 1890s and early 1900s, now Freud was attracting a group of followers, 
many of whom read widely in philosophy and literature. Coming out of a period in which he 
'did not have to read any pUblications, nor listen to any ill-informed opponents', which Freud 
saw as examples of the 'advantages and charms' of his solitary state ('On the History', p. 22), 
he must have been disconcerted to begin to realize the essentially illusory nature of his 
intellectual isolation. Isolation, real or imagined, was a position which appealed strongly to 
Freud. We can see this in his description of his disenchantment of the belief that repression, the 
'comer-stone on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis rests' ('On the History', p. 16), 
was his original idea: 
The theory of repression quite certainly came to me independently of any other source; I know 
of no outside impression which might have suggested it to me, and for a long time I imagined it to be 
entirely original, until Otto Rank ... showed us a passage in Schopenhauer's World as Will and Idea in 
which the philosopher seeks to give an explanation of insanity. What he says there about the struggle 
against accepting a distressing piece of reality coincides with my concept of repression so completely that 
once again lowe the chance of making a discovery to my not being well-read ... In later years I have 
denied myself the very great pleasure of reading the works of Nietzsche, with the deliberate object of not 
being hampered in working out the impressions received in psycho-analysis by any sort of anticipatory 
ideas. I had therefore to be prepared - and I am so, gladly - to forgo all claims to priority in the many 
instances in which laborious psycho-analytic investigation can merely confIrm the truths which the 
philosopher recognized by intuition. ('On the History', pp. 15-16) 
Many years later, in a speech honouring Freud's eightieth birthday, Thomas Mann took 
the attitude that Freud displays, in this very interesting passage, to its limits. By 1936, Freud's 
surprised discovery of his lack of priority had explicitly become what was only implied in 1914, 
a result of his heroic, stoic years battling alone: 
I repeat that the profound sympathy between the two spheres [of literature and psychoanalysis] had 
existed for a long time unperceived. Actually we know that Sigmund Freud ... trod the steep path alone 
and independently, as physician and natural scientist, without knowing that reinforcement and 
encouragement lay to his hand in literature. He did not know Nietzsche, scattere~ throughout whose 
pages one fmds premonitory flashes of truly Freudian insight; he did not know Novalis ... he did not 
know Kierkegaard ... and, fmally, he did not know Schopenhauer, the melancholy symphonist of a 
philosophy of the instinct, groping for change and redemption. Probably it must be so. By his unaided 
effort, without knowledge of any previous intuitive achievement, he had methodically to follow out the 
line of his own researches; the driving force of his activity was probably increased by this very freedom 
from special advantage. And we think of him as solitary - the attitude is inseparable from our earliest 
picture of the man. S 
Mann describes Freud in glowing terms, and one feels this is partly to compensate for what is, 
in places, a speech about how Freud's theories have been prefigured. If one is conversant with 
separated from Breuer, with whom he had written Studies on Hysteria ('An Autobiographical Study' 
(1925), in SE, XX, 1-74 (p. 48». 
j Thomas Mann, 'Freud and the Future', in Essays of Three Decades, trans. by H. T. Lowe-Porter (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 411-28 (pp. 412-13). 
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the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Mann writes, 'he must needs have been filled with a 
sense of recognition and familiarity when first ... he entered the realms of psychoanalysis and 
looked about him' ('Freud and the Future', p. 417). Describing the word-picture that Mann 
creates in the above passage, of Freud as solitary, battling pioneer, Richard Webster writes that 
it is 'a deeply impressive one. As a representation of the character of Freud's intellectual 
achievement it is, however, almost entirely false. For ... this myth of the hero was one which 
Freud himself consciously created, sometimes by destroying or suppressing the evidence which 
might conflict with it,.6 
Freud's own 1914 discussion of the possible relevance of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to 
his work is interesting in many ways, not least because it conveys much about Freud's 
assumptions about his own originality and how this attitude affected his working habits. As far 
as I discover, the passage that Freud describes is in Volume II of The World as Will and 
Representation. Schopenhauer's examples of 'a distressing piece of reality' are, 'things that 
powerfully prejudice our interests, wound our pride, or interfere with our wishes'. He writes 
that the mind naturally opposes these thoughts, in terms of creating a 'resistance on the part of 
the will to allow what is contrary to it to come under examination of the intellect,.7 In the 
extreme form of this mental tendency, Schopenhauer writes, there is 'a violent "casting out of 
one's mind" of something', which necessitates the putting back into the mind of something else 
to fill the gap, a process which naturally leads to mental illness (The World as Will, II, 401). In 
these ideas Freud recognized a prefiguration of his theory of repressIon. However, 
Schopenhauer's description of the mind's processes could also be seen in some sense to 
describe Freud's early attitude to the issue of originality. Freud betrays himself in the above 
passage. The language he uses in explaining that he has not read Nietzsche, ('I have denied 
myself the very great pleasure [Genu,P1' ,8 seen here in a strange chance conjunction with 
Schopenhauer's definition of reality, starts to suggest very basic motives behind Freud's reading 
behaviour. I think it possible that Freud here overstates the pleasure he would gain from the 
perusal of Nietzsche, in order to try to hide the greater pleasure he feels in the idea of being 
original, a pleasure he cannot lightly relinquish. 9 
Freud's early master Charcot taught that, in Freud's own words 'the greatest satisfaction a 
man could have was to see something new - that is, to recognize it as new; and he remarked 
6 Richard Webster, Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science and Psychoanalysis (London: Fontana, 1996), p. 
13. 
7 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (1819), trans. by E. F. J. Payne, 2 vols 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1966), II, 400. 
i- Sigmund Freu~ 'Zur Geschichte der Psychoanalytischen 8ewegung' (1914), in Gesammelte Werke. 
Werke aus den Jahren J 9 J 3-19 J 7, 18 vols (London: Imago, 1940-52: Frankfurt Am Maim. 1868), X, 53. 
9 There is a possibility that Freud's contact with the ideas of Schopenhauer may have been established 
rather earlier than he claims in his autobiographical accounts. Frank J. Sulloway comments that Freu~ as 
a student, was for five years a member of a Reading Society. which discussed the works of Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche and Wagner (Freud. Biologist 0/ the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend (Cambridge. 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 468). 
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again and again on the difficulty and value of this kind of "seeing'" .10 In the 1890s, Freud's 
letters to Wilhelm Fliess revealed a scholar who had taken this to heart. Paul Roazen, to whose 
invaluable section on 'Priorities' in his Freud and his Followers I am indebted, testifies that at 
that time, 'Freud had written that "I do not want to read, because it stirs up too many thoughts 
and stints me of the satisfaction of discovery"', and that later in his career 
To a pupil in 1909 Freud wrote that he was 'really very ignorant about my predecessors. If we ever meet 
up above they will certainly greet me ill as a plagiarist. But. .. it is such a pleasure to investigate the 
thing itself instead of reading the literature about it.' 11 
The thought of the possibility of being deprived of this pleasure, this satisfaction, was enough to 
prompt symptoms of anxiety. He wrote to Fliess in 1898, 'I opened a recently published book 
by Janet, Hysterie et idees fIXes, with a pounding heart and put it aside again with my pulse 
calmed. He has no inkling of the key.' 12 The extent of the forces behind this anxiety, springing 
from a deep-seated need for fame, can be seen in a letter to Freud's fiancee, also cited by 
Roazen, but from which I will quote at more length: 
[Breuer] told me he had discovered that hidden under the surface of timidity there lay in me an extremely 
daring and fearless human being. I had always thought so, but never dared tell anyone. I have often felt 
as though I had inherited all the defiance and all the passions with which our ancestors defended their 
Temple and could gladly sacrifice my life for one great moment in history. And at the same time I always 
felt so helpless and incapable of expressing these ardent passions even by a word or a poem. So I have 
always restrained myself, and it is this, I think, which people must see in me. 13 
But, as I would like to suggest in this Introduction, in the 1890s at least, Freud did not restrain 
his thirst for fame and priority as much as he would perhaps have wanted. His lack of reading 
was a symptom. A fore-echo of Freud's extraordinarily topsy-turvy words in his description of 
the discovery of Schopenhauer's knowledge of repression, 'once again lowe the chance of 
making a discovery to my not being well-read' can be seen in an episode of academic 
plagiarism which Roazen describes: 
In the course of illustrating the human 'tendency to forget what is disagreeable' [in The 
10 Sigmund Freud, 'Charcot' (1893), in SE, III, 7-23 (p. 12). 
11 Paul Roazen, Freud and his Followers (London: Allen Lane, 1976), p. 212. 
12 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 10 March 1898, in The Complete Letters 0/ Sigmund Freud to 
Wilhelm Fliess, /887-/904, trans. and ed by Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), pp. 301-02 (p. 302). Hereafter, Freud-Fliess. Masson's note to Freud's account 
of this reading experience is interesting: 'Presumably a reference to Pierre Janet, Nevroses et idees fau 
... There is almost no mention of sexuality, which may be what Freud is referring to. Further on, 
however, Janet ... describes the seduction of a seven-year-old girl and explains the suicide attempts and 
hysterical attacks in a fourteen-year-old as due to attempted rape.' (Freud-Fliess, p. 302 n.) First, then, 
Freud is inaccurate in citing the name of Janet's book, and secondly, it appears that he may not have read 
far enough to see that in fact Janet did have, in his tenns, some sort of 'inkling of the key' of sexual 
trauma. As elsewhere, a combination of Freud's wishful thinking that he should not be prefigured, and 
his over-impatience to ascertain this, show through in his rather careless reading behaviour. 
Il Sigmund Freud to Martha Bemays, 2 February 1886, in Letters o/Sigmund Freud, pp. 200-04 (pp. 202-
03). 
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Psychopathology of Everyday Life], Freud later cited how he had forgotten in 1900 to acknowledge 
Fliess's notion of the role of repressed bisexuality in neurosis. 'It is painful', Freud admitted 'to be 
requested in this way to surrender one's originality'. (Roazen, p. 108) , 
This was by no means the only time that this sort of event occurred in Freud's career. 
His theory that sexuality was at the root of the neuroses was, he later realised, triggered by 
utterances made by Charcot, Breuer and Chrobak, a gynaecologist. 14 What I would like to 
emphasize about the above passage, however, is that in it Freud gives the impression that he has 
started his career with the assumption that one is original until proved otherwise. This explains 
much about the fact that, especially in the 1890s, in his self-proclaimed period of isolation, he 
preferred not to read. His natural inclination was not to face what might be the reality about the 
priority of his ideas, which, to paraphrase Schopenhauer, would have prejudiced his interests, 
wounded his pride, and interfered with his wishes. Indeed, the picture may be a little more 
complex than this. In an article entitled 'Freud's library and his Private Reading', Edward 
Timms discusses Freud's suggestion, made in his interpretation of Gradiva, for example, that it 
was not until the mid 1900s that he recognized the possibility of parallels between literature and 
psychoanalysis. Timms points out that Freud was in fact, from childhood, an avid reader of 
literature. Therefore, he writes, 'we must assume that as a reader he passed through a kind of 
"latency period", during which the formative reading experiences of his childhood became 
obscured by his commitment to medical science' and became 'no longer fully conscious', that 
is, inaccessible to his intellectual memory on some level. ls Indeed, Roazen points out that in a 
very late work, 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937), Freud wrote, 'I can never be 
certain, in view of the wide extent of my reading in early years, whether what I took for a new 
creation might not be an effect of cryptomnesia' .16 Cryptomnesia, literally, hidden or secret 
memory, is an interesting word, suggestive of the crypts - underground vaults or passages, 
whose name springs from the same roOt. 17 This late admission of wide reading in youth, put 
against Freud's self-reported 'ignorance of my predecessors' in 1909, is rather startling, and, 
juxtaposed with the word cryptomnesia, raises interesting, though unanswerable questions about 
the nature of the history of Freud's ideas; for 'hidden' and 'secret' things can be made so 
14 Freud recounts this incident in 'On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement' - 'But these three 
identical opinions, which I had heard without understanding, had lain donnant in my mind for years, until 
one day they awoke in the fonn of an apparently original discovery' ('On the History', p. 13). As he later 
revealed in his 'Autobiographical Study', Freud realized in the very process of writing his 1914 
retrospective that this theory had been suggested to him by Charcot, Breuer and Chrobak. In his 1925 
work he adds to his account - 'Nor was I then aware that in deriving hysteria from sexuality I was going 
back to the very beginnings of medicine and following up a thought of Plato's. It was not until later that I 
learnt this from an essay by Havelock Ellis' ('Autobiographical Study', p. 24). Having admitted all this, 
he still writes of the importance of sexuality, on the same page, as 'my surprising discovery'. 
15 Edward Timms, 'Freud's library and his Private Reading', in Freud in Exile: Psychoanalysis and ils 
Vicissitudes, ed. by Edward Timms and Naomi Segal (London: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 65-79 
(D. 72). 
II 'Analysis Terminable and Intenninable' (1937), in SE, XXIII, 209-53 (p. 245); cited in Roazen, p. 210. 
17 See Oxford English Dictionary, ed. by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, 2nd edn, 20 vols (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), IV, 95. Hereafter, OED. 
6 
consciously or by unconscious processes. A convenient degree of responsibility is taken from 
the mind that unconsciously represses memories, hence I think Freud's insistence on this 
unconscious process to explain the appearance of various nineteenth-century sources in his 
work. Conscious hiding is a different matter; and the fact that Freud undertook a large amount 
of destruction of his notes and papers twice in his life does not put him in a favourable light 
when one considers this possibility. 
Schopenhauer, in The World as Will and Representation, describes the process that a 
healthy mind undergoes after it has, by necessity, overcome the natural inclination to ignore an 
unfavourable reality: 
Every new adverse event must be assimilated by the intellect, in other words, must receive a place in the 
system of truths connected with our will and its interests, whatever it may have to displace that is more 
satis~actory. As soon as this is done, it pains us much less; but this operation itself is often very painful, 
and m most cases takes place only slowly and with reluctance. (The World as Will, II, 400) 
Freud's embrace, it is true, in his analysis of Gradiva, of the creations of the artist in relation to 
psychoanalysis seems entirely warm and generous. He not only finds a place for writers of 
fiction in the system of Freudian theory, but asserts that psychoanalysis has much to learn from 
them: 
But creative writers are valuable allies and their evidence is to be prized highly, for they are apt to know a 
whole host of things between heaven and earth of which our philosophy has not yet let us dream. In their 
knowledge of the mind they are far in advance of us everyday peoEle, for they draw upon sources which 
we have not yet opened up for science. ('Jensen's "Gradiva"', p. 8) 8 
The creative writer, Freud continues in this essay, 'has from time immemorial been the 
precursor of science, and so too of scientific psychology ... Thus the creative writer cannot 
evade the psychiatrist nor the psychiatrist the creative writer' (p. 44). Thomas Mann, thirty 
years later, summed up his view from his vantage point in history by saying, 'the close relation 
between literature and psychoanalysis has been known for a long time to both sides' ('Freud and 
the Future', p. 412). The picture, however, is a little more complicated, for the admiration 
psychoanalysis had for literature (under which head Mann seems to include the philosophy of 
18 It is interesting that Freud paraphrases Hamlet here. Ernest Jones testifies that Freud was a keen reader 
of Shakespeare, and had started reading his works from the age of eight (Ernest Jones, The Life and Work 
of Sigmund Freud, Volume 1: The Formative Years and the Great Discoveries, 1856-1900, ncb edn, 3 
vols (New York: Basic Books, 1960), I, 21). This may have been another writer whose effects on Freud's 
thinking and imagination could have been operative, though unconscious. Freud was fond of quoting 
from literature to support his argument, particularly the works of Goethe. See Totem and Taboo (1913), 
in which a passage from Goethe's Faust is used to illustrate the idea of inheritance (in SE, XIII, vii-162 
(p. 158», and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), in wbich Freud uses Goethe's phraseology to 
describe the driving nature of the repressed instinct's search for some sort of satisfaction (in SE, XVIII, 1-
64 (p. 42). Hereafter, Beyond). If these are ideas with wbich he was familiar from bis early reading, there 
is the very real possibility that they had in fact gone to inform bis scientific and imaginative thought, his 
way of seeing certain of the mind's processes, and, having formed a tally with bis theories, were then 
consciously used as support, as if discovered after such theories were conceived. 
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Schopenbauer, Nietzsche and others) was actually rather more conditional than it appeared to 
be. In 1914, as we have seen, helped by a combination of his growing fame, the slow revelation 
of the number of his predecessors and also, no doubt, by the fact that he had developed a 
contempt for the sort of petty prize-grabbing academic behaviour that he had seen among his 
followers,19 Freud wrote of his gladness to forsake claims to priority 'in the many instances in 
which laborious psycho-analytic investigation can merely confirm the truths which the 
philosopher recognized by intuition'. This idea of intuition is key to Freud's acceptance of the 
philosopher's views. Its counterpart in the artistic world is revealed by Freud in his 1912 
Postscript to the Second Edition of his essay on Gradiva: 
In the five years that have passed since this study was completed, psycho-analytic research has 
summoned up the courage to approach the creations of imaginative writers with yet another purpose in 
view. It no longer merely seeks in them for confirmations of the fmdings it has made from unpoetic, 
neurotic human beings; it also demands to know the material of impressions and memories from which 
the author has built the work, and the methods and processes by which he has converted this material into 
a work of art. It has turned out that these questions can be most easily answered in the case of writers 
who (like our Wilhelm Jensen, who died in 1911) were in the habit of giving themselves over to their 
imagination in a simple-minded joy in creating. ('Jensen's "Gradiva''', p. 94) 
In Freud's view, creativity, coming from the depths of the artistic mind, will support and sustain 
analytic theory; it will reveal the unconscious, at the same time as employing some censorship 
of it. This indeed was a theory that he developed in many commentaries on art and literature. 
However, Jensen's understanding of the unconscious mind's processes may not just have been a 
matter of intuition, of 'simple-minded joy in creating'. Just after the essay on Gradiva was 
published, in 1907, Freud wrote to Jung that when Jensen had written to him, in response to the 
publication of the article, 'he suggested the agreement [with psychoanalysis] could be ascribed 
to poetic intuition, and partly perhaps to his early medical studies'?O Jensen's text, then, was a 
mixed product of art and science. However, Freud overlooks this element which its writer 
believes is a contribution to the formation of Gradiva, adopting, it must be said, rather a 
patronising tone in doing so, writing of 'our Wilhelm Jensen' and his 'simple-minded joy'. 
In this thesis I will be looking at three Victorian writers whose works were, like 
Jensen's, more than a simple-minded joy in creating, whose fiction was in part a product of its 
environment, an environment which was permeated with scientific theories on the mind and 
body. George Henry Lewes, in The Principles o/Success in Literature (1865) gives some idea 
of the nineteenth-century view of what went into a work of art, in a description of the nature of 
genius. This description, in some sense, encompasses mental processes that are hidden (which 
tallies with Freud's view of creativity), but Lewes, having quoted Ruskin on the 'vast 
19 In 'On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement', written in the aftermath of Freud's split with 
Alfred Adler and Jung, Freud wrote of the early days of the Vienna Psycho-Analytic Society, 'nor was ( 
able to stifle the disputes about priority for which there were so many opportunities' ('On the History', p. 
25). 
20 Sigmund Freud to C. O. Jung, 26 May 1907 in Letters o/Sigmund Freud, pp. 252-54 (p. 253). 
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storehouses' of memory which contribute to artistic production, portrays the mind of the artist 
as a realm of almost endless possibility, fed by countless memories: 
?enius ~ r~ely able to ~ive any account of its own processes. But those who have had ample 
OpportuDltles of mtnnately knowmg the growth of works in the minds of artists, will bear me out in 
saying that a vivid memory supplies the elements from a thousand different sources, most of which are 
quite beyond the power of localisation - the experience of yesterday being strangely intenningled with 
the dim suggestions of early years, the tones heard in childhood sounding through the diapason of 
sorrowing maturity; and all these kaleidoscopic fragments are recomposed into images that seem to have 
a corresponding reality of their own?l 
Accepting the difficulty of defining what makes genius, and that the work of some of the writers 
I will examine is more complex than that of others, these words bear as much relevance to the 
working activities of the mind of Sigmund Freud as they do to those of Sheridan Le Fanu, 
Wilkie Collins and George Eliot. It is perhaps worth registering here the opinion of Henri 
Ellenberger, who writes: 'No doubt Freud could have been one of the world's foremost 
writers' .22 We have seen the relevance of Lewes's view of creativity to Freud in his patchy 
remembrances of ideas which he had originally claimed as his, but which proved to be inspired 
by utterances from Charcot, Fliess, and others. The products of the minds of the fiction writers 
I have chosen to consider, and the authenticities of the 'corresponding realit[ies]' that they 
create are very varied; this is partly why I am bringing them together in this thesis, to suggest 
that not only do Le Fanu, Collins and Eliot, although quite disparate writers, all draw, 
consciously and unconsciously from endless sources in their environment, but that a few of 
these sources are the same as, or connected with, those that Freud would later use, consciously 
or unconsciously, from which to fonn his theories. It is clear that what will arise from this 
process are prefigurations, in the literature I will examine, of certain aspects of Freudian 
theories and models of the mind. Before examining the nature of this undertaking, which is by 
no means a straightforward one, I will need to set out the parameters of what I believe is being 
prefigured in Victorian literary texts; in other words, on which 'Freudian theories and models of 
the mind' I will be concentrating, and why. 
Sigmund Freud's Writing: Moving Towards a Sphere of Focus 
A survey of the most eminent Freudian critics is an instructive lesson in how studies on 
the precursors of Freud can develop. Criticism examining Freud's sources has tended to 
produce such tomes as Frank J. Sulloway's 1979 book, Freud: Biologist of the Mind and Henri 
Ellenberger's The Discovery of the Unconscious (1970). A rather more recent work examining 
a wide range of influences on Freud, including Western religious thought, in conjunction with a 
21 George Henry Lewes, The Principles o/Success in LiteralUl'e (1865) (London: Walter Scott, n. d.), pp. 
77-78. 
n Henri Ellenberger, The Discovery 0/ the Unconscious: The History and Evo/lIlion 0/ Dynamic 
Psychiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 467. 
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close critical appraisal of the minutiae of Freud's theories, is Richard Webster's 1995 
publication, Why Freud was Wrong, also a very long book. Ellenberger's comprehensive work, 
which surveys dynamic psychiatry from the ancient world to the intellectual and therapeutic 
descendants of Freud, follows up possible 'influences' on psychoanalysis from cultural 
movements to Freud's immediate teachers. And although the latter are discussed in some detail, 
it is rather the former which Ellenberger takes pains to give a picture of, for his thesis is based 
on the idea that the figure of Freud had much less to do with the emergence of psychoanalysis 
than cultural circumstance. A much-quoted passage (the first part of which neatly captures the 
myth with which Thomas Mann so obviously identified Freud) condenses and emphasizes the 
main points of Ellenberger's argument: 
A rapid glance at the Freudian legend reveals two main features. The flrst is the theme of the solitary 
hero struggling against a host of enemies, suffering 'the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune' but 
triumphing in the end. The legend considerably exaggerates the extent and role of anti-Semitism, of the 
hostility of the academic world, and of alleged Victorian prejudices. The second feature of the Freudian 
legend is the blotting out of the greatest part of the scientiflc and cultural context in which psychoanalysis 
developed, hence the theme of the absolute originality of the achievements, in which the hero is credited 
with the achievements of his predecessors, associates, disciples, rivals, and contemporaries. 
The legend discarded, we are permitted to see the facts in a different light. Freud is shown as having an 
average career of the contemporary academic man in central Europe, a career whose beginnings were 
only slightly hampered by anti-Semitism, and with no more setbacks than many others ... Much of what 
is credited to Freud was diffuse current lore, and his role was to crystallize these ideas and give them an 
original shape. (The Discovery o/the Unconscious, pp. 547-48i3 
The section of Ellenberger's book on 'Freud's sources' (pp. 534-46), because of his interest in a 
mixture of immediate influence and cultural sweep is, in essence, an impressive and wide-
23 It is worth citing the opinion of another, rather more vehement critic of Freud at this juncture, as he 
provides an interesting extreme of what Ellenberger is saying here, and of what Sulloway writes about 
Freud's destruction of his sources, quoted a little later in this introduction. The work of Frederick Crews 
is the measure of the most radical feeling about Freud along these lines. It is also interesting as it is much 
more recent than Ellenberger's work, and so can take in what other radical critics have written. In 
Memory Wars: Freud's Legacy in Dispute, Crews enumerates the tradition from which his criticism 
springs, then provides a picture of Freud that forms a counterpart to the one Ellenberger paints: 'Since the 
1970s, a rapidly growing number of independent scholars - including among others Henri Ellenberger, 
Paul Roazen, Frank Cioffi, Frank 1. Sulloway, Peter 1. Swales, E. M. Thornton, Morton Schatzman, Han 
Isra!ls, and Phyllis Grosskurth - have been showing us a different Freud, darker but far more interesting 
than the canonical one. According to their revisionist view, our would-be Prometheus was highly 
cultivated, sophisticated, and endowed with extraordinary literary power, sardonic wit, and charm, but he 
was also quite lacking in the empirical and ethical scruples that we would hope to fmd in any responsible 
scientist, to say nothing of a major one. 
'Now we are beginning to discern a notably willful and opportunistic Freud who appears to have 
thrown together his magisterial-looking claims from various unacknowledged sources - some of them 
more folkloric than scientific - while passing them off as sober inferences from the data of his clinical 
practice. Once having arrived at those claims, we see, he adhered to them with a blind, combative 
stubbornness - though not without willingness to expand the system on an ad hoc basis to encompass 
newly perceived difficulties. And he promoted that conceptually overstuffed system by means of devious 
rhetorical maneuvers that disarmed criticism without obliging Freud himself to take the criticism into 
material account. Through all his conduct, at least from the 1890s onward, runs a note of existential 
daring and high disdain that could hardly be more remote from ordinary scientific prudence. Fiercely 
believing in his general vision yet stooping to low tricks in defense of it, this Freud is a saturnine self-
dramatizer who defies us to see through his bravado and provides us with tantalizing autobiographical 
clues for doing so' (Frederick Crews, et aI., Memory Wan: Freud's Legacy in Dispute (London: Granta 
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ranging list, including such elements as the events of Freud's own life, his masters and 
contemporaries, patients and disciples, Romantic psychiatry, the French moralists of the 
seventeenth century, Ibsen, the great writers, 'the Greek Tragedians, Shakespeare, Goethe, and 
Schiller' (p. 540), Jewish mysticism, positivism, Darwin and Marx. 'However,' Ellenberger 
writes at the end of his survey, 'the closest approach to psychoanalysis is to be found in the 
philosophers of the unconscious, Carus, von Hartmann, and particularly Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche' (p. 542). 
Ellenberger's bewildering list (and I have not enumerated all the elements in it) has 
been supplemented by other critics, who have most notably mentioned Immanuel Kant as a 
precursor of Freud.24 The field of criticism covering prefigurations of Freud is a mass of valid 
and alluring investigative possibilities, and to attempt either to follow up all of these proposed 
precursors, or indeed one or two of them in great detail and with relevance to all of Freud's 
oeuvre would simply be folly in a thesis concerning, first and foremost, Victorian literary texts. 
A largely different critical approach is required. While reserving the option of including wider 
sources which I believe form interesting connections between the nineteenth century and Freud, 
and which shed illumination on the ways that Victorian fiction prefigures his theories and 
models of the mind, my emphasis in this thesis will also take inspiration from the approaches of 
the 1960s critics Peter Amacher and Ola Andersson. These commentators, who write in the 
tradition of Maria Dorer (1932) and Siegfried Bernfeld (1944), but benefit from a certain 
amount of primary material first published in 1950 that their predecessors did not have, 25 have 
distinguished themselves and formed the foundations for a great number of later appraisals of 
Freud, by concentrating in detail on a relatively short period of his career. Andersson looks at 
Freud's works from 1886 to 1896, and Amacher examines his early neurological education. 
The results of such a methodical and specific approach can be seen in Ellenberger's account of 
the progress of critical thought regarding Freud's neurological career: 
The frrst historians of psychoanalysis divided Freud's scientific career into a prepsychoanalytic 
and a psychoanalytic period. They considered Freud as a neurologist who left his frrst vocation to found a 
new psychology. It was later recognized that a knowledge of the f~t period is necessary for a full 
understanding of the origin of psychoanalysis. An even closer examination of the facts reveals a defmite 
line of evolution throughout the prepsychoanalytic period. (p. 474i6 
Books, 1997), pp. 35-36). 
24 Ola Andersson is one of these (see Studies in the prehistory of Psychoanalysis: The etiology of 
psychoneuroses and some related themes in Sigmund Freud's scientific writings and letters, /886-/896 
(Stockholm: Scandanavian University Books, 1962), pp. 195-97. 
2S The Fliess papers, which I will discuss in detail later. 
26 Although Andersson's title starts 'Studies in the prehistory of Psychoanalysis' she makes clear that this 
sectioning between these different phases of Freud's career is essentially erased with the progress of her 
work. She writes that in the decades following 1896, the ideas that Freud had developed up until this time 
'were to become of central importance in the development of psychoanalysis. Though, indeed, they soon 
lost their significance in the specific form that they had been given ... they reappeared in new variants ... 
Although it is beyond the scope of the following investigations to inquire into these later developments, 
the study of the prehistory and farst emergence of these ideas in Freud's writings has been undertaken on 
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Ernest Jones, whose place in Freud's circle gives him a very different outlook from Ellenberger, 
and whose historical position (1953) means that he wrote before Andersson and Amacher, also 
acknowledged that a line could be traced through Freud's early work to the end of his career. 
Jones writes, 'in Freud's theory of the mind at about the tum of the century there were 
permanent elements to which he adhered all his life' (Jones, I, 365). 
Of special interest in this thesis will be evidence of Freud's developing philosophy of 
mind which had hardened into lasting theoretical mainstays by 1900: his work of the 1890s. 
This was a period in Freud's life, as we have already seen, in which he portrayed himself as 
being intellectually alone, and, leaving aside the many debates on the validity of this claim, 27 it 
is nevertheless true that at this time Freud's work was, more perhaps than at any subsequent 
time, a product of his relative solitude, unmixed with the work of any followers, and produced 
before others could inform him of his predecessors?8 The 1890s, in some ways, were a time of 
great change and development in Freud's thought (and we can learn much from his mistakes 
and false starts), yet held certain stable elements, part of whose immediate sources are relatively 
easily traced. They form, in my belief, and in the belief of many critics, a very interesting link 
between nineteenth-century theories of neurology, biology and psychophysics, and later 
Freudian theory. They contain many of the themes that I will discuss in Victorian literary texts, 
namely, those of the origin of symptoms, force and the economy of the mind, the association of 
ideas and the workings of memory. 
Peter Amacher, in concluding his study of the influence of Freud's neurological 
education on his later, more famous works, writes: 
A comprehensive account of the development of Freud's thought must consider the influence on it of his 
neurological education. When he began the psychoanalytic phase of his career, if one wishes to separate 
it from the neurological phase, he had a rather complete scheme of how the nervous system and its mental 
concomitants functioned ... It has been pointed out that this scheme shaped theories that Freud held to 
throughout his career, such as that of dreams as wish-fulfillment processes and that of infantile sources of 
excitation. It is unlikely that Freud was influenced by the ideas of his teachers in these early but crucial 
theories and not in the wider development ofpsychoanalysis.29 
Amacher builds to the conclusion that Freud's wish-fulfilment theory and that of the infantile 
sources of sexuality arise from what he learnt from his masters. He does this through looking at 
how he followed their ideas from the rather primitive theory of reflex function postulated by the 
account of their later historical influence' (Andersson, pp. 2-3). 
27 Whether he was actually alone is a constant matter of critical debate, the consensus of critics such as 
Ellenberger and Sulloway being that Freud exaggerated his solitude at this time. Ellenberger suggests 
that Freud's belief that he was alone was in fact a symptom ofa 'creative illness' which he suffered in the 
I 890s (The Discovery 0/ the Unconscious, p. 449). Sulloway argues that the concept of his own isolation 
was essential to Freud's self-belief and status, and that in fact 'Freud never stopped feeling isolated, no 
matter how famous he later became' (Sulloway, p. 478). 
21 Freud's collaboration with Breuer in the early to mid-l900s, and his rather intense friendship with 
Fliess which inspired him intellectually, are exceptions to this solitude, but importantly, they are more 
traceable, fmite, and simple than relations with his followers from the mid-l900s onward. 
29 Peter Amacher, Freud's Neurological Education and iu Influence on Psychoanalytic Theory, 
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mechanist Ernst Briicke, Freud's teacher, through the work of 'the great Meynert' on brain 
anatomy and neurology,30 to the dynamics and processes of the experience of satisfaction, which 
Meynert and Sigmund Exner 31 wrote about and which inspired these particularly 'Freudian' 
ideas on sexuality and wish fulfilment. The last connection that Amacher makes is in a sense 
the least important (although worthy of note) because the idea of the 'experience of satisfaction' 
leads to so many other 'Freudian' theories, from the mechanics of the pleasure principle to 
issues concerned with the development of intellectual thought and other characteristics of 
civilized life. The processes involved in 'the experience of satisfaction' are also dynamic 
factors in certain Victorian texts that 1 will discuss in the course of this thesis, most notably 
those of George Eliot. It is in a sense in exploring missing links, the middle ground, of this sort, 
that we most fully appreciate the possibility of the existence of a continuum between Victorian 
thought and Freudian theory. 
Certain critics believe that there are more links between nineteenth- and twentieth-
century psychological thought than those who perpetuate and have perpetuated the Freudian 
legend (including, of course, Freud himself) have allowed to become known. Frank 1. Sulloway 
describes how 'twice in his life, in 1885 and again in 1907, [Freud] completely destroyed all his 
manuscripts, private diaries, notes, and correspondence' (Sulloway, p. 7),32 partly, it seems, in 
order (as he writes to his fiancee in 1885) to foil the intentions of future biographers, and others 
who will be interested in his career - 'I couldn't have matured or died without worrying about 
who would get hold of those old papers' .33 Although Freud describes the contents of what he 
has destroyed as 'my thoughts and feelings about the world in general and about myself in 
particular' which 'have been found unworthy of further existence', his inventory itemises 
documents whose nature is more intellectual than personal 34 - 'I have destroyed all my notes of 
the past fourteen years, as well as letters, scientific excerpts, and the manuscripts of my papers' 
(Letters of Sigmund Freud, pp. 141, 140). The fact that scientific excerpts are purged is 
especially telling. Sulloway describes the result of such destruction on the Freudian legend: 
Monograph 16, Psychological Issues, IV (New York: International Universities Press, 1965),84. 
30 Freud cited in Amacher, p. 21. Theodor Meynert is described in these tenns in The Interpretation of 
Dreams (in SE, IV & V, ix-629 (p. 437). Hereafter, Interpretation). Freud worked in Meynert's clinic 
for five months in the early 1880s, after leaving Brilcke's laboratory. 
31 Exner was an assistant, senior to Freud, in BrUcke's laboratory, where Freud worked from 1876-1882. 
32 In the mid-teens of the twentieth century, Freud wrote his metapsychological papers. We have five of 
them. However, in his introduction to these papers in SE, XIV, 105-07, Strachey points out that this is 
not the complete set: 'We also learn from Dr. Jones ... that seven more papers were added to the series ... 
the whole collection of twelve being completed by August 9 [1915]. These further seven papers, 
however, were never published by Freud and it seems probable that at some later date he destroyed them, 
for no trace of them has been found and indeed their very existence was unknown or forgotten until Dr. 
Jones came to examine Freud's letters.' (pp. 105-06) These two purgings, in 1885 and 1907, seem not to 
be the only occasions on which Freud destroyed his papers. And if we consider the papers that have not 
been destroyed, there are some, according to Crews, that have been locked away, some until the twenty-
second century, by 'a jealously secretive psychoanalytic establishment, whose leaders have been ... 
fearful of open historical judgement' (Crews, et aI., p. 36). 
33 Sigmund Freud to Martha Bemays, 28 April 1885, in Letters of Sigmund Freud, pp. 140-42 (p. 141), 
cited in Sulloway, p. 7. 
34 That Freud obviously saw them as personal is interesting in itself, signifying some sort of inability to 
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A m~jor result of Freud's systematic destruction of his past was that, until relatively recently, 
psychoanalysIs appeared even to his closest followers to have sprung full-blown from his own head 'like 
Athena. from the head of Zeus' (Erikson 1957: 80) '" In actual fact, Freud extracted many conclusions 
from hIS analyses, both of himself and of his patients, that he had already become convinced of from· 
?the~, ~d now obliterated, sources of evidence. Biology, as a key source of these hypothetico-deductive 
InsprratIons, subsequently became a special target of analytic obliteration. (Sulloway, p. 8) 
Apart from the mid-twentieth-century critical interest in Freud's neurological education 
and publications (an interest that continues to inspire pUblications, one of the most recent being 
Valerie Greenberg's Freud and his Aphasia Book, which examines the text and possible sources 
of Freud's 1891 monograph, On Aphasia), the other major 'relatively recen[t]' event in 
Freudian scholarship to which Sulloway seems to refer here was the emergence of the Fliess 
papers, which were published for the first time in 1950. These, with Freud's already published 
neurological papers (which, as we have seen, tended to be dismissed as prepsychoanalytic), 
provide the best link we have between the Victorians and Freud. I will examine the Fliess 
papers, or at least what I believe is their most important element, below, in the context of a 
small introduction to Freud's neurological papers of the 1890s. 
Before I continue, however, it is worth mentioning here one symptomatic account of an event in 
Freud's life which occurred before the 1890s began, recounted in 'An Autobiographical Study', 
which may help illustrate my aim in this project. After Freud's time with Charcot (in the winter 
of 1885-86) he explored the therapeutic possibilities of hypnosis: 
With the idea of perfecting my hypnotic technique, I made a journey to Nancy in the summer of 1889 and 
spent several weeks there ... I was a spectator of Bernheim's astonishing experiments upon his hospital 
patients, and I received the profoundest impression of the possibility that there could be powerful mental 
processes which nevertheless remained hidden from the consciousness of men. ('An Autobiographical 
Study', p. 17, my emphasis) 35 
The impression is given here of a discovery made, a realization dawning, in the mind of Freud. 
An important step in his own intellectual journey, doubtless, but it is nevertheless true that the 
knowledge of hidden mental processes had been evident for some time in the work of Victorian 
physiologists and psychologists, in nineteenth-century encyclopaedias, literature and 
periodicals. It is true that Freud here does not claim originality for his profound impression, but 
originality is not really the point here, neither is it relevant whether this was indeed the first time 
Freud had an inkling that unconscious mental processes did occur. What it is sometimes 
possible to assert is that, on occasions, Freud's intellectual growth, his dawning realizations, 
provide a sort of echo of steps in thought already taken in Victorian Britain. This is especially 
the case with the development of his ideas about memory, as I shall argue in Chapter 3. This 
separate his work from his personality. 
35 Unless I claim responsibility for emphasis, it should be understood to be the author's. 
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strange echoing process illustrates, I believe, the disadvantage of Freud's destruction of 
evidence which may have shown sources and influences which reached back into the Victorian 
period. Freud's claims for the originality of his discoveries, in consequence of the gap he 
created between himself and his predecessors, became in a sense the ghosts in his work and his 
autobiography, of discoveries made earlier in the history of psychological thought, and, if we 
are to believe some critics, those made through his earlier reading and learning. In my next 
section I will consider something of what is known about the latter, in a selected survey of 
Freud's education and its possible impact on his early work. However, it is my general aim in 
this thesis to go some way towards examining the former - to chart certain elements in the 
history of Victorian psychological ideas, their manifestations in a limited range of literary texts, 
and their later reappearance in Freud's works. In this way it is my hope to be able to add to the 
existing criticism that attempts to close the breach that Freud so laboriously created. 
Freud's Work of the 1890s: Possible Sources in his Education and Early Career 
It was not only Arthur Schopenhauer who prefigured in some way the Freudian theory of 
repression, introduced around 1894 as Abwehr (defence) and which became, both as Abwehr 
and Verdrangung (repression), the keynote to the theories of the aetiology of the neuroses. 
Sulloway notes that Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) 'wrote of ideas being "repressed" 
(verdrangt) from consciousness by other opposing ideas, and conceived of mental operations in 
terms of "forces" possessing specific "quantities'" (Sulloway, p. 67). Ola Andersson's Studies 
in the prehistory of Psychoanalysis testifies to the fact that it would have been mandatory for 
Freud to study Herbartian psychology in the course of his education: 
Nowhere does Herbartianism seem to have been so well established as the dominant school of psychology 
as in Austria, where, since the middle of the century, the school system had been imbued with Herbartian 
ideas, primarily through the influence of Franz Exner. Consequently, Austrian students were most likely 
to have become acquainted with Herbartian psychology during their school days not as one of several 
schools of psychology but as a well-established semi-official psychology. This meant, moreover, that 
psychological discussion in Austria among educators, psychologists, psychiatrists, physiologists and 
neurologists was almost invariably conducted in tenns of Herbartian psychology ... During his last school 
years Freud got his first instruction in psychology according to G. A. Lindner's textbook. A study of the 
version of Herbartianism presented in that book, makes it possible to state the ideas characteristic of 
Herbartianism with which Freud had been acquainted before starting his medical studies and his scientific 
work. (Andersson, pp. 11-12) 
Andersson then goes on to examine the contents of this textbook in detail. She concludes that 
Herbart is not followed to the letter, that his 'metaphysical framework' and 'abstruse 
mathematical calculations were ... omitted. What remains of Herbartian psychology, however, 
is the basic idea of the book: the conception of psychic phenomena as manifestations of a 
"Vorstellungsmechanik", a dynamic interaction of ideas' (Andersson, p. 13). This dynamic 
model included such elements as inhibition ('''Hemmung'''), attention ('''Aufmerksamkeit'''), 
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the repression of an idea under the threshold of consciousness ('''Verdriingung oder Sinken der 
Vorstellungen unter die Schwelle des Bewusstseins"') and the ascent of ideas over the threshold 
of consciousness ("'Aufsteigen der Vorstellungen tiber die Schwelle des Bewusstseins"') 
(Andersson, p. 13). Andersson believes that this model of the psyche, instilled in Freud at such 
a young age, and continued by his university study, informed his later conception of the 
processes of the mind. In his work of the early 1890s, 'the ideas which are shut off from 
consciousness are designated as "gehemmt" or "verdrangt". In Herbartian psychology these 
two terms referred to two different ways of describing the conditions during which ideas, 
previously conscious, disappear from consciousness' (Andersson, p. 116). It was from this 
middle ground in Freud's work, it is possible to suggest, that the 1894 concept of Abwehr arose. 
Lindner's textbook added something to Herbart's psychology, however, an element 
which, according to Andersson would later be introduced into the scheme in any case by 
Herbart's descendants - the concept of the association of ideas.36 This was a doctrine which 
formed a fundamental building-block for substantial parts of Freud's work, including theories 
involving dreams, parapraxes (slips of the tongue or pen, symptomatic forgetting, and so on) the 
formation of symptoms and the processes of memory, and this list is by no means exhaustive. 
According to Andersson, by the late 1880s, to use association to explain psychical matters was 
'a very common approach' (p. 71). In my second chapter, I will demonstrate that Andersson's 
assertion, if anything, is actually an understatement, that this doctrine was a pervasive schema 
that in the nineteenth century was inseparable from the conception of the mind's processes. The 
association of ideas was explicitly used in the work produced by the Freud-Breuer collaboration 
in the early 1890s, Andersson documents, which is a further indication of its importance to the 
formation of theories of the aetiology of the neuroses. In a sense, it could be argued that 
Herbart's theory that ideas are repressed below the threshold of consciousness, and the doctrine 
of the association of ideas, combine to form something very much like Freud's theory of 
repression, in which the repression of an idea means that it becomes inaccessible to associative 
processes in the mind. Freud therefore took into the 1890s a Herbartianism mixed with 
associationism that served him well. Of his 1891 monograph on aphasia (loss of speech), 
Freud's translator, E. Stengel, proclaims that his idea of separating the aphasias into three 
groups 'was a bold attempt at establishing a consistent psychological system based on the 
theory of associations applied to speech' .37 In Chapter Two I will examine the impact of the 
framework of the association of ideas on Freud's thinking. For now, however, I will be 
concentrating on certain other ideas in On Aphasia that Freud derived from previous thinkers, 
and from which he went on to form his later theories. 
Freud's On Aphasia is an interesting text. It is an example ofa purely neurological work 
36 Andersson documents that many writings of those contemporary to Freud did not distinguish between 
the Herbartian 'Vorstellungsmechanik' and association, and Freud was no exception (p. 225). 
31 Sigmund Freud, On Aphasia. a Critical Study (1891), trans. by E. Stengel (London: Imago Publishing, 
1953), p. xi. 
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by Freud, which also looks forward to his later approach to the mind. Further, in this work 
Freud cites and shows his obvious intellectual admiration for an English neurologist, John 
Hughlings Jackson, who was a disciple of the psychological and sociological philosopher 
Herbert Spencer, friend of George Eliot and George Henry Lewes. One of Hughlings Jackson's 
ideas that found its way in a changed form into Freud's 1890s work, especially the Project/or a 
Scientific Psychology of 1895, is actually taken from Spencer's concept of 'dissolution'. Freud 
describes it thus: 
In assessing the functions of the speech apparatus under pathological conditions we are adopting 
as a guiding principle Hughlings Jackson's doctrine that all these modes of reaction represent instances of 
functional retrogression38 (dis-involution) of a highly organized apparatus, and therefore correspond to 
earlier states of its function development. This means that under all circumstances an arrangement of 
associations which, having been acquired later, belongs to a higher level of functioning, will be lost, 
while an earlier and simpler one will be preserved. From this point of view, a great number of aphasic 
phenomena can be explained. (On Aphasia, p. 87) 
Freud's translator, Stengel, proposes that Freud would have come across the idea of regression, 
probably in Meynert's writings, before he met it in the writings of Hughlings Jackson, but 
'nowhere had it been stated ... and its applications to psychopathology ... pointed out so clearly' 
as in the latter's work (On Aphasia, p. xii). Stengel, citing the work of L. Binswanger, testifies 
that Hughlings Jackson himself uses this concept to explain more than aphasic phenomena, that 
'he also adumbrated their importance for the study of "insanity'" (p. xii). Freud also went on to 
use this theory to explain much more than aphasic phenomena. Strachey documents that, in the 
early 1900s, to provide a description of the process that leads to what Freud termed perversions, 
he used the metaphor of a stream of water, meeting an obstacle, and having to run back to the 
old dry channels, to describe regression, although he did not explicitly use the word.39 
By 1914, Freud had identified three kinds of regression - temporal, formal and 
topographical. All were a form of return to an earlier state. Temporal regression in essence was 
best described by the stream metaphor and was seen as a form of defence which may lead to 
neurosis; formal regression was a return to primitive methods of expression and representation, 
helping to explain dream symbolism, perhaps nearest to the aphasic retrogression; and 
topographical regression, which, although slightly ambiguous, seems to be the idea of force 
ebbing and flowing within the psychical system, a backward flow leading to hallucination and 
dreaming (Interpretation, pp. 542, 548).40 As we shall see, the idea of a return to an earlier state 
is an important factor in the construction of symptoms in Victorian texts, especially those by 
38 The translator writes in his introduction that he has translated this word ('RQckbiidung') as 
retrogression to distinguish it from the Gennan word Regression which was not published by Freud until 
1900. In an appendix to Projectfor a Scientific Psychology (1950) (in SE, I, 281-397; hereafter, Project), 
Strachey testifies that the word was fust used, unpublished in one of the Fliess papers of May 2, 1897 
('Appendix A: Freud's use of the Concept of Regression', in SE, I, 344-46 (p. 344». However, the two 
Gennan words have the same meaning, according to Stengel (On Aphasia, p. xii n.). 
39 'Appendix A', ProjectforaScientific Psychology, p. 345. 
40 See 'Appendix A' , Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 346, for Strachey's account of this. 
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Sheridan Le Fanu. Regression, a return to 'what is older in time ... more primitive in fonn' 
(Interpretation, p. 548), is in essence a reversal of the idea of evolution, and it started in that 
way with Spencer, for he had in fact contrasted evolution with dissolution (in particular detail in 
the second edition of First Principles (1867». Ellenberger links this pairing to Freud's later 
most fundamental ideas about the processes that fonn the basis of every occurrence in the mind, 
ideas first explicitly theorized in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). He writes of Freud, 'in 
every psychological process he saw the presence of the two processes, Eros as a tendency to 
form larger units, and the death instinct Thanatos as the reverse tendency; this latter concept was 
very close to Spencer's defmition of evolution and dissolution' (The Discovery 0/ the 
Unconscious, p. 515). As we shall see in Chapter 4, the idea of Eros and the death instinct did 
not just affect Freud's ideas of the individual mind, but also infonned his ideas on civilization 
and society. 
There was another idea in Hughlings Jackson's work that would later find its way into 
Freud's theories. Andersson documents that, in one of Hughlings Jackson's papers that is 
referred to in On Aphasia there is evidence of an idea which, she writes, would later become 
'abreaction' (a reaction in the individual to a psychic impression that diminishes in him or her 
the sum of excitation that impression has caused, thereby preserving health) 41 in the scheme of 
hysteria. Hughlings Jackson writes: 'All actions are in one sense results of restorations of 
nervous equilibrium by expenditure of energy' (cited in Andersson, p. 110). Abreaction is not 
the only process this prefigures - it is also an early version of what would become the pleasure-
unpleasure principle, later simply the pleasure principle. It is unlikely that Freud was inspired 
to this theory simply by the works of Hughlings Jackson, however. For, in theories concerning 
the action and reaction of force or energy within the psychic system, Freud had a rich heritage 
of nineteenth-century central European thought to draw upon. We see something of the extent 
of this in his Project/or a Scientific Psychology of 1895. 
Freud's Project, in more than one sense at the heart of the 1890s, is a remarkable text, to which 
I cannot possibly do full justice in this introduction. Implications and ideas arising from it will 
appear throughout the thesis. In what follows, I will begin by sketching something of its 
historical background, and go on to outline its importance as a linking text between Victorian 
science and Freudian theories and models of the mind, taking into account its possible sources 
and its strong legacy. 
In Siegfried Bernfeld's paper 'Freud's Earliest Theories and the School of Helmholtz' 
(1944),42 he traces in detail Freud's early acquaintance with the mechanistic theories of this so-
41 This process is outlined in 'On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: A Lecture' (l893), 
in SE, nI, 2S-39 (p. 36). 
41 Siegfried Bemfeld, 'Freud's Earliest Theories and the School of Helmholtz', The Yearbook 0/ 
Psychoanalysis, 1 (1945), 31-47. This paper was flfSt published in The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 13 
(1944), 341-62. 
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called school,43 whose basic doctrine stated: 'No other forces than the common physical 
chemical ones are active within the organism' (Bemfeld, p. 37) and that, 'the sum of forces 
(motive forces and potential forces) remains constant in every isolated system' (p. 38). Bemfeld 
then writes: 'At seventy-four Freud said on a solemn occasion: "My life work was aimed at one 
goal only: to deduce or to guess how the psychic apparatus is constructed and what forces 
interplay and counteract in it.'" Bemfeld goes on to comment: 'He refers here to his 
psychoanalytic work. But as we now see, this statement embraces all his scientific efforts, back 
to his first research concerning certain nerve cells of a strange and rare fish.' (p. 44) What is 
interesting about this paper, which notes Freud's occasional strange outdated phrases which 
recall the mechanistic doctrine, such as 'quantity of excitation' and 'discharge', terms that 
Bernfeld writes 'appear to be relics of the neurology of 1890' (p. 31), is that it was unknowingly 
written in response to a jigsaw with a piece missing. The evidence of the goal towards which 
Freud worked is spread throughout his many papers and books, as Bemfeld notes, from the later 
to the very earliest work. But it is especially crystallized and concentrated in one text, Freud's 
Project of 1895 {whose 'invisible ghost', Strachey writes, 'haunts the whole series of Freud's 
theoretical writings to the very end'),44 a text which Bemfeld did not know existed when he 
wrote his paper. 
Freud's text is a combination of force theory (following Helmholtz's principle of the 
conservation of energy) and neurology, the creation of a system comprising three different kind 
of neurones, (~, 'V and GJ) in which the release and storage of differing quantities of excitation, 
Q {which is 'subject to the general laws of motion' (Project, p. 295)) for differing lengths of 
time (or period), go to help explain the basic processes of mind. There are two functions of the 
nervous system; a primary and a secondary. The primary function is to keep the nervous system 
free from stimulus, to discharge excitation, 'this is the principle of neuronal inertia: that 
neurones tend to divest themselves of Q' (p. 296). The secondary function is required by the 
needs that life inspires - hunger, respiration, sexuality, the 'endogenous stimuli': 
In consequence, the nervous system is obliged to abandon its original trend to inertia (that is, to bringing 
the level [of Qrj] to zero). It must put up with [maintaining] a store of Qrj sufficient to meet the demand 
for a specific action. Nevertheless, the manner in which it does this shows that the same trend persists, 
modified into an endeavour at least to keep the Qrj as low as possible and to guard against any increase of 
it - that is, to keep it constant. All the functions of the nervous system can be comprised either under the 
aspect of the primary function or of the secondary one imposed by the exigencies of life. (p. 297t5 
43 This school consisted of Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894), Carl Ludwig (1816-1895), Emil Du Bois-
Reymond (1818-1896) and Ernst BrOcke (1819-1892), in whose laboratory Freud worked for several 
years. 
" 'Editor's Introduction', Project /01' a Scientific Psychology, in SE, I, 283-93 (p. 290). 
45 Square brackets inserted by Freud's editor. Qrj is stated at the beginning of the Project as meaning 
'Quantity (of the intercellular order of magnitude)', as opposed to Q, which is 'Quantity (in general, or of 
the order of magnitude in the external world)' (Project, p. 294). However, this difference becomes 
ambiguous within the Project, which is in essence a rough draft. See the 'Editor's Introduction' (p. 289) 
on 'this enigma'. In' Appendix C' to the Project, 'The Nature of Q' (SE, I, 392-97), Strachey makes it 
clear that the Q of which he gives account is, in the strictest sense, QJj, the quantity within the system. 
Taking this lead, I will refer to what strictly should be Qrj as Q, as Freud also often refers to what he 
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Within this system, therefore, too much stimulation gives rise to pain, the discharge of 
excitement is felt as pleasure, and the raising of tension within the system by the endogenous 
stimuli, followed by its lowering through discharge, is the experience of satisfaction. The 
search for this satisfaction forms the basis of many of the processes of mind. Stimulus enters 
and is contained within the system by the three types of neurone. ~,which is completely 
permeable, is closest to the outer world, impressions entering the mind through it. 'V neurones 
are less permeable. 'The latter class', writes Freud, 'may, after each excitation, be in a different 
state from before and they thus afford a possibility of representing memory' (p. 299). 
Facilitation, a type of clearing of a pathway caused by a common store of force, or cathexis, in 
adjacent neurones, is the mechanism behind this - 'the facilitations between the 'V neurones 
constitute "memory", the representation of all the influences which 'V has experienced from the 
external world' (p. 365). Facilitation and the cathexis (the occupation by excitation) of 
connecting neurones allow easier transmission of Q or diversion of excitation within this 
system, and therein lies the possibility of an ego, part of whose role is to inhibit the strength of 
the primary processes, an essential concession to reality. Once this system was created, Freud 
was drawn into its implications for psychology far more than he intended, for, as he wrote to 
Fli~ss, 'all 1 was trying to do was to explain defense, but ... 1 had to work my way through the 
problem of quality, sleep, memory - in short, all of psychology' .46 As Sulloway argues, defence 
is the only thing Freud does not attempt to fully explain with this system; a further section was 
promised to Fliess, but never sent (Sulloway, p. 124). 
If we return to Bernfeld's article, therefore, having sketched out something of what he 
had missed, it is obvious that Freud's lifelong aim to 'deduce or to guess how the psychic 
apparatus is constructed and what forces interplay and counteract in it', was a large motivating 
factor in the creation of his model in the Project, in which apparatus and forces are described 
throughout in exactly those terms. As Freud wrote to Fliess before starting the Project, 'I am 
vexed by two intentions: to discover what form the theory of psychical functioning will take if a 
quantitative line of approach, a kind of economics of nervous force, is introduced into it, and, 
secondly, to extract from psychopathology a yield for normal psychology,.'47 What Bemfeld 
represents as Freud's later outdated phrases are not just relics from the neurology of 1890, but 
terms used in the Project to try and explain basic psychological processes such as pleasure, 
pain, satisfaction, memory, the formation of symptoms, the creation of dreams. That the Project 
was echoed in many of Freud's later works is a critically accepted fact that I will explore later, 
and Bemfeld's paper, written almost as if it was already published, is a testament to this; but 
this does not subtract from the fact that it is a remarkable condensation of Freud's early theories 
defmes at the beginning of the Project as Qrj as, simply, 'QuanJitdl' (quantity), and sometimes, according 
to Strachey. is 'inconsistent in his use of the signs' (p. 289). 
46 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 16 August 1895, in Freud-F/iess, pp. 135-36 (p. 136). 
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into one system and worthy of great interest. 
Freud's Project (named by his editors) was a text that returned to haunt him, and after 
his death reappeared without his permission. When Marie Bonaparte, student and patient, 
informed Freud that she had bought the Fliess papers, including the Project, Jones relates: 
He was indignant about the story of the sale and characteristically gave his advice in the fonn of a Jewish 
anecdote. It was the one about how to cook a peacock. 'You first bury it in the earth for a week and then 
dig it up again.' 'And then?' 'Then you throw it away!' ... She read to him a few of the letters to 
demonstrate their scientific value, but he insisted that they should be destroyed. (Jones I, 289) 
We may recall here Sulloway's account of Freud's purging behaviour, in order to try and hide 
his biological past. There is no doubt that in some ways the Project is a very sensitive 
document, and there is little wonder Freud wanted it destroyed, for its biological theme is only 
one reason why he may have wanted it to remain hidden. 
Written at great speed, partly on a train journey back from a meeting with his then 
intimate friend Wilhelm Fliess, essentially as a first draft for his perusal, this text was certainly 
unready for publication. Because of this it displays more than Freud perhaps would have 
wanted, in terms of its urgent language - in other words, it displays too much of Freud's hidden 
agenda which re-writing would have covered over. We have come across Freud's words, in a 
letter to Fliess, to the effect that reading would deprive him of the satisfaction of discovery. The 
need for this satisfaction seems very real for Freud at this time. For in the Project his language 
tells of a strong desire to make the system work. He uses such phrases as 'the necessity of 
finding a place for memory calls for something further from the theory of contact-barriers' 
(Project, p. 301), and 'what would be most satisfactory, of course, would be if the mechanism 
we are in search of should arise out of the primitive biological part ... if so, we should have a 
single answer to both questions' (p. 302). These suggest a strong wish that the processes of 
psychology will fit into his model, rather than that they should be examined and a model created 
from that investigation. Richard Webster writes that questions should be asked about 'to what 
extent Freud's compulsive need for fame may have engendered his psychological theories, 
rather than, as is normally assumed, his theories generating his fame by their own profundity 
and intellectual acuity' (Webster, p. 34). The Project would only seem to intensify these 
questions, but, valuably, it also affords a small glimpse into the engendering process, in 
particular, Freud's method of venturing on assumptions based on what is the most 'satisfactory' 
and all-encompassing answer. 
Freud's introduction of the concepts of Eros and Thanatos into Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, was originally heralded in the following terms: 'What follows is speculation, often 
far-fetched speculation, which the reader will consider or dismiss according to his individual 
predilection. It is further an attempt to follow out an idea consistently, out of curiosity to see 
where it will lead.' (Beyond, p. 24) In his editor's introduction to Beyond the Pleasure 
47 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 2S May 189S, cited in 'Editor's Introduction', Project, p. 283. 
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Principle, Strachey comments that 'what is particularly remarkable is the closeness with which 
some of the earlier sections of the present work follow the "Project for a Scientific 
Psychology",48. He cannot have been referring to the speculative streak that runs through both, 
but this is also a striking similarity. Like his earlier model, built on assumptions and curiosity 
about how far it would run (describing it in a letter to Fliess, in the Autumn of 1895, Freud said 
his model in the Project 'really was a machine that shortly would function on its own'),49 
having tentatively introduced this new concept of mind, Freud soon used it as the basis for his 
later work, finding he could not see the workings of the psyche without them. Having 
hypothesized, however, Freud sometimes discovered he had started a process that then came to 
be beyond his control. Speculative ideas, based on the construction of feasible models whose 
parts 'seemed to fall into place, [whose] cogs meshed' (Freud-Fliess, p. 146), became law, with 
their own implications. Bernfeld, who held some of the minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic 
Society, testified to this trait in his work: 
In 1923, heckled about some contradictions in his early papers by a young member of the 
Psychoanalytic Society in Vienna, Freud said: 'This problem exists only because thirty years ago I wrote 
quite candidly, not foreseeing that at some future time every detail would be accepted and made 
sacrosanct to the last letter.' ... Faced with the wealth of new facts which the cathartic studies daily were 
producing, Freud introduced a number of new concepts: repression, defense, abreaction. They were well 
suited to organize the new material and to integrate it into the naIve and scientific knowledge previously 
achieved. They have withstood the test of many years and varied research and have proved to be 
adjustable to new facts, applications, and development. But to Freud they were only descriptive terms. 
They did not explain the facts but were themselves in need of an explanation ... Psychoanalytic theories 
so-called, as distinct from psychoanalytic discoveries and inventions, are the sum of these various 
freudian efforts at scientific explanation. (Bemfeld, p. 45) 
Apart from Freud's reluctance to give the Project over to a psychoanalytic movement which 
would take it out of his hands, and examine his early ideas, and the processes of their 
conception, with a magnifying glass, he must also have been mindful of the fact that his draft 
was written under the influence of a book by his colleague Sigmund Exner, published the year 
before, with which Freud's work showed similarities. 
Frank Sulloway helpfully enumerates the similarities between Freud's Project and 
Exner's work Entwurf zu einer physiologischen Erkliirung der psychischen Erscheinungen 
('Sketch ofa Physiological Explanation of Psychical Phenomena', 1894): 
Exner's model started from the notion of intracerebral excitation. Such excitation, he had argued, 
undergoes continual 'summations' of energy within each neurone, and the energized neurones are 
discharged only after attaining critical firing 'thresholds.' At a more general level still, this neuronal 
model of mind was regulated by the physiological dictates of the pleasure-unpleasure principle. Exner's 
intracerebral excitation possessed the further capacity for what he called Ausfahren von Bohnen (a 
facilitation of the pattern of energy flow based upon the previous passage of energy through a given 
neuronal pathway). This last concept, crucial to Exner's whole scheme, was later adopted by Freud in the 
Project under the term Bahnung ('f~ilitation'). Freud's concept of 'cathexis' (BaeIZIUIg), the occupying 
of a neurone by a quantity of energy, was in tum influenced by Exner's general model. (p. 116) 
48 'Editor's Introduction t, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in SE, XVnl, pp. 3-6 (p. 6). 
49 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 20 October 1895, in Frnd-Flieu, pp. 146-47 (p. 146). 
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A quick survey of the tenns and concepts in this passage tells of the heritage from which 
Exner's published work and Freud's unpublished one had emerged. The idea of summation was 
a feature in Briicke's work. Amacher quotes Freud as having written in 1927 that Briicke 
'carried more weight with me than anyone else in my whole life' (Amacher, p. 9). Amacher 
links the theories of the three thinkers, Briicke, the 1894 theory of Exner (his assistant) and the 
1895 theory of Freud (who had also worked for Briicke for a time), in his account of their use of 
the concept of summation. He cites a passage in an 1876 work by Briicke, in which he 
demonstrates the doctrine of the 'summation of stimuli' by describing the way in which food, 
stuck in the oesophagus, creates stimulus after stimulus. These stimuli, after a time, are 
'summed', and then swallowing, a reflex movement, can be perfonned (Amacher, p. 15). 
Briicke, steeped in the economics of force theory, draws on his mechanistic heritage, in the end 
producing what Amacher claims is 'a variation of the reflex concept which had been part of 
neurology for two centuries' (p. 15). The mechanistic heritage, shared by Helmholtz and others, 
did not pass Victorian England by; in fact Edwin Boring writes of Helmholtz that 'in 1854 he 
paid his first of many visits to England. His contact with English thought was much closer than 
was usual in Gennany, and in certain limited respects Helmholtz belongs more in the British 
than in the Gennan tradition' .50 Wilkie Collins, giving examples of the extra reading he had 
undertaken in order to complete Heart and Science: A Story of the Present Time (1883),51 
mentioned Helmholtz in his introduction to the novel. Helmholtz's doctrine of the conservation 
of energy, which, in his own words, dictated that: 'the quantity of force which can be brought 
into action in the whole of Nature is unchangeable, and can neither be increased nor 
diminished ,52 found echoes in the writings of many Victorians. In the works of each writer I 
will consider in this thesis there are manifestations of this all-pervasive law. 
Freud's Project and his later Beyond the Pleasure Principle are, as Freud points out in 
both, also indebted to Gustav Fechner (1801-87), a psychophysicist who coined his own 
Lustprinzip and principle of constancy. Exner's use of the pleasure-unpleasure principle was 
undoubtedly inspired by Fechner also, a figure considerably admired among neurologists and 
psychologists at this time.53 The aim underlying all mental processes in Freud's 1895 model, 
'to keep the Qtj as low as possible and to guard against any increase of it - that is, to keep it 
so Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd edn (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1957), p. 300. 
51 Wilkie Collins, Heart and Science: A Story of the Present Time (1883) (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1994). 
Collins writes, 'When "Mrs Galilee" wonders whether "Cannina has ever heard of the Diathermancy of 
Ebonite", she is thinking of proceedings at a conversazione in honour of Professor Helmholtz (reported in 
the "Times" of April 12, 1881), at which "radiant energy" was indeed converted into "sonorous 
vibrations'" (p.4). 
52 H. Helmholtz, 'On the Conservation of Force' (1862), in Popular Lectures on ScientifIC Subjects, First 
Series, trans. by E. Atkinson (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1884), pp. 277-317 (p. 280). 
53 Sulloway documents that 'Josef Breuer ... greatly admired Fechner, who, along with Goethe, was one 
of his two favourite authors (Jones 1953: 223). Fechner likewise exerted considerable influence upon 
Freud's teacher Theodor Meynert (Dorer 1932: 158-59)' (Sulloway, p. 67). 
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constant' (Project, p. 297), is his version of Fechner's principle of constancy. The pleasure 
principle became simply an extension of this. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud quotes 
Fechner in detail. Freud's comments and the passage from Fechner are worth quoting in full, as 
they offer an interesting insight into the nature of the legacy of the Project, at this time still 
buried, and, as Freud obviously believed, never to re-emerge: 
We cannot, however, remain indifferent to the discovery that an investigator of such penetration 
as G. T. Fechner held a view on the subject of pleasure and unpleasure which coincides in all essentials 
with the one that has been forced upon us by psycho-analytic work. Fechner's statement is to be found 
contained in a small work, Einige Ideen zur Sch6pfungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen, 
1873 (part XI, Supplement, 94), and reads as follows: 'In so far as conscious impulses always have some 
relation to pleasure or unpleasure, pleasure and unpleasure too can be regarded as having a psycho-
physical relation to conditions of stability and instability. This provides a basis for a hypothesis into 
which I propose to enter in greater detail elsewhere. According to this hypothesis, every psycho-physical 
motion rising above the threshold of consciousness is attended by pleasure in proportion as, beyond a 
certain limit, it approximates to complete stability, and is attended by unpleasure in proportion as, beyond 
a certain limit, it deviates from complete stability' . (Beyond, p. 8) 
Then follows one of the most famous passages in Freud's 1920 work, the definition of the 
pleasure principle, and its relationship with the principle of constancy: 
The facts which have caused us to believe in the dominance of the pleasure principle in mental 
life also fmd expression in the hypothesis that the mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of 
excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant. This latter hypothesis is only 
another way of stating the pleasure principle; for if the work of the mental apparatus is directed towards 
keeping the quantity of excitation low, then anything that is calculated to increase that quantity is bound 
to be felt as adverse to the functioning of the apparatus, that is as unpleasurable. The pleasure principle 
follows from the principle of constancy: actually the latter principle was inferred from the facts which 
forced us to adopt the pleasure principle. (p. 9) 
After the initial quotation, therefore, Fechner is squeezed out of the picture. The impression is 
given that Freud's psychoanalytic discoveries forced him to adopt both principles, and that 'the 
discovery that an investigator of such penetration as G. T. Fechner' (my emphasis) had written 
about the same principle, only adds supp0!1 to his own pioneering work. However, as 
Ellenberger writes, 'the theories contained in Beyond the Pleasure Principle were not all as new 
as they appeared to some of Freud's followers. Freud was returning ... to Fechner, who had 
inspired his former speculative works' (The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 514). Twenty-
five years before, in a text that referred to 'Fechner's law' (a different law, according to 
Strachey (Project, p. 315 n.), with no reference made to any particular text), Freud would write: 
Since we have certain knowledge of a trend in psychical life towards avoiding amp/easure, we are 
tempted to identify that trend with the primary trend towards inertia. In that case unp/easure would have 
to be regarded as coinciding with a raising of the level of QrJ ... Pleasure would be the sensation of 
discharge. (Project, p. 312) 
Here the pleasure-unpleasure principle undoubtedly arises from a tendency towards stability of 
levels of excitation within the psychical system. This, although perhaps less sophisticat~ is 
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the same principle that Freud would later claim he was forced to adopt from his own researches, 
written here in a purely hypothetical, speculative text, which took immediate inspiration from a 
contemporary whose book contained the same principle. Added to this, Freud was already 
acquainted with the works of Fechner (if not through his studies, then certainly through Breuer; 
their joint work Studies on Hysteria was published in the same year as he wrote the Project). I 
have already noted the fact that Hughlings Jackson wrote on the psychic need for equilibrium. 
Further, as I shall discuss in my ftrst chapter, this need for stability had been a traditional 
characteristic of spiritual and natural systems, and Fechner, a mystical philosopher as well as a 
scientist, originated his law of stability ftrmly in keeping with the rules he believed pertained to 
these systems. Difficult to avoid, in their permeation of Judaeo-Christian Western culture, the 
laws governing spiritual systems informed an understanding of a need for equilibrium within the 
systems reflected in the ftction of writers such as Sheridan Le Fanu, as well as in the Project 
and later works of Freud. 
Freud's Project, as I have discussed, is the invisible ancestor of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. It is also a ghost-like presence in many other of his later works. This is 
understandable, given the Project's long list of themes (Jones enumerates twenty-three, twenty 
of which, including such elements as 'Unconscious and Preconscious', 'Urge towards Wish-
Fulftllment', 'Traumas and pain as excessive stimuli' were, he writes, 'developed further in 
Freud's later writings, often thirty years later' (Jones, I, 392». But, as a text that is more 
transparent with regard to its immediate sources and its neurological and psychophysical 
heritage, its later appearance is a little embarrassing for Freud, as in essence it links his latest 
work to nineteenth-century science. And the Project's legacy does extend to his latest work. In 
the notes to the text, Strachey helpfully provides a list of the works that can be seen to follow 
the Project (pp. 290-191 n.). In a thesis considering the preftguration of Freudian theories and 
models of the mind in Victorian literature, this list is especially important, as it suggests which 
works contain a model of the mind comparable with Freud's Project, and in addition which 
texts are linked through the Project to nineteenth-century thinking. In addition, then, to 
concentrating on the 1890s as in some sense a link to the Victorians, in this thesis I will also 
take account of some of those texts that Strachey links to the Project, in order to begin to sketch 
an idea of how far these nineteenth-century ideas may have found resonance in Freud's latest 
works. These will be Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), The Unconscious 
(1915), Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), The Ego and the Id (1923), and An Outline of 
Psycho-Analysis (1940; written in 1938). 
I will also concentrate on texts in which the themes I have discussed in this Introduction 
as rooted in the nineteenth century are developed in certain directions. I have considered Eros 
and the death instinct in Beyond the Pleasure Principle; this dual view of the processes that 
worked in nature went on to inform Freud's later work, particularly his consideration of social 
issues, in writings such as Civilization and its Discontents (1930). Similarly, the idea of 
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regression, goes on to underpin Freud's idea of the primitive within man, a concept explored in 
The Interpretation of Dreams which considers dreaming as a regression into 'the earliest and 
most obscure periods of the beginnings of the human race' (Interpretation, p. 549). This 
possibility of regression into a primitive state provides Freud with a way of explaining group 
behaviour in texts such as Totem and Taboo (1913), The Future of an Illusion (1927) and 
Civilization and its Discontents. In my last chapter I will examine the impact on Freud's social 
theories of these major ideas, common also to the Victorians (although bearing different names). 
Prefigurations of Freud in Victorian Literature 
In the introduction to their recent anthology of Victorian psychological writings, Embodied 
Selves: An Anthology of Psychological Texts 1830-1890, Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally 
Shuttleworth provide a description of the texts that follow, in relation to Freudian theory, stating 
that 'although they did not directly prefigure Freud's work their writing was an important part 
of the intellectual context within which psychoanalytic theory arose' .54 Although I will be 
attempting to, in a sense, describe a more definite relationship between the Victorians and 
Freud, I hope I have managed so far in this Introduction to confrrm my agreement with this 
sentence. Ten years earlier, Bourne Taylor, in a discussion on the nature of nineteenth-century 
discourses on unconscious mental processes in Collins's The Moonstone, writes that they 'do 
not straightforwardly prefigure later Freudian or Jungian psychoanalytic models, though they 
might contribute to their formation' .55 I also believe this to be the case. My thesis is not about 
straightforward prefigurations in Victorian literature of Freudian theories and models of the 
mind; if these existed the already popular arena of scholarship about Victorian psychology 
would be awash with publications tracing them. 
'Prefiguration', the 'representation beforehand by a figure or a type' (OED, XII, 347), is 
rather a problematic term, apt in many ways to describe what my project intends to identify in 
the work of certain Victorian writers, but also limited and in need of clarification. It is difficult 
to find a term that captures an anticipation, yet communicates a partial, unabsolute quality. 
Prefiguration, which suggests the idea of shadowy models, figures or types that will be realized 
and made substantial in the future, is adequate for this purpose. However, this definition, in a 
sense, also belies the findings of this thesis, setting Freud up as it does as a watershed or a 
standard by which all previous ideas are measured. Freud himself encouraged this state of 
things; we have seen the way in which works whose ideas he echoes in his own theories are 
then claimed as supporting texts for psychoanalysis. This is the way that the situation is 
commonly perceived, therefore, and as such is the most accessible point, though rather 
54 Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth, eds., Embodied Selves: An Anthology of Psychological 
Texts, 18JO-1890(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 67. 
55 Jenny Bourne Taylor, In the Secret Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins, sensation narrative, and 
nineteenth-cenJrUy psychology (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 176. 
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unsatisfactory, from which to start. Beginning in this position, it is inevitable that my own view 
will take on something of the idea of Freud as an end-point. That nineteenth-century scientific 
theories, and the fiction that they informed, are complete and valid in themselves, can often be 
seen in the fact that they are not only echoed in Freud's work, but, in certain cases, represent an 
advance on Freud's ideas. My thesis, therefore, will contain deliberately placed pockets of 
discussion on such advances. Chapter 3 is an example of this; I will suggest that Victorian ideas 
on the reliability of memory, which rendered Wilkie Collins's The Moonstone rather ambiguous 
in its key issues of testimony and the reproduction of past scenes, provide a commentary on 
Freud's abandoned seduction theory, which foundered on the realization that memory of past 
events is not an absolute faculty. These Victorian ideas also offer an explanation of Freud's 
own unreliable remembrance of this rather shameful incident in his career. In this way, the 
Victorians would seem to provide a commentary on Freud's own methodologies and behaviour, 
decades before time. This sort of insight, providing as it does a counterattack to the 
presumption that Freud was a watershed, cannot be separated from my consideration of 
prefigurations of Freudian theories and models of the mind, as it serves as an antidote to the 
problems inherent in the term 'prefiguration'. In tracing the extent to which Freud echoed the 
writings of his predecessors, yet, especially in his early career, was consumed by the wish that 
he should be original, commentary on behaviour arising from such an awkward juxtaposition is 
helpful. It is all the better if it is made by the very people that Freudian mythology attempted to 
separate from Freud himself: his ancestors. 
Owing to the less than straightforward nature of the prefigurations I will be discussing, I 
hope I have made it clear that it is not the most 'Freudian' aspects of psychoanalysis that I will 
be tracing back into Victorian psychology. I do not claim to have found strong precursors of 
dream theory, the Oedipus complex, all the mechanisms and vagaries of repression, and I 
certainly have not found any strong parallel in Victorian England with the therapeutic 
techniques of psychoanalysis. I have found no real evidence to suggest that the Victorians, like 
Freud, believed that all psychical illness sprang from sexual life. These Freudian theories are 
the development of a number of logical lines. My contention, however, is that these lines, at an 
earlier stage, also passed through the Victorian period. It is possible, therefore, to see certain 
elements (theories of the aetiology of symptoms, force in closed systems, the association of 
ideas, the processes of memory, the dynamics and influences which shape society) that Freud, 
unknowingly or otherwise, inherited from his forefathers, and went on to shape in his own 
fashion. In certain of his texts, especially those of the 1890s, we can see intermediate stages in 
this process; in the papers that form the descendants of his Project of 1895 we can see 
something of the progress of the line which has passed through the nineteenth century as it 
reaches its logical conclusion (within the frame of psychoanalysis) in Freud's late work. As 
Taylor indicates in her mention of Jung, Freud's thinking was only one strand that reached back 
into Victorian thought, his conclusions were by no means a final result; the realm of psychology 
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has progressed since, but it is beyond the realm of this thesis (although a tempting prospect) to 
examine the outcome of other lines. And, of course, the Victorians provided their own 
conclusions, their own outcomes, and by no means agreed with each other. There will be 
occasions in this thesis when, starting out with similar raw materials, it is obvious that different 
conclusions are drawn by certain Victorian thinkers, and by Freud. This is especially the case 
when I come to examine ideas that each held about the progress of society. What is important, 
however, is to identify the middle ground, the link, from which the Victorians and 
psychoanalysis then diverged. 
In my survey of key theories and models in Freud's work that find their roots in nineteenth-
century thought, I have already indicated something of how the individual authors that I will 
consider in this thesis incorporate certain ideational threads into their fiction, threads that would 
later be taken up by psychoanalysis. For the rest of this Introduction I will try to convey more 
clearly why it is that I have chosen to concentrate on the works of Sheridan Le Fanu, Wilkie 
Collins and George Eliot, as sites for the expression of concepts and models that would be 
assimilated into Freudian theory. 
One reason I have chosen to focus this investigation on Le Fanu, Collins and Eliot is 
because their joint operation within this thesis will, I feel, provide an idea of how Freud could 
be prefigured by writers over a wide span of years, with differing interests, who displayed 
varied levels of engagement with the psychological theories of their day. The fictional texts that 
this thesis will consider were published from the late 1830s (in the case of Le Fanu) to the 
1880s (in the case of Collins), and therefore convey an idea of how thought about the mind, and 
the possibility of unconscious mental processes, progressed in this time. The longevity of the 
careers of each of these writers, which all lasted in excess of twenty years (in the case of Collins 
and Le Fanu, in excess of thirty) means the consideration of their work provides an overall 
picture, not only of the development of psychological thought (with which they all engaged in 
differing degrees), but of the spread and popularization within Victorian culture of ideas that 
Freud would later use in his work. 
Inevitably in a study which attempts to assess something of the engagement of writers 
with their intellectual environment, I will, where possible, consider what is known of their 
reading habits, as I have done, and will continue to do, with Freud. This is essential, in order to 
establish the common ground between the Victorians and Freud. Of the writers I have chosen, 
however, there are varied amounts of knowledge about what they read, and when. Although 
Collins and Eliot, who I will consider in Chapters Two, Three and Four, demonstrably show a 
lively interest in psychological theories that were contemporary to them, there is meagre 
evidence of such enthusiasm in the biography of Sheridan Le Fanu, about whose life, and whose 
reading habits, relatively little is known. My consideration of Le Fanu, therefore, in Chapter 
One, rather than emphasizing specific psychological theories, traceable to his reading, discusses 
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his inheritance of certain spiritual, scientific and literary traditions of Western thought, an 
inheritance which, I shall argue, he shared with Freud. Of the three writers I will consider, Le 
Fanu conforms most closely to Freud's picture of the artist who seems to produce 
psychologically accurate pictures (as psychoanalysis would later have seen them) from a 
'simple-minded joy in creating'. lust as lensen's creativity could be said to be informed by his 
medical studies, however, Le Fanu's prefiguration of certain aspects of psychoanalysis, as I will 
try to show, is less because of intuition than the fact that he and Freud shared this broad 
common ground. 
In common with Collins, Le Fanu takes an interest in symptoms. Chapters One and 
Two will consider the production of these as a result of an inability to remain within, or master, 
certain systems on which psychoanalytic theory was later built. Here, the prefiguration of 
Freudian models of the mind is particularly evident, as I consider Le Fanu's portrayal of the 
need for equilibrium within the personal, the natural and the universal system, and Collins's 
exploration of the advantages and especially the disadvantages to the individual, of the model of 
the association of ideas. Collins's manipulation and interrogation of this aspect of psychology 
that others, such as Freud, unquestioningly accepted and used as foundation for theory, also 
extends to memory, especially with regard to testimony. His understanding of the implications 
of the fallibility of memory speaks, I believe, for Collins's interest in contemporary 
psychological debate, which was, around the time The Moonstone was written, concerned with 
this issue. I will examine this debate, and its possible impact on Collins's 1868 novel, in 
Chapter 3. 
My final chapter, on George Eliot, will consider the works of a writer who not only 
maintained a constant engagement with current scientific, psychological and social theories but, 
it could be argued, helped to contribute to such ideas. Her relationship with the philosopher and 
psychologist George Henry Lewes was an intellectual partnership which could not help but 
variously inform her fiction. I shall also emphasize the influence on her work of Eliot's 
relationship with Herbert Spencer, whose ideas on the direction of motion of the early 1860s 
and whose rich and complex vision of evolution and dissolution of 1867 impacted on 
characterization and social vision within her novels. On the death of Lewes, Eliot edited, and in 
places rewrote, the last series of his Problems of Life and Mind (1874-79). That she felt able to 
do so speaks for her embedded knowledge and understanding of the latest psychological and 
social theories; more importantly for my purposes in this Introduction, however, it 
fundamentally belies the idea of the artist who prefigures psychoanalysis through simple 
intuition. To take just one example, Eliot employed the concept of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics in Daniel Deronda (1876), an idea which was being widely debated around this 
time, and would be prominent in the last series of Lewes's Problems, which she edited. This 
idea later formed a foundation for Freud's theories of society and his conception of the id. 
Although Eliot used this theory creatively, a writer who self-confessedly sought 'to make 
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certain ideas thoroughly incarnate' in her fiction 56 was here clearly guided more by her 
conscious engagement with the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics than by the 
intuitive recognition of eternal truths, that psychoanalysis would prefer to assign to those 
authors who prefigured its 'findings'. 
Of the three writers I will consider in this thesis, Eliot seems to be the only one who 
read and spoke German. Lewes often cited German scientific discoveries in his work, and their 
library contained many German works of literature and science. This fact raises issues about 
whether being a German speaker would put Eliot's mindset closer to other contemporary and 
later German speakers, including Freud himself; further, whether a project charting specifically 
English and Irish prefigurations of a German speaker is a feasible one. Here is an occasion on 
which I become aware that what I am dealing with is not a straightforward prefiguration of 
Freudian theory in Victorian thought. Part of what distorts it is the effect of translation 
(Strachey rightly compares this process to a blurred reflectioni7 and the fact that I have, in 
general, read Freud in English cannot help. If all the writers I was studying read German, and if 
Freud did not read English, and had not been consulted in the translation of his work by 
Strachey (although this does not render Strachey's translation definitive, as I shall discuss in my 
first chapter), then it would certainly be my task to read Freud, and any German speakers that 
may have informed the writers I consider, in the original. However, in my defence it is worth 
pointing out that in this project the ideas that I trace from the Victorians to Freud are relatively 
broad ones, which, rather than staying within the confines of any particular borders, spread 
across European psychological thought. Freud never limited himself to German-speaking 
countries, as we can see from his early visit to Charcot in Paris, by which he was most inspired. 
He read the works of Dickens and Eliot (See Jones, I, 174), and was impressed, as I have 
discussed, by such English thinkers as Hughlings Jackson. The question of whether Eliot's 
mindset is placed nearer Freud's by her German reading can be countered by the question of 
whether Freud's mindset is placed nearer those of the Victorian writers I will consider by his 
knowledge of English. Finally, on the issue of whether it is feasible to consider these Victorian 
fiction writers as anticipators of psychoanalysis, it is important to point out here that each of 
them have been subjected to psychoanalytic criticism at one time or another.58 My intention in 
this thesis is to consider why they attract such interpretations, to suggest that this may not be 
because Freud's theories are universally applicable to literature, as a product of the infinitely 
psychoanalysible human mind, but that literature, as a product of an intellectual and cultural 
context which formed the acknowledged or unacknowledged ancestry of psychoanalysis, may 
.56 George Eliot to Frederic Harrison, IS August [1866], in The George Eliot Letters, ed. by Gordon S. 
Haight, 9 vols (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19S4-78), IV, 300-02 (p. 300) . 
.57 See his dedication to the Standard Edition (SE, I, v) . 
.5. I will discuss Freudian interpretations of Collins and Eliot in Chapters Three and Four. For a 
discussion of Freudian interpretations of Le Fanu's 'Green Tea' (1869), see Jack Sullivan, Elegant 
Nightmares: Tite English Ghost Story From Le Fanu to Blackwood (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980). 
pp. 17-18. 
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indicate where the roots of Freud's theories lie. 
Before I begin Chapter One, it would perhaps be of interest to ask a rather mischievous 
question, inspired by an account that Freud gives of a turning-point in his own life. In' An 
Autobiographical Study' he recounts how 'it was hearing Goethe's beautiful essay on Nature 
read out aloud at a popular lecture ... just before I left school that decided me to become a 
medical student' ('An Autobiographical Study', p. 8). An editor's note records how' according 
to Pestalozzi (1956) the real author of the essay (written in 1780) was G. C. Tobler. a Swiss 
writer. Goethe came across it half a century later, and, by a paramnesia, included it among his 
own works' (p. 8 n.). In his turn, what ideas and concepts originating with other writers, 
perhaps from different countries, may Freud have included, however inadvertently, under the 
umbrella of his own name? 
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Chapter 1 
Tormenting Secrets: Symptoms as Problems of Economy 
in the Fiction of Sheridan Le Fanu l 
What would you say, by the way, if I told you that the whole of my brand-new primal 
history of hysteria was already well-known and had been published a hundred times over _ 
several centuries ago? Do you remember how I always said that the mediaeval theory of 
possession, held by the ecclesiastical courts, was identical with our theory of a foreign body 
and a splitting of consciousness? ... Some time soon I must delve into the literature of the 
subject. (Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 17 January 1897i 
The Soul, 'die Seele' and the Psyche 
There are few, including Freud's most loyal supporters, who would claim that Freud discovered 
unconscious mental processes.3 Some, however, assert that he was the first to discern a 
structure according to which they operated. Malcolm Bowie writes of Jacques Lacan, 'for 
Lacan, as for many writers, Freud's essential insight was not - clearly not - that the 
unconscious exists, but that it has structure, that this structure affects in innumerable ways what 
humans say and do'.4 In this thesis I shall endeavour to demonstrate that what Bowie describes 
as Freud's essential insight was in fact implicitly understood by the writers I will consider, 
I In Studies on Hysteria (1895), Breuer and Freud write of the release ofa memory's 'affect' (its force, in 
essence its symptom-causing potential), through the subject's proportionate reaction to it; that in some 
cases, 'speaking is itself the adequate reflex, when, for instance, it is a lamentation or giving utterance to 
a tormenting secret, e. g. a confession' (Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, Studies on Hysteria, The 
Standard Edition o/the Complete Works o/Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by James Strachey and others, 
24 vols (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953-74), II, 8, emphasis mine). 
The Standard Edition 0/ the Complete Psychological Works will hereafter be referenced as SE. 
2 Letter 56, Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 17 January 1897, in SE, I, 242. 
3 See 'Editor's Introduction' to 'The Unconscious', in SE, XIV, 161-65. Strachey acknowledges the 
influence on Freud of Herbartian psychology, and writes that 'a recognition of the existence of 
unconscious mental processes played an essential part in Herbart's system' (p. 162). 
4 Malcolm Bowie, Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), p. 102. Bowie concludes the sentence, 'and that in thus betraying itself it becomes accessible to 
analysis'. This last element in Freud's tripartite 'insight' carries equal weight, I believe, with the other 
two; Bowie then expands on this point, writing that the unconscious is 'endlessly voluble and self-
revealing: in our dreams, forgettings, misrememberings, slips of tongue or pen, jokes, symptoms, verbal 
and physical mannerisms, it insists on being heard. The psychical energy by which repression takes 
place, and is maintained, is met and challenged by another energy which seeks ... to propel the repressed 
contents of the unconscious into the preconscious-conscious domain. The unending dialectic that this 
conflict produces exercises a special fascination upon Lacan' (p. 102). This explanation adds to my 
feeling that by 'analysis' Lacan does not exclusively mean psychoanalytic techniques, that I am justified 
in using Bowie's statement in a more concise form, and in doing so do not omit any essential proviso. 
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many years before psychoanalysis began. 5 In the work of each the possibility that there exists a 
structure of an unnamed latent source, or resource, is discernible through the manifestations of 
what the mid-Victorians called 'unconscious cerebration', or 'unconscious mental processes',6 
that arise from it. 
5 Though also believing that Freud's predecessors had conceived of unconscious mental processes 
Strachey describes how, in his view, Freud's work went beyond their theories: 'What he did ... was ... t~ 
clothe the metaphysical entity in flesh and blood. He showed for the first time what the unconscious was 
like, how it worked, how it differed from other parts of the mind, and what were its reciprocal relations 
with them' (,Editor's Introduction' to 'The Unconscious', p. 164). My argument is that the Victorians 
had begun to inch their way towards this sort of conception of unconscious mental processes; that they 
had begun to clothe the metaphysical entity, to discern how parts of it worked and interacted with other 
parts of the mind, many years before Freud. 
6 A thesis by itself could be written on the prefiguration of Freud's concept of the unconscious. I will try 
to avoid too much comment on this area alone, partly because of the amount of criticism already written 
on the subject, by commentators such as Henri Ellenberger and before him, Lancelot Law Whyte, who in 
The Unconscious Before Freud (New York: Basic Books, 1960) asserts, 'the available surveys suggest 
that Unbewusstsein and bewusstlos (in meanings close to those now current) were first used by E. Platner 
in 1776, and these or similar terms were made popular by Goethe, Schiller, and Schelling between 1780 
and 1820. The word "unconscious" as an adjective (with the same meaning) appears in English in 1751, 
and more frequently after 1800, for example, in the writings of Wordsworth and Coleridge. By 1850 both 
adjective and noun were extensively used in Germany, and were moderately common in England' 
(Whyte, p. 66). This should suggest how the word was used in England in the Victorian period; I have 
only come across 'unconscious' as an adjective in all the texts I have read, and have no interest in 
asserting that the Victorians used the term as a noun. Freud himself used 'unconscious' as a noun (das 
Unbewusste) but also as an adjective (unbewusst); in 1933, towards the end of his career, he wrote: 'The 
oldest and best meaning of the word "unconscious" is the descriptive one; we call a psychical process 
unconscious whose existence we are obliged to assume - for some such reason as that we infer it from its 
effects -, but of which we know nothing.' ('Lecture XXXI: The Dissection of the Psychical Personality', 
in SE, XXII, 57-80 (p. 70» Jenny Bourne Taylor makes a valid point that the Victorians' idea of the 
unconscious is nearer what Freud called the 'preconscious' . Writing that her use of the term 
'unconscious' 'should not be confused with the later development of the concept by Freud', she 
continues: 'Although there are some correspondences between some aspects of the earlier theories and 
psychoanalytic development, the mid-nineteenth-century "unconscious", if anything, comes nearer to 
Freud's notion of the "preconscious" than to his idea of the unconscious proper; the crucial difference 
being that for Freud the unconscious itself was constructed by the transformation of sexual drives through 
a process of repression that was itself unconscious.' (Jenny Bourne Taylor, In the Secret Theatre of 
Home: Wilkie Collins, sensation narrative, and nineteenth-century psychology (London: Routledge, 
1988), p. 256 n.) Bourne Taylor rightly identifies the mechanism of repression as a key difference 
between Freudian and Victorian concepts of the mind; however, her argument needs the additional 
emphasis that the preconscious is still unconscious. Freud describes how these two entities relate to each 
other: 'A consideration of these dynamic relations permits us now to distinguish two kinds of 
unconscious - one which is easily, under frequently occurring circumstances, transformed into something 
conscious, and another with which this transformation is difficult and takes place only subject to a 
considerable expenditure of effort or possibly never at all ... We call the unconscious which is only latent, 
and thus easily becomes conscious, the "preconscious" and retain the term "unconscious" for the other ... 
Once again: the preconscious is also unconscious in the purely descriptive sense, but we do not give it 
that name, except in talking loosely or when we have to make a defence of the existence in mental life of 
unconscious processes in general' ('Lecture XXXI', p. 71). 
This idea of differing degrees of latency recalls the work of Sir William Hamilton, one-time 
Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh University, who in his Lectures on Metaphysics and 
Logic (1859) distinguished three degrees of mental latency. The third and deepest degree was conceived 
of in response to the fact that 'in madness, in fever, in somnambulism, and other abnormal states, the 
mind should betray capacities and extensive systems of knowledge, of which it was at other times wholly 
unconscious' (Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic (1859), ed. by H. C. Mansel and John Keith, ,. edn, 4 
vols (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1865), I, 340-41. Whether the material existing in this 
degree of mental latency could be said to 'easily' and 'frequently' reach consciousness is a matter for 
debate, but I would argue that Hamilton's third degree, though not perbaps as deep as Freud's 
unconscious proper, nevertheless seems deeper and less accessible than the Freudian preconscious. 
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Although it will mostly be the case, especially in the more obviously phenomenological 
fictions of Sheridan Le Fanu and Wilkie Collins, that the symptoms arising out of the structure 
of the mind, including an area or areas whose contents could be described as 'unconscious', are 
revealed, rather than the structure itself, it occasionally happens that an actual spatial model of 
the thinking apparatus is described. Consider the following two passages. The first is in Le 
F anu' s Uncle Silas (1864), and the second is from The Ego and the Id (1923): 
How marvellously lie our anxieties, in filmy layers, one over the other! Take away that which has lain on 
the upper surface for so long - the care of cares - the only one, as it seemed to you, between your soul 
and the radiance of Heaven - and straight you will fmd a new stratum there. As physical science tells us 
no fluid is without its skin, so does it seem with this fme medium of the soul, and these successive films 
of care that form upon its surface on mere contact with the upper air and light. 7 
We have said that the consciousness is the surface of the mental apparatus; that is, we have ascribed it as 
a function to a system which is spatially the first one reached from the external world - and spatially not 
only in the functional sense but, on this occasion, also in the sense of anatomical dissection. Our 
investigations too must take this perceiving surface as a starting-point. 8 
In both these passages there is a sense of structure, and, importantly, a reference to another form 
of more established science with which to support it - Le Fanu refers to physical science, Freud 
to neurobiological dissection. An aim of this thesis, particularly in the earlier chapters, on Le 
Fanu and Collins, will be to investigate some of the ideas about such structures and systems 
which circulated in the nineteenth century, some inspired by older sciences, which may also 
have contributed towards the formation of Freudian models of the mind. 
These structures and systems are often only discernible in the details of their workings. 
Later in this chapter I will examine a particular characteristic, that of the necessity of attaining a 
state of equilibrium, in some nineteenth- and pre-nineteenth-century micro- and macrocosms (of 
mind, body, and spiritual universe) which were discussed and described in the philosophical and 
scientific climate within which Le Fanu and Freud read and wrote. Then I shall go on to discuss 
some manifestations by which we get a sense of these systems in the work of these two figures. 
In Le Fanu's fiction this almost invariably means a malfunction of the system, manifested in 
symptoms, which, often dramatically and sometimes horrifically, affect the behaviour of his 
characters. This is particularly the case in his short stories, which by the end of his career offer 
certain parallels with Freud's early case histories. Of particular significance in the present 
section, and throughout this chapter, will be the question of what it was that filled and powered 
7 Sheridan Le Fanu, Uncle Silas (1864), ed. by W. J. McCormack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981), p. 348. 
• Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, in SE, XIX, 3-66 (p. 19). An editorial note rightly points out that 
Freud is referring to an assertion made in his earlier work Beyond the Pleasure p,.inciple, (in SE, XVIII, 
1-64 (p. 26). Hereafter, Beyond). Freud cannot resist calling for the support of the discipline of 
biological anatomy bere, it should be noted, simply because on this occasion the model fits with it He 
held a relationship with biology (explored expertly by Frank J. Sulloway in Freud, Biologist of the Mind: 
Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992» which was 
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the models, large and small, in the works of Le Fanu and Freud; what was the circulatory 
material or the dynamic force within them, a debate that was only furthered, not settled, by 
Freud, who never determined 'the nature of Q,.9 
It may not immediately be apparent where the common ground lies between Sigmund 
Freud and Sheridan Le Fanu. The Anglo-Irish Le Fanu is traditionally portrayed as a reclusive 
yet prolific writer, whose rather unassuming career, from 1838-1873, produced an array of 
gothic and ghost stories, often written purely for money, some of which his own biographer has 
described as 'poor' .10 Unlike Wilkie Collins, Le Fanu did not endeavour to self-consciously 
display his knowledge of the science of mind within his work, and showed little interest in using 
the latest technical terms (except, perhaps, for ironic effect). In the above two passages we see 
something of this - it cannot be denied that a structure is depicted in each, but surely these 
descriptions are of different faculties. Where Freud uses the language of mental apparatus and 
consciousness, Le Fanu writes, rather archaically it might seem, of a 'soul'. My general 
contention in this chapter is that the distance between the systems of Le Fanu and Freud is not 
as great as may first appear, owing to their common inheritance of European scientific, 
philosophical, spiritual and literary traditions. More specifically, if we take into consideration 
the viewpoint of Bruno Bettelheim, in Freud and Man's Soul (1982), the gap between Le Fanu 
and Freud begins to narrow: 
In his work and in his writings, Freud often spoke of the soul - of its nature and structure, its 
development, its attributes, how it reveals itself in all we do and dream. Unfortunately, nobody who reads 
him in English could guess this, because nearly all his many references to the soul, and to matters 
pertaining to the soul, have been excised in translation. II 
Bettelheim's assertion is that, due to Strachey's over-technical translation of Freud's work, 
those who read him in English remain unaware of his frequent references to the soul (die Seele). 
He writes that Freud used the idea of the soul 'especially in crucial passages where he is 
attempting to provide a broad view of his system' , and more specifically: 
In various places, Freud spoke about 'the structure of the soul' and 'the organization of the soul' ('die 
Strulctur des seelischen Apparats' and 'die seelische Organisation'). In the translation, these terms are 
almost always rendered as 'mental apparatus' or 'mental organization.' Such substitutions are 
particularly misleading because in German the words Seele and seelisch have even more exclusively 
spiritual meanings than the word 'soul' has in present-day American usage. (p. 71) 
Indeed, we find this is the case in the very passage, from The Ego and the /d, which I have 
patchy and ambivalent. 
t This is a phnse which fonns the title of Appendix C to Project lor a Scientific Psychology (in SE, I, 
392-97) which discusses the nature and theoretical development of the force within the mental apparatus 
from its appearance in the Project to the end of Freud's career. 
10 W. J. McCormack, Sheridan Le Fanu and Victorian Ireland {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 199. 
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reproduced above as an example of Freud's description of the structure of the psychical 
apparatus; where Strachey translates 'of the mental apparatus', it is in fact the case that Freud 
has written 'des seelischen Apparats', which literally translates as 'of the apparatus of the 
soul' .12 
Freud (as Bettelheim points out) knew well the etymological basis for the word 
Psychoanalyse (psychoanalysis). Bettelheim renders an opening statement from a 1905 article 
by Freud thus, "'Psyche" is a Greek word and its Gennan translation is "soul'" (Bettelheim, p. 
73) (Strachey renders the last word 'mind '); even at the end of his life, in An Outline of 
Psychoanalysis, Freud referred to 'our psyche (the life of the soul)' {See/en/eben).1J The word 
'psyche', the Oxford English Dictionary tells us, precisely translates from Greek into English as 
'breath', and describes 'the animating principle in man and other living beings, the source of all 
vital activities ... the soul or spirit' .14 This description encompasses much, suggesting rather 
than defining; this is an obscurity that Freud also seemed to inherit, and, according to 
Bettelheim, understood and utilized: 
Nowhere in his writings does Freud give us a precise defmition of the tenn 'soul.' I suspect that 
he chose the tenn because of its inexactitude, its emotional resonance. Its ambiguity speaks for the 
ambiguity of the psyche itself, which reflects many different, warring levels of consciousness 
simultaneously. To have attempted a clinical defmition of such a tenn ... would have robbed it of its 
value as an expression of Freud's thinking. (Bettelheim, p. 77) 
He continues, with an interesting qualification of the use of this word by a thinker who was, 
after all, fundamentally an atheist, 'when Freud speaks of the soul he is talking not about a 
religious phenomenon but about a psychological concept; it too is a metaphor' (p. 77). This 
may be so, but it is worth considering the possibility that Freud may have inherited more than 
he realized from a theistic heritage, and that to use tenns such as die Seele only draws attention 
to this. In his psychoanalytic rewriting of a history of what was originally recorded by Church 
Authorities as an encounter with the devil in 'A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis' 
(1923), and in his jubilant letters to Fliess of 1897 about how the possession of centuries ago 
was 'identical with' the hysteria which he aspired to cure, Freud was in fact appropriating an 
II Bruno Bettelheim, Freud and Man's Soul (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 4. 
12 Sigmund Freud, Das Ich und das Es (Wien: Intemationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1923), p. 18. 
13 Translated by Bettelheim, p. 75. Taken from An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940). Strachey, as 
Bettelheim points out, renders Seelen/eben as 'mental life' (An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940), in SE, 
XXIII, 139-207 (p. 144). Hereafter, Outline). 
14 Oxford English Dictionary, ed. by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, 2nd edn, 20 vols (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), XII, 756. Hereafter, OED. As Helen Small points out, in Love's Madness: 
Medicine, the Novel, and Female Insanity, /800-/865 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), "'Psychiatry", 
"psychiatric", "psychiatrics", "psychopathy", and "psychopathology" all enter the [English] language 
from German in the late 1840s' (p. 22); those who understood the root of these words may have seen no 
reason to drop the terminology of the soul in favour of more technical terms that could have been said to 
simply be a tautology. Small's description of the introduction of these terms forms an illustration of her 
point about how medical professionals began at this time to couch their science in technical terms in order 
to assume a greater authority; for such as Le Fanu, this language-based power-seeking would have had 
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already constructed model and ascribing to it his own tenninology.ls 
In considering the career of Le Fanu we see something of an illustration of this. 
Spanning as it did some thirty-five years, it demonstrates a change that seems to illuminate the 
process of translation which Freud went on to apply to traditional systems of European thought 
and belief. The developments visible in Le Fanu's career are part of a larger heritage which 
treated the same mental symptoms in different ways according to the prevalent cultural trend. 
G. H.Lewes, writing at the end of the 1870s, expresses it thus: 
Hippocrates, a great observer, whose vision was little blurred by mists of metaphysics, saw in mental 
maladies abnormal brain-action; and his immediate successors sought in abnormal conditions of the 
organism for the direct causation of all the forms of insanity. But during the reign of theologians and 
metaphysicians this scientific standpoint was deserted, and mental maladies passed from the hands of 
physicians into the hands of priests: exorcism and prayers took the place of hygiene and prescriptions. 
The theologian regarded insanity as demoniacal possession. The metaphysician regarded it as a spiritual 
perversion, and sometimes as a want of harmony between the soul and its 'instrument.' ... The existence 
of a cerebral disease, which demands the physician's care, is now the universal belief. Mental maladies 
have taken their place beside bodily maladies, and have become a subject of natural science, to be studied 
on the same method as all other sciences. 16 
In 1838, when Le Fanu first started writing stories for the Dublin University Magazine, he 
presented them as extracts 'from the Legacy of the late Francis Purcell, P. P. of Drumcoolagh', 
a Roman Catholic Priest with an enthusiasm for stories of mystery and the supernatural. In 
doing this he was in fact writing within the tradition of such clerical investigators as Augustine 
Calmet, a French Catholic monk whose century-old gathered reports on supernatural events 
were translated and edited in 1850 by Rev. Henry Christmas as The Phantom World, or the 
Philosophy of Spirits, Apparitions, &C. 17 Purcell's 'editor' writes of him that he was simply a 
scribe, attempting to record 'those hannless fragments of a picturesque superstition, which it is 
our object to preserve' and that having compared Purcell's accounts with original family 
documents, he has found 'that whatever of supernatural occurred in the story, so far from having 
been exaggerated by him, had been rather softened down, and, wherever it could be attempted, 
little attraction. 
IS In his paper on the seventeenth-century demonological neurosis, and in an early paper on Charcot, it is 
obvious that Freud sees the duty of psychoanalysis as replacing the language of demon possession with 
that of symptom and neurosis. He writes of Charcot's interest in witchcraft and superstition, that in order 
for him to get to the fundamental truth that the splitting of consciousness was a key to the formation of 
hysteria, 'it would only have been a matter of exchanging the religious terminology of that dark and 
superstitious age for the scientific language of to-day' ('Charcot' (I 893), in SE, III, 7-23 (p. 20». 
16 George Henry Lewes, Problems 0/ Life and Mind, Third Series, Problem the First: The Study 0/ 
Psychology: Its Object, Scope and Method (London: TrUbner &. Co., Ludgate Hill, 1879), pp. 35-36. 
Hereafter, Problems, 3"' Series, I. 
17 Augustine Calmet, The Phantom World, or, The Philosophy o/Spirits, Apparitions, &c., ed. and intro. 
by Rev. Henry Christmas, 2 vols (London: Richard Bentley, 1850). Fred Kaplan testifies that Dickens 
had a copy of this (Fred Kaplan, Diclcens and Mesmerism: The Hidden Springs 0/ Fiction (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 4n.); Robert Tracy, the editor of a recent edition of In a Glass 
DarIcJy (1872) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), maintains that Le Fanu adapted one of Calmet's 
accounts in order to write 'Cannilla' (1871-72), the last story in the collection, and that he probably 
would have consulted this edition in order to do so (In a Glass DarIcJy, p. 346 n.). 
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accounted for' .18 Also symptomatic of this sort of flirting relationship with the idea of the 
supernatural which cannot accept it wholeheartedly yet cannot completely relinquish it, 
Calmet's editor qualifies and rationalizes the papers he has spent so much time preparing for 
publication, the necessity for preserving his clerical integrity and a decade's advance on Father 
Purcell's scientific knowledge causing an irresistible urge to the following explanation: 
Not a few cases of demoniacal possession are capable of being resolved into cataleptic trance, a state very 
similar to that produced by mesmerism ... Not a few of the most remarkable cases of supposed modern 
possession are to be accounted for by involuntary or natural mesmerism ... And here, to avoid 
misconception, or rather misrepresentation, let me at once observe, that I speak thus of modern and 
recorded cases only, accepting literally all related in the New Testament, and not presuming to say that 
similar cases might not occur now. Calmet, however, may be supposed to have collected all the most 
remarkable of modem times, and I am compelled to say I believe not one of them. 19 
Notwithstanding this blow to his authenticity, Christmas proclaims Calmet, in the spirit of 
Purcell's editor, to be 'a man of naturally cool, calm judgment, pious and truthful, and 
possessed of singular learning' (Christmas, p. xi). His work may go, Christmas says, 'to 
illustrate many physical facts' (p. x), in other words to support modem scientific laws. In his 
feverish privileging of the forces of mesmerism in the creation of symptoms, and his attempts to 
separate out instances of possession in the gospels from modem accounts of the same 
phenomenon, Christmas betrays the fact that he, like Calmet, and like the gospel writers, is of 
his time, and is simply replacing the previous agent of the demon with whatever potentially 
pathogenic energy happens to be culturally prevalent. His theistic faith only serves as a 
complication, forming for him an additional force for which it is necessary to find a place within 
the already charged system of the universe. 
At the end of Le Fanu's career, the character framing his narratives had changed; in the 
place of the priest is the 'philosophic physician',20 Dr. Hesselius of In a Glass Darkly (1872) 
who, like Purcell, collects secret histories. As we shall see, however, the ambiguity surrounding 
the phenomena experienced by the characters in each of these stories remains as strong as it did 
in the early stages of his career: there seems to be a shift from a Christian supernatural vision, 
comprising external avenging or aggressive agents which, for lack of explanation, are presumed 
to be evil or ghostly, to a picture of individual psychology completed by external ghostly 
symptoms, which in their tum could lean towards an explanation of a haunting personal guilt, 
but this shift is actually rather illUSOry. It is perhaps the case that the only thing guiding our 
view of events within these stories is the framer of the narrative, who in each case operates 
II Sheridan Le Fanu, 'A Chapter in the History of a Tyrone Family, Being a Tenth Extract from the 
Legacy of the Late Francis Purcell, P. P. of Drumcoolagh' (1839), in The Ox/ord Boole o/Gothic Tales, 
ed. by Chris Baldick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 102-32 (p. 105). 
19 Henry Christmas, 'Introduction', in Calmet, The Phantom World, I, v-xvii (pp. vii, viii). 
20 Rev. Jennings of 'Green Tea' describes him thus ('Green Tea' (1869), in In a Glass Darkly, pp. 5-40 
(p. 28». Elsewhere he is termed '. medical philosopher' (p. 8). 
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through the barrier of posthumous editing.21 Further, Le Fanu's remarkably repetitive method 
of writing and rewriting enables us to see especially clearly that through the changing, 
interpreting voice (purcell, Hesselius, beset narrator, or reader), which defines the force that 
originates and fuels the symptoms according to his or her own current agenda, the narrative that 
this voice interprets remains remarkably similar over a number of years, and indeed in many 
cases, across the traverse of the Irish Sea.22 Purcell's 'Passage in the Secret History of an Irish 
Countess' (1838) is later rewritten, first as 'The Murdered Cousin' in 1851, then in novel form 
as Uncle Silas (1864), 'A Chapter in the History of a Tyrone Family' (1839) becomes The 
Wyvern Mystery (1869) (Varma, p. vii).23 
In In a Glass Darkly, the second story, entitled 'The Familiar', is in essence a reprint, 
with minor revisions, of 'The Watcher' which was published in Le Fanu's 1851 anthology, 
Ghost Stories and Tales of Mystery?4 It becomes obvious, when surveying the changes made 
by Le Fanu over his career, that the titles of these stories may encourage an assigning of a 
particular interpretation: in particular the change from 'The Watcher' to 'The Familiar' implies 
a narrowing of the gap between evil visitant and victim, from outside surveyor to intimate.25 It 
is Le Fanu's choice of the title of In A Glass Darkly for the anthology in which 'The Familiar' 
appears, however, that is the most leading framing technique that he uses, and is the more 
intriguing because this phrase bears no direct reference to any of the stories in particular; it is at 
once a central commentary and a throwaway. Especially when starkly compared to Le Fanu's 
1851 anthology title, Ghost Stories and Tales of Mystery, it can be seen in essence as a 
suggestion that the unfortunate haunted subjects contained in the later stories are, in beholding 
what seems most alien to them, actually seeing a dim reflection of their inner selves. But, it is 
in considering the progress of 'The Watcher' to 'The Familiar' that we realize that the system 
that Le Fanu describes has in essence remained unchanged underneath different labels. The 
later story is prefixed by what is almost a superfluous 'diagnosis', 'necessarily conjectural' 
because Hesselius could not examine the patient, now dead (p. 42). If Captain Barton were not 
dead, Hesselius claims, he could ascribe his condition, which Barton himself believes is due to a 
supernatural 'scheme of vengeance' (p. 75), to one of three causes. Either Barton is a visionary, 
he has become morbidly oversensitive to influences and spiritual realities from which he should 
21 In the case of Hesselius the remove is even greater - he has been translated, and as the anthology goes 
on he is, after an initial embarrassment (which I will later discuss), gradually faded from the histories. 
22 Devendra P. Vanna identifies Le Fanu's way of rewriting thus - 'Le Fanu's individual method was to 
attempt and refurbish a tale several times, generally inaugurating it as a short-story, then blowing it into a 
larger format, and subsequently elaborating it in a three-decker novel' (,Musings on The Life and Works 
of Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, a Forgotten Creator of Ghosts', in Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, Ghost Stories 
and Tales o/Mystery (1851) (New York: Amo Press, 1977), pp. i-xvii (p. vii). 
23 It was with the writing of each full-length novel that the setting changed from Ireland to England, a 
shift of context which had much to do with Le Fanu's publisher, Richard Bentley, and what was 
perceived as likely to sell (see Sheridan Le Fanu and Victorian Ireland, p. 140). 
24 Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, 'The Watcher' (1851), in Ghost Stories and Tales 0/ Mystery, pp. 9-60. 
2J Indeed, in an 1870 essay entitled 'Unconscious Cerebration: A Psychological Study' (Macmillan's 
Magazine, 23 (November 1870),24-37), Frances Power Cobbe calls the unconscious mind 'our Familiar' 
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be protected, or there is a vibratory disturbance of his cerebral circulation that gives rise to 
illusions (pp. 41-42). In these explanations, Hesselius begins to sound remarkably like Rev. 
Henry Christmas when faced with the phenomena recorded by Calmet. With his over-technical 
language, his references to his own obscurely numbered metaphysical papers, and his further 
comments that have to be omitted since they contain 'a great deal which is of interest only to a 
scientific physician' it is Hesselius, in contrast to Barton's own interpretation (c. 1794) who 
appears outdated. Indeed, Hesselius's commentary is in the end only a scientific veneer on the 
real narrative, enclosed within his, which is written by a representative of the theistic tradition, 
'the Rev. Thomas Herbert' (p. 42). For in this and the 1851 version, what causes Barton's 
torment is guilt. The figure that stalks him is a shrunken version of a sailor whose daughter 
Barton ruined, and who died of a broken heart. After her death, Barton mistreated the sailor 
who died as a result. In the earlier edition, instead of Hesselius's preface, there is a simple 
epigram at the head of the story: 'How long wilt thou not depart from me? Thou terrifiest me 
through visions: so that my soul chooseth strangling rather than my life.' ('The Watcher', p. 9) 
This quotation is paraphrased from a passage in Job (7. 12-21),26 which is also used in a 
meditation attached to a letter in Richardson's Clarissa, in which the heroine is urged to 
repentance by her uncle. In the Bible passage, and more so in Richardson's novel, it functions 
as a simple expression of the terrors of having committed sin; it is the lament of the sufferer of a 
haunting guilt, the symbol and symptom of which, in Le Fanu's story, is the evil spirit?? Later 
we will see how this springs from Le Fanu's awareness of the possibility of a universal system, 
a concept which was also part of Freud's heritage. 
The passing of twenty years in Le Fanu's career has only served to introduce additional 
(p.27). 
2 The passage from Job appears (in the Authorised King James Version): 'Am I a sea, or a whale, that 
thou settest a watch over me? When I say, My bed shall comfort me, my couch shall ease my complaint; 
Then though scarest me with dreams, and terrifiest me through visions: So that my soul chooseth 
strangling, and death rather than my life. I loathe it; I would not live alway: let me alone, for my days are 
vanity. What is man, that thou shouldest magnify him? and that thou shouldest set thine heart upon him? 
And that thou shouldest visit him every morning, and try him every moment? How long wilt thou not 
depart from me, nor let me alone till I swallow down my spittle? I have sinned; what shall I do unto thee, 
o thou preserver of men? why hast thou set me as a mark against thee, so that I am a burden to myself'? 
And why dost thou not pardon my transgression, and take away mine iniquity? for now shall 1 sleep in 
the dust; and thou shalt seek me in the morning, but 1 shall not be.' 1 have quoted the section 1 think most 
relevant; Le Fanu takes both halves of the phrase from this passage, but inverts them, putting the phrase 
which occurs second first. The reference to being watched at the beginning of this passage, from which 
the epigram to 'The Watcher' is taken, is particularly interesting. 
27 The section appears in Clarissa thus: 'I have sinned! What shall I do unto Thee, 0 Thou Preserver of 
men! Why hast Thou set me as a mark against Thee; so that I am a burden to. myselfl! When 1 say, My 
bed shall comfort me; My couch shall ease my complaint; Then Thou scarest me with dreams, and 
terrifiest me through visions) So that my soul chooseth strangling and death rather than life' (Samuel 
Richardson, Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady (1747-48), ed. by John Butt, 4 vols (London: Dent, 
1968), IV, 101). The noteworthy element in this rendering is the featuring of beds and dreams; in Le 
Fanu's work it is often in bed that the haunted subject meets his or her tormentor, usually unsure whether 
what he or she has witnessed (for example, in 'Carmilla' a black cat in her room, in 'Squire Toby's Will' 
(1868) a dog climbing over his bedclothes) is a dream or a waking experience. Frequently, it is also the 
case that the bedroom is the scene of death for many of Le Fanu's protagonists (see 'The Watcher' and 
'Green Tea'). 
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options for the explanation of phenomena (thereby adding ambiguity); new ways of describing 
old concepts. In the end, all that Hesselius's various explanations of Barton's plight do is 
encourage us to strip away the superfluous material from them and accept, if we want, the 
option that most neatly fits the overall picture, which includes Barton's crime and punishment: 
Others, again, owe their sufferings to a mixed condition. The interior sense, it is true, is opened; but it has 
been and continues open by the action of disease. This form of disease may, in one sense, be compared to 
the loss of the scarf-skin, and a consequent exposure of surfaces for whose excessive sensitiveness, nature 
has provided a muffling. The loss of this covering is attended by an habitual impassability, by influences 
against which we were intended to be guarded. (pp. 41-42) 
The loss of the 'scarf-skin', the reason for which is in this instance unexplained (in contrast to 
the development of 'interior vision' in the story before it, 'Green Tea', attributed to the abuse of 
the substance in the title ('Green Tea', p. 39» makes us conscious of those things of which we 
should remain unconscious in order to avoid distress?8 Fundamentally arising from the 
common Victorian conceptions of conscious (knowing) and unconscious (unknowing), this 
aetiology of symptoms yet prefigures Freud's apt phrase, 'they would not have become 
symptoms if they had not forced their way into consciousness,.29 In Barton's case what is 
slowly forced on him is the extent of his crime, and the depth of his guilt which he had always 
done his best to forget. It is this episode of his life which, we are told, 'of all others, he hated to 
remember' (p. 50). The forming in Barton of a firm connection between his haunting and his 
past happens gradually, suggesting that the guilty incident is kept far from his consciousness; at 
first it is simply a 'vag[ue] and instincti[ve]' linking (p. 50). It is with the passing of time, and 
increased hauntings, that he becomes 'deeply and horribly convinced' of the systemic 
connection between his sin and the retribution he is experiencing (p. 60). Because of his 
unwillingness to remember, to class this memory with the others in his psyche, Barton lays 
28 James Sully, in Illusions: A Psychological Study (1881) 4th edn (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, TrUbner 
& Co., Ltd, 1905) provides, in the experiences of students of optics, a practical example of the 
phenomenon that Barton suffers, of becoming too conscious, 'when a sensation arises in the mind, it may, 
under certain circumstances, go unattended to. In that case there is no perception. The sensation floats in 
the dim outer regions of consciousness as a vague feeling, the real nature and history of which are 
unknown. This remark applies not only to the undefmed bodily sensations that are always oscillating 
about the threshold of obscure consciousness, but to the higher sensations connected with the special 
organs of perception. The student in optics soon makes the startling discovery that his field of vision has 
all through his life been haunted with weird shapes which have never troubled the serenity of his mind 
just because they have never been distinctly attended to' (pp.20-21). Barton has ignored a whole sphere 
of existence because of his former attitude, 'the callous scepticism of a confirmed infidel' ('The 
Familiar', p. 45); now what was visible ifhe had cared to look is forced upon his vision. 
29 Sigmund Freud, 'Lecture XVIII: Fixation to Traumas - The Unconscious', (1916-17) in SE, XVI, 273-
85 (p. 278). Hamilton provides a psychical extension to Sully's description of the sensation which 'floats 
in the dim outer regions of consciousness', sheds light on Barton's sudden consciousness of the 
consequences of his crime, and portrays a structure that bears similarities to that within which Freud is 
obviously working in the phrase I have quoted, when he writes, 'the sphere of our conscious 
modifications is only a small circle in the centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion, of which we 
are only conscious through its effects' (Lectures on Metaphysics, I, 349). This is a suggestive comment, 
which helps pave the way for Freud's vision of the creation of symptoms and other mental phenomena 
that are our only clue to the existence of the unconscious. 
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himself open to its unexpected return, in the same way that Dr. Sturk in Le Fanu's 1860 novel, 
The House by the Churchyard, by witnessing a murder when intoxicated, is suddenly revisited 
in a dream, in a way that would later attract the term 'traumatic', by 'a strange, painfully-sharp 
remembrance of things past' .30 
The idea of the scarf-skin provides something of a link for us between the old ways of 
seeing the workings of guilt, and the structures of psychoanalysis. It is another part of Le 
F anu' s vision of the structure of the mind or soul which finds later correspondence in a part of 
the Freudian psychical system. Dr. Hesselius's ordinarily muffled system can be seen to 
correspond to the binding of memories by the ego's natural processes in Freud's 1895 Project 
for a Scientific Psychology, in which hallucinations, in particular, are due to a memory's 
unbound state, which leaves the psychical system open to an unusual influx of the full raw force 
of the primary processes.31 Twenty-five years later, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud 
writes, 'we may, I think, tentatively venture to regard the common traumatic neurosis as a 
consequence of an extensive breach being made in the protective shield against stimuli' 
(Beyond, p. 31). As in Freud's unbound system, in which 'the patient ... is obliged to repeat the 
repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to 
see, remembering it as something belonging to the past' (Beyond, p. 18), that a protective shield 
has not developed around Barton's memory lies in the fact that he 'hat[es] to remember' these 
past scenes of his life. Therefore he is forcibly and repetitively reminded of them, without his 
conscious consent. 
Significantly, in summing up Barton's case, the clergyman narrator uses the following 
words; that Barton perceived himself' as working out a retribution for some grievous sin of his 
past life' ('The Familiar', p. 81, emphasis mine). This phrase, arising from traditional biblical 
discourse, 32 suggesting the payment of a debt, also prefigures the Freudian vision of symptom 
formation as a result of excess force trapped within the psychical system, which requires 
spending. In his Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis (1916-17), Freud describes the nature 
of trauma in economic terms, which find resonance in the phrase used at the end of 'The 
Familiar': 
Indeed, the term 'traumatic' has no other sense than an economic one. We apply it to an experience 
which within a short period of time presents the mind with an increase of stimulus too powerful to be 
dealt with or worked offin the normal way, and this must result in permanent disturbances of the manner 
in which the energy operates. ('Lecture XVIII', p. 275, emphasis mine) 
In his Project of 1895, Freud explores the process needed to cure the patient of traumas. The 
30 J. Sheridan Le Fanu, The House by the Chlll'chyard(1863) (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1994), p. 182. 
31 See Sigmund Freud, Project/or a Scientific Psychology (1950), in SE, 1,281-397 (p. 381). Hereafter, 
Project. 
32 In St. Paul's letter to the Philippians, he exhorts them to 'work out your own salvation with fear and 
trembling' (philippians 2.12, Authorised King James Yerslon). 
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memory, he writes, must be faced, mulled over, considered; by recollection it is able to be 
bound and forgotten. 
It is now tamed and by a thought-facilitation strong enough to exercise a pennanent effect and to produce 
an inhibiting action once more at every later repetition of the memory. The pathway leading to the 
release of unpleasure will then, owing to disuse, gradually increase its resistance: for facilitations are 
subject to gradual decay (forgetting). Only after this is [the] memory a tamed memory like any other. 
(Project, p. 382, editor's brackets) 
Freud's use of the word 'tamed' ('gebandigt'i3 with regard to the binding of a previously 
traumatic or hallucinatory memory is interesting in considering Le Fanu's work, in which the 
revenants so often appear as terrifying animals.34 The full working out of Barton's haunting 
memory, however, can only occur with his death, after which the full story of his crime, which 
he never verbalizes, is finally aired. Therefore, with the debt of confession owed, the memory 
untamed, he continues haunted. 
By the time Le Fanu published 'The Familiar', in 1872, his singling out of guilt as a 
pathogenic agent for the creation of symptoms was, if we believe Lewes, rather outdated. In his 
survey of the interpretation of mental maladies, from possession to cerebral disease, from which 
I have already quoted, Lewes writes that whereas earlier in the nineteenth century mental 
aberrations were seen an 'the symptom of Vice', 'the practical absurdity of this theory has long 
been recognized. No one now argues with a demented patient. No one thinks of curing mania 
with sermons' (Problems, 3m Series, I, 36). In psychoanalysis, however, a thinking frame 
within which repressed guilt was a major agent of neurosis, of which a type of confession to a 
self-proclaimed 'father confessor' (Studies on Hysteria, p. 282) was the cure, it is possible to 
see a return to these, as Lewes would have it, outdated ideas. In his assessment of what mental 
science has become in the 1870s, Lewes writes: 'Mental maladies have taken their place beside 
bodily maladies, and have become a subject of natural science, to be studied on the same 
method as all other sciences.' (Problems, 3m Series, I, 36) Lewes's principle of approach would 
have been classed by Freud, in 'A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis', as 'exact 
science', a discipline that psychoanalysis has triumphantly disproved and overcome: 
The demonological theory of those dark times has won in the end against all the somatic views 
of the period of 'exact' science. The states of possession correspond to our neuroses, for the explanation 
33 Sigmund Freud, Aus den Ausfangen der Psychoanalyse: Briefen an Wilhelm Fliess, Abhandlungen und 
Notizen aus den Jahren 1887-1902 (London: Imago Publishing Co. Ltd., 1950), p. 460. 
34 Jochen Achilles helpfully provides a long list of the animals that appear in Le Fanu's fiction, also 
stressing the untamed nature of the affects they represent: 'Animals functioning as displaced 
representations of hidden guilt, anger or desire are legion in Le Fanu's oeuvre. Cats ("The Mysterious 
Lodger", "Carmilla", "The White Cat of Drumgunniol", "Laura Silver Bell"), a gander ("The Quare 
Gander"), bears and rats ("An Account of Some Strange Disturbances in an Old House in Aungier 
Street"), monkeys (uThe Haunted Baronet", "Green Tea''), a parrot and a jay ("The Fatal Bride", "The 
Haunted Baronet") can be considered as displaced indicators of repressed emotions.' Jochen Achilles, 
'Fantasy as Psychological Necessity: Sheridan Le Fanu's Fiction', in Gothick Origins and Innovations, 
ed. by Allan Lloyd Smith and Victor Sage (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), pp. 150-68 (p. 162). 
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of which we once more have recourse to psychical powers. In our eyes, the demons are bad and 
reprehensible wishes, derivatives of instinctual impulses that have been repudiated and repressed. We 
mer~ly elim~ate the projection of these mental entities into the external world which the middle ages 
carned out; Instead, we regard them as having arisen in the patient's internal life, where they have their 
abode.3s 
The implication in this passage is that there has been a long-standing disconnection, which 
Freud has now reconnected, between phenomena caused by evil spirits and the philosophy of 
mind. But it is in fact the case that there was a connection there all along, which he had missed. 
Freud's obvious belief is that by redefining possession in terms of psychoanalysis, he is 
effecting a major departure from nineteenth-century science. It is true, certainly, that 
psychoanalysis does tum away from an important school of thought, that which Lewes 
advocates. In this chapter, however, I will be discussing another tradition of thinking, that 
forms this long-running connection which remained unbroken throughout the nineteenth 
century, and partly out of which Freud's own theories emerged. 
Richard Webster asserts throughout Why Freud was Wrong that Freud, despite his 
ostensible faithlessness, subscribed to a metaphysical or theological vision of the mind, because 
this was the legacy of European thought, and more specifically, of German Romanticism's 
Naturphilosophie, which held as 'a fundamental tenet ... that natural phenomena cannot be 
understood through mechanical and physical concepts alone, but that the ultimate task of the 
scientist was to elucidate the spiritual laws by which all nature was governed' .36 This doctrine 
in its tum was 'rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition itself, a tradition so deeply embedded in 
European culture, that, Webster records, in response to the anti-metaphysical positivist 
movement that swept through science in the nineteenth century, many thinkers 'began to 
smuggle theistic views back across the frontiers of science, and secrete them in their theories in 
a disguised form': 
Instead of abandoning the ancient occult fictions of 'soul' and 'spirit' which had constantly been 
invoked in order to explain the inexplicable, these nineteenth-century scientists systematically translated 
them into positivistic language, using concepts and terminology drawn from the physical sciences. In this 
way they constructed fictional entities which were no less occult than their precursors but which, since 
they were described in the language of science, were often treated as though they were science. 
Among the many academic disciplines which succumbed to this particular form of disguised, 
pseudo-scientific spiritualism was psychology. (Webster, pp. 177-78) 
The 'prime culprit' of this act of masking, and a true son of Naturphilosophie, Webster states, 
was a figure we have already encountered: Gustav Fechner (Webster, pp. 178, 176). The 
thinker whose work the avowed positivist G. H. Lewes once described as 'too mathematical for 
my comprehension' ,37 was for much of his life just as much a metaphysical philosopher as a 
35 'A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis' (1923), inSE, XIX, 67-105 (p. 72). 
36 Richard Webster, Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, Science and Psychoanalysis (London: Fontana, 1996), 
p. 177. 
'7 Letter IS, G. H. Lewes to [recipient unknown], 16 April [1864-671] in Anthony McCobb, George 
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physicist, writing about the spiritual universe concurrently with the physical one: 'Fechner's 
numerous writings on supernatural phenomena cover more than half a century of his life ... 
These works clearly overlap in time with the publication of his major scientific publications in 
experimental psychology,.38 These two strands of his career, unsurprisingly, were not kept 
separate. In an account by Henri Ellenberger, however, we get a sense of how they intertwine: 
For many years Fechner had been preoccupied with the relationship between the physical and the spiritual 
worlds. He fel~ that there had to be a general law governing this relationship, and he tried to discover 
what mathematIcal formula would be the most probable one for such a law. According to his own 
account, that formula, which he called the psychophysical law, occurred to him suddenly on the morning 
of October 22, 1850, in time to enable him to mention it briefly in his book Zend-Avesta.39 He now 
proceeded to devise a long series of experiments to ascertain whether this law was true, and was absorbed 
by this research for the following ten years. His fmdings were contained in the two volumes of the 
Psychophysics published in 1860, which aroused considerable interest and were the starting point of 
modem experimental psychology. (The Discovery o/the Unconscious, p. 217) 
Of these volumes Ellenberger elsewhere writes, 'it would be erroneous to consider the 
Psychophysics as a textbook of experimental psychology in the modem sense. A good part of it 
is devoted to "inner psychophysics" and is more metaphysical than psychological' .40 
It is this figure, whom Webster sums up as 'a conventional scientist only in appearance', 
a 'spiritual scientist' (Webster, pp. 181, 175), who is referred to by Freud in his 
'Autobiographical Study', thus: 'I was always open to the ideas of G. T. Fechner and have 
followed that thinker upon many important points' .41 It is Fechner's principle of stability, as I 
have already discussed in my Introduction, that Freud used as a starting point in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, and had used as a foundation for his posthumously published Project of 
1895. In the next section I will discuss the necessity for the attainment of equilibrium, in 
essence a principle of stability, in the systems that Freud and Le Fanu portray in their work. I 
emphasize Fechner here, and will continue to do so, because I believe he is a figure that usefully 
bridges the ground from which emerged Le Fanu's and Freud's ideas of mind and soul. It is 
useful to keep in mind Webster's opinion that Fechner was in essence a masking figure, a 
disguiser of theistic concepts under scientific terms, for this view, I believe, illuminates the 
process that I have described of Freud's transposition of ludaeo-Christian systems into 
psychoanalytic language. Freud, taken in by Fechner's disguise, theorizes within a much more 
traditionally rich framework than he realizes. Conversely, Le Fanu, as I shall discuss, displayed 
Eliot's Knowledge 0/ German Life and Letters (Salzburg: Universitllt Salzburg, 1982), p. 334. McCobb 
records in a note that Lewes's journal testifies that he read some of Fechner's work in the 1869-74 period, 
and that Eliot and Lewes owned three books by Fechner (p. 334 n.). 
38 Wolfgang O. Bringmann, Nonna J. Bringmann, Nonna L. Medway, 'Fechner and Psychical Research', 
in G. T. Fechner and Psychology ed. by Josef Brouk and Horst Gundlach (Leitung: W. Traxel, Passavia 
Universitltsverlag, 1988), 243-56 (p. 244). 
39 This was a spiritual work, bearing, according to Bringmann, Bringmann and Medway, 'the intriguing 
subtitle "On Matters of Heaven and the Beyond'" ('Fechner and Psychical Research', p. 245). 
40 Henri Ellenberger, 'Fechner and Freud', Bulletin o/the Menninger Clinic, 20 (1956), 201-14 (p. 202). 
41 Sigmund Freud, 'An Autobiographical Study' (1925), in SE, XX, 1-74 (p. 59). 
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within his fiction a familiarity with the work of a figure whose vision of a spiritual universe 
bore many resemblances to that which Fechner held - Emanuel Swedenborg. In his work, 
therefore, Le Fanu portrayed comparable spiritual systems to those which Fechner describes. 
He therefore appears rather less naive than Freud, positioned within an unmasked tradition of 
mystical thought, with a full realization that this is the case. 
For although Freud, as far as we know, only read one of the many metaphysical or 
spiritual books written by Gustav Fechner,42 it seems the case that even Fechner's most 
scientific books are part of a much greater plan by which he aimed to describe the universe. 
This is a fact of which Freud, who in 1933 described 'the struggle of the scientific spirit against 
the religious Weltanschauung' ,43 here establishing a clear opposition between psychoanalysis 
and any sort of spiritual vision, seems unaware. We see something of Fechner's plan in his 
1836 book, Life After Death. In the concluding paragraph, after discussing the whole of man's 
spiritual life, in its three stages (before birth, birth to death, after death) our contact with spirits 
good and bad, and the mechanics of how souls might see in heaven, Fechner writes: 
My speculations, as laid down in this last and in the foregoing chapters, will become better established on 
larger and fIrmer grounds, and will be more generally adopted, when the science of psycho-physic, now 
only in its infancy, shall become aware that its subject is not an isolated theory of the relations between 
body and mind in the particular human and animal organisms, but a universal theory of the relations 
between the mental and the material principles of the universe.44 
After twenty five years, his Elements of Psychophysics shows signs of this early ambition, 
Fechner's definition of its subject appearing as, 'an exact theory of the functionally dependent 
relations of body and soul ... the physical and the psychological worlds', its occasional reference 
to the spiritual element of life amid discussions of physical forces causing his mid-twentieth-
century translators to insert slightly embarrassed footnotes to explain them.4s Even in his most 
technical works, then, Fechner cannot separate or omit the soul, the spiritual world. 
In combining physical or natural science with theories of the soul and spirit, Fechner 
42 According to the editor of the last volume of the Standard Edition, the works by Fechner that Freud 
cited in his published work were, Elemente der Psycho physik (Elements of Psychophysics) (1860), Einige 
Ideen zur Schopfungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen (Some Ideas on the History of 
Creation and Development of Organisms) (1873), Vorschule der Asthetik (Primary Aesthetics) (1876) 
(SE, XXIV, 98). However, of special interest is the fact that Freud references, in his work on jokes and 
wit, the Ratselbuchlein von Dr. Mises, which is roughly translated as 'The Little Mystery Book of Dr. 
Mises' (frrst published 1850; Freud cites the 4th edn, 1875). Dr. Mises was the name under which 
Fechner published his more mystical work, and wrote about his trial through illness, during which he 
composed poems and riddles. Freud was therefore aware of Fechner's more metaphysical publications, 
though he does not seem to connect them up with his scientific vision. 
43 Sigmund Freud, 'Lecture XXXV: The Question of a Weltanschauung' (1933), in SE, XXII, 158-82 (p. 
169). 
44 Gustav Theodor Fechner, On Life After Death (1836), trans. by Hugo Wemekke (London: Sampson 
Low, Marston, Searle, & RivingtoD, 1882), p. 95. Hereafter, Life. 
4.5 For example, '8 typical Fechner notioD. God is the soul of the universe', Gustav Theodor Fechner, 
Elements of Psychophysics, Volume I (1860), trans. by Helmut Adler, eel. by Davis Howes and Edwin 
Boring (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 2 D. 
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was not a lone figure. There were more thinkers within the nineteenth century and before who , , 
created intricate systems of the mind's relation to the universe with the aid of already 
established sciences, from which they took ideas and metaphors to define and explain the spirit 
world.
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It was partly within this tradition, including such figures as Emanuel Swedenborg, 
Ernst von Feuchtersleben47 and the immensely popular Robert Dale Owen,48 that Freud, 
however unwittingly, created his own systems. Such philosophy, in addition to a strong 
contingent of British physiologists, such as W. B. Carpenter and Thomas Laycock, who 
endeavoured to reconcile theistic thinking with scientific discovery, also formed part of the 
context within which Le Fanu wrote his fiction. 
Settling the Equities of Eternity: The Attainment of Equilibrium in 
Sheridan Le Fanu's Fiction 
Sheridan Le Fanu, as a contributor to and for some time the editor of a modest monthly 
periodical (The Dublin University Magazine), a husband and father and a man of faith, was, like 
the majority of Victorians, surrounded, defined, explained and influenced by various systems; 
systems of publishing economy and circulation in his professional life, spiritual and bodily 
models in his private life. Sally Shuttleworth, in Charlotte Bronte and Victorian Psychology,49 
gives an idea of the extent to which various systems of force and value pervaded nineteenth-
century culture. 'The ideologies governing the expansion of industrial capitalism' (p. 4) 
46 Henri Ellenberger lists a number of such figures, frrmly placed within the Romantic school of 
Naturphilosophie that Webster also highlights, in The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and 
Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 202-10. 
47 Feuchtersleben (1806-1849) whom Ellenberger also locates within the Romantic tradition (The 
Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 210), was, like Freud, from Vienna. In Hysteria: The History of a 
Disease (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), Ilza Veith argues that he anticipates the works of 
Freud in his view that dreams are a return to a former state of being, and the link he makes between 
hysteria and pent-up sexual desire (pp. 190-93). He was extremely popular in Vienna in the mid-
nineteenth century, and the titles of two works that were quickly translated into English are revealing, in a 
consideration of figures that straddle the worlds of science and spirit. In 1847 The Sydenham Society 
published The Principles of Medical Psychology; five years later John Churchill published The Dietetics 
of the Soul. To translate 'die seele' as soul, rather than mind, the editor explained, was a conscious 
decision based on the contents of the volume (Ernst von Feuchtersleben, The Dietetics of the Soul (1838), 
trans. and ed. by H. A. Ouvry, 7th edn (London: John Churchill, 1852), pp. vi-vii). Feuchtersleben's aim 
in this work was 'to explain how this spiritual portion of man may be protected from disease' (p. 8). 
Though not a mystic, like many scientists before him, Feuchtersleben saw the soul as an important 
component of the human system, its needs and state of health intertwined with, and perhaps 
indistinguishable from, those of the mind. That this may approach Freud's use of the term 'die seele' 
speaks for the perils arising from Freud's vague use of the term, and only suggests the more that the 
foundations of his thinking lay within this tradition. 
48 Robert Dale Owen was an American, whose Footfalls on the Boundary of Another World (London: 
TrUbner, 1860) was frrst printed in this English edition from its tenth American edition. Fred Kaplan 
testifies that Dickens had an 'extensively annotated' copy of this book (Kaplan, p. 4). Owen cited many 
established English physiologists, including W. B. Carpenter, John Abercrombie, and Henry Holland, to 
support his argument, which suggested that known natural laws could be seen, alongside miraculous 
phenomena, as part of a much larger system. 
~9 Sally Shuttleworth, Charlotte Brontl and Victorian Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
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encouraged a widespread use of the discourse of the control, conservation and release of 
energies, forces, resources. This circulating language infected all spheres of life to the extent 
that the discourses used in different aspects of society and individual existence interpenetrated 
and influenced each other. Shuttleworth's interest lies in the way that 'the discourses of 
political economy, medicine and psychology all converged in their preoccupation with the 
balanced channelling of energy within the individual body' (p. 151); this 'embodied self (p. 6) 
in its tum was conceived, again within a framework of economical thought, 'both as an 
autonomous unit, gifted with powers of self-control, and also as a powerless material organism, 
caught within the operations ofa wider field of force' (p. 28). This idea of what might be termed 
the microcosm (the individual) in an often problematical relation to the macrocosm (the 
universe) is one that runs throughout Le Fanu's work. It found particular r~sonance in Captain 
Barton's plight. In the following lament, there is a feeling conveyed that Barton, having 
relinquished his individual self-control in his irresponsible sexual behaviour, is now caught up 
in a structure too large and fast-moving to take any account of the preferences and emotions of 
the unfortunate soul within it: 
'The fact is,' said Barton, 'whatever may be my uncertainty as to the authenticity of what we are 
taught to call revelation, of one fact I am deeply and horribly convinced, that there does exist beyond this 
a spiritual world - a system whose workings are generally in mercy hidden from us - a system which may 
be, and which is sometimes, partially and terribly revealed. I am sure - I know,' continued Barton, with 
increasing excitement, 'that there is a God - a dreadful God - and that retribution follows guilt, in ways 
the most mysterious and stupendous - by agencies the most inexplicable and terrific; - there is a spiritual 
system - great God, how I have been convinced! - a system malignant, and implacable, and omnipotent, 
under whose persecutions I am, and have been, suffering the torments of the damned!' ('The Familiar' , p. 
60) 
There were plenty of opportunities for Le Fanu to contemplate, in vanous ways, 
systems large and small; cosmic, but more often, individual. At home, the mechanisms of the 
individual bodily economy found particular resonance. Le Fanu's wife, Susanna, was prone to 
nervous disorders, including 'visionary disturbances' (Sheridan Le Fanu and Victorian Ireland, 
p. 147) and in fact died in 1858 from the strain of a hysterical attack.so Living with and 
monitoring the female system which at the time was interpreted and defined by Victorian ideas 
of what constituted health or morbidity, would have rendered Le Fanu particularly sensitive to 
the necessity of establishing and maintaining a state of equilibrium. It is worth, therefore, 
briefly considering this system as an unusually clear example of the workings of an individual 
economy. It is particularly in the imbalances, tensions and crises within a system that its 
mechanisms and dynamics are visible. The contemplation of the female economy, therefore, 
seen in the nineteenth century as inherently prone to these aberrations, could be seen to have 
. 
provided Le Fanu with a particularly sharp illumination of the dynamics of force within the 
50 Sheridan Le Fanll and Victorian Ire/and, p. 147. See pp. 126-35 for an account of Susanna's illness 
and death. 
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body, which then inflected his fiction. 
Victorian culture and medicine, according to Shuttleworth, viewed woman in herself as 
a potentially unbalanced system: 
Woman, with her constant predisposition to hysteria, is a figure of radical instability. As in the social 
economy, surface order rests on a precarious balancing of forces, ready to be disrupted and thrown into 
convulsions at the slightest disturbance of eqUilibrium. (Charlotte Bronte and Victorian Psychology p. 
76) , 
Shuttleworth writes that in the female economy, regular menstruation was seen as an essential 
release, and that 'the physiological, mental and emotional economies of womanhood were all 
regarded as interdependent'. This led to the belief that irregular menstruation could cause 
mental disorder, and that emotional strain could cause 'menstrual obstructions which could in 
tum lead to insanity and death' (p. 77). An imbalance of the forces within the system, therefore, 
was potentially fatal. Robert Brudenell Carter, who published a book on hysteria five years 
before Susanna died, wrote of emotion as a potentially pathogenic force, which must be released 
wherever possible: 
When the more ordinary effects are produced, such as blushing, lachrymation, gesture, sobbing, &c., two 
or more of them frequently coincide; but when some less usual outlet has been found, the whole force is 
generally concentrated upon the suffering organ. The fIrst named and most common consequences, even 
when not useful in themselves, seem to permit the accomplishment of a harmless explosion; the strength 
of which is still further diminished by the number of organs acted upon. But when, in a desperate effort 
to avoid the external manifestations of feeling, these outlets are wilfully closed; the imprisoned power is 
driven to seek another opening, and probably discovers one in a part of the system which is usually 
exempt from emotional influences, but which, under such circumstances, receives their entire shock, and 
suffers from its consequences in the highest degree.51 
llza Veith, who proclaims this thinker's concepts 'so strikingly similar to those of Freud -
before the latter was even born - that mere coincidence of their ideas seems scarcely credible' 
(Veith, p. 199) suggests that Carter, in passages such as these, created the first theory of 
repression (p. 201). Although I believe, with many others (including Freud himself, as we have 
seen in my Introduction) that the idea of repression dated further back even than this, it is 
certainly true that Carter does understand something of the mechanics of repression; in a work 
on hysteria, however, what is striking is the similarity his theories sometimes bear to those of 
Freud and Breuer in their Studies On Hysteria, published some forty years later; in particular 
their idea of abreaction. The following passage from this later work is worth quoting at length: 
The fading of a memory or the losing of its affect depends on various factors. The most 
important of these is whether there has been an energetic reaction to the event that provolces an affect. 
By 'reaction' we here understand the whole class of voluntary and involuntary reflexes - from tears to 
51 Robert Brudenell Carter, On the Pathology and Treatment 0/ Hysteria (London: Churchill, 18S3), pp. 
17-18. 
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acts of revenge - in which, as experience shows us, the affects are discharged. If this reaction takes place 
to a sufficient amount a large part of the affect disappears as a result ... language serves as a substitute for 
action; by its help, an affect can be 'abreacted' almost as effectively. In other cases speaking is itself the 
adequate reflex, when, for instance, it is a lamentation or giving utterance to a tonnenting secret, e. g. a 
confession. If there is no such reaction, whether in deeds or words, or in the mildest cases in tears, any 
recollection of the event retains its affective tone to begin with. (Studies on Hysteria, p. 8) 
The similarity between the call for a reaction to an event in both Carter's text and that of Freud 
and Breuer is clear: we respond, writes Carter, in a number of ways to occurrences that inspire 
emotion - muscles contract, glands secrete, in order to effect an expression of these feelings, in 
many different possible ways, 'but they are all alike in affording speedy and evident relief to the 
emotion itself, which is, so to speak, exhausted in producing them, and which appears to be 
correlated to its effects' (Carter, p. 6). Balance is reached between feeling and unconfined 
reaction; equilibrium is achieved and the system returns to a normal state. 
Le Fanu, as a concerned husband, may have known the work of Carter, or work he 
influenced;s2 McCormack testifies to the fact that he was uncertain, before his wife's death and 
afterwards, whether the right treatment was given to her (Sheridan Le Fanu and Victorian 
Ireland, pp. 129-30), an anxiety that may have been expressed in the ineffectual methods of Dr. 
Hesselius, later in his career. However, he certainly understood the need for the normal release 
of emotions, or speech, or both, in order to help prevent symptoms. Maud of Uncle Silas, 
naturally prone to straightforward emotional reactions in response to the frightening events in 
her life after her father's death ('At last I was relieved by long paroxysms of weeping' (Uncle 
Silas, p. 375)) suffers a classic hysterical symptom in the midst of an unpleasant conversation in 
which she cannot, as she feels she should do, tell her uncle the truth that he has been spoken 
against by a family friend, 'I had to clear my throat twice or thrice. There was a kind of spasm 
in my throat' (p. 304). Breuer later would write of a similar circumstance producing an 
identical symptom in Anna 0., 'A dispute, in the course of which she suppressed a rejoinder, 
caused a spasm of the glottis' (Studies on Hysteria, p. 94). In 'Mr Justice Harbottle' in In a 
Glass Darkly, a woman servant sees an uncanny figure in the house of her master, which 
frightens her terribly: 
Very much scared and very hysterical, Mrs Carwell ran down to her room, afraid to look over 
her shoulder, and got some companions about her, and wept, and talked, and drank more than one cordial, 
and talked and wept again, and so on, until, in those early days, it was ten o'clock, and time to go to 
bed.53 
In three of the four stories in this collection which involve revenants of some kind ('Green Tea', 
'The Familiar', 'Mr Justice Harbottle', 'Carmilla'), the victims of the hauntings are men. Le 
52 Veith writes that Carter is not a major figure in the history of thought on hysteria, 'Robert Carter 
belongs to that strange category of creative men whose indirect influence may have been enormous but 
who had so little impact upon their immediate successors that their names are scarcely known to 
historians' (p. 199). 
50 
Fanu seems to suggest that the sort of emotional release women can find when talking with 
companions spends a certain amount of dangerous force which the men store up in some way.S4 
Always allowing for Le Fanu's ambiguity about the exact cause of male deaths in his fiction, 
they seem to be either from suicide or fright. These dramatic methods of demise may represent 
the final violent manifestation of this pent-up force. Carter describes the process and result of 
the sort of prolonged suppression of emotion which each male character in these three stories 
undergoes, because of the shame or embarrassment he feels at his haunting, or what he 
perceives to be its cause: 
Even when an emotion is fairly established, its effects upon the muscular system are under the 
control of the will in some degree, and for a certain time; but as each of the opposing forces is liable to 
numerous variations of strength, so neither the degree nor the time can be exactly estimated. And if the 
emotion be not in its very nature transient, its influence is found to possess a cumulative character, so that 
after being kept down for a longer or shorter period, it often breaks forth at last with increased violence, 
and through more dangerous channels. (Carter, p. 20) 
We can see a dangerous pressure building up in Barton's system, as he keeps his secret, which 
corresponds to Carter's description: 
The mind thus turned in upon itself, and constantly occupied with a haunting anxiety which it dared not 
reveal or confide to any human breast, became daily more excited, and, of course, more vividly 
impressible, by a system of attack which operated through the nervous system; and in this state he was 
destined to sustain, with increasing frequency, the stealthy visitations of that apparition which from the 
first had seemed to possess so terrible a hold upon his imagination. ('The Familiar', p. 58) 
Found with his features 'fixed, stem and white; the jaw ... fallen; and the sightless eyes, still 
open, gaz[ing] vacantly forward toward the front of the bed' (p. 80), Barton's death seems to 
have been caused by fear. If we consider once again the epigram to 'The Watcher', however, 
'Thou terrifiest me through visions: so that my soul chooseth strangling rather than my life', it 
becomes possible to see this death more clearly as self-inflicted, a want of breath that this victim 
has fundamentally chosen in preference to his haunting. In terms of the economics of the 
individual body it could be suggested that Barton has died from the 'strangling' effects of a 
hysterical attack, brought on by a steady increase of nervous excitation within his system, a fatal 
53 Sheridan Le Fanu, 'Mr Justice Harbottle', in In a Glass Darkly, pp. 83-118 (p. 116). 
54 Laura, the heroine of 'Cannilla', the exception to this rule, fmds it difficult to communicate her 
experiences, unlike Harbottle's servant, and unlike Maud of Uncle Silas. She writes, 'I write all this you 
suppose with composure. But far from it; I cannot think of it without agitation. Nothing but your earnest 
desire so repeatedly expressed, could have induced me to sit down to a task that has unstrung my nerves 
for months to come, and reinduced a shadow of the unspeakable horror which years after my deliverance 
continued to make my days and nights dreadful, and solitude insupportably terrific' (,Cannilla', in In Q 
Glass Darkly, pp. 243-319 (p. 316». The key word in this passage of course is 'unspeakable'. It is 
noteworthy that Laura's father, her only parent, had always discouraged her from talking in supernatural 
terms, to the extent that after her fIrSt adult encounter with the vampire, part of the reason why she did not 
tell her father was because 'I thought he would laugh at my story, and I could not bear its being treated as 
ajest' (p.279). 
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tension which he could not release in the outlets of emotional expression or confession.55 
Le Fanu understood the mechanics of force, therefore, on an individual level, and the 
need to retain a state of equilibrium. He could also conceive of these concepts on a much larger 
scale. In Willing to Die (1873) his last novel, the seaside landscape is a tempestuous one. A 
Catholic priest, Mr Carmel, tries to use the storm he and the novel's heroine are witnessing as a 
theological metaphor: 
y ou ~n~erstand these awful P?enomena - their causes. You remember our little talk about electricity _ 
here It IS! We know all that IS but the restoration of an equilibrium. Think what it will be when God 
restores the moral balance, and settles the equities of eternity!56 
In the application of the laws and tendencies of the universe to those of the body, or psyche, and 
vice versa, Le Fanu was drawing on a strong mystical and spiritual tradition, which utilized and 
in tum helped define the rules of force within a number of systems, each of which could provide 
a model for the next. Fechner describes the process by which he felt able to theorize on this 
world in relation to the spiritual, this life in relation to the next, in these terms - 'a better insight 
into the things below would enable us better to comprehend higher things, and from their 
mutual connexion we should comprehend the great whole of which we only form a part' (Life, 
p.86). 
Before I go on to examine more closely the idea of cosmic equilibrium, which Le Fanu 
may have encountered in the writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, it is important to note that the 
translation of natural laws seen in individual systems, to the cosmos, and vice versa, was by no 
means confined to the mystical tradition. In mid-nineteenth-century England there was an 
emphasis, in the work of certain physiologists, on the place of God in the natural world. In stark 
55 Justice Harbottle literally dies from strangling - he is found hanging from the top of his staircase, after 
being 'sentenced' to die on that day for the murder of a man he had wrongly condemned to death in court. 
Although witnesses in his household had seen various strange figures in the house on the night that he 
died, one of them with a noose in his hands, the verdict on his death was suicide: 'There was not the 
smallest sign of any struggle or resistance. There had not been heard a cry or any other noise in the 
slightest degree indicative of violence. There was medical evidence to show that, in his atrabilious state, 
it was quite on the cards that he might have made away with himself. The jury found accordingly that it 
was a case of suicide. But to those who were acquainted with the strange story which Judge Harbottle 
had related to at least two persons, the fact that the catastrophe occurred on the morning of the 10th 
March seemed a startling coincidence' CMr Justice Harbottle', pp. 117-18). This story is a good 
example of the ambiguity inherent in the collection of stories as a whole. Harbottle is in an 'atrabilious 
state' because of the ghostly trial and sentencing he has received, but its shock to his system, the fact it 
puts him 'among his blue devils', and forces him to 'thin[k] of retiring from the Bench' (p. 112) means 
that the pronouncement of murder (interestingly, made by a 'dilated effigy of himself (p. 108» strikes an 
answering chord within him, suggesting the possibility that even if the Judge had not dreamed his trial, he 
may have, like Barton, chosen, on some level, a deserved strangling, rather than a haunting by his own 
blue devils of guilt. 
56 Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, Willing to Die (1873) (London: Hutchinson & Co, 188-), p. 92. The pattern 
of the storm conforms neatly to Feuchtersleben's description of one of the effects of 'the natural law of • 
equilibrium', 'tension is followed by relaxation'. (Ernst von Feuchtersleben, The Principles 0/ Medical 
Psychology, Being the Outline 0/ a COIUse of Lectures (1845), trans. by H. Evans Lloyd, ed. by B. G. 
Babington (London: The Sydenbam Society, 1847), p. 167). Feuchtersleben is describing the changes in 
the body - an increased vitality, followed by sleep - that occur with intoxication. 
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and direct contrast to Freud's later attempt to separate out science and religion, there was, in the 
work of W. B. Carpenter and Thomas Laycock, a fundamental premise that, 'Science itself, in 
its highest and fullest development, is religion ... a knowledge of creation and its laws can only 
lead to the knowledge and love of God'. 57 This beliefled to such conceptions of the interactions 
of micro- and macrocosms, projecting a vision of what is unknown from laws that are known, as 
we see here expressed in the work of Laycock: 
If we examine the phenomena of creation in general, and of organisation in particular, we fmd 
that we arrive inductively at the same general law. Creation is a whole made up of an infinitesimal 
number of parts in relation to each other. The matter of which the earth is composed is conceivably and 
actually divisible into larger and smaller parts, until the mind reaches the abstract conception of an atomic 
or molecular division, and therewith of molecular forces. The earth itself is only a subdivision of a 
system, or harmonious putting together of masses - the solar system; and this, again, only a subdivision of 
another and more inclusive, in which solar systems play the part of a solitary planet in relation to other 
solar systems. And the mind can conceive combination after combination of such compound systems, 
until, pursuing a course wholly antagonistic to that which carries it onwards to the molecular division of 
matter, it reaches the conception of one grand whole, the Universe - the absolute created One - with all its 
parts in due relation to each other, and itself in relation to the Creator. Multiplicity of parts, therefore, 
necessarily implies a unity of parts, as the result of the great laws which regulate the uniformities of 
nature. (Mind and Brain, I, 386) 
For W. B. Carpenter this doctrine of science, in its highest form, as religion helped him 
conceive of the nature of the force operating within a variety of systems of differing sizes. It is 
in a mid-century letter to Dr. Paget that he communicated this idea most fully: 
I have been thinking much more about Mental phenomena, and have been questioning within 
myself whether Mental force should not be brought into the general category of the Vital Forces, on the 
grounds that Nervous Force excites Mental force ... and conversely Mental Force excites Nervous Force 
... It seems to me impossible to deny that this correlation is as complete as those existing among the 
physical forces ... But if such a correlation really exists between Mental and Vital and Physical forces, 
that the one may even directly produce the other, may we not regard all the physical forces of the universe 
as the direct manifestation of the Mental force of the Deity? ... The correlation of the Mental and Vital 
forces is manifested on the large scale in the phenomena of life, and the direct result of the Divine 
agency; on a smaller and more limited scale in the mutual relations of mental and corporeal activity in 
man.S8 
Fundamentally, then, these scientific commentators, current to Le Fanu, thought in terms of the 
correlations of systems, and of the forces within these systems; their belief in the dynamic 
existence of God meant that the ultimate force, the ultimate system, found root in the Deity, and 
that He was a model for the rest of creation, and creation a pattern that could be studied in order 
to understand Him. 
This was a view that was not so far from parts of the ideology of Emanuel Swedenborg 
S7 Thomas Laycock, Mind and Brain: Or the Co"elations o/Consciousness and Organisation; with their 
Applications to Philosophy, Zoology, Physiology, Mental Pathology, and the Practice 0/ Medicine, 2 vols 
(Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co., 1860), I, 84. 
,. W. B. Carpenter to Dr. Paget [n.d], in W. B. Carpenter, Nature and Man: Essays Scientific and 
Philosophical, ed. and intro. by J. Estlin Carpenter (London: Kegan Paul, Trench &. Co., 1888), pp. 52-53 
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(1688-1772).s9 Le Fanu, as is expertly argued by W. J. McConnack, was well acquainted with 
the works ofSwedenborg.60 In his Introduction to Uncle Silas, McConnack writes ofLe Fanu's 
relationship with these mystical writings, 'Swedenborgianism is not so much the ideology to 
which Le Fanu's romance-type fiction adheres, as it is the symbolism of that ideology,.61 Here, 
then, Swedenborgianism is presented not as a doctrine but as a system within which Le Fanu 
imagines, according to which he writes. In In a Glass Darkly, Hesselius confesses 'lowe 
Swedenborg a great deal' (,Green Tea', p. 16); Rev. Jennings acquires a copy of his Arcana 
Caelestia in desperate response to his haunting, annotating the passages on evil spirits with 
'Deus miseraeatur mei - "May God compassionate me'" (p.1S). These words suggest that, in 
his bewildennent, he has accepted Swedenborg's view of the universe, that he has fallen into a 
prescriptive pattern of using the mystic's works as a system according to which he will now 
view, be affected by, and react to, the bizarre events in his life. In a sense, this is a fictionalized 
(though, due to Jennings's anxiety, a rather more extreme and uncritically accepting) version of 
the sort of adoption of the Swedenborgian structure, to help shape his narratives, in which Le 
Fanu engages. Freud, too, owned one of Swedenborg's publications,62 perhaps acquired in 
response to Havelock Ellis's suggestion that the writings of 1. J. Garth Wilkinson, a 
Swedenborgian scholar, prefigured the concept of free association.63 
It is often forgotten that Swedenborg himself was originally trained in the discipline of 
sCIence. In 1. J. Garth Wilkinson's 1846 introduction to Swedenborg's work, originally 
published in 1740-1, The Economy of the Animal Kingdom, Considered Anatomically, 
Physically, and Philosophically,64 he stressed the importance of scientific knowledge in 
providing a basis for the thinker's later, more philosophical work: 
For as his doctrines rest upon the leading facts of nature, so for some time previous to his appearance, 
those facts came to light one by one, and took their appointed places in the fInnament of science. But for 
this, the mission of Swedenborg could scarcely have been accomplished. Thus the Copernican 
astronomy, which proved the sun to be the centre of the system, so changed the face of the heavens for 
man, that the revelation of the Divine Sun as the centre of the spiritual world, of Divine Love as the 
centre of creation, and of love or the will as the central power in the mind, became attested by a physical 
truth, and rested upon the widest basis of natural probability or analogy ... So again the Newtonian 
doctrine of gravitation or attraction became the ground for a doctrine of spiritual attraction, in which the 
(fP. 52-53). 
5 Bringmann, Bringmann and Medway, in 'Fechner and Psychical Research' testify that Fechner quoted 
the writings of Swedenborg extensively in his spiritual works (p. 245). 
60 Indeed, McCormack writes in his chapter on Uncle Silas, in Sheridan Le Fanu and Victorian Ireland, 
that the novel was based on a Swedenborgian model of the mirroring of mortal life and life after death 
(op. 148-94). 
6f W. J. McCormack, 'Introduction', in Sheridan Le Fanu, Uncle Silas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981), pp. vii-xx (p. xiii). 
62 See Nolan O. C. Lewis and Carney Landis, 'Freud's Library', Psychoanalytic Review, 44 (1959), 327-
54 (p. 352). 
63 See 'A Note on the Prehistory of the Technique of Analysis', in SE XVIII, 263-65, in which Freud 
aives an account of this. 
~ J. J. Garth Wilkinson, 'Introductory Remarks by the Editor', in Emanuel Swedenborg, The Economy 0/ 
the Animal Kingdom, Considered Anatomically. Physically, and Philosophically (1740-41), trans. by Rev. 
Augustus Clissold, 2 vols (London: W. Newbery, 1846), I, ix-xc. 
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omnipresence of the Divine Love, as in the former case its centrality, was manifested ... Lastly, the 
Harveian doctrine of the circulation of the blood, was a pillar in the natural mind to other spiritual truths 
combining the former, and primarily regarding the circulation of ends, or the orderly procession of love in 
all things. (Economy of the Animal Kingdom, I, lxxix-lxxx) 
Wilkinson asserts that the 'universal truths in physics ... do not differ from the truths of 
philosophy, except in degree' (1, xxv); this means that everything that exists, visible and 
invisible, can be speculated on, with a fair chance of accuracy: 
For what sense cannot teach, we may learn from science justly founded upon sense; and what the lower 
sciences cannot teach, we may learn from philosophy founded upon them, which is their own higher 
science; and what this world's philosophy, science and sense cannot attain to, is communicated by 
Revelation, which is again amenable in the same order to the threefold organism of sense, science and 
philosophy: the doctrine of God being similarly circumstanced to the doctrine of nature; and all being 
real; by no means questionable as fact, yet meant to be interrogated as respects its causes by the scientific 
and philosophical mind. (I, lxiv) 
Le Fanu wrote in the Dublin University Magazine, about the sphere of interest of the novelist, 
that 'whatever lies within the precincts of nature - no matter how wild, how terrible, how 
ludicrous - provided the conditions of human action and passion sanction it, is honestly at the 
disposal of the writer,;65 the connection we find in the tradition within which he read and wrote, 
between visible science and invisible worlds, helps us to understand that nature for him as a 
writer is a vast system, including the possibilities of revenants of various permutations (a figure 
who is a shrunken version of his living self,66 the ghost of a hand),67 haunting animals, in short, 
what could be termed the fantastic. 
The idea expressed in meteorological terms in Willing to Die, of the necessity for 
retaining equilibrium within a system, was, as I have mentioned, self-confessedly used as 
'Fechner's "principle of the tendency towards stability'" by Freud to introduce his argument in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Beyond, p. 9), and was also used much earlier, in his Project for 
a Scientific Psychology. It can be said to inform the whole of his fundamentally economic view 
of the psyche, whose health, as we have seen in his early theory of abreaction, depends on an 
ability to react in proportionate force to any stimulus it encounters. Fechner's law, which Freud 
dates to 1873, was an expression of a much more widespread understanding, which had 
permeated all walks of philosophy and science. Herbert Spencer, in his First Principles (1862) 
6S Dublin University Magazine, 60 (October 1862),483, cited in Sheridan Le Fanu and Victorian Ireland, 
~202. 
Barton asks of his doctor, '''is there any disease, in all the range of human maladies, which would have 
the effect of perceptibly contracting the stature, and the whole frame - causing the man to shrink in all his 
proportions, and yet to preserve his exact resemblance to himself in every particular - with the one 
exception, his height and bulk; any disease, mark - no matter how rare - how little believed in, generally 
_ which could possibly result in producing such an effect?'" The narrator continues, 'the physician 
replied with a smile, and a very decided negative' ('The Familiar', p. 54). Barton enquires, notably, about 
'all the range of human maladies'; this is the visible science that is only a part of the vast system of whose 
existence Barton is eventually forced to become convinced. 
67 See The House by the Ch&II'Chyard, Chapter 12 (pp. 56-(2). 
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wrote about a process which he tenned equilibration: 'In all cases ... there is a progress toward 
equilibration. That universal co-existence of antagonist forces ... necessitates the ultimate 
establishment of a balance. ,68 
Interestingly, Spencer's idea that, as the antagonist forces react against each other, 'every 
motion being motion under resistance, is continually suffering deductions; and these unceasing 
deductions finally result in the cessation of the motion' (First Principles, pp. 441-42) finds an 
echo in McConnack's account ofLe Fanu's symbolic systems, that 'the Swedenborgian world, 
and indeed other symbolic systems in his fiction ... strive towards the reconciliation of 
opposites by a process of osmosis' (Sheridan Le Fanu and Victorian Ireland, p. 247). For 
Spencer's equilibration, and Fechner's 1873 principle, were both anticipated, a century earlier, 
by the writings of Swedenborg, in a volume which Maud Ruthyn's Uncle Silas owns, Heaven 
and Hell.69 In a chapter on 'The Equilibrium of Heaven and Hell' he writes: 
Unless the Lord ruled both the heavens and the hells there could be no equilibrium, and if there 
were no equilibrium, neither heaven nor hell could exist; for all things in the universe, whether in the 
natural or the spiritual world, endure by equilibrium. That this is the fact every rational man may 
perceive, because if there were a preponderance on one part, and no resistance on the other, it is plain to 
see that both must perish. Thus the spiritual world would perish if good did not re-act against evil, and 
continually restrain its insurrection; and unless the Divine alone did this, both heaven and hell would 
perish, and with them the whole human race.70 
Finnly placed within this metaphysical tradition, then, we find the appearance of Fechner's as-
yet-unnamed law, as early as 1836. His discussion of heavenly justice in Life after Death, 
which is like a fore-echo ofMr Cannel's theological vision, contains the seed of the later law: 
But among the spirits hereafter there wiJ) be no misjudging; what was weighed amiss here wiJ) be set 
right above, and will be overweighed by an addition to the other side of the balance. For heavenly justice 
shall fmally overcome all injustice of the earth. (Life, p. 45) 
In the narratives of In a Glass Darkly, and certain other short stories by Le Fanu, the 
premature visitation of spirits to earth means that judgement is enacted here, before time. 
Captain Barton's fate neatly mirrors that of the victim of his seduction, who suffers terribly as a 
result of her father's fury. That the epigram to 'The Watcher' had appeared in Richardson's 
Clarissa, intended as a lament by a ruined woman, only serves to emphasize that in this case the 
fate of the seducer is balanced exactly with the distress of the seduced. Justice Harbottle, who 
has wrongly condemned an innocent man to death, is himself found hanging from a noose. In 
The Evil Guest (1851), the protagonist, Richard Marston, kills his cousin for money. 
Eventually, after suffering the terrors of being haunted by his victim, Marston is found, his 
68 Herbert Spencer, First Principles (London: Williams and Norgate, 1862), p. 441. 
69 As McConnack points out, it is 'the only Swedenborgian text which is named' in the novel (Sheridan 
Le Fan., and Victorian Ireland, p. 177). 
70 Emanuel Swedenborg, Heaven and ils Wonders. and Hell. from things Heard and Seen (1758) 
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throat slit horrifically. As his clergyman friend turns away. distressed from viewing the body, 'it 
seemed to him as if a soft solemn voice whispered in his ear the mystic words, "'Whoso 
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed"'. 71 Jochen Achilles calls this sort of 
exact justice 'a mirror technique', and describes its effect in 'Squire Toby's Will' on the 
relationships between father (the squire) and son (Charles): 
Weary of Squire Toby's violence, Charles once almost kills his father, strangling him to death with a 
cravat. At the end of the story it is Charles who throttles himself to death with his own cravat. He 
revokes the rebellion against his father and converts it into an act of auto-aggression. It is as if Charles 
substituted his father's identity for his own. (Achilles, p. 162). 
A similar idea of balance can be seen in Freud's Project, in what he calls the 'surprising' 
conclusion, gleaned from analysis, 'that for every compulsion there is a corresponding 
repression, that for every excessive intrusion into consciousness there is a corresponding 
amnesia' (Project, p. 350). This should be anything but surprising, however; it is but the natural 
characteristic of a system, of whatever size, that, if it obeys mechanistic theories of the 
conservation of force, it holds a certain constant energy within itself. We have seen Helmholtz 
express this law thus: 'the quantity of force which can be brought into action in the whole of 
Nature is unchangeable, and can neither be increased nor diminished,.72 Fechner understood 
this in 1836. It found its place within his conception of the system of the universe in Life after 
Death: 
Conscious energy is in fact never produced afresh, nor can it be absolutely destroyed. Similar to the body 
with which it is connected, it may change its place, form, and activity, in time and space. When it sinks 
to-day in one place, it will rise in another place, tomorrow. (Life, p. 74) 73 
In 'Carmilla' this rule of the conservation of force might also seem to underpin the events 
of the story, after all, the satiating of the vampire means the weakening of the victim: 'She used 
to gloat on me with increasing ardour the more my strength and spirits waned.' ('Carmilla', p. 
281) It is in 'Carmilla', however, that we see the effects of what could have been seen as a 
morbid aberration to which force-filled systems could be vulnerable. Carmilla, the vampire, 
literally drains the microcosm (the individual of blood) and the macrocosm (the aristocratic 
~ondon: Swedenborg Society, 1937), pp. 491-92. 
1 Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, 'The Evil Guest' (1851), in Ghost Stories and Tales of Mystery, pp. 136-304 
(p.301). 
12 H. Helmholtz, 'On the Conservation of Force' (1862), in Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, First 
Series, trans. by E. Atkinson (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1884), pp. 277-317 (p. 280). 
73 This principle found its way into Le Fanu's work in small ways as well as great; the world of Uncle 
Silas seems (especially if we take into account the view of McCormack who believes that, according to 
Swedenborgian doctrine, Silas can only be introduced to Maud after the death of her father, as he is his 
alter ego) a macrocosm of contained energies, manifested in the tendency which it displays for each 
character to emerge and then, often, to sink to make way for the next. Doctor Bryerley in Uncle Silas, 
last seen at Knowl, 'emerges' at Bartram-Haugh ('Doctor Bryerley emerges' is the title of Chapter 37; 
Chapter 44 is named 'A Friend Arises'). 
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family of heirs, society of population) due to a lack within her own system that must constantly 
and repetitively be replenished. A parasitic void or gap in the fabric of the larger system, in a 
sense she acts, like the suicide that begins the vampiric process, as a sort of ejection from the 
natural macrocosm. She is a site (in Fechner's terms) which energy sinks into, but in contrast to 
its behaviour in other systems, this energy is then destroyed. In her continuous need to satiate 
herself, to restore her own equilibrium, Carmilla unbalances other individual systems and 
society.74 Her lesbianism, 'an engrossing vehemence, resembling the passion oflove' towards a 
victim she 'husban[ ds]' (p. 317) is but a manifestation of her anti-generative nature; her only 
reproduction, her mUltiplication, occurs with the creation of a state of death, rather than new 
life, in others (p. 318). Laura, the vampire's victim, is troubled by another sort of 
unproductiveness in Carmilla, a verbal one: 'I found that she exercised with respect to herself, 
her mother, her history, everything in fact connected with her life, plans, and people, an ever 
wakeful reserve' (p. 262). In perceiving that she has offended Laura with her reticence, 
Carmilla responds, 'think me not cruel because I obey the irresistible law of my strength and 
weakness': 
'I live in your wann life, and you shall die - die, sweetly die - into mine. 1 cannot help it; as 1 draw near 
to you, you, in your tum, will draw near to others, and learn the rapture of that cruelty, which yet is love; 
so, for a while, seek to know no more of me and mine, but trust me with all your loving spirit' (p. 263). 
In exhorting Laura to the ways of vampirism, Carmilla is encouraging her to enter a new system 
with its own set of laws, a medial structure between dead and living, in which energy, once it 
sinks, must be replenished from the resources of the living world. Hesselius's only quoted 
comment on the case, that it involves 'some of the profoundest arcana of our dual existence, and 
its intermediates' (p. 243), makes clear the transitional nature of the system within which the 
vampire operates, neither in life nor death, but in thrall to its own set of laws, which, above 
anything, require it to feed, to drain.7s In a sense it is as if Le Fanu in 'Carmilla' is exploring 
the possibility of the sicknesses, the diseases of the macrocosm. Carmilla, with her urge to 
destroy the healthy components of society, of ancient families, so that they can then repeat the 
process with others, can be likened to an agent of infection, of contagion; a pathogen. 
'4 An idea of the revenant, or spirit's ability to unbalance natural states is seen before Cannilla arrives; in 
talking of the full moon's encouragement of spiritual activity, Mademoiselle De Lafontaine, 'in right of 
her father, who was a German, assumed to be psychological, metaphysical, and something of a mystic', 
tells of her cousin, who had slept on the deck of a ship on the night of a full moon, and 'had wakened, 
after a dream of an old woman clawing him by the cheek, with his features horribly drawn to one side; 
and his countenance had never quite recovered its equilibrium' ('Carmilla', p. 2S 1). 
75 Robert Tracy, in his editorial commentary on Hesselius's interpretation, offers a helpful illumination of 
the state of affairs in 'Cannilla' using Swedenborg's philosophy. He points out that 'our dual existence 
is, as in Swedenborg's teachings, in the spiritual and material worlds. Swedenborg describes "The world 
of spirits" as "a place intermediate between heaven and hell, and ... also the intermediate state of man 
after death". It is a kind of posthumous purgatory or testing place, where humanity is purged and the 
individual inclines towards heaven or hell. Hesselius seems to posit a similar state between life and death 
where the ''undead'' exist' (In a Glass Dar/cJy, p. 344 n.). 
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This, the last tale in In a Glass Darkly, is the most extreme example in Le Fanu's fiction 
of the production of symptoms in the larger system due to a crucial and morbid imbalance of 
individual energies. This is the logical end-result of a process that starts when in the first story 
in the anthology, Dr. Hesselius directly attributes the rather less far-reaching (though personally 
catastrophic) symptoms of the Rev. Jennings to a disturbance of equilibrium in a bodily system 
of which, interestingly, 'the brain is the heart': 
You know my tract on The Cardinal Functions of the Brain. I there, by the evidence of 
innumerable facts, prove, as I think, the high probability of a circulation arterial and venous in its 
mechanism, through the nerves. Of this system, thus considered, the brain is the heart. The fluid, which 
is propagated hence through one class o( nerves, returns in an altered state through another, and the nature 
of that fluid is spiritual, though not immaterial, any more than, as I before remarked, light or electricity 
are so. 
By various abuses, among which the habitual use of such agents as green tea is one, the fluid 
may be affected as to its quality, but it is more frequently disturbed as to equilibrium. This fluid being 
that which we have in common with spirits, a congestion found upon the masses of brain or nerve, 
connected with the interior sense, forms a surface unduly exposed, on which disembodied spirits may 
operate: communication is thus more or less effectually established. ('Green Tea', pp. 38-39) 
However, the lack or attainment of stability within a system is only one of its characteristics, 
and in 'Green Tea' this symptom-triggering lack of equilibrium is only one possible link in an 
aetiological chain that results in the Rev. Jennings's haunting and suicide. In this as in so many 
other of his short stories, it is in Le Fanu's ambiguity, which suggests many interpretations, but 
fully allows none, that we see an unusual variety of aetiological possibilities which exposes 
different characteristics of individual and wider systems that would be hidden by the narrow 
focus of certainty. 
In the next section I will examine 'Green Tea' as a case history. Just as case studies 
were necessary in Freud's work to show psychoanalytic models in action, Le Fanu's systems are 
best seen by the examples provided in the experiences of his characters, and especially in the 
symptoms produced by an abnormality or weakness in the individual which, interacting with the 
larger system, can spell doom to an unfortunate subject. 'Green Tea' seems to be a meeting-
point where ideas from the scientific-mystical tradition that I have already discussed are 
especially concentrated and form a problematic, or ambiguous aspect, to physiological theories, 
current to Le Fanu, of the creation of symptoms. My hope is that I have outlined the way in 
which the world-view of the scientific-mystical tradition may have influenced Freud's 
conception of the psyche, however unwitting he was of this. 'Green Tea', informed by similar 
philosophies is, in a sense, a side-effect of this process, a text which in many different ways 
serves to demonstrate the extent and nature of Le Fanu' s anticipation of psychoanalytic theory 
and therapy. In fact, it is actually in Le Fanu's portrayal of therapy, in the person of Dr 
Hesselius, that much of this anticipation is concentrated. That this is the case is not a departure 
from the spiritual tradition that I have identified as common to Le Fanu and Freud. Rather, I 
hope to clarify what I have already implied in my early suggestion that Hesselius is a literary 
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descendant of Father Purcell: that the role of the 'philosophic physician' of 'Green Tea', like 
that of the psychoanalyst, is simply a version of the traditional spiritual position of confessor, of 
'Father'. This privileged role, however, cannot be anything but compromised by the additional 
mantle of 'case history narrator' that these two figures assume. 
'Green Tea': A Case Study 
The case study of Rev. Jennings is found, as many of Freud's early thoughts and accounts of 
case histories would be found in the Fliess letters, amid the papers of Dr VanLoo, of Leyden. 
This is Le Fanu's first and last pure case history within In a Glass Darkly. After this initial 
story, narrated throughout (after a brief preface from his editor), by Dr. Hesselius, the 
philosophic physician gradually disappears from the anthology. The following stories are 
narrated by other witnesses, and fmally, with 'Carmilla', by the victim herself.76 Hesselius, 
having been given free rein of interpretation in 'Green Tea', now becomes a subordinate to 
Laura. As the editor explains: 
As I publish the case, in these volumes, simply to interest the 'laity', I shall forestall the 
intelligent lady, who relates it, in nothing; and, after due consideration, I have detennined, therefore, to 
abstain from presenting any precis of the learned Doctor's reasoning, or extract from his statement. 
('Carmilla', p. 243) 
This fading-out of Hesselius, in an anthology one of whose major characteristics is a peculiarly 
apt meting out of justice, is entirely fitting; for in 'Green Tea' it is his voice that drowns out 
Jennings's tragic story, his version of the narrative that prevails; in 'Carmilla', therefore, this 
imbalance is rectified. Nevertheless, although it is remedied at the end of the collection, it is the 
case that 'Green Tea' remains an example of an imbalanced narrative, that Le Fanu, in his 
setting it right, obviously perceives it as such; this surely inspires questions about the case 
history genre as a whole. 
In classing 'Green Tea' in a 'case history genre' I am not simply likening Le Fanu's 
short story to Freud's case studies. I am also suggesting, with many other critics, and with 
Freud himself, that his accounts of his patients' symptoms and treatment could approach fiction. 
Steven Marcus has discussed Freud's Dora case as a literary text, arguing that, 'Freud's case 
histories - and his works in general - are unique as pieces or kinds of writing, and it may be 
useful to examine one of Freud's case histories from the point of view of literary criticism'. 77 
76 The story preceding 'Cannilla', 'The Room in the Dragon Volant', is also narrated by the protagonist; 
however, as this text, an adventure of conspiracy, rather than the account of a haunting, proves an 
exception to the general theme of the collection, I am not considering it in this chapter. 
77 Steven Marcus, 'Freud and Dora: Story, History, Case History', in In Dora's Case: Freud - Hysteria -
Feminism, ed. by Charles Bernheim and Claire Kahane (London: Virago, 1985), pp. 56-91 (p.56). Mary 
Jacobus has also considered the 'literariness' of the case histories in Studies on Hysteria, in Reading 
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The following two comparable passages, the first from 'Green Tea', and the second from the 
case of 'Frau Emmy von N' in Studies on Hysteria only serve to confmn the existence of a case 
history genre within which both Freud and Le Fanu produce their narratives: 
The Rev. Mr Jennings is tall and thin. He is middle-aged, and dresses with a natty, old-fashioned, high-
church precision. He is naturally a little stately, but not at all stiff. His features, without being handsome, 
are weB-formed, and their expression extremely kind, but also shy. ('Green Tea', p. 6) 
This lady, when I fIrst saw her, was lying on a sofa with her head resting on a leather cushion. She still 
looked young and had fmely-cut features, fuB of character. Her face bore a strained and painful 
expression, her eyelids were drawn together and her eyes cast down. (Studies on Hysteria, p. 48) 
In the same 'anthology' in which the second description appears, Freud himself acknowledged 
that his case histories 'read like short stories', but that the literary quality of his accounts of the 
aetiology and treatment of a patient's symptoms was not just appropriate, but entirely necessary: 
I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other neuropathologists, I was trained to employ 
local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it stilI strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I 
write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science. I 
must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, 
rather than any preference of my own. The fact is that local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead 
nowhere in the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental processes such as we are 
accustomed to fmd in the works of imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few psychological 
formulas, to obtain at least some kind of insight into the course of that affection. Case histories of this 
kind are intended to be judged like psychiatric ones; they have, however, one advantage over the latter, 
namely an intimate connection between the story of the patient's sufferings and the symptoms of his 
illness - a connection for which we still search in vain in th~ biographies of other psychoses. (Studies on 
Hysteria, pp. 160-61) 
It is, in a sense, this firm connection between biography and symptom that eludes Hesselius, 
who uses Jennings's life story as an opportunity to display his powers of deduction (which 
cause Lady Mary to declare him a 'conjurer' ('Green Tea', p. 12», yet ultimately fails to see the 
relevance of Jennings's history"to his haunting, and later, to his suicide. In the following pages 
I shall examine the case of Mr. Jennings, in terms of its 'intimate connection between the story 
of the patient's sufferings and the symptoms of his illness,' a link which Le Fanu repeatedly 
suggests rather than confirms, but which Hesselius effectively misses, an oversight which leads 
to tragic results. 
Rev. Jennings suffers from terrifying hallucinations of a small black monkey, who 
constantly watches him, sleeping and waking, and sometimes speaks to him. The monkey 
Woman: Essays in Feminist Criticism (London: Methuen, 1986), pp. 197-204, suggesting that Freud saw 
this quality as imposed on what would be his otherwise scientific writing by his subjects, whose hysteria, 
in a sense, spills out into his nmative, which becomes 'a form of hysterical utterance' (p. 197). More 
generally, Malcolm Bowie explores Freud's literary talents in Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as 
Fiction, and Bnmo Bettelheim, in Freud and Man's Soul, writes of the admiration the beauty of Freud's 
writing caused among bis contemporaries, particularly Albert Einstein, claiming that Freud modelled bis 
writing on Goethe. (pp. 8-9) 
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appears in a period in Jennings's life when he has been engaged in a great deal of study, and 
drinking green tea to aid him. A strictly physical view of this case can be taken from these 
facts. James Sully, echoing many of his colleagues, wrote in 1881, 'we must recognize the fact 
that most men are sometimes liable to illusion' (lliusions, p. 2). Citing the German doctor 
Wilhelm Griesinger, he writes that 'the action of poisons', as well as other causes, 'appears to 
predispose the central structures to an abnormal kind of activity' (Illusions, p. 116). Indeed, it 
would not even take this much to prompt the sight of illusions in a normal man: 
A momentary fatigue of the nerves, a little mental excitement, a relaxation of the effort of attention by 
which we continually take our bearings with respect to the real world about us, will produce just the same 
kind of confusion of reality and phantasm which we observe in the insane ... Our luminous circle of 
rational perception is surrounded by a misty penumbra of illusion. (Illusions, pp. 2-3) 
It is only a step on from this to Dr Hesselius's explanation of hauntings due to the loss of 
equilibrium in the nervous fluid of the subject, caused by 'various abuses'; in fact Hesselius's 
view of the case can be seen as simply a description of a larger system which includes Sully's 
viewpoint. The one difference is the possibility that the illusions in Le Fanu's world are real. 
By the time we get to Jennings's case history this is a truly ambiguous issue; earlier in Le 
Fanu's career, however, the spirit world is much more (though not fully) tangible, proofs in the 
form of multiple sightings being supplied, for example. Yet physical susceptibility is still a vital 
factor in manifestation of this spirit world. In' An Account of Some Strange Disturbances in 
Aungier Street' (first published in The Dublin University Magazine in 1853), a medical student, 
staying in a house of dubious history, experiences nightly a 'dream, nightmare, or infernal 
illusion - which you please,,'8 in which a painting of an evil-looking figure is held in front of 
his vision, until the morning comes. Drawing on his medical knowledge, he attempts to find a 
tonic that will cure this: 
I will do this tonic justice, and frankly admit that the accursed portrait began to intermit its visits 
under its influence. What of that? Was this singular apparition - as full of character as of terror -
therefore the creature of my fancy, or the invention of my poor stomach? Was it, in short, subjective (to 
borrow the technical slang of the day) and not the palpable aggression and intrusion of an external agent? 
That, good friend, as we will both admit, by no means follows. The evil spirit, who enthralled my senses 
in the shape of that portrait, may have been just as near me, just as energetic, just as malignant, though I 
saw him not. What means the whole moral code of revealed religion regarding the due keeping of our 
own bodies, soberness, temperance, etc.? here is an obvious conn ex ion between the material and the 
invisible; the healthy tone of the system, and its unimpared energy, may, for aught we can tell, guard us 
against influences which would otherwise render life itself terrific. The mesmerist and the electro-
biologist will fail upon an average with nine patients out of ten - so may the evil spirit. Special 
conditions of the corporeal system are indispensable to the production of certain spiritual phenomena. 
The operation succeeds sometimes - sometimes fails - that is all. (pp. 364-65) 
This philosophy similarly finds a place in Fechner's Life after Death: 
71 J. S. Le Fanu, • An Account of Some Strange Disturbances in Aungier Street' (1853), in Best Ghost 
Stories, (New Yark: Dover, 1964), pp. 361-79 (p. 363). 
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We often wonder whence such a thought had got into our minds; some longing, or some 
melancholy, or happy mood will come over us we know not how or why; an inward voice persuades us to 
act, or exhorts us to forbear acting, though all the time we are not conscious of any motive of our own 
tending one way or other. This is the influence of spirits entering into us, thinking and acting into us from 
centres different from our own. Such effects are the more striking in certain abnormal conditions of the 
mind - in somnambulism or mental distraction - when the relation of mutual dependence has been 
decided in their favour, making us entirely passive under their influence, without any reaction on our own 
part. As long, however, as our mind is awake and in a state of health it cannot become a mere toy, 
without a will of its own, of the spirits that have grown into it and become a living part of it. (pp.29-30) 
This spirit world that finds its way into us includes 'spirits opposed to each other, so that their 
presence in the same human mind is incompatible' (p. 31); Swedenborg believed that, 
ordinarily, 'spirits do not know at all that they are with man' .79 Later these spirits would find 
their way into Freud's concept of the unconscious, especially in the possibility of 'the existence 
in us not only of a second consciousness, but of a third, fourth, perhaps of an unlimited number 
of states of consciousness, all unknown to us and to one another' ('The Unconscious', p. 170). 
Jennings's first encounter with the monkey is symptomatic of the whole haunting. In its 
advanced stage, the monkey was in the habit of launching 'a dreadful interruption' to the vicar's 
prayers by swaying mesmerically; when he was in the pulpit reading the scriptures, the monkey 
would squat on the Bible, blotting out the words. Likewise, then, when Jennings first notices 
the monkey it is at a time when 'on the whole, existence had never been, I think, so pleasant 
before' (p. 22). It serves as an interruption, in every sense disconnected from him, an alien. In 
this it resembles the Freudian symptoms, which, 'give the patient himself the impression of 
being all-powerful guests from an alien world, immortal beings intruding into the turmoil of 
mortal life', a belief that, Freud claims, proves beyond doubt the existence 'of a special region 
of the mind, shut off from the rest' ('Lecture XVIII', p. 278). 
The perception of unconscious processes by consciousness can be likened to 'the 
perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs' ('The Unconscious,' p. 171). As 
the case of Captain Barton suggests, Jennings is certainly not alone in his feeling that his life is 
being intruded upon by an alien being. In 'The Evil Guest', Richard Marston, haunted by the 
cousin he has killed, uses an interesting metaphor in describing his terror: "'it is a fear of 
nothing mortal, but of the immortal tenant of this body. My mind, sir, is beginning to play me 
tricks; my guide mocks and terrifies me'" (p. 279). Marston's words, 'immortal tenant of this 
body' link his deepest fear to himself, and also recall Freud's famous assertion about the ego, 
that it 'is not master in its own house.,ao Further, the understanding they give that there is a part 
of ourselves that is indestructible provides a fore-echo of Freud's idea, expressed in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, of the immortality of all unconscious mental acts. al In positing that 
79 A Compendium of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, ed. by Rev. S. M. Warren 
(London: Swedenborg Society, 1939), p. 609. 
10 Sigmund Freud, 'A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis' (l917), in SE. XVII, 135-44 (p. 143). I. Freud writes, in a note, of unconscious wishes: 'They share this character of indestructibility with all 
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there are such things as immortal unconscIous processes, surely Freud IS here simply 
reproducing the idea of a spirit, or soul, in scientific language. 
Wilhelm Griesinger, in his Mental Pathology and Therapeutics, published in England in 
1867, gives an account of patients who have similar symptoms to Jennings, who testifies that 
the monkey's voice 'comes like a singing through my head' (p. 31). Barton's and Marston's 
symptoms, the suffering of 'wicked appearances', also find expression in this passage. The 
debate that invariably takes place within each character to whom revenants appear takes into 
account at some level the possibility that they are suffering a 'mental seeing' or a 'mental 
hearing'; nineteenth-century mental scientists like Griesinger go some way to informing this 
constantly inconclusive discussion in Le Fanu's fiction: 
In mental diseases hallucinations are almost invariably considered as realities. Still, in 
occasional cases, especially at the commencement, the patient admits their morbid nature. Sometimes, 
indeed, we hear the patients declare that they know very well that it is no ordinary hearing or seeing, it is 
a mental hearing - some one 'composes to him in his head,' &c., or he complains bitterly that the malice 
of strangers, the medicines which he has taken, &c., have caused such wicked appearances, and he 
expresses in his own peculiar way the idea that he is governed by something in his mind which is opposed 
and perfectly foreign to his 1. 82 
In all the characters in Le Fanu's fiction who suffer from the appearance of revenants there is 
something of this last idea, which especially mirrors Marston's description of the immortal 
tenant of his body, the guide that mocks him. Further, Griesinger's closing words reflect 
Freud's later theories more minutely than may appear at first. For the 'I' Griesinger describes is 
exactly the same term as Freud's 'ego'; both start as Ich in German.83 Indeed, another of 
Bettelheim's concerns with Strachey's translation of Freud's works is that the full resonance of 
Ich is not rendered in the word 'ego' ,84 that its 'intimate' and 'personal' (p. 53) connotations are 
lost; 'If anything, the German Ich is invested with stronger and deeper personal meaning than 
the English "1''' (p. 55), since the English 'me' is taken under the term Ich also. That I am not 
the master in my own house reflects Victorian anxieties much more deeply, and touches the 
heart ofLe Fanu's phenomenological narratives. 
The disclosure that the ego is not master in its own house, Freud asserted, is the third in a 
line of revelations made to mankind, which serve to knock him from his position as the centre 
other mental acts which are truly unconscious, i.e. which belong to the system Ucs. only. These are paths 
which have been laid down once and for all, which never fall into disuse and which, whenever an 
unconscious excitation re-cathects them, are always ready to conduct the excitatory process to discharge. 
If I may use a simile, they are only capable of annihilation in the same sense as the ghosts in the 
underworld of the Odyssey - ghosts which awoke to new life as soon as they tasted blood.' (The 
Interpretation o/Dreams. SE. IV & V, ix-629 (p. 553 n.» 
82 W. Griesinger, Mental Pathology and Therapeutics (1845) (London: New Sydenham Society, 1867), p. 
92. 
83 Wilhelm Griesinger, Die Pathologie amd Therapie der psychischen KranJcheiten, fiJr Aertze amd 
Studirende dargestellt (Stuttgart: Verlag von Adolph Krabbe, 1845), p. 76. Freud owned a copy of this 
work (Lewis and Landis, 'Freud's Library', p. 335). 
84 See Bettelheim, pp. 53-64. 
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of the universe. The second was Darwin's denial that man is at the pinnacle of creation. 
George Romanes, in his Mental Evolution in Man,85 describes the effect of this disclosure in 
prosaic detail: 
After centuries of intellectual conquest in all regions of the phenomenal universe, man has at last begun to 
find that he may apply in a new and most unexpected manner the adage of antiquity - Know thyself. For 
he has begun to perceive a strong probability, if not an actual certainty, that his own living nature is 
identical in kind with the nature of all other life, and that even the most amazing side of this his own 
nature - nay, the most amazing of all things within the reach of his knowledge - the human mind itself, is 
but the topmost inflorescence of one mighty growth, whose roots and stem and many branches are sunk in 
the abyss of planetary time. Therefore, with Professor Huxley we may say: - "The importance of such an 
inquiry is indeed intuitively manifest. Brought face to face with these blurred copies of himself, the least 
thoughtful of men is conscious of a certain shock, due perhaps not so much to disgust at the aspect of 
what looks like an insulting caricature, as to the awaking of a sudden and profound mistrust of time-
honoured theories and strongly rooted prejudices regarding his own position in nature, and his relations to 
the wider world of life". 86 
Romanes quotes from Huxley's Evidence to Man IS Place in Nature (1863), which Le Fanu may 
have read, and probably would have been aware of. It is the combination of Romanes's 
exhortation to 'Know thyself with the image of the ape in the mirror that is suggestive. 
Jennings, though he claims separation from the ape, is connected to it without his consent. 
Or perhaps it is the case that, in certain subtle ways, the monkey that appears to 
Jennings is answering to a latent part of himself, a part that does not often see the light.87 In 
mainstream writings on the appearance of hallucinations and illusions at this time, or slightly 
later, the impression was given, prefiguring something of Freud's notion of unconscious wishes, 
that patients invited their symptoms in some way. Feuchtersleben commands, 'Pronounce 
yourself in health, and you may become so' (The Dietetics of the Soul, p. 47); this was reflected 
later in the century by such publications as Henry Maudsley's Natural Causes and Supernatural 
Seemings, (1886), which pinpointed the state of expectation as a large factor in the appearance 
of hallucinations.88 James Sully's attribution of illusion to pre-perception prefigures Freud's 
account in Project for a Scientific Psychology of the danger that wishful impulses will, from a 
hasty investment in what the individual thinks is reality, fuel the creation of hallucinations 
(Project, p. 319). Sully suggests that by fostering an expectation of what we think we see we 
meet the illusion half-way (Illusions, p. 28). This expectation, the pre-perception, is what Sully 
calls the 'passive' stage of the visual process, awaking the mental images in memory; the other 
'being that of perception proper' (p. 27). The creation of an expectation behind the scenes, as it 
were, before its subject fully realizes what is happening, is illustrated in Le Fanu' s description 
8S Freud owned a copy of this work (Lewis and Landis, 'Freud's Library', p. 354). 
86 George Romanes, Mental Evolution in Man: Origin of Human Faculty (London: Kegan Paul, Trench 
and Co., 1888), pp. 2-3. 
87 Hesselius's description of the faculty Jennings needs to see the monkey only adds to this feeling, 'I 
have met with, and treated, as my book shows, fifty-seven cases of this kind of vision, which 1 term 
indifferently "sublimated', "precocious", and "interior''' ('Green Tea', p. 38, emphasis mine). 
88 Henry Maudsley, Nahll'al Causes and Supernatural Seemings (London: Kegan Paul, Trench &. Co., 
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of the haunting in Aungier Street: 
I became somehow conscious of a sort of horrid but undefmed preparation going forward in some 
unknown quarter, and by some unknown agency, for my torment; and, after an interval, which always 
seemed to me of the same length, a picture suddenly flew up to the window, where it remained fixed, as if 
by an electrical attraction, and my discipline of horror then commenced, to last perhaps for hours. 
(' Aungier Street', p. 364) 
For although Jennings's haunting by the monkey was a surprise to him, there is a sense in which 
it has been prepared for, on a less than conscious level. Jennings himself gives the clue to this 
in his description of his studies, as 'not good for the mind - the Christian mind, I mean': 
'Paganism is all bound together in essential unity, and, with evil sympathy, their religion involves their 
art, and both their manners, and the subject is a degrading fascination and the nemesis sure. God forgive 
me! 
'I wrote a great deal; I wrote late at night. I was always thinking on the subject, walking about, 
wherever I was, everywhere. It thoroughly infected me.' ('Green Tea', p. 21) 
Jennings's own diagnosis is encapsulated here in the mixture of the ideas of 'evil sympathy' and 
'nemesis'; that is, attraction or association by likeness, and justice or balance. I have already 
discussed something of the latter, as one characteristic of the systems that informed Le Fanu's 
work. The former is also a characteristic of these systems, working to the advantage or 
disadvantage of the individual according to certain laws. The Swedenborgian philosophy that 
pervades 'Green Tea' gives an idea of these laws. Jennings himself describes the effect of the 
law propounded in Swedenborg's words, 'The evil spirits associated with man are, indeed, from 
the hells' ('Green Tea', p. 14): 
As food is taken in softly at the lips, and then brought under the teeth, as the tip of the little finger caught 
in a mill crank will draw in the hand, and the arm, and the whole body, so the miserable mortal who has 
been once caught frrmly by the end of the fmest fibre of his nerve, is drawn in and in, by the enormous 
machinery of hell, until he is as I am. (p. 31) 
There is a certain attraction within the system, especially strong between like and like, so that 
once tainted, the individual is inexorably caught up with evil. It starts with a certain gravitation 
towards evil, such as we see in Le Fanu's story 'Squire Toby's Will': 'It behoves us all to act 
promptly on our good resolutions. There is a determined gravitation towards evil, which, if left 
to itself, will bear down first intentions. ,89 This gravity has had its effect on Jennings's spiritual 
life. Now unable to pray, there is no way out for him. Swedenborg describes this process: 
It is different with those who cannot be reformed and regenerated. To them also good spirits are 
adjoined, that they may be withheld by them as much as possible from evil; but their immediate 
1886), see especially pp. 192-203 . 
., Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, 'Squire Toby's Will: A Ghost Story' (1868), in Madam Crowl's Ghost and 
other Stories, ed. by M. R. James (Ware, Wordsworth Editions, 1994), pp. 15-40 (p. 30). 
66 
conjunction is with evil spirits who communicate with hell, - from whence they have spirits of such 
characters as the men are themselves. (Compendium, p. 610) 
As might be expected, Fechner provides something of a link between Sweden borg and Freud, at 
the same time providing a description of Jennings's plight through the laws of gravity and 
association: 
Besides, kindred spirits will fmd, and associate with, each other, flying from contrary ones, if not 
forced to stay. The good spirits within us call other good spirits around us, and the evil spirits within us 
attract the evil ones. Pure spirits rejoice to come and live in a pure mind, but outward evil takes hold of 
the evil within us ... good spirits when they see the impossibility of reclaiming a soul from the 
predominant evil ones, leave it all to them, and it becomes a hell, a place full of the torment of the 
damned. (pp. 33-34) 
Freud's theories of symptom-formation are based on the law of association, a law which I will 
explore in more detail in the next chapter. In Freud's Project of 1895, we see something similar 
to Fechner's system of spiritual attraction and association in the idea of the cathexis of a 
neurone attracting the Q in the system. The more loaded a neurone is, according to this rule, the 
more energy will flow towards it (Project, p. 319). A similar idea is found in the facilitation of 
paths in the nervous system - the more force passes through these paths, the easier they become 
to traverse (p. 301); a concept (as we shall see in the next chapter) rooted in nineteenth-century 
association theory, yet which also finds ancestry in theories of the gravity inherent in the spirit 
world. 
I have not touched so far on the ancestry of ideas, common to Freud and Le Fanu, found 
m German romanticism, that tradition from which came Schelling's phrase, 'the eternal 
unconscious' (cited in Whyte, p. 125). Much has been written on The Dublin University 
Magazine's enthusiasm for German literature.90 In Hoffman's Der Sandmann ('The Sandman') 
(1816) we find a passage which accords with Freud's view of the mind, but also provides a 
commentary on In a Glass Darkly.91 The passage is in a letter from Clara to Nathanael. Its 
narrative status is ambiguous as Clara is here reporting what she and her brother, Lothaire, have 
90 See Patrick O'Neill, Ireland and Germany: A Study in Literary Relations (New York: Peter Lang, 
1985). He describes 'the days of the Dublin University Magazine' as 'the heyday of German literature in 
Ireland' (p. 92). Later he says, 'The Dublin University Magazine, the most important Irish literary journal 
for several decades after its foundation in 1833 was also the most enthusiastic Irish propagator of German 
literature' (p. 96). 
91 We know that Freud read this story, relatively late in his career, as his essay on 'The Uncanny', in 
which he pronounced, 'Hoffman is the unrivalled master of the uncanny in literature' is based upon it 
('The Uncanny' (1919), in SE, XVII, 217-256 (p. 233». We do not know for certain that Le Fanu read 
Hoffman's story. A translation of 'The Sandman' (from which I am taking the passage below) was 
published in 1844, in a collection entitled Tales from the German: Comprising Specimens from the most 
Celebrated Authors, translated by John Oxenford and C. A. Feiling (London: Chapman and Hall, 1844), 
pp. 140-65. This collection included three tales by Hoffman, and, among other works, a story by Hauff 
entitled 'The Severed Hand', whose title may recall the narrative of the ghost of a hand in chapter 12 of 
The House by the Churchyard. One of the other tales by Hoffman in the collection, 'The Elementary 
Spirit', bears certain similarities to 'The Familiar': a sceptical military man is won over to belief in the 
spirit world by manifestations that leave him broken. 
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discussed, but chiefly what he has said to her, on the subject of Nathanael's haunting by the 
figure of the lawyer Coppelius (who is associated in his mind with the figure of the Sandman, 
who tears out the eyes of children). She writes afterwards, 'I find 1 have not been able to write 
down the chief part without trouble ... Lothaire's words 1 do not quite comprehend' (,The 
Sandman', p. 148). This casts the passage in a light that is problematical, the same 
characteristic we encounter with most explanations of phenomena in Le Fanu's fiction. This 
element of ambiguity is something which Le Fanu and Hoffman both display; we could say, 
then, that they share similar ideologies of uncertainty. Clara writes: 
If there is a dark power, which with such enmity and treachery lays a thread within us, by which 
it holds us fast, and draws us along a path of peril and destruction, which we should not otherwise have 
trod; if, I say, there is such a power, it must fonn itself within us, or from ourselves; indeed, become 
identical with ourselves, for it is only in this condition that we can believe in it, and grant it the room 
which it requires, to accomplish its secret work. Now, if we have a mind, which is sufficiently ftrm, 
sufftciently strengthened by cheerful life, always to recognise this strange hostile operation as such, and 
calmly to follow the path which belongs to our inclination and calling, then will the dark power fail in its 
attempt to gain a power, that shall be a reflection of ourselves. Lothaire adds that it is certain, that the 
dark physical power, if of our own accord, we have yielded ourselves up to it, often draws within us some 
strange form, which the external world has thrown in our way, so that we ourselves kindle the spirit, 
which, as we in our strange delusion believe, speaks to us in that fonn. It is the phantom of our own 
selves, the close relationship with which, and its deep operation on our mind casts us into hell, or 
transports us into heaven. ('The Sandman', p. 147-48) 
The image of Coppelius in Nathanael's mind, then, is a phantom of himself. The force which 
has entered his system has, because of a lack of some sort of strength in him, been accepted and 
embraced as some sort of reflection of himself. That the particular spirit that haunts Jennings 
also forms a reflection of him is obvious in a literal sense, 'I soon saw with tolerable 
distinctness the outline of a small black monkey, pushing its face forward in mimicry to meet 
mine' ('Green Tea', p. 23). It is in Swedenborg's description of haunting spirits, that they are 
'of such characters as the men are themselves' that are being tormented, that we begin to get a 
fuller idea of the relation of the monkey to Jennings. 
Jennings's sin is, as he perceives himself, that of seeing too much; knowing too much 
about the object of his study, the pagans, reading too much about their manners, looking, too 
long perhaps at their art, in what he himself describes as a 'degrading fascination' .92 That he is 
constantly watched by the monkey is an indication that what he is seeing is a reflection of 
himself, in a glass darkly.93 The title of the collection is interesting in many ways, taken from 1 
92 In Helen Stoddart's '''The Precautions of Nervous People are Infectious": Sheridan Le Fanu's 
Symptomatic Gothic' (Modern Language Review, 86 (1991), 19-34), she argues very effectively that 
Jennings's haunting guilt springs from a latent homosexuality. Jennings's unmarried state means that he 
has failed the demands of the species, crystallized at that time in Darwinism, to reproduce, to be 
heterosexual. This can be seen to be compounded with the sin of looking, for it may be assumed that in 
the art of paganism there were many sorts of sexual activity, unencumbered by lines dividing hetero- and 
homosexuality, depicted. 
93 This provides something of a foreshadowing of Freud's case, 'From the History of an Infantile 
Neurosis' (1918), in SE, XVII, 1-123. This patient, known as the Wolf-Man, dreamt oftive or six white 
wolves in a tree outside his window that stare at him. Freud interprets this steady gaze as a reflection and 
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Corinthians 13. 12: 'For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know 
in part; but then I shall know even as also I am known. ,94 This verse, especially its first phrase, 
is actually something of a motto within the tradition that produced phenomenological writings 
on heaven and hell, and manifestations of the unknown. Fechner heads one of the chapters of 
Life and Death with it. Robert Dale Owen, in his popular Footfalls on the Boundary of Another 
World, first published in an English edition in 1860, which examined supernatural and 
unexplained occurrences, which, he insisted, should be 'as surely embraced in the ordered 
economy of the world as the storm or the sunshine' (p. xii) wrote in his conclusion: 
If it should fmally prove that through the phenomena referred to we may reach some knowledge of our 
next phase of life, it will be impossible longer to deny the practical importance of studying them. Yet 
perhaps, as the result of that study, we ought to expect rather outlines, discerned as through a glass darkly, 
than any distinct filling up of the picture of our future home. (Owen, p. 374) 
Interestingly, the phrase 'as through a glass, darkly' was the concluding phrase in W. B. 
Carpenter's 1868 lecture 'On the Unconscious Activity of the Brain', within a suggestion that 
what latent intuition, with practice, can see immediately, the intellect can only see dimly. It 
therefore classes unconscious mental processes as in some way a God-given spiritual faculty.9s 
Le Fanu, however, distances himself from these different, and it must be said, hopeful, uses of 
the quotation, by choosing to use a version that includes the word 'in', rather than 'through', as 
was obviously the usual choice. Although both versions of the phrase clearly imply the 
studying of a mirror,96 the use of the word 'in' suggests a claustrophobic repetition of self that 
prevents any sense of seeing beyond one's own image. In Le Fanu's last novel, Willing to Die, 
his heroine writes of the trials in her life in the following terms, which suggest that his choice of 
the word 'in' was a deliberate diversion from the usual message gleaned from the verse: 
I am tired and footsore yet, though through a glass darkly, I think I can now see why it all was, and I 
thank God with a contrite heart for the terrors and the mercies he has shown me. I begin to discover 
through the mist who was the one friend who never forsook me through all those stupendous wanderings, 
and I long for the time when I shall close my tired eyes, all being over, and lie at the feet of my Saviour. 
(p.25) 
Le Fanu here shows his understanding of the meaning of 1 Corinthians 13. 12. The last image in 
the passage corresponds to the second half of the phrase so often used to proclaim a sense of 
mystery in the nineteenth century: 'then I shall see face to face'. His choice of the title In a 
conversion of the stare with which the child, at one-and-a-half, fixed his parents when they were engaging 
in an afternoon 'love scene', as they thought, unobserved. 
94 Authorised King James Version. • 
95 William B. Carpenter, 'On the Unconscious Activity of the Brain', Proceedings of the Royal 
Institution, 5 (1868), 338-45 (p. 345). 
96 In the nineteenth century 'a glass' was taken as referring to a looking-glass; recent translations of the 
Bible show that this is not necessarily a connection that is made today, as the word 'mirror' is frequently 
used instead. See Eight Translation New Testament (Wheaton, Illinois: Tyndale House, 1974), p. 1252. 
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Glass Darkly for the volume which includes Jennings's history removes this hopeful aspect, for 
it creates a solipsistic world in which, in a sense, there is nowhere to go. We see ourselves face 
to face to begin with; there seems no room for the image of God, a God that is seemingly only 
the agent of vengeance in this collection, deaf to prayer. Le Fanu has made St. Paul's mirror 
even more reflective, in a sense. Suggestive of glories to come originally, all it becomes is a 
reflection of our dark selves, our dark sins. 
A monkey reflected in the mirror recalls Huxley's idea of the shock and sense of insult 
of the modern man 'brought face to face with ... blurred copies of himself; and it is suggestive 
that in some sense the monkey may symbolize Jennings's inheritance. Jennings's father, 'silent 
and moping ... he used to drop in, sometimes, in the dusk, when I was alone in the drawing-
room, and I used to fancy there were ghosts about him' (,Green Tea', p. 12) is not unlike the 
monkey, who, at least at first 'looked sullen and sick' (p. 26-7), 'jaded and sulky' (p. 25). 
Swedenborg's view of the soul is relevant here - 'By no wise man is it doubted that the soul is 
from the father' (Compendium, p. 543). Hesselius, the Swedenborg scholar, is well aware of 
issues of inheritance: 'either his mother or his father - I should rather think his father, saw a 
ghost' ('Green Tea', p. 12). In Jennings's haunting, and its rather repetitive progress (the 
monkey disappears every so often; its return mimics all its other returns, 'on lifting my eyes 
from a book, or turning my head, I see it, as usual, looking at me, and then it remains, as before, 
for its appointed time' (p. 28», there is not only an arrest but a reminder of a more primitive 
state, of the past. It places him in the position of his father, a ghost-seer, and encourages him to 
repeat his suicidal fate, by telling him to injure himself. The civilized man is mocked by 
mimicry and urges to crime, to degeneracy. At a time when Jennings had never been so happy, 
ten years after his father's death, it replaces the air of morbidity ('he used to bore my father 
about his dreams ... I was so afraid of him' (p. 12» that had died with him. In all these things 
the monkey symbolizes what Freud would term a regression. Its gaze reminds Jennings of the 
sin that gave it birth. He is locked in history: his own immediate history, his father's, that of the 
race. 
Around the same time that Freud wrote The Ego and the Id (1923), he wrote another 
paper which I have mentioned in this chapter, 'A Seventeenth-Century Demonological 
Neurosis' (1923), in which he concluded that the painter Christoph Haizmann invited demonic 
possession because he needed a father substitute. In 'Green Tea' we see something of the 
combination of the essence of these two papers. What keeps Jennings in a regressive state is 
the same thing that causes his death. Though Hesselius, in an attempt to disown the case, 
separates the symptom and the suicide, in beating a hasty retreat he also goes to the heart of the 
matter: 'If the patient do not array himself on the side of the disease, his cure is certain' ('Green 
Tea', p. 40). Freud would write in the same terms in The Ego and the Id: 
In our analyses we discover that there are people in whom the faculties of self-criticism and conscience -
mental activities, that is, that rank as extremely high ones - are unconscious and unconsciously produce 
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effects of the greatest importance ... But this new discovery ... compels us, in spite of our better critical 
judgement, to speak of an 'unconscious sense of guilt' ... we gradually come to see that in a great number 
of neuroses an unconscious sense of guilt of this kind plays a decisive economic part and puts the most 
powerful obstacles in the way of recovery. (The Ego and the Jd, pp. 26-27) 
This unconscious sense of guilt could be seen to be a progression of what Maud Ruthyn 
describes as her 'troublesome sort of conscience, which occasionally went mad, and insisted, in 
small things as well as great, upon sacrifices which my reason now assures me were absurd' 
(Uncle Silas, p. 335). When Maud is urged to go against her father's will and ask Silas to 
relinquish guardianship, she dreams of her father's face, in various fonns, but 'always with the 
same unnatural expression of diabolical fury' (p. 167). In the morning, when the answer comes 
from Silas that he would not consider giving up guardianship, she is in contlict - 'grieved to the 
heart ... but my conscience is at rest' (p. 169). 'At rest' is exactly the phrase to use. The' ghost' 
of her father is at rest with this decision as well. The guilt we see in In a Glass Darkly is the 
logical extension of that which Maud experiences. 
In Maud's case, then, guilt is fundamentally connected with the will (psychical and 
legal) of her father. It is possible to see that it is the case with Jennings, also, that his feeling of 
nemesis is bound up with the issue of his father. His guilt is of an unconscious (as in the 
Victorian sense, unknowing) nature. It does not harm his 'pleasant' life until the haunting, not 
affecting his 'I', yet has obviously been preparing itself for him, behind the scenes. The 
monkey is primitive yet judgmental, its anger and malevolence, its need to punish, greater as 
time goes on. In these things it is something of a prefiguration of the Freudian super-ego, an 
'observing agency' of conscience (,Lecture XXXI', p. 59), whose demands 'may become so 
powerful and so relentless that the ego may be paralysed, as it were, in the face of its other 
tasks' (Outline, p. 172). Jennings's inability to function as a priest could be seen as an example 
of this paralysis. This agency is rooted in the archaic and the inherited: 
Thus in the id, which is capable of being inherited, are harboured residues of the existences of countless 
egos; and, when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving shapes of 
former egos and be bringing them to resurrection. (The Ego and the Jd, p. 38) 
The tenn 'resurrection' ('Auferstehung' (Das Ich und das Es, p. 47» is interesting here; Freud 
gives the impression of a ghostly host which find a site in the conscience. According to 
Freudian theory, the super-ego understands what is going on in the depths of the person, 
because it arises from and is connected to the id. This word, Es in Gennan, means, literally, 'it', 
which is how the monkey, 'the brute', is always referred to. The 'I' of the person, therefore, is 
castigated mercilessly for something of which they know little or nothing, the traffic between 
ego and id being unconscious. Freud describes his vision of this state of affairs: 
It may be said of the id that it is totally non-moral, of the ego that it strives to be moral, and of the super-
ego that it can be super-moral and then become as cruel as only the id can be. (The Ego and the Id, p. 54) 
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Fuelling this cruelty is a power that Freud attributes to 'a pure culture of the death instinct'. This 
death instinct, driven by which the super-ego 'often enough succeeds in driving the ego to 
death' (p. 53), comes to fruition in Jennings's bloody suicide. G. H. Lewes wrote in 1879, in a 
passage that manages to link Jennings's plight with Freud's theories, of Schiile's idea that 
mental maladies are "'more'" than cerebral diseases: 
The more consists in conceiving the patient, not simply as one suffering from cerebral disease, but as a 
spiritual being, the product of former generations, so that his ancestors must be taken into account among 
the conditions of his psychical symptoms. (Problems, jrd Series, 1,37) 
But ancestry is not all. It is only 'among the conditions' which lead to Jennings's 
suicide. Part of the rest of the picture can be pieced together if we examine the therapeutic 
relationship between Hesselius and his patient. Chapter VI of Freud's late work, An Outline of 
Psycho-Analysis gives a comprehensive account of the psychoanalytic version of such a 
relationship, which he describes in one of his earliest works, Studies on Hysteria, thus: 
One works to the best of one's power, as an elucidator (where ignorance has given rise to fear), as a 
teacher, as the representative of a freer or superior view of the world, as a father confessor who gives 
absolution, as it were, by a continuance of his sympathy and respect after the confession has been made. 
(Studies on Hysteria, p. 282). 
Hesselius is all of these things to Jennings, who respects his work and puts his faith in him. 
Hesselius himself seeks 'a confession' (p. 12) from Jennings, who tells him, 'I have never told 
so much and so minutely before to anyone' (p. 28). In his Outline of Psycho-Analysis, Freud 
describes a process that must go on in order for analysis to succeed: 
The patient is not satisfied with regarding the analyst in the light of reality as a helper and adviser ... On 
the contrary, the patient sees in him the return, the reincarnation, of some important figure out of his 
childhood or past, and consequently transfers on to him feelings and reactions which undoubtedly applied 
to this prototype. (Outline, p. 174) 
'The analyst', he continues, 'as a rule is put in the place of one or other of the patient's parents, 
his father or mother' (p. 175). In 'Green Tea', I would suggest, Jennings transfers the role of 
the father onto Hesselius, who describes the point at which this milestone in their relationship 
was reached: 
As I reasoned this point with him, Mr Jennings wept. He seemed comforted. One promise I 
exacted, which was that should the monkey at any time return, I should be sent for immediately; and, 
repeating my assurance that I would give neither time nor thought to any other subject until I had 
thoroughly investigated his case, and that tomorrow he should hear the result, I took my leave. ('Green 
Tea', p. 33) 
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That Jennings wept when the Doctor reasoned with him, and was comforted, is a sign that he 
sees him as a figure of respect, a father (or a Father) figure. In securing the promise, Hesselius 
acts as a father towards the child. Jennings has finally relaxed, letting Hesselius take control 
over his life, rather than the ghost of his father. Freud writes of the therapeutic relationship: 
If the patient puts the analyst in the place of his father (or mother), he is also giving him the power which 
his super-ego exercises over his ego, since his parents were, as we know, the origin of his super-ego. The 
new super-ego now has an opportunity for a sort of after-education of the neurotic; it can correct mistakes 
for which his parents were responsible in educating him. (Outline, p. 175) 
There is immense power involved in the psychoanalytic relationship. We can also see 
Jennings's respect for and trust in Hesselius and his new role as the commander of his 
conscience, usurping the monkey, in the note that Jennings later writes to him. In it there is the 
tone of the child who has proudly kept his promise against the odds, and also the plaintive cry 
for help to the father: 
'It knows everything - it knows you and is frantic and atrocious. It reviles. I send you this. It knows 
every word I have written - I write. This I promised, and I therefore write, but I fear very confused, very 
incoherently. I am so interrupted, disturbed. 
'Ever yours, sincerely, yours 
'Robert Lynder Jennings.' ('Green Tea,' p. 34, emphasis mine) 
'As the child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the 
categorical imperative of its super-ego' (The Ego and the Id, p. 48). Jennings has kept his side 
of the bargain. But Hesselius, unfortunately, fails in his new role as father, disappearing into 
the country, untraceable until late in the next day. Jennings, it seems, has miscalculated, in 
investing so much in the relationship. His eagerness to do this can perhaps be explained by the 
ancestry of the role that Hesselius has assumed; he is a descendant, as Freud rightly perceives, 
of the 'father confessor'. However, in contrast to those who have assumed this privileged 
spiritual position before him, Hesselius has neither the spiritual faith nor the full sense of a 
calling to a caring vocation that goes with it. The 'extremely kind' Mr. Jennings ('Green Tea', 
p. 6) has mistaken Hesselius (who in his conclusion to the case shows himself to be a man 
whose interest lies rather in the demonstration of his own ideas than in his patient' s welfare) for 
someone like himself, a type of clergyman. 
Le Fanu graphically shows us the horrific results that can occur with what is, in essence, 
the assumption of a position of authority, without a sense of the responsibility which should 
automatically accompany it. His second super-ego showing a terrible disregard for him, his 
'father' deserting him, Jennings commits suicide. Hesselius leaves the house 'dejected and 
agitated' . Relating this terrible conclusion of his therapy to his correspondent, Vanloo, he 
writes that 'my memory rejects the picture with incredulity and horror' ('Green Tea', p. 37). 
This is a strange anticipation of Breuer's hasty exit 'in a cold sweat' from the house of Anna O. 
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after her transference in therapy led to her re-enactment of a phantom childbirth with his' child', 
and of his later refusal to treat a patient with a similar condition, from whom he literally repeats 
the fleeing process.97 Hesselius, in addition, then denies the connection between himself and 
Jennings, and implicates him in the failure of the case: 
Poor Mr Jennings I cannot call a patient of mine, for I had not even begun to treat his case and he had 
not yet given me, I am convinced, his full and unreserved confidence. If the patient do not ~y himself 
on the side of the disease, his cure is certain. (p. 40)98 
Freud, it is interesting to note was known to behave in a similar way towards his unsuccessful 
cases. In the case of Frau Emmy Von N., who was not cured, Freud goes so far as to add a 
footnote twenty years later, revealing that he had met her daughter, who 'was intending to take 
legal proceedings against her mother, whom she represented as a cruel and ruthless tyrant' 
(Studies on Hysteria, p. 105 n.). 
Contrary to Hesselius's light tone in his conclusion, it is entirely conceivable that, had 
he arrived when sent for, he would have prevented Jennings's suicide, for the moment at least. 
In 'The Evil Guest' Richard Marston, now in an asylum, is rescued by his doctor. This incident 
is very interesting in a consideration of systems and structures in Le Fanu's work. Just as parts 
of the psyche take on roles or become agencies in Freudian models, it becomes possible to see 
the actual acting out of such roles in Le Fanu's fiction. In Freud's conception of the super-ego 
he, under certain conditions, filled the external symbol of what is usually a part of the 
personality with a person - the analyst (originally, of course, the figure of the parent 
internalized). People can represent the element that is lacking or weak in the internal 
organization. Similarly with Le Fanu. For we find in the plot structure of 'The Evil Guest' a 
type of guardian who rescues Marston from himself, a luxury that most of Le Fanu's other 
characters are deprived of, for one reason or another. This prefigures the Freudian metaphor of 
the watchman, whose job it is to prevent the overwhelming of the ego. 
Marston, haunted by the cousin he has killed, now in an asylum, asks the proprietor to 
look after him, as he cannot trust himself to behave normally. Then he spends his first night in 
the building, in a room next to the doctor's. In the night he suddenly starts howling and yelling, 
97 According to Ernest Jones, this re-enactment occurred after Breuer, who had become rather too 
engrossed in the case, and too attached to his patient, decided that it was time to end the therapy. 
Confronted, in consequence, with Anna O's alarming symptoms, 'though profoundly shocked, [Breuer] 
managed to calm her down by hypnotizing her, and then fled the house in a cold sweat' (Ernest Jones, 
The Life and Work o/Sigmund Freud, Volume J: The Formative Years and the Great Discoveries, 1856-
1900, 13th edn, 3 vols (New York: Basic Books, 1960), 1,225). Ten years later, Jones relates, when Freud 
and Breuer were preparing for the publication of Studies on Hysteria, 'Breuer called him into consultation 
over an hysterical patient. Before seeing her he described her symptoms, whereupon Freud pointed out 
that they were typical products of a phantasy of pregnancy. The recurrence of the old situation was too 
much for Breuer. Without saying a word he took up his hat and stick and hurriedly left the house' (p. 
226). Breuer's repetition here of his fleeing the house of Anna O. is an interesting counterpart to 
Hesselius's honified and incredulous rejection of his memory of the vision of the dead Jennings. 
98 In a sense Hesselius has mistaken the treatment for the pre-diagnosis consultation, missing the value of 
, 
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and the doctor immediately enters his room. This is unusual in Le Fanu's stories, for once the 
victim is left alone in the bedroom with the haunter, and yelling ensues, we rarely see them alive 
again. But the doctor's presence in the room saves Marston: 
Second after second, and minute after minute, he stood confronting this frightful slave of Satan, in the 
momentary expectation that he would close with and destroy him. On a sudden, however, this brief 
agony of suspense was terminated; a change like an awaking consciousness of realities or rather like the 
. ' WIthdrawal of some hideous and visible influence from within, passed over the tense and darkened 
features of the wretched being. ('The Evil Guest', pp. 287-88) 
True to his role as watchman, when the doctor arrives, consciousness returns and unconscious 
forces withdraw. Freud describes the job of the censoring watchman in guarding the 
preconscious (Pes.), that is, the portion of consciousness nearest the surface during sleep, 
against the onslaught of the forces of the unconscious: 
For even though this critical watchman goes to rest - and we have proof that its slumbers are not deep - it 
also shuts the door upon the power of movement ... The position is less harmless when what brings about 
the displacement of forces is not the nightly relaxation in the critical censorship's output of force, but a 
pathological reduction in that force or a pathological intensification of the unconscious excitations while 
the preconscious is still cathected and the gateway to the power of movement stands open. When this is 
so, the watchman is overpowered, the unconscious excitations overwhelm the Pes., and thence obtain 
control over our speech and actions; or they forcibly bring about hallucinatory regression and direct the 
course of the apparatus (which was not designed for their use) by virtue of the attraction exercised by 
perceptions on the distribution of our psychical energy. To this state of things we give the name of 
psychosis. (Interpretation, p. 568) 
In the end of the stories with watchmen who wait with the victim, it is not simply a case of the 
watchman leaving the room (that is, the preconscious). In 'The Familiar' the unconscious 
element, the watcher, changes from an owl to a servant and locks the door without turning the 
key. In 'Schalken the Painter' when the uncle of Rose Velderkaust steps over the threshold of 
the room she is in, 'the door which divided the two rooms closed violently after him, as if 
swung to by a strong blast of wind' .99 This is the same overpowering energy that overcomes the 
watchman guarding the preconscious in the mind. After months or years of torment, the 
watchman fails at exactly the same time as the unconscious power rises. Freud calls this 
outcome 'psychosis'. The original meaning of this word, first used by Feuchtersleben in his 
Principles of Medical Psychology (p. 11) in application to a condition of the mind, was 
'animation, principle ofHfe ... give soul or life to' (OED, XII, 769). This definition clarifies the 
condition as a sheer overwhelming of the ego. 
But although the original defmition of the word suggests that the ego is, in psychosis, 
overwhelmed with soul or life, this in a sense takes us no nearer to discovering what precisely 
constitutes the force in the psychic system. At the end of his career, Freud explained the failure 
what must have seemed to the relieved Jennings a 'talking cure' . 
99 Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, 'Schalken the Painter' (1839), in The Mammoth Book 0/ Victorian and 
Edwardian Ghost Stories, ed. by Richard Dalby (London: Robinson, 1995), pp. S-27 (p. 24). 
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of therapy thus: 
We shall. not be disappointe<L but, on the contrary, we shall fmd it entirely intelligible. if we 
reac~ the conclusIOn that the fmal outcome of the struggle we have engaged in depends on quantitative 
re~atJons - on the quota of energy we are able to mobilize in the patient to our advantage as compared 
wlth the sum of energy of the powers working against us. Here once again God is on the side of the big 
battalions. (Outline, pp. 181-82) 
In this passage Freud speaks in terms of battle on a large scale, the forces of light fighting the 
forces of darkness. In his use of the last maxim and the words 'once again' he communicates 
that his system corresponds to other well-known systems, which can be used as metaphors, and 
for which Freud's system can become a metaphor in its tum. It is because of the fact that 
Freud's systems contain this potential for metaphor, that they could be blown up into schemes 
that encapsulated heaven and hell, good and bad. It is in this that we find the key to Freud's 
prefiguration in spiritual or mystical works of the nineteenth century and before; these thinkers 
used schemas, inherited from ludaeo-Christian tradition, which Freud in tum used as a structure 
for his own thinking, filling it with a force that, as I have tried to suggest in many ways above, 
was essentially the same as that used in previous models. Swedenborg's 'nervous juice' 
(Economy of the Animal Kingdom, I, 501) may have informed Hesselius's nervous fluid 
(described as 'spiritual, though not immaterial, any more than ... light and electricity are so' 
('Green Tea', p. 39». Such circulatory material was, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
translated into the Q of Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology, a type of nervous energy. 
Fechner's spirits became the wishful impulses of psychoanalysis. The latter are formed from 
early experiences which occur in response to the urge to satisfy the major biological needs of 
the subject, then the memories of these incidents are incorporated into the psyche as wishes; 100 
in the fonner model, spirits that identified with some element in a subject came in from heaven 
or hell and stayed in the individual soul. Although Freud had no spirit or metaphysical world in 
his belief system, he had the outer world, the source of a wealth of exogenous stimuli which, if 
not met by a corresponding inner strength, can imperil the mental health of the individual. 
As, by the end of his career, Sheridan Le Fanu had formed a strange ambiguity at the 
heart of his fiction, posing constant unanswerable questions about the origin of symptoms such 
as hallucinationslhauntings and the causation involved in their arrival and progress, so Freud in 
his tum could never be certain of what powered the model that he held to, with inevitable 
variations, throughout his working life. Starting as Q (simply, quantity), a form of energy, 
nervous in his Project, later, for example in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) it became a 
psychical current, synonymous with the individual's wishes,101 and what Freud in 189S had 
100 See Freud's account of early satisfaction and its results for the psyche in Project/or a Sclatific 
Psychology, pp. 317-19, and a slightly later description of the same process in 1M l~taliOlf of 
l)~nu,pp.564-67. 
101 See TIre Inlerpnlalion 0/ Dreoms, p. 591. 
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tenned endogenous Q was then recast as the instincts: 'The forces which we assume to exist 
behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id are called instincts.' (Outline, p. 148)102 In 
Appendix C to the Project, entitled 'On the Nature of Q', Strachey concludes that 'we have no 
choice but to follow Freud in leaving the problem of Q unsolved' (,Appendix C', Project, p. 
396), and cites these suggestive words from Beyond the Pleasure Principle: 
The indefmiteness of all our discussions on what we describe as metapsychology is of course due to the 
fact that we know nothing of the nature of the excitatory process that takes place in the elements of the 
psychical systems, and that we do not feel justified in framing any hypothesis on the subject. We are 
consequently operating all the time with a large unknown factor, which we are obliged to carry over into 
every new formula. (Beyond, pp. 30-31) 
The nature of this 'large unknown factor' was not conclusively detennined in the nineteenth 
century, a fact that is partly reflected in the ambiguous works of Sheridan Le Fanu. It was this 
uncertainty that Freud inherited, carrying it over from similar structures before his. For, as 
Strachey points out, the only thing known about Q is its characteristics (,Appendix C', Project, 
p. 396), and it takes its participation in a working system to witness these manifestations. As 
with the large unknown at the heart ofLe Fanu's system, this uncertainty allows all possibilities 
but none completely. A force that cannot be defined cannot be fully owned; Freud, like those 
before him, simply provided its conceptual framework for a short time, unable to claim it for 
psychoanalysis. 
102 One of the major needs of the id, of course, was sexual satisfaction. Giving one or two specific 
examples of Freud's thinking on this all-pervading tenet of psychoanalysis would necessarily be a hugely 
reductive exercise, for its importance, indeed, its virtual indispensability, in the psychical model was 
continually emphasized by Freud in all his writings from the mid-1890s to the end of his career. Richard 
Webster writes of its advantages as a force for Freud, which suggests, he argues, that this is why it was 
this instinct, more than any other, that powered the psychical model: 'In the first place his whole model, 
as we have seen, depended on a theory of mental "energetics". As such it could not work at all without a 
constantly renewable source of energy. Breuer had already written in Studies on Hysteria that ''the sexual 
instinct is undoubtedly the most powerful source of persisting accretions of excitation (and consequently 
of neuroses)". Freud now incorporated this view into his Project and, by doing so, he effectively supplied 
the "fuel" on which his mechanical model of mind could run.' (Webster, p. 182) See also Sulloway, p. 
91, on the necessity in Freud's system for the sexual instinct 
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Chapter 2 
The Association of Ideas in the Fiction of Wilkie Collins 
and in Freudian Theory and Therapy 
'Association's mystic power': a short survey 
In this chapter I will explore the nature of the relationship between the fiction of Wilkie Collins 
and one major aspect of Victorian psychology, the concept of the association of ideas. John 
Abercrombie helpfully defined this doctrine in a text that would be much cited during the 
nineteenth century, Inquiries Concerning the Intellectual Powers and the Investigation o/Truth, 
first published in 1830: 
The principle of association is founded upon a remarkable tendency, by which two or more facts 
or conceptions, which have been contemplated together, or in immediate succession, become so 
connected in the mind, that one of them at a future time recalls the others, or introduces a train of 
thoughts, which, without any mental effort, follow each other in the order in which they were originally 
associated. This is called the association of ideas, and various phenomena of a very interesting kind are 
connected with it. 
But, besides this tendency, by which thoughts formerly associated are brought into the mind in a 
particular order, there is another species of association, into which the mind passes spontaneously, by a 
suggestion from any subject which happens to be present to it. The thought or fact, which is thus present, 
suggests another which has some kind of affinity to it; this suggests a third, and so on, to the formation of 
a train or series which may be continued to a great length. A remarkable circumstance likewise is, that 
such a train may go on with very little consciousness of, or attention to it; so that the particulars of the 
series are scarcely remembered, or are traced only by an effort. This singular fact every one must have 
experienced in that state of mind which is called a reverie. It goes on for some time without effort, and 
with little attention; at length the attention is roused, and directed to a particular thought which is in the 
mind, without the person being able at first to recollect what led him to think of that subject. He then, by 
a voluntary effort, traces the chain of thoughts backwards, perhaps through a long series, till he arrives at 
a subject of which he has a distinct remembrance as having given rise to it. I 
The association of ideas is a concept which is especially pertinent to this thesis because the 
natural progression of the observation of its 'various phenomena', such as that a train of thought 
'may go on with very little consciousness of, or attention to it', proved to be a nineteenth-
century realization of the possibility of a type of mental activity which was variously termed 
latent, unconscious or preconscious.2 His cultural and intellectual climate rich in the ideas of 
I John Abercrombie, Inquiries Concerning the Inlelleclllal Powers and the llIWUtlgation of Truth (1830), 
3rd edn (Edinburgh: Waugh & Innes, 1832), pp. 102-03. Hereafter, IntelleclJllll Powers. 
2 Robert Hoeldtke, in 'The History of Associationism and British Medical Psychology', Medical History, 
II (1967), 46-65, arpel convincinaJy that thinking on the association of ideas led to theories about what 
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associationism, Wilkie Collins depicted in fiction many such interesting phenomena; the purest 
example can be found in No Name (1862). I will consider this fictional counterpart to the 
psychological anecdotes that circulated during the nineteenth century, within a sketch of the 
history of associationism which will span the first two sections of this chapter. There is a sense 
in which we can underestimate the all-pervading nature of the doctrine that, to the Victorians, 
was inseparable from the conception of thought; thinking processes were seen as operating 
according to certain rules or dynamics within this framework. The widespread discussion and 
illustration of this system, in nineteenth-century periodicals, poems, and works of fiction, as 
well as in scientific manuals, was no doubt partly due to its necessary coexistence with 
attractive, easily accessible metaphors, which effectively described and explained it. 
Although the association of ideas was in some sense an ancient concept, considered, for 
example, by Aristotle,3 it started to be explored fully as a model by which to explain the 
processes of thinking with the rise of empiricism, beginning with the writings of Thomas 
Hobbes in the mid-seventeenth century. John Locke, in the fourth edition of his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1700) expanded on the concept, using helpful metaphors 
by which to describe the habitual patterns that thinking followed in the process of association. 
These customary thoughts, he writes, 'once set going continue in the same steps they have been 
used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it becomes easy 
and as it were Natural,.4 This metaphor of the path was used to describe associative thought 
processes throughout the nineteenth century, and was later adopted by Freud. Echoing Locke, 
Freud wrote in his Project for a Scientific Psychology of the varying amount by which certain 
ideas were charged with the force within the psychic system (Q), in terms of their ability to 
access 'breadth of pathway'.s After Locke, thinkers like George Berkeley, David Hume and 
he calls 'the subconscious mind' (p. 59). 
3 See A Source Book in the History of Psychology, ed. by Richard J. Herrnstein, Edwin J. Boring 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 327-30. 
4 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), ed. by Peter H. Nidditch, 4111 edn 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 396. 
S Sigmund Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950), in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by James Strachey and others, 24 vols (London: 
Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953-74), 1,281-397 (p. 375). The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works will hereafter be referenced as SE. 
In reading Freud's Project, it is clear that he theorizes within associationist structures. His idea 
about breadth of pathway within neurones is simply an attempt to map association within 'a psychology 
that shall be a natural science' (Project, p. 295). The Project renders the weak or strong force that ideas 
hold into varying amounts of Q (which we see, in more traditional models, as thoughts that are connected 
to few others by association, or those that become 'easy and as it were Natural' (Locke, p. 396», and it 
translates the popular associationist metaphor of the chain or path into chains of neurones connected by 
contact-baniers. Freud describes the principle of breadth of pathway thus: 'We may perhaps assume that 
not all ofa neurone's pathways are equally receptive to Q, and we may describe this difference as breadth 
of pathway ••. If we assume that with an increasing Q a pathway is opened which can bring its breadth 
into effect, then one can perceive the possibility of the passage of Q being fundamentally altered by an 
increase in the Q in flow. Everyday experience seems to give express support to precisely this 
conclusion.' (Project, p. 375) Therefore, the more a thought or idea has invested in it, and the more 
habitual it becomes, the easier the path it forges subsequently becomes to traverse; it creates what Freud 
calls a 'smooth passage' (p. 375); this is surely what Locke, almost two centuries previously, had 
described as 'a smooth path' (Locke, p. 396). 
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David Hartley through the eighteenth century increasingly emphasized the importance of the 
association of ideas on all mental activity. Hartley's work was a staple part of psychological 
education for such popular nineteenth-century commentators as W. B. Carpenter,6 and was an 
important framework for the philosophical thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. The 
Biographia Literaria (1817), a section of which was a response to Hartley's ideas, recorded the 
case of a servant who, in a delirium, began to speak the biblical languages that she had heard 
recited by a pastor who had taken her in as a child.7 This became one of many anecdotes which 
was circulated during the nineteenth century (for example, by Abercrombie and William 
Hamilton)8 as evidence of the marvels of association, of hidden or latent trains of thought in the 
mind that, when once the first of its ideas arises, perhaps within a state of delirium, reverie or 
Freud also used the German term 'weg' (path) in 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' ('Zur Atiologie der 
Hysterie') (1896) in a way that more obviously displayed its roots in associationism, with regard to the 
connecting paths, constructed of a chain of associations, from symptoms to a traumatic scene which acts 
as their source: 'As we know from Breuer, hysterical symptoms can be resolved if, starting from them, we 
are able to fmd the path [Weg] back to the memory of a traumatic experience. If the memory which we 
have uncovered does not answer our expectations, it may be that we oUght to pursue the same path [Weg] 
a little further; perhaps behind the fIrst traumatic scene there may be concealed the memory of a second ... 
so that the scene that was fIrst discovered only has the signifIcance of a connecting link in the chain of 
associations.' ('The Aetiology of Hysteria' in SE, III, 187-221 (p. 195), 'Zur Atiologie der Hysterie' in 
Gesammelte Werke, Werke aus den Jahren 1892-1899, 18 vols (London: Imago, 1940-52, Frankfurt Am 
Maim, 1968), I, 425-59 (p. 430.» 
This path is a constant metaphor in Freud's description of the organization of memories in the 
mind and of his therapeutic technique, in Studies on Hysteria (1895) (See SE 11,289-90,292,294,295). 
6 Herrnstein and Boring testify that Hartley's Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His 
Expectations (1749) 'was considered the authoritative work on the subject of association' for 'at least 
seventy years' (Herrnstein and Boring, p. 326). W. B. Carpenter's memoir writer in Nature and Man 
documents, 'he had been trained by his father in the principles of Hartley' (1. Estlin Carpenter, 
'Introductory Memoir', in W. B. Carpenter, Nature and Man: Essays Scientific and Philosophical 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1888), pp. 1-152 (p. 38». 
7 See Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth, Embodied Selves: An Anthology of Psychological 
Texts, 1830-1890 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 73-76. It is worth mentioning Coleridge's 
connection with the Collins family. Catherine Peters documents that Wilkie's father, William Collins, 
painted Coleridge's daughter, and Coleridge would visit the house during Wilkie's childhood (he died 
when Wilkie was ten). Wilkie would recount one particular anecdote that he remembered from this time 
(concerning his mother's sensible advice to Coleridge about his opium addiction) which suggests these 
visits made a deep impression on the boy (Catherine Peters, The King of Inventors: A Life of Wilkie 
Collins (London: Minerva, 1992), pp. 23-24). 
8 See Intellectual Powers, pp. 142-43. See also William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic 
(1859), ed. by H. C. Mansel and John Keith, 7th edn, 4 vols (London: William Blackwood, 1865), I, 344-
47. Hereafter, Lectures. Hamilton's work is based on a course of lectures given from 1836. He refers to 
this phenomenon, not primarily as evidence of association, but in the context of the possibility of thought 
on a less than conscious level. Of his three degrees of mental latency, he places it in the activities of the 
second: 'The second degree of latency exists when the mind contains certain systems of knowledge, or 
certain habits of action, which it is wholly unconscious of possessing in its ordinary state, but which are 
revealed to consciousness in certain extraordinary exaltations of its powers. The evidence on this point 
shows that the mind frequently contains whole systems of knowledge which, though in our normal state 
they have faded into absolute oblivion, may, in certain abnormal states, as madness, febrile delirium, 
somnambulism, catalepsy, clc., flash out into luminous consciousness, and even throw into the shade of 
unconsciousness those other systems by which they had, for a long period, been eclipsed and even 
extinguished. For example, there are cases in which the extinct memory of whole languages was 
suddenly restored, and, what is even still more remarkable, in which the faculty was exhibited of 
accurately repeating, in the known or unknown tongues, passages which were never within the grasp of 
conscious memory in the normal state.' 0, 339-40). What is especially worthy of note is that this 
anecdote can be used equally well to demonstrate the marvels of associationism, the construction of our 
ideas from 'the living chain of causes', as Coleridge puts it (cited in Embodied Selva, p. 77), and the idea 
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drug-induced intoxication, will suggest the next idea, and the next, leading to marvels of 
recollection in the wondering subject. Abercrombie describes the process in the following way: 
We have likewise observed the remarkable manner in which persons, events, or scenes, long past, perhaps 
forgotten, are recalled into the mind by means of association; - trains of thought taking possession of the 
mind, in a manner which we often cannot account for, and bringing back facts or occurrences, which had 
long ceased to be objects of attention. These remarkable processes are most apt to take place, when the 
mind is in that passive state which we call a reverie; and they are more rarely observed, when the 
attention is actively exerted upon any distinct and continued subject of thought. (Intellectual Powers, p. 
254) 
Little wonder that in some of the poetry of the first half of the century there were references to 
'Association's mystic power' and 'Association's mystic chain,.9 
Wilkie CoIlins creates a fictional anecdote which illustrates the process in which 'trains 
of thought tak[e] possession of the mind', and the wonder it inspires, in his first publication in 
Household Words, 'A Terribly Strange Bed' (1852). The bed of the title is situated in a 
gambling-house in Paris, and reserved for those who have broken its bank. Mr Faulkner, who 
has won all the house's money, is drugged by its owners, in readiness for the descent of the 
canopy, which is supposed to smother him as he sleeps, but is over-drugged so that he becomes 
wakeful instead. Endeavouring to fall asleep, Faulkner is looking around his room attempting to 
allow his mind to create associations whose trains will naturally lead him to dream: 
The moonlight shining into the room reminded me of a certain moonlight night in England - the night 
after a picnic party in a Welsh valley. Every incident of the drive homeward through lovely scenery ... 
came back to my remembrance, though I had never given the picnic a thought for years; though, if I had 
tried to recollect it, I could certainly have recalled little or nothing of that scene long past. Of all the 
wonderful faculties that help to tell us that we are immortal, which speaks the sublime truth more 
eloquently than memory? Here was I, in a strange house of the most suspicious character, in a situation 
of uncertainty, and even of peril, which might seem to make the cool exercise of my recollection almost 
out of the question; nevertheless remembering, quite involuntarily, places, people, conversations, minute 
circumstances of every kind, which I had thought forgotten for ever, which I could not possibly have 
recalled at will, even under the most favourable auspices. And what cause had produced in a moment the 
whole of this strange, complicated, mysterious effect? Nothing but some rays of moonlight shining in at 
my bedroom window ... I was absorbed by these past scenes and past amusements, when, in an instant, 
the thread on which my memories hung, snapped asunder; my attention immediately came back to present 
things, more vividly than ever, and I found myself, I neither knew why nor wherefore, looking hard at the 
picture again. 10 
that the mind has its latent degrees. 
9 Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), Canto III, 'Progress of the Mind', The Temple of Nature; or, the Origin 
of Society: A Poem, with Philosophical Notes (London: Johnson, 1803) VI. 355, Robert Montgomery 
(1807-1865), 'Retrospect', Poetical Trifles: By a Youth (Bath: Higman, 1825), III. 1. In some of the 
poetry of this time, association became a type of muse, as it was recognized more and more that the 
mechanism of memory was indebted to it. Thomas Brown, in his famous Lectures on the Philosophy of 
the Human Mind (1820), which placed his alternative tenn for association, 'suggestion', at the heart of 
mental function, quoted lines from the poetry of Mark Akenside, who in his Pleasures of Imaginalion, 
writes of association in tenns of 'sympathy unbroken', and that 'by these mysterious ties, the busy powerl 
Of memory her ideal train preserves! Entire; or when they would elude her watch! Reclaims their fleeting 
footsteps from the waste! Of dark oblivion' (cited in Thomas Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind, 11 III edn (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838), p. 218. 
10 Wilkie Collins, 'A Terribly Strange Bed' (1852), in Mad Monkton and Other Stories, ed. by Norman 
Page (Oxford: Oxford Univenity Press, 1994). 1-20 (pp. 12-13). 
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The process depicted here (before the sudden exertion of Faulkner's attention on the 
disappearing picture) and in Coleridge's case of the servant, is a passive one, of the kind that 
early associationists such as Hartley believed dictated the mind's events. Collins's description 
of 'the thread on which my memories hung' suggests a gravity which, according to Robert 
Hoeldtke, was a major element in Hartley's model (Hoeldtke, p. 46). This gravity within the 
system remained as associationism developed (hence the 'effort' needed to trace the chain back 
in Abercrombie's definition) but, with the influence of thinkers such as Thomas Brown and 
William Hamilton, the mind came to be seen as more active in the processes of association. I I 
This reached the point at which W. B. Carpenter, in 1868, would advise that the moral will 
could, with the development of good habits, be imposed upon the unconscious mind.12 We see 
literally an absence of mind in the above passage; the place that would later be taken by 
unconscious mental processes is assigned to an immortal element which inspires a 'strange, 
complicated, mysterious' experience, akin to the marvels of poetry's 'mystic chain'. Collins's 
description of the involuntary return of Faulkner's memories acts as an example of the first, and 
theoretically older, half of Abercrombie's definition of association which I cited at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
The second half of Abercrombie's definition shows the influence of Thomas Brown, 
whose Lectures on The Philosophy o/the Human Mind asserted (and in doing so emphasized 
the possibility that on some level the mind had a choice in the whole associative process), that 
'suggestion' would be a far better term for association (Brown, p. 216). Abercrombie takes 
Brown's view into account when describing this 'species of association, into which the mind 
passes spontaneously, by a suggestion from any subject which happens to be present to it. The 
thought or fact, which is thus present, suggests another ... this suggests a third, and so on'. He 
writes, 'in the mental process now referred to, it is probable that the term suggestion is much 
more correct than association, which has often been applied to it': 
For in the cases which belong to this class, the facts or thoughts suggest each other, not according to any 
connexion or association which the mind had previously fonned between them, but according to some 
mental impression or emotion, which by a law of our constitution proves a principle of analogy or 
suggestion. (Intellectual Powers. pp. 102, 105-06) 
We are allowed to see the active workings of a fictional example of the second half of 
Abercrombie's definition of the association of ideas in Collins's 1862 novel, No Name. 
II Hoeldtke gives a comprehensive account of Hamilton's background and thought, arguing that what was 
important in Hamilton's outlook was his acceptance of Genoan idealism, in particular 'the Kantian 
emphasis on the active Ego, important both to his theory of consciousness and to his interpretation of 
dreams' (p. 61). 
12 This was in a lecture given on 27 March 1868 (William B. Carpenter, 'On the Unconscious Activity of 
the Brain', Proceedings 0/ the Royal Institution, 5 (1868) 338-45 (p. 345». Hereafter, 'On the 
Unconscious Activity'. 
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Magdalen Vanstone, stripped of what she sees as her rightful inheritance, seeks to redress her 
wrongs by marrying the heir to her parents' fortune, her cousin Noel Vanstone, who has never 
met her, under an assumed name. On visiting his house in London's Vauxhall Walk 
masquerading as her own governess, Miss Garth, she encounters Noel Vanstone's housekeeper, 
Mrs Lecount, who forms a suspicion of her true identity. Time passes and Mrs Lecount meets 
Magdalen again, this time masquerading, with a fictional 'family', as Susan Bygrave. This 
meeting forms an uneasy impression on Mrs Lecount, who is certain that Miss Bygrave, though 
a stranger, is familiar to her in some way. The narrator writes, 'She had got no further than this 
during the day; she could get no further now: the chain of thought broke'. 13 Pondering then on 
the Bygraves in general, she asks, 'were the members of this small family of three, what they 
seemed on the surface of them?' and 'with that question on her mind, she went to bed' (No 
Name, p. 276). This question proves to be what Abercrombie calls 'some mental impression or 
emotion, which by a law of our constitution proves a principle of analogy or suggestion'. The 
narrator describes what follows: 
As soon as the candle was out, the darkness seemed to communicate some inexplicable 
perversity to her thoughts. They wandered back from present things to past, in spite of her. They brought 
her old master back to life again; they revived forgotten sayings and doings in the English circle at 
Zurich; they veered away to the old man's death-bed at Brighton; they moved from Brighton to London; 
they entered the bare, comfortless room at Vauxhall Walk; they set the Aquarium back in its place on the 
kitchen table, and put the false Miss Garth in the chair by the side of it, shading her inflamed eyes from 
the light ... they revived an old doubt ... whether the threatened conspiracy had evaporated in mere words, 
or whether she and her master were likely to hear of it again. At this point her thoughts broke off once 
more, and there was a momentary blank. The next instant she started up in bed; her heart beating 
violently, her head whirling as if she had lost her senses. With electric suddenness, her mind pieced 
together its scattered multitude of thoughts, and put them before her plainly under one intelligible form. 
In the all-mastering agitation of the moment, she clapped her hands together, and cried out suddenly in 
the darkness: 
"Miss Vanstone again!!!" (No Name, p. 276) 
Although Mrs Lecount is unable calmly to trace the chain of associations backwards to their 
source, Collins maximizes his role of omniscient narrator on this occasion to describe the 
process: 
She could not get sufficiently far from herself to see that her half-formed conclusions on the subject of the 
Bygraves, had ended in making that family objects of suspicions to her; that the association of ideas had 
thereupon carried her mind back to that other object of suspicion which was represented by the 
conspiracy against her master; and that the two ideas of those two separate subjects of distrust, coming 
suddenly in contact, had struck the light. (pp. 276-77) 
The 'momentary blank' in the process is telling, and acts as a demonstration that a detailed 
tracing of associative processes must naturally allow for the possibility of links in the chain of 
which an individual is unaware; in William Hamilton's words, 'mental activities and passivities, 
13 Wilkie Collins, No Name (1862), ed. by Virginia Blain (Oxford: Oxford Univenity Press, 1992), p. 
275. 
83 
of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their existence by effects of which we are 
conscious' (Lectures, I, 347). Mrs Lecount is unconscious, in contrast to the narrator, of exactly 
what has caused her to arrive at the 'answer' she seeks. This is suggestive of hidden links in the 
associative chain which are situated below consciousness, of the type that William Hamilton 
described in a metaphorical exploration of the possibility of a third degree of latency in the 
mind: 
Now it sometimes happens, that we fmd one thought rising immediately after another in consciousness, 
but whose consecution we can reduce to no law of association. Now in these cases we can generally 
discover by an attentive observation, that these two thoughts, though not themselves associated, are each 
associated with certain other thoughts; so that the whole consecution would have been regular, had these 
intennediate thoughts come into consciousness, between the two which are not immediately associated. 
Suppose, for instance, that A, B, C, are three thoughts, - that A and C cannot immediately suggest each 
other, but that each is associated with B, so that A will naturally suggest B, and B naturally suggest C. 
Now it may happen, that we are conscious of A, and immediately thereafter of C. How is the anomaly to 
be explained? It can only be explained on the principle of latent modifications ... You are probably aware 
of the following fact in mechanics. If a number of billiard balls be placed in a straight row and touching 
each other, and if a ball be made to strike, in the line of the row, the ball at one end of the series, what will 
happen? The motion of the impinging ball is not divided among the whole row ... but the impetus is 
transmitted through the intennediate balls which remain each in its place, to the ball at the opposite end of 
the series, and this ball alone is impelled on. Something like this seems often to occur in the train of 
thought. One idea mediately suggests another into consciousness, - the suggestion passing through one 
or more ideas which do not themselves rise into consciousness. The awakening and awakened ideas here 
correspond to the ball striking and the ball struck off; while the intennediate ideas of which we are 
unconscious, but which carry on the suggestion, resemble the intennediate balls which remain moveless, 
but communicate the impUlse. (Lectures, I, 352-53) 
The examination of the phenomena of the association of ideas could not lead to anything else 
but the conclusion that there existed unconscious mental processes. 
Later in this chapter I will discuss the ways in which Collins alludes to and manipulates 
the rules and structures of association to enlighten traits of character and elucidate emotion and 
motive in Basil, to suggest a scale of psychological symptomatology and to explain relationship 
and hence plot patterns in The Woman in White, and to cause disorientation, confusion and 
anxiety in Armada/e. In Collins's much more straightforward fictional demonstrations of the 
processes of association in No Name and 'A Terribly Strange Bed', however, it is difficult to 
avoid tracing a direct connection with specific sources, the sort of associationist psychological 
writings that I have discussed in this section. Jenny Bourne Taylor, in In the Secret Theatre of 
Home,14 who also links Mrs Lecount's sudden revelation to Abercrombie's account of the 
association of ideas, sees this episode as rather an exception to Collins's general method in the 
novel. This method utilizes a combination of 'the uncertainty of the "how" rather than the 
"what" of the story' (Secret Theatre, p. 132), 'a narrative voice that continually undercuts the 
sources of its own ideological coherence' (p. 134) and a plot that 'continually resorts to chance 
and coincidence to reach its predestined end' (p. 148). For Bourne Taylor, then, the Lecount 
episode acts as the 'one moment where Collins does directly exploit internalized psychological 
14 Jenny Bourne Taylor, In the Secret Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins, sensation narrative, and 
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processes, drawing on specific developments in associationist psychology to make possible the 
necessary conceptual leap in order to be able to recognize masquerade' (p. 149). Here the 'how' 
is unusually traceable, the ideology relatively stable and straightforward, the chance and 
coincidence much less marked than in other parts of the novel. However, I would contest that 
Mrs Lecount's moment of revelation is actually rather over-explained for the discovery that it 
represents, and the effect that this discovery has. Faulkner's vivid experience of the marvels of 
the association of ideas in 'A Terribly Strange Bed' is an isolated incident, with little real 
purpose within the story; similarly, the 'how', No Name's narrator's intricate explanation of Mrs 
Lecount's revelation in terms of the association of ideas, is actually surplus to the requirements 
of the plot, for the housekeeper herself 'was quite incapable of tracing the mental process which 
had led her to discovery' (No Name, p. 276). The discovery itself does not fulfil the 
expectations that its dramatic emergence promises; the change of behaviour it inspires in the 
housekeeper immediately puts the enemy, the 'Bygraves', on guard. It is ammunition for the 
'skirmish' (p. 285), possessing her of 'weapon [ ry]' against Magdalen, but it is ultimately 
powerless to stop her gaining her purpose. Magdalen goes on, despite Lecount, to marry her 
master, then, much later, to come into possession of the Trust which will secure her the fortune 
she lost at the beginning of the story. The discovery of this Trust, like Lecount's discovery, 
manifests a certain 'perversity'. Like Lecount's associatively-linked thoughts, which wandered 
'in spite of her', the finding of the Trust 'proved no exception to the general perversity of all 
lost things. Look for them, and they remain invisible. Leave them alone, and they reveal 
themselves!' (p. 544). Magdalen, who has taken it upon herself to reclaim the family 
inheritance, is not the one who finally does so. It is Norah, the sister who is, in effect, left alone 
by the story, who respectably and quietly marries back into the family, and who accidentally 
finds the Trust. 'Met and baffled successfully at every point' (p. 320), Lecount's inability to 
make full use of her revelation, to attain the final triumph, is therefore entirely characteristic in a 
novel that works to these rules, 'a story of "perversity'" (Secret Theatre, p. 132) in which, when 
the Trust is presented to Magdalen, whose life's purpose has been to find it, it is promptly tom 
up. 
The wondrous workings of associationism in this novel and in 'A Terribly Strange 
Bed', are not pivotal to the plot; there is more significance in the descriptions of their processes 
than in their consequences. I would suggest that Collins includes them, and in more detail than 
is necessary for their role in the proceedings, to illustrate the fact that the marvels of memory 
and deduction that association enables are often uncalled-for, inherently perverse, of limited or 
no practical use; as Faulkner testifies, 'every incident of the drive homeward through lovely 
scenery ... carne back to my remembrance ... though, if I had tried to recollect it, I could 
certainly have recalled little or nothing of that scene long past' ('A Terribly Strange Bed,' p. 
12). These episodes are fictional counterparts to the endless anecdotes that, circulating in 
nineteenlh-c.nhJ1'y psychology (London: Routledge, 1988). Hereafter, St!cret Theatre. 
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orthodox scientific manuals, popular lectures, various encyclopaedias and journals, became 
embedded in the nineteenth-century consciousness. The imbalance that the minuteness of their 
description causes against the proceedings of the rest of the text in which they appear, means 
that these incidents actually act best as rather interruptive isolated illustrations of the laws of the 
association of ideas, and, as a natural consequence, of the possibility of the operation of 
unconscious mental processes. I also emphasize them here because they do much to 
demonstrate Collins's understanding of these processes, and, in their clear reflection of current 
associationist theories, they, quite intentionally I believe, form unusually transparent 
illustrations of his acquaintance with the psychological writings of his time. For, as I will 
explore in this chapter, Collins not only undertook what he himself called 'promiscuous 
reading,}5 in order to write his novels, he also took pains to demonstrate that this was the case. 
The two episodes that I have discussed, therefore, are entirely characteristic of a writer who 
delighted in exhibiting his knowledge, of which current psychological theory was a part. 
In my Introduction I cited the scholarship of Ola Andersson which suggested that the 
doctrine of the association of ideas was an element in Freud's psychological education. Freud 
included an account of thinking in which, like Mrs Lecount's train of thought, only selected 
links become conscious, in his attempt to explain ordinary thought in Project for a Scientific 
Psychology: 
Thus there is in fact also an observing process of thought in which indications of quality are either not, or 
only sporadically, aroused, and which is made possible by the fact that the ego follows the passage [of 
association] automatically with its cathexes. This process of thought is in fact far the more frequent, 
without being abnormal; it is our ordinary thought, unconscious, with occasional intrusions into 
consciousness - what is known as conscious thought with unconscious intermediate links, though these 
can be made conscious. (Project, p. 373, editor's brackets) 
He continues that a sudden intrusion into consciousness can be explained if the unconscious 
passage of Quantity 'has aroused an idea which, for other reasons, calls up indications of quality 
- that is, consciousness' (p. 375-76). Quality is in its essence the comparison of the thought 
with the purposive idea - what the mind, in thought, is searching for, although it may not be 
aware of its motives. It is the 'mental impression or emotion', in Abercrombie's terms, that 
guides the associative process, from whatever level of the psyche it originates. Mrs Lecount's 
explosive verbalization of the answer at which her mind has arrived would be explained in 
Freudian terms as a sudden influx of energy in response to the matching of what the psyche was 
searching for and what it has found. Freud describes the process in The Interpretation of 
Dreams: 'Under certain conditions a train of thought with a purposive cathexis is capable of 
attracting the attention of consciousness to itself and in that event, through the agency of 
consciousness, receives a "hypercathexis'" .16 This is equivalent to Collins's striking of the 
IS Wilkie Collins, Heart and Science: A Story o/the Present Time (1883) (Stroud: Alan Sutton 1990). p. 
4. 
16 Sigmund Freud, The Interprellllion 0/ Dreams (1900), in SE, IV &. V, ix-629 (p. 594). Hereafter, 
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light, and to what Carpenter described in 1855 as the result of a process that 'most men are 
occasionally conscious of, that of 'trying to recollect some name, phrase, occurrence, &c., ... 
and, after vainly employing all the expedients we can think-of ... have abandoned the attempt as 
useless', whereupon: 
It wil~ often occur s~ontaneously a l~ttle while afterwards, suddenly flashing (as it were) before the 
con~clOusness; and th~s although the mmd has been engrossed in the mean time by some entirely-different 
subject of contemplatIOn, and cannot detect any link of association whereby the result has been obtained 
notwithstanding that the whole train of thought which has passed through the mind in the interval may b~ 
most distinctly remembered.17 
In Freudian theory, it is often the case that speech is simultaneous with the arrival of an idea 
from the depths of the psyche into consciousness, hence the importance of what in his early 
writings Freud referred to as 'the cathartic method' (Studies on Hysteria, p. 286). Speech 
signals the release of the idea's affect, or energy, which in Mrs Lecount also manifests itself in 
her compUlsion to sit up in bed and clap her hands. It is useful to remember that Freud's work 
is often just as much an attempt to explain the phenomena of thought as were the writings of the 
nineteenth-century associationists. 
The work of Hamilton provides a useful link with Freudian theory, which, in its central 
concepts of dream-interpretation and the diagnosis and cure of neurosis, is essentially the search 
for the hidden links in the chain of association. The law of association by contiguity, or 
simultaneity, a law (as we have seen in Abercrombie's definition)18 by which association was 
primarily defined in the nineteenth century,19 was the key in psychoanalysis to the formation of 
symptoms. These were often determined by an incidental factor present at the moment when 
Interpretation. 
17 William Benjamin Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology: With their Chief Applications to 
Psychology, Pathology, Therapeutics, Hygiene, and Forensic Medicine, 5th edn (London: John Churchill, 
1855), pp. 607-08. Hereafter, Human Physiology, 5th edn. This description is repeated in almost exactly 
the same terms in Carpenter's lecture of 1868 ('On the Unconscious Activity', p. 343) and his Principles 
of Mental Physiology: With their Applications to the Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study 
of its Morbid Conditions (1874), 4th edn (Henry S. King & Co, 1876), p. 519. Hereafter, Mental 
Physiology. 
18 'Two or more facts or conceptions, which have been contemplated together, or in immediate 
succession, become so connected in the mind, that one of them at a future time recalls the others' 
(Abercrombie, Intellectual Powers, p. 102). 
Freud describes association primarily by the law of contiguity in The Interpretation of Dreams: 
'Our perceptions are linked with one another in our memory - first and foremost according to 
simultaneity of occurrence. We speak of this fact as "association'" (Interpretation, p. 539). 
19 Hamilton describes the laws, including the law of contiguity/simultaneity, that determined which ideas 
were associated: 'It has been established, that thoughts are associated, that is, are able to excite each 
other; - 1 0, If coexistent, or immediately successive, in time; 2°, If their objects are conterminous or 
adjoining in space; 3°, If they hold the dependence to each other of cause and effect, or of mean and end, 
or of whole and part; 4°, If they stand in a relation either of contrast or of similarity; S°, If they are the 
operations of the same power, or of different powers conversant about the same object; 6°, If their objects 
are the sign and the signified; or 7°, Even if their objects are accidentally denoted by the same sound'. 
Interestingly, he continues, 'Aristotle recalled the laws oftbis connection to ... three, - Contiguity in time 
and space, Resemblance, and Contrariety' (L«tures, II, 231). It seems that Contiguity has always been, 
therefore, a primary condition of association. 
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the affect, which functions as the symptom's source of power, took root in the patient.20 It is by 
finding the hidden pathogenic idea, often by tracing it along a chain of associations, that the 
patient is cured. In the early years of psychoanalysis, Freud used the pressure of his hand on the 
patient's forehead (a technique abandoned as this physical contact was deemed unnecessary for 
the process) to call forth an idea from the patient. His description of this technique, in Studies 
on Hysteria, is telling in his use of tenns which are taken from the heart of nineteenth-century 
associationism: 
What emerges under the pressure of my hand is not always a 'forgotten' recollection; it is only in 
the rarest cases that the actual pathogenic recollections lie so easily to hand on the surface. It is much 
more frequent for an idea to emerge which is an intermediate link in the chain of associations between the 
idea from which we start and the pathogenic idea which we are in search of; or it may be an idea which 
forms the starting point of a new series of thoughts and recollections at the end of which the pathogenic 
idea will be found. ... The idea that is first provoked by the pressure may in such cases be a familiar 
recollection which has never been repressed. If on our way to the pathogenic idea the thread is broken off 
once more, it only needs a repetition of the procedure, of the pressure, to give us fresh bearings and a 
fresh starting-point. (Studies on Hysteria, pp. 271-72) 
In dream symbolism the link between the manifest dream (what is dreamt) and the dream-
thought (the wish behind the fonnation of the dream) is obscure due to the dream-work, the 
censorship. It is only by tracing all associations connected with the manifest dream, a method 
called 'free association', that an interpretation can be found. Freud describes the process: 
Our procedure consists in abandoning all those purposive ideas which normally govern our reflections, in 
focusing our attention on a single element of the dream and in then taking note of whatever involuntary 
thoughts may occur to us in connection with it. We then take the next portion of the dream and repeat the 
process with it. We allow ourselves to be led on by our thoughts regardless of the direction in which 
they carry us and drift on in this way from one thing to another. But we cherish a confident belief that in 
the end, without any active intervention on our part, we shall arrive at the dream-thoughts from which the 
dream originated. (Interpretation, pp. 526-27) 
The concept of the association of ideas, therefore, is an integral part of the theory and therapy of 
psychoanalysis. At all junctures it is a system that is assumed by Freud to regulate thought; it is 
therefore built into the structure of psychoanalysis, and employed to produce therapeutic results. 
The phenomena that I have discussed in this introductory section have largely 
represented the marvels and benefits of associationism; my aim in this chapter is to show the 
20 In the Project for a Scientific Psychology Freud describes this process: 'Before the analysis, A is an 
excessively intense idea, which forces its way into consciousness too often, and each time gives rise to 
weeping. The subject does not know why he weeps at A; he regards it as absurd but cannot prevent it. 
After the analysis, it has been discovered that there is an idea B, which justifiably gives rise to 
weeping and which justifiably recurs frequently so long as a certain complicated psychical action has not 
been performed against it by the SUbject. The effect of B is not absurd; it is intelligible to the subject and 
can even be combated by him. 
B stands in a particular relation to A. 
For there has been an occurrence which consisted of B + A. A was an incidental circumstance; B 
was appropriate for producing the lasting effect. The reproduction of this event in memory has now taken 
a form of such a kind that it is as though If had stepped into B's place. A has become a substitute, a 
sy",bol for B' (Project, pp. 348-49). 
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intricacy of Collins's exploration of the doctrine as a whole, including, for the individual, its 
possible disadvantages. This exploration is not necessarily a conscious critique of the process; 
rather, it is often the case that Collins, like other Victorians, and like Freud, cannot separate his 
way of thinking about the mind from the metaphors and images inherent in associationism. 
What follows will be divided into three parts. The first section will examine Collins's use of 
factual and scientific sources in order to write his fiction. By considering a number of his 
novels in which he declares, in text or preface, what his research has entailed, I hope to form a 
picture of a writer who maintained a constant engagement with his current intellectual and 
cultural surroundings throughout his long career. The length of Collins's writing life in itself 
provides the possibility of interesting studies on the spread of psychological theories from the 
1850s to the 1880s. By examining the psychological knowledge, and, consequently, the self-
knowledge, of one character from each end of his career, I hope to give some idea of the 
growing accessibility of theories of the mind during this timespan, and Collins's awareness of 
this trend. In the second and third sections I will consider what Collins did with the 
psychological theories that he gleaned from his surroundings. In the second section I will 
examine the review of the associationistic model that we find in Basil (1852); here, as 
elsewhere, Collins tests this system and its effects on the individual, not all of which are 
beneficial under certain circumstances. In the third and final section I will consider how Collins 
pushes the model of associationism further, in what could be seen as a pursuit of the logical 
conclusions of a system that does not always function perfectly. This can result in fixed ideas, 
in which all paths lead to one unavoidable obsessional thought. Another by-product is the 
individual's constant need to associate what appears before him or her with the rest of the events 
in his or her life, or with an underlying narrative or hidden meaning, that mayor may not exist. 
This leads to constant questions about the meaning of signs, and crippling worries about the link 
to an unseen ominous reality that a visible symptom suggests. The testing and stretching of the 
system that Collins undertakes reveals its pitfalls and limitations; towards the end of this chapter 
I will suggest that Freud, decades after Collins, viewed associationism rather less 
interrogatively, which may have led to a certain overestimation of what it could be expected to 
achieve in theory and therapy. 
'Finding his materials everywhere': Basil, Mrs Farnaby and Indications 0/ 
the Spread 0/ Nineteenth-Century Psychological Knowledge 
From the beginning to the end of Collins's long career his habit was to inform his reader 
of the extent of the research he had undertaken in order to write them, frequently locating his 
work under a named or unnamed authority. There is a sense in which, without factual 
information, 'tangible and reliable materials to work from', the writing of his fiction would not 
have been possible. In a note to Chapter vn of the 1854 novel Hide and Seek, he writes that the 
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very existence of the novel depended on his finding first hand infonnation on the experiences of 
a deaf person: 
When the idea first occurred to me of representing the character of a 'Deaf Mute' as literally as possible 
according to nature, I found the difficulty of getting at tangible and reliable materials to work from, much 
greater than I had anticipated; so much greater, indeed, that I believe my design must have been 
abandoned, if a lucky chance had not thrown in my way Dr Kitto's delightful little book, 'The Lost 
Senses'. In the first division of that work, which contains the author's interesting and touching narrative 
of his own sensations under the total loss of the sense of hearing, and its consequent effect on the faculties 
of speech, will be found my authority for most of those traits in Madonna's character which are especially 
and immediately connected with the deprivation from which she is represented as suffering.21 
Almost 30 years later, in the preface to Heart and Science: A Story of the Present Time (1883), 
it is clear that Collins's need to be factually correct and to authenticate his work by citing his 
sources, has not changed. There seems, further, to be an added element to his usual claims of 
accuracy to life - an indication where steps might be taken in order to further scientific research. 
The novel considers the case of Carmina, a girl with hysterical catalepsy, and the search for a 
cure which entails a debate on the merits of vivisection (Collins lists his eminent correspondents 
on the subject (Heart and Science, p. 3» versus a non-physiological approach to the patient's 
symptoms, discovered by the protagonist, Ovid Vere. In section II of his Preface - 'To Readers 
in Particular,' addressed to those who 'habitually anticipate inexcusable ignorance where the 
course of the story happens to tum on matters of fact' (p. 3), he writes about the parts of the 
novel devoted to psychology: 
Again: a supposed discovery in connection with brain disease, which occupies a place of importance, is 
not (as you may suspect) the fantastic product of the author's imagination. Finding his materials 
everywhere, he has even contrived to make use of Professor Ferrier - writing on the 'Localisation of 
Cerebral Disease', and closing a confession of the present result of post-mortem examination of brains in 
these words: 'We cannot even be sure, whether many of the changes discovered are the cause or the result 
of the Disease, or whether the two are the conjoint results of a common cause.' Plenty of elbow room here 
for the spirit of discovery. (pp. 3-4) 
Catherine Peters's assessment of Collins's research was that 'his conclusion was correct. The 
secrets of mental processes were not being unlocked in the laboratory, but in the observations of 
Charcot and his followers. Freud published his first paper on hysteria in 1888, the year before 
Wilkie died' (Peters, p. 401). This is a rather simplistic assessment. Charcot's later theories 
were based on his earlier laboratory work; indeed, in his Lectures on the Localisation of 
Cerebral and Spinal Diseases, published in England in the same year as Heart and Science, he 
speaks of his indebtedness to the vivisectionist David Ferrier.22 It was Ferrier's case of 1882, in 
which he was charged with cruelty and acquitted, which acted, as Peters testifies, as an 
21 Wilkie Collins, Hide and Sed (1854), eel by Catherine Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), p. 431. 
II See J. M. Charcot, LechUes on the Localisation o/Cerebral tmd Spinal Diseases, trans. and ed. by W. 
Baugh Hadden (London: New Sydenbam Society, 1883), pp. 9-10, 12, 13. 
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inspiration for Heart and Science.23 The writing of this 'Story of the Present Time' so excited 
Collins that (as he wrote to William Winter) 'I went on writing week after week, without a day's 
interval of rest' (cited in Peters, p. 401). This may have indicated a bel ief that he was touching 
on a subject that was no longer confined to the realm of mystery, that was, increasingly, 
knowable, definable, and available to those who approached it, however tentatively, in 'the 
spirit of discovery'. Mistaken or not, Collins now believed that the secrets of the mind's 
symptoms and phenomena were becoming accessible; that what are described in Basil as 'the 
workings of the hidden life within us which we may experience but cannot explain', 24 were now 
within the reach of knowledge for ordinary people. Around this time there perhaps seemed to 
him to be a fulfilment of the prediction that Henry Morley made in 1852 in Household Words, 
the journal to which Collins made frequent contributions and on which he was for some time a 
member of staff. In an article entitled 'New Discoveries in Ghosts', the medically-trained 
Morley wrote of his belief that regarding many seemingly supernatural phenomena, 'new 
explanations are at hand which will reduce into a natural and credible position many other tales 
by which we have till recently been puzzled'.25 
The dream, filled with the possibility of portent or the yielding of a meanmg 
inaccessible to waking life, was one such phenomenon. If we consider the contrasting 
interpretations of their dreams attempted by the dreamers in two of Collins's novels, separated 
by almost three decades - Basil (published in the same year as Morley's article) and The Fallen 
Leaves (1879) - we can gauge something of the extent of the spread of psychological knowledge 
and consequently self-knowledge, during this time. In the later novel, The Fallen Leaves, we 
come across a discussion of a dream that is interesting both in its significance and, conversely, 
its relative unimportance within the text and the plot. It is all the more noteworthy, as the novel 
is less a study in psychological than political phenomena (the concept of Christian Socialism). 
Mrs Farnaby has lost a child many years ago, and is obsessed with finding her. The young 
Amelius Goldenheart stumbles into her house and, in his account of the inhabitants of the 
Christian Socialist community in which he lives, awakens certain barely buried associations 
within her, and renews the hopes, which are never far from her consciousness, that her lost child 
may be found. The following night she has a vivid dream, repeated three times, about 
Goldenheart, in which he brings her daughter home. She tells him: 'I was in a room that was 
quite strange to me; and the door opened, and you came in leading a young girl by the hand. 
You said, "Be happy at last; here she is." My heart knew her instantly, though my eyes had 
never seen her since the first days of her life. ,26 In Basil, the protagonist undergoes a similar 
dreaming experience after the day in which he meets Margaret Sherwin for the first time. This 
encounter inspires a powerful attraction which overwhelms his intellectual faculties, to the 
23 And whether, in agreeing with Freud, Collins is therefore 'correct' (peters, p. 401) is also a moot point. 
24 Wilkie Collins, Basil (1852), ed. by Dorothy Goldman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 29. 
25 'New Discoveries in Ghosts', Household Words 4 (17 Jan 1852),403-06 (p. 406). 
26 Wilkie Collins, The Fallen Leaves (1879) (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1994), p. 69. 
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extent that he writes of its 'deteriorating ... effect on the exercise of my mental powers, and on 
my candour and sense of duty in my intercourse with home' (Basil, p. 42). He experiences a 
dream which he records in minute detail; a dream of two women, one light, redemptive, pure, a 
representation of his virtuous sister Clara, his main tie with home, the other dark and sensuous, 
who leads Basil into the dark woods, 'my blood burning and my breath failing me' (p. 46), and 
in whose arms he forgets the light woman. In the original 1852 version, in a passage omitted in 
editions of the novel from 1862, Basil creates a supernatural context to this dream, a suggestion 
of fatality in its representation of his close relationship with Margaret, by conjecturing, in the 
midst of his description of her boarding of the omnibus, about the possibility that 'invisible, 
inexplicable influences, constantly interchanged between us [are] earthly foretastes of that 
perfect spiritual communion which we are to enjoy in another world' .27 Further to implying a 
communion in the life to come, Basil then speculates on a connection between himself and 
Margaret which was created before either of them were born to the present life: 
It seemed as ifl must have known her in some former state of being - as ifl had died for her, or she for 
me, after livingfor each other and with each other in some past world; and that we were now revived and 
reunited again, for a new life in a new earth. But ... I cannot describe to others, except by phrases which 
must read like meaningless rhapsody, the mysterious attraction which drew me to her, heart and soul, the 
moment she appeared before my eyes.28 
In excising these passages on supernatural attraction, Collins diminishes Basil's naivete in his 
reading of his own dream (which is considerable, even without them), and in so doing he 
foregrounds more strongly the possibility of the workings of a latent faculty within him of 
which he is unaware?9 Either side of this dream, which is striking in its sensuality (,Her lips 
27 Wilkie Collins, Basil: A Story of Modern Life (London: James Blackwood, 1856), p. 26. 
28 Wilkie Collins, Basil (1856), p. 27. 
29 This foregrounding manages to do Collins more good, intellectually, than Basil. Part of Collins's 
motive for the later omission of this passage was possibly a reluctance to align himself with, by 1862 a 
rather quaint privileging of supernaturalism over psychology. This reluctance he presumably feels 
despite what Jenny Bourne Taylor describes as an ambiguous relationship between narrator and author: 'it 
is never clear exactly where narrative authority resides, nor how the figure or the text should fmally be 
read.' (Secret Theatre, p. 74). The deleting of this passage in 1862 at least gives some idea of how it 
should be read, how the author prizes his accuracy in the portrayal of psychological motives and 
mechanisms according to current theories. In the same year as Basil was written, Collins had contributed 
a series of articles to The Leader entitled Magnetic Evenings at Home in which he took a similar 
wondering, speculative tone to Basil on the mind's unexplained processes: 'Here was some strange 
influence working on the intellectual faculties, the nerves, and the whole vital principle - the question is -
how did it work? I cannot tell! Neither can I, nor anybody else, explain several other mysteries which 
every human being knows to be existing within himself. I have a thinking machine about me, commonly 
called a "brain" - by what process is it set working? What power, when I am asleep, when my will is 
entirely inactive, sets this thinking machine going, going as I cannot make it go when my will is active 
and I am awake? I know that I have a soul - what is it? where is it? when and how, was it breathed into 
the breath of my life? Is Animal Magnetism the only mystery which the medical profession, and strong-
minded unbelievers in general, cannot scientifically and logically explain?' (W. W. C., 'Magnetic 
evenings at home. Letter II. - to G. H. Lewes', The Leader, III (14 February 18S2), 160-61 (p. 161). 
Collins, as Peters testifies, wanted to keep these articles anonymous (peters, p. 109); this and his later 
excision of the supernatural passages in Basil suggest that supernaturalism was something he flirted with 
as an explanation of certain mental phenomena (always allowing for the possibility of a source within the 
subject) and then cast aside when psychological explanations became increasingly popular. 
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were parted with a languid smile; and she drew back the long hair, which layover her cheeks, 
her neck, her bosom, while I was gazing on her' (p. 45», there is a denial by Basil of any sexual 
longing. He insists before the dream that his love for Margaret is nothing but a pure feeling: 
It was a pure feeling towards her. This is truth. If I lay on my death-bed, at the present moment, and 
knew that, ~t the Judgment Day, I ~hould be tried by the truth or falsehood of the lines just written, I 
could say WIth my last breath: So be It; let them remain. (p. 43) 
After the dream, in which he gave himself, 'heart, and soul, and body, to the woman from the 
dark woods', this part being especially strongly marked in his memory, Basil, failing to see that 
the dream held its own consummation, wonderingly questions: 'Was it a warning of coming 
events, foreshadowed in the wild visions of sleep? ... Why had it remained incomplete, failing 
to show me the visionary consequences of my visionary actions?' (p. 47). Twenty-seven years 
later, Mrs Farnaby would have no need to rely on such questions in seeking an interpretation of 
her dream. Although acknowledging a superstitious pang,30 she is ready with a straightforward 
psychological explanation: 
0, you needn't remind me that there is a rational explanation of my dream. I have read it all up, in the 
Encyclopaedia in the library. One of the ideas of wise men is that we think of something, consciously or 
unconsciously, in the daytime, and then reproduce it in a dream. That's my case, I daresay. When you 
were first introduced to me, and when I heard where you had been brought up, I thought directly that she 
might have been one among the many forlorn creatures who had drifted into your Community, and that I 
might fmd her through you. Say that thought went to my bed with me - and we have the explanation of 
my dream. (The Fallen Leaves p. 69, first emphasis mine) 
'We think of something, consciously or unconsciously' - up until this time, thinking was not 
included in Collins's writings as one of the many things that could be done unconsciously. This 
phrase is an important one, as it marks Collins's explicit recognition (which is so seemingly 
casual here as to be unconscious (unknowing), in itself) that the mind can think on more than 
one level. In Basil there is an implicit understanding of this possibility (Basil, after all, is 
profoundly unconscious of the instinctive side of his personality, which, nevertheless, manifests 
itself in his dream) but here for the first time, in The Fallen Leaves, Collins commits himself 
explicitly to the idea of unconscious thinking by verbalizing (and in the process, defining) it. 
This concept of the possibility of unconscious thought had been in circulation for many 
years by 1879 and was expressed explicitly by a thinker who was one of those with whom 
Collins corresponded (on vivisection) in order to write his 1883 novel, Heart and Science. 
Frances Power Cobbe,31 in an article printed in Macmillan's Magazine in 1870, wrote: 
30 This pang is presented more as a forced acceptance of the possibility of what faith connected with the 
divine guidance that might be afforded to the Christian Amelius might achieve, rather than what a mystic 
fatalism could do (The Fallen Leaves, pp. 68-69). 
31 In his Preface to the novel, he writes of 'the assistance rendered to me by Miss Fnnces Power Cobbe' 
in his research on vivisection, one of the story's main themes. (Heart and Science, p. 3). 
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We hav~ got ~emory, ~~cy, ~nders~ding, at all events, as faculties exercised in full by the 
UnconscIous Bram. Now It IS obvIous that It would be an unusual defmition of the word 'Thought' which 
should debar us from applying it to the above phenomena; or compel us to say that we can remember 
fancy, and understand without 'thinking' of the things remembered, fancied, or understood.32 ' 
The title of Cobbe's article was 'Unconscious Cerebration: A Psychological Study'. Akin to 
Hamilton's idea of 'latent mental modification', 'Unconscious Cerebration', a term which in its 
basic meaning could be defined as 'unconscious thinking', had been coined by William 
Benjamin Carpenter as early as 1853, in the fourth edition of his immensely popular Principles 
of Human Physiology.33 The rest of this section will serve as an attempt to trace something of 
the emergence and spread of this concept within the psychological literature that was current in 
different stages of Collins's career, to explore the processes of dissemination that led to its 
casual mention in The Fallen Leaves. This will serve two main purposes; the first is to 
emphasize the range of literature, its generic breadth increasing over the decades from the 
beginning to the end of his career, that may have informed the fundamentally connected ideas 
on association and the mind's latent processes expressed in Collins's novels. The second 
purpose is to emphasize the wide understanding of the concept and the processes of unconscious 
cerebration in Victorian England many years before Freud. The Victorian idea of unconscious 
cerebration, it must be remembered, lacks the potential for almost total repression that is 
essential in the Freudian 'Unconscious' (denoted by a noun); however, I hope to show that the 
same phenomena were often cited by both the Victorians and Freud to prove the existence of 
unconscious mental processes, and that these processes operated according to a number of the 
same laws and rules, the rules of association not being the least of these. Collins, an interested 
Victorian, imbibing his culture's ideas, understandably and unavoidably produced literature that 
sometimes expressed certain theories and psychological models that Freud would later, 
unwittingly, take up. 
The term 'Unconscious Cerebration', denoting a concept which would be directly alluded 
to in 1879 by Collins's Mrs Famaby, was first used by W. B. Carpenter in 1853 to help defme 
such phenomena as the following: 
Most persons who attend to their own mental operations, are aware that when they have been occupied 
for some time about a particular subject, and have then transferred their attention to some other, the first, 
when they return to the consideration of it, may be found to present an aspect very different from that 
which it possessed before it was put aside; notwithstanding that the mind has since been so completely 
engrossed with the second subject, as not to have been consciously directed towards the rust in the 
interval ... a development which cannot be reasonably explained in any other mode, than by attributing it 
to the intennediate activity of the Cerebrum, which has in this instance automatically evolved the result 
without our consciousness. Strange as this phenomenon may at rust sight appear, it is found, when 
carefully considered, to be in complete harmony with all that has been affinned ... respecting the relation 
of the Cerebrum to the Sensorium, and the independent action of the fonner; and looking at all those 
32 'Unconscious Cerebration: A Psychological Study', Macmillan's Magazine, 23 (November 1870), 24-
37 (p. 35). 
33 Previous commentators, such as Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth, have mistakenly cited 
the 5th edition of 1855 as containing the rust appearance oftbis phrase. See Embodied Selves, p. 393. 
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automatic operations by which results are evolved without any intentional direction of the Mind to them 
in the li~t of 'reflex actions' ~f the Cerebrum, there is no more difficulty in comprehending that such 
reflex actIOns may proceed WIthout our knowledge, so as to evolve intellectual products when their 
results are transmitted to the Sensorium and are thus impressed on our consciousness, than there is in 
unders~ding that impressio.ns may ~xcite muscular movements, through the 'reflex' power of the Spinal 
Cord, wIthout the necessary mterventton of Sensation. 
Carpenter continues, 'it is difficult to find an appropriate tenn for this class of operations. They 
can scarcely be designated as Reasoning Processes, since "unconscious reasoning" is a 
contradiction in tenns. The designation Unconscious Cerebration is perhaps less objectionable 
than any other.'34 Carpenter was castigated for this passage by Sir William Hamilton's3s 
disciple, Thomas Laycock, for not acknowledging his origination of the idea of 'reflex function 
of the brain', which, Laycock argued, was identical with 'unconscious cerebration' .36 
Laycock's idea, again unacknowledged, was something that Freud would also unwittingly use 
as a basis for his own work. Decades later, he would acknowledge the importance of the 
application of the principle of reflex action in all mental processes: 'the psychical apparatus 
must be constructed like a reflex apparatus. Reflex processes remain the model of every 
psychical function' (Interpretation, p. 538). The above passage by Carpenter would almost 
certainly have been known to Collins, by 1868 at least, as it is from this chapter in this edition 
of Principles of Human Physiology that Jennings takes one of the passages that persuades 
Franklin Blake to undergo the reconstructive experiment in The Moonstone.37 The 
34 William Benjamin Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology: With their Chief Applications to 
Psychology, Pathology, Therapeutics, Hygiene, and Forensic Medicine, 4th edn (London: John Churchill, 
18S3), pp. 818-19. Hereafter, Human Physiology, 4th edn. T. H. Huxley testified to the popUlarity of this 
work, 'the "Principles of Human Physiology" not only played a leading part in the scientific education of 
successive generations of medical practitioners, but was widely read by the public at large', cited in J. 
Estlin Carpenter, 'Introductory Memoir', in Nature and Man, p. 67. 
35 Hamilton, whose Lectures on Metaphysics were given from 1836, had conceived of latent mental 
modification before Carpenter coined the term 'unconscious cerebration'. 
36 Laycock, in the appendix to his 1860 work Mind and Brain, writes that Carpenter's claim, made in the 
preface to the Sth edition of Human Physiology of priority to this idea, 'is wholly unfounded; for the law 
was discovered and applied by Dr Laycock to mental physiology and pathology more than twenty years 
ago, under the term "reflex function of the brain," and twelve years before Dr Carpenter knew anything of 
it whatever. "Unconscious cerebration" is in fact only another phrase to designate reflex cerebral 
function' (Thomas Laycock, Mind and Brain: or, The Correlations of Consciousness and Organisation; 
with their Applications to Philosophy, Zoology, Physiology, Mental Pathology, and the Practice of 
Medicine, 2 vols (Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox, 1860), II, 466). Carpenter replied by assertinE that 
Laycock did not make it clear enough that the reflex action was unconscious (Mental PhySiology, 4 edn, 
p. S 16 n.). That Laycock picks out the passage (identical to that in the Sth edition of Human Physiology), 
from which I have quoted above, to cite as evidence of Carpenter's plagiarism is interesting. Laycock's 
most famous treatise of 1844, 'On the Reflex Function of the Brain' does not contain anything so 
accessible as Carpenter's anecdotal example, and it is indeed difficult to see how reflex function bears on 
everyday human existence; the examples that Laycock gives tend to be from the asylum, and he does not 
always explain exactly why he is giving them. Carpenter had a style which was described by an admirer 
in the following terms, 'he had the double gift of both selecting what was significant and of emphasizing 
its significance in connection with general principles. Whatever he took into his mind was digested and 
assimilated there into perfect clearness; and I suppose few scientific writers have ever so distinctly known 
what they meant, or expounded it with such precision, or with such a wealth of apt illustration' (Mr. 
Thiselton-Dyer, cited in J. Estlin Carpenter, 'Introductory Memoir', in Nature and Man, pp. 68-69). It 
was this that made his voice heard over Laycock's, and also ensured him such a wide readership. 
37 Wilkie Collins, 1M Moo1Lf/one (1868), eel. by J. I. M. Stewart (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), p. 
440. 
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phenomenon for which Carpenter needs to find a label, however, is of greater interest to us, as it 
was repeated again and again throughout the psychological literature that was current to CoHins 
, 
and eventuany found its way into the early writings of Freud. Cobbe describes it, twenty-five 
years later, thus: 
Another and more important phase of unconscious cerebration, is that wherein we find our 
mental ~ork o~ any kind, a. calcula~ion, an e~say, a tale, a composition of music, painting, or sculpture, 
arrange Itself m order durmg an mterval eIther of sleep or wakefulness, during which we had not 
consci~usly thought of it at. all. Probably no one has ever written on a subject a little complicated, or 
otherwIse endeavoured to think out a matter any way obscure, without perceiving next day that the thing 
has somehow taken a new form in his mind since he laid down his pen or his pencil after his first effort ... 
I have said that this work is done for us either asleep or awake, but it seems to be accomplished most 
perfectly in the former state, when our unconsciousness of it is most complete. ('Unconscious 
Cerebration', p. 25) 
The phenomenon of the day's work, or thoughts, being carried on into the night's 
dreams, an event which Mrs Farnaby has self-professedly experienced at first-hand, was later 
described by Carpenter in 1874, in his Principles of Mental Physiology: 
The chief peculiarity of the state of dreaming appears to be, that there is an entire suspension of 
volitional control over the current of thought, which flows-on automatically, sometimes in a uniform, 
coherent order, but more commonly in a strangely incongruous sequence. The fonner is most likely to 
occur, when the mind simply takes-up the train of thought on which it had been engaged during the 
waking-hours, not long previously; and it may even happen that, in consequence of the freedom from 
distraction reSUlting from the suspension of external influences, the reasoning processes may thus be 
carried-on during sleep with unusual vigour and success, and the imagination may develope new and 
harmonious forms of beauty. (Mental Physiology, p. 584) 
Twenty five years later Freud would elaborate on this same process in The Interpretation of 
Dreams in a description, notably in terms taken from the heart of nineteenth-century 
associationism, that seems to combine Carpenter's account of intellectual activity in sleep with 
the idea of unconscious thoughts leading to dreams which Mrs Farnaby speaks of: 
The most complicated achievements of thought are possible without the assistance of consciousness - a 
fact which we could not fail to learn in any case from every psycho-analysis of a patient suffering from 
hysteria or from obsessional ideas. These dream-thoughts are certainly not in themselves inadmissible to 
consciousness; there may have been a number of reasons for their not having become conscious t~ us 
during the day. Becoming conscious is connected with the application of a particular psychical funCtion, 
that of attention - a function which, as it seems, is only available in a specific quantity ... Now it seems 
that the train of thought which has thus been initiated and dropped can continue to spin itself out without 
attention being turned to it again, unless at some point or other it reaches a specially high degree of 
intensity which forces attention to it. Thus, if a train of thought is initially rejected (consciously, perhaps) 
by a judgement that it is wrong or that it is useless for the immediate intellectual purposes in view, the 
result may be that this train of thought will proceed, unobserved by consciousness, until the onset of 
sleep. (Interpretation, p. 593)3' 
A phenomenon first described as an example of the workings of 'unconscious cerebration' in 
3. He continues, 'we describe a train of thought such as this as preconscious' (Interpretation, p. 593-94). 
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1853, then, finds more and more eloquent expression as the nineteenth century progresses. 
Freud's words here therefore act very much as a logical development (as they follow on from 
the writings of 1870 and then 1874 that I have traced), of Carpenter's 1853 description of 
thought that is possible without consciousness. Freud adds detail of description to these earlier 
accounts that entirely fits with them, and actually becomes useful for interpreting the dreaming 
behaviour of Basil and Mrs Famaby. Basil, therefore, whose sexual passions have been aroused 
but who dare not admit to himself that he has developed an illicit attachment according to the 
habit of his older brother Ralph, to whom he feels superior in this regard, is not aware of the 
logical psychical conclusion of the meeting with Margaret; this appears to him for the first time 
in his dream. Mrs Famaby, after so many years at the point where she understands that a 
natural completion of her train of thought - the fantasy of a reunion with her child - only causes 
pain and frustration, will have stopped short of imagining this consciously during the day. The 
difference between them is that Basil is unaware of the process that has occurred within him, 
and Mrs Famaby, from her viewpoint towards the latter part of 'the weary old nineteenth 
century' (Heart and Science, p. 5), possesses a self-knowledge which has been gained because 
of a certain advantage she possesses over Basil. This advantage is simply her perusal of 'the 
Encyclopaedia in the Library'. Her casual mention of this communicates much about the 
accessibility of psychological knowledge by the 1870s. 39 
From Collins's Preface to Heart and Science we glean much information about his own 
means and methods of research. In addition to his acquaintance with thinkers who informed 
him about current scientific debates,40 he also, he informs us, looks to more commonplace 
sources of information: 
On becoming acquainted with 'Mrs Galilee', you will fmd her talking - and you will sometimes even 
find the author talking - of scientific subjects in general. You will naturally conclude that it is 'all gross 
caricature'. No; it is all promiscuous reading. Let me spare you a long list of books consulted, and of 
newspapers and magazines mutilated for 'cuttings' - and appeal to examples once more, and for the last 
time. 
When 'Mrs Galilee' wonders whether 'Carmina has ever heard of the Diathermancy of Ebonite', she is 
thinking of proceedings at a conversazione in honour of Professor Helmholtz (reported in the 'Times' of 
April 12, 1881) ... Again: when she contemplates taking part in a discussion on Matter, she has been slily 
looking into Chambers's Encyclopaedia, and has there discovered the interesting conditions on which she 
can 'dispense with the idea of atoms'. (Heart and Science, p. 4tl 
It would be a mistake to view mid-Victorian journals and encyclopaedias on certain 
39 Heart and Science is set in 1872. 
40 In In the Secret Theatre 0/ Home, Jenny Bourne Taylor gives a picture of the circle in which Collins 
moved: 'Dickens (the close friend of Conolly and Elliotson, involved in mesmerism as well as the 
criminal and lunacy refonn), Reade (also involved with lunacy reform, though not in the same way as 
Dickens), Bulwer-Lytton, Edward Pigott, George Eliot, G.H. Lewes, and Herbert Spencer were all friends 
or acquaintances, and this list is not exhaustive. t (p. 29) 
41 In the concluding paragraph to his Preface, Collins writes, 'Past experience has shown me that you 
have a sharp eye for slips of the pen, and that you thoroughly enjoy convicting a novelist, by post, of 
having made a mistake' (HetlI1 tmd Science, p. 4). It seems that to an extent Collins's promiscuous 
reading was undertaken in order to keep up with his well-informed public. 
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psychological subjects as vastly inferior to the scientific manuals that were also published at the 
time. In the rest of this section I will try to explain why this is by focussing on the subject of 
Mrs Farnaby's research into the continuation of waking trains of thought in the dreaming 
process. This phenomenon, constantly used in the mid-Victorian period as an example of the 
association of ideas, was also, as we have seen, cited as evidence of the mind's latent processes. 
In investigating something of its widespread dissemination, it will be possible to gain a picture 
of the way in which Collins's intellectual context abounded with certain constantly-repeated 
anecdotes (that even extended later into Freud's writings), which were recounted in order to 
demonstrate the workings of an associationistic model of mental processes. These anecdotes 
could be seen to have set something of a stylistic pattern which Collins's writings, or certain 
incidents within them (such as the phenomena of thought experienced by Faulkner and Mrs 
Lecount), continued. 
Mrs Farnaby's 'Encyclopaedia in the Library' was likely (especially as we know it was 
this volume which Collins consulted for Heart and Science), to have been Chambers's 
Encyc/opt2dia, which bore the subtitle A Dictionary of Universal Knowledge for the People. 
There were two mid-Victorian editions of this work, one issued in 1860-68, and the other in 
1874. The entries of both, under the heading 'Dreaming', are identical.42 Further to being 
identical with each other, however, in many sections they show heavy borrowing, in 
phraseology and structure, from W. B. Carpenter's 1847 entry on 'Sleep' in The CYc/0pt2dia of 
Anatomy and Physiology.43 In this sense there is very little change in the information which was 
available from 1847 to 1874; what had changed was its accessibility by its inclusion in a 
'Dictionary of Universal Knowledge' rather than in more specialized medical works such as the 
Cyc/opt2dia. In the opening paragraph of Chambers's entry the main characteristics of 
dreaming are described: 
The chief feature of this state is 'an entire absence of voluntary control over the current of thought, so that 
the principle of suggestion - one thought calling up another, according to the laws of association - has 
unlimited operation.' We seem to perform all the actions of life; we experience every kind of mental 
emotion, and sometimes our reasoning processes are remarkably clear and complete. Thus, when the 
mind, during sleep, takes up a train of thought on which it had been previously engaged during the 
preceding waking hours, intellectual efforts may be made during sleep which would be impossible in the 
waking state. Such cases, however, are not common. To name two instances (quoted by Dr Carpenter in 
his essay on Sleep in the Cycloptzdia of Anatomy and Physiology): Condorcet saw, in his dreams, the 
42 Chambers's Encycloptedia: A Dictionary of Universal Knowledge for the People. On the Basis of the 
Latest Edition of the German Conversations Lexicon Illustrated by Wood Engravings and Maps, 10 vols 
(London: W. & R. Chambers, 1860-1868), III, 666-68, and Chambers's Encycloptedia: A Dictionary of 
Universal Knowledge for the People, Illustrated with Maps and Numerous Wood Engravings, Revised 
Edition 10 vols (London: W. and R. Chambers, 1874), III, 666-68. 
43 W. B. Carpenter, 'Sleep', in The Cycloptedia of Anatomy and Physiology, ed. by Robert B. Todd, 5 
vols (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1835-1859), IV (1847-49), 677-97. These 
similarities are too many to list; here just one or two instances will be given. Both entries speak of an 
'absence of consciousness ofextemal things', that there is in dreaming an amount 'of mental activity, of 
which we are more or less distinctly conscious at the time' (Cycloptedia. p. 687, Chambers 's, p. 666); that 
generally in dreams 'all probabilities, and even possibilities of "time, place, and circumstance" are 
violated' (Cyclo,-dia, p. 688, Chambers 's, p. 666); much more of what Carpenter has written is 
recognizably paraphnsed in Chambers " rather than copied verbatim. 
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fmal steps of a d.iffic~lt calculati~n which had puzzled him during the day; and Condillac states that, 
when engaged WIth hIS Cours d Etude, he frequently developed and fmished a subject in his dreams 
which he had broken offbefore retiring to rest. (Chambers IS Encyc/opf£dia, p. 666) 
Mrs Famaby's cogitations were, of course, perfectly possible during her waking state. and in 
dreaming she did not perform any marvellous feats of intel1ect such as are described in 
Chambers's Encyclopcedia. She herself presents her experience as a commonplace one, but it is 
stilI the case that the same principle applies to Condillac and Mrs Farnaby; in the cases of both 
they developed and concluded trains of thought that had been 'broken off (at least, as far as 
consciousness is concerned) during waking hours. In demonstrating the possibilities of creation 
within sleep, which could be seen as a step onward from the conclusion of thought processes in 
a dream, Chambers's cites two examples: Coleridge's composition of Kubla Khan, which was 
inspired by a line of a work which he was reading before falling asleep, and Tartini's conception 
of the Devil's Sonata, written after a dream in which the devil played the violin with marvellous 
skill. In both cases the dreamers woke and were spurred into action; Coleridge 'on awakening 
... had so distinct a remembrance of the whole, that he seized his pen and wrote down the lines 
that are still preserved' (p. 666). For the dreamers in Basil and The Fallen Leaves the effects on 
their waking lives were no less tangible. Basil, spurred on by the 'love-images which that 
dream had set up ... for the worship of the senses' (Basil, p. 47), detennines to win Margaret that 
day and so seals his fate; Mrs Famaby describes to AmeIius how her dream has affected her, 
saying, 'it has encouraged me to take you into my confidence, and ask you to help me' (The 
Fallen Leaves, p. 69), a request which leads to the tracing of her daughter. 
Victorian psychological texts such as the entry in Chambers's commonly used stories 
which demonstrated the extreme of whichever process they were discussing. These theories, in 
tum, had been largely conceived in response to such anecdotal phenomena, or their more 
everyday versions arising from the same basic principle, as we have seen in Carpenter's coining 
of the term 'Unconscious Cerebration', when faced with a certain common psychological 
occurrence. Hence such stories were endlessly circulated within Collins's cultural context, 
regardless of any boundaries between book, journal or encyclopaedia. In fact, it was sometimes 
the case that each publication, of whatever kind, fed the next. As the entry in Chambers's 
indicates in its citation of an earlier essay by Carpenter, it was by no means the first (or indeed 
the last) publication to use the examples of Condorcet, Condillac, Coleridge and Tartini. 
Carpenter, in his 1847 entry in The Cyclopcedia of Anatomy and Physiology recounts these 
stories, all of which, excepting that about Tartini, go on to appear in an 1851 article on 'Dreams' 
by Dr. Thomas Stone in Household Words,44 a piece for which the writer was castigated by 
Dickens who thought it should be 'a little less recapitulative of the usual stories in the books'. 
Stone defended himself by saying that he had used well-trodden anecdotal sources only, for 
44 Dr. Thomas Stone, 'Dreams', Household Words, 2 (8 March 1851),566-72 (p. 569). 
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reasons of authenticity.4s Nineteen years later, Frances Power Cobbe's 1870 article on 
'Unconscious Cerebration' would use all but the Tartini story to exemplify a sort of mental 
somnambulism 'in the realm of pure imagination', the physical counterpart of which was 'an 
unmistakeable form of unconscious cerebration' ('Unconscious Cerebration', p. 30). 
Carpenter's 1874 Principles of Mental Physiology, a volume which quoted extensively from 
Cobbe's article, and like his 1855 Principles of Human Physiology, made use of anecdotal 
material published in Household Words,46 recapitulated all of the four famous anecdotes 
(Mental Physiology, p. 584 n.) in a section on 'Sleep, Dreaming and Somnambulism' which in 
some parts was only a lightly rewritten version of his Cyclopredia essay.47 
In 1900, Freud wrote that 'the establishment of unconscious psychical reality' by 
psychoanalysis meant that now 'some of the activities whose successful performance in dreams 
excited astonishment are now no longer to be attributed to dreams but to unconscious thinking, 
which is active during the day no less than at night': 
If a dream carries on the activities of the day and completes them and even brings valuable fresh ideas to 
light, all we need to do is to strip it of the dream disguise, which is the product of dream-work and the 
mark of assistance rendered by obscure forces from the depths of the mind (cf. the Devil in Tartini' s 
sonata dream); the intellectual achievement is due to the same mental forces which produce every similar 
result during the daytime. We are probably inclined greatly to over-estimate the conscious character of 
intellectual and artistic production as well. Accounts given us by some of the most highly productive 
4S Cited in Anne Lohrli, Household Words: 1850-59. Table o/Contents, List o/Contributors, and their 
Contributions (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 440. 
46 In the 1855 edition of Principles 0/ Human Physiology Carpenter recounts a story told by Harriet 
Martineau about an idiot whose mother had died before he was two, 'and who could not have 
subsequently been made cognizant of anything relating to her; and who yet, when dying at the age of 
thirty, "suddenly turned his head, looked bright and sensible, and exclaimed in a tone never heard from 
him before, "Oh, my mother! how beautiful!" and sunk round again - dead' (p. 601 n.). This story is 
repeated in the 1874 edition of Principles o/Mental Physiology (p. 431). 
47 Carpenter's 1847 essay, of course, relied on sources published earlier in the century, most likely The 
Philosophy 0/ Sleep (1835) by Robert Macnish. In an alternative tracing of anecdotal evidence to the one 
I have explored in the body of the text, in the story of Dr. John Gregory's dreaming experience, flrSt 
recorded (as far as I can tell) in Abercrombie's Inquiries Concerning the Intellectual Powers we see 
another constantly repeated example of a certain phenomenon which was later cited by Freud. In this 
case the anecdote is a demonstration of a 'somatic' dream (a dream inspired by the sensations of the 
dreamer). Abercrombie wrote, ' By the kind attention of my friend Dr. James Gregory, I have received a 
most interesting manuscript by his late eminent father ... In this paper, Dr. Gregory mentions of himself, 
that, having on one occasion, gone to bed with a vessel of hot water at his feet, he dreamt of walking up 
the crater of Mount Etna, and of feeling the ground warm under him ... On another occasion, he dreamt 
of spending a winter at Hudson's Bay, and of suffering much distress from the intense frost. He found 
that he had thrown otT the bed-clothes in his sleep' (pp. 260-61). However, by the time the story is 
reprinted in Carpenter's 1847 Cyclopaedia entry the identity of the dreamer has changed to Dr. James 
Gregory himself (Cyclopaedia, p. 688), as it was in Dr. Stone's article in Household Words ('Dreams', p. 
567). It seems that Stone has used Abercrombie as his source, the earlier phraseology 'gone to bed with a 
vessel of hot water at his feet, he dreamt of walking up the crater of Mount Etna' and 'the ground warm 
under him' being reproduced exactly. Carpenter's source, however, seems to be different from Stone's in 
this instance. The mention of the crater is gone, and the ground, instead of being simply warm, becomes 
'intolerably hot' (Cyclopaedia, p. 688). Freud's account, taken from Robert MacNish's 1835 edition of 
The Philosophy o/Sleep, shows these same changes (Interpretation, p. 24) and so MacNish seems to be 
the likely source for Carpenter. By the time the story gets to Frances Power Cobbe, it has become that of 
'the lady whose hot bottle scorched her feet, and who imagined she was walking into Vesuvius' 
('Unconscious Cerebration', p. 28). Having undergone these changes, the story becomes more mythical 
than evidential, and approaches the fictional examples of psychological phenomena that Collins creates in 
his fiction. 
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men, such as Goethe and Helmholtz, show rather that what is essential and new in their creations came to 
them without premeditation and as an almost ready-made whole. (Interpretation, p. 613) 
For Freud, the 'obscure forces from the depths of the mind' which powered Tartini's 
composition derive from 'certain unconscious fantasies (deriving, probably, from sexual 
impulses)'; still, his belief that he is the first to explain such anecdotes as were circulated during 
the nineteenth century, or, as he terms them, 'dream-problems with which earlier writers were 
deeply concerned' (p. 613) in terms of an unconscious thinking, is mistaken. The unconscious 
cerebration described by Carpenter and Frances Power Cobbe cannot be fully likened to Freud's 
largely inaccessible Unconscious proper.48 However, both concepts oppose the argument that 
Freud is attempting to counter in the passage in which he cites Tartini, that 'consciousness is an 
indispensable characteristic of what is psychical' (p. 612). Unknown to Freud, these words were 
prefigured by Carpenter in 1868, when he asserted that, excepting certain thinkers such as Sir 
William Hamilton, 'in the systems of Philosophy long prevalent in this country, consciousness 
has been almost uniformly taken as the basis of all strictly Mental activity' ('On the 
Unconscious Activity', p. 339).49 Even further back, in 1859, William Hamilton himself was 
published as lamenting the fact that 'in Britain', notably in contrast to Germany,50 'succeeding 
philosophers have almost admitted as a self-evident truth, that there can be no modification of 
mind devoid of consciousness' (Lectures I, 362).51 
48 'Unconscious Cerebration' was given the alternative tenn 'Preconscious Activity of the Soul' (see 'On 
the Unconscious Activity', p. 339). This is helpful, as it places the Victorian idea of unconscious mental 
activity nearer the Freudian Preconscious system (Pes.) than the actual Unconscious (Ucs.). 
49 In Principles of Mental Physiology of 1874, Carpenter expands on his point: 'To affinn that the 
Cerebrum may act upon impressions transmitted to it, and may elaborate Intellectual results, such as we 
might have attained by the intentional direction of our minds to the subject, without any consciousness on 
our own parts, is held by many Metaphysicians, more especially in Britain, to be an altogether untenable 
and even a most objectionable doctrine. But this affmnation is only the Physiological expression of a 
doctrine which has been current among the Metaphysicians of Gennany, from the time of Leibnitz to the 
present date, and which was systematically expounded by Sir William Hamilton, - that the Mind may 
undergo modifications, sometimes of very considerable importance, without being itself conscious of the 
process, until its results present themselves to the consciousness, in the new ideas, or new combinations 
of ideas, which the process has evolved.' (p. 515) Carpenter's mention of Gennany as at the forefront of 
ideas about unconscious mental processes is especially interesting, as one would not gain this impression 
from Freud's writings. 
50 Hamilton ascribes Gennany's acceptance that 'mental' does not always equal 'conscious' to its 
adoption of the philosophy of Leibnitz, who had been an influence on Hamilton himself: 'In Gennany, 
the doctrine of Leibnitz was almost universally adopted. I am not aware of a philosopher of the least 
note, by whom it has been rejected.' (Lectures, I, 362) According to Henri Ellenberger, who cites 
Leibnitz as one of the philosophers of the unconscious before Freud, 'Leibnitz is generally credited with 
having coined the word "dynamic" in contradistinction to the words "static" and "cinematic". He used it 
in mechanics. The tenn was taken over and applied to psychology by Herbart'. He continues that 
Fechner's work also emerged from the Leibnitzian tradition. (Henri Ellenberger, The Discovery of the 
Unconscious: The History and Evolution o/Dynamic Psychiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 289). 
Not only did he infonn the dynamic visions of two of Freud's teachers, however, Leibnitz also, according 
to Ellenberger 'proposed the first theory of the unconscious mind supported by purely psychological 
arguments' (p. 312). 
51 Freud himself added a footnote to this point in 1914 which quotes the work of a writer called Du Prel, 
who in tum quotes Maudsley (although it is the editor, rather than Freud, who acknowledges Maudsley) 
as an exception to a belief in these words. Maudsley, according to the note, comments in Psychology and 
Pathology o/the Mind, 1868 (first published 1867): 'It is a truth which cannot be too distinctly borne in 
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In their common understanding that in dreaming, as in other psychological occurrences, 
certain mental processes, generally inaccessible to the consciousness of the individual, come 
into play, Carpenter, Cobbe and Freud, by looking below the surface of consciousness, all 
provide, in Carpenter's words, 'the scientific elucidation of many phenomena that would 
otherwise remain obscure and meaningless' ('On the Unconscious Activity', p. 339). I hope I 
have made clear that Collins's writing, with its own consideration of unconscious processes, 
sought, in a small way, to add something to this process of scientific elucidation. It was 
primarily the phenomena and ideas that sprang from the doctrine of associationism that, for such 
thinkers as Carpenter, Cobbe and Hamilton, both gave rise to and continued to feed their belief 
that not all mental activity took place on a conscious level. Collins's work, in considering the 
same doctrines and ideas, provided the same conclusion. In producing the sort of fictional 
examples of associationism that we have encountered in Faulkner's memories, Mrs Lecount's 
mental detection, Basil's and Mrs Famaby's dreams, Collins was continuing a consideration of 
the intricacies of this concept, and its relation to unconscious thinking, that was constantly 
occurring within his intellectual and cultural context. 
A Mere Creature of Habit and Impulse: Basil 
Basil is a young man peculiarly susceptible to expenencmg the sort of phenomena of 
association that I have already touched on in this chapter. Late in his chronicle of the events of 
a year in his life, recuperating from a nervous illness, his unconsummated 'marriage' to 
Margaret Sherwin ruined by her infidelity with Robert Mannion, he visits her house and is 
confronted by a servant who asks Basil about one of a series of letters that has been sent 
addressed to her mistress: 
Though I did not know the handwriting, still there was something in those unsteady characters 
which seemed familiar to me. Was it possible that I had ever seen them before? I tried to consider; but 
my memory was confused, my mind wearied out ... The effort was fruitless. (Basil, p. 223) 
He returns the letter to the servant, and walks a little way: 
It was very strange; but that unknown handwriting still occupied my thoughts: that wretched trifle 
absolutely took possession of my mind, at such a time as this; in such a position as mine was now. 
I stopped wearily in the fields at a lonely spot, away from the footpath. My eyes ached at the 
sunlight, and I shaded them with my hand. Exactly at the same instant, the lost recollection flashed back 
on me so vividly that I started almost in terror. (pp. 223-24) 
The realization that has come to Basil, without his willing it, is that the handwriting on the letter 
to Margaret is identical with that on a forgotten letter, addressed to himself, in his pocket, a 
mind that consciousness is not c:o-extensive with mind' (p. IS; cited in Interpretalion, p. 612 n.). 
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letter which, on inspection, is signed 'Robert Mannion' .52 Basil is unable to understand how he 
could not consciously have made the connection between the two letters, that he had in effect 
all owed Margaret to receive a letter from his rival. He asks the question, 'How had my 
perceptions become thus strangely blinded?' and his faculties answer for him: 'The confusion of 
my memory, the listless incapacity of all my faculties, answered the question but too readily, of 
themselves.' (p. 224) In Basil, Collins presents a young man who, because of the often inactive 
nature of his consciousness, becomes a site on which the workings of association, of what were 
seen in the IS50s as the lower mental faculties, are uniquely visible. 
Basil's was a state of being that held great interest for commentators in and before the 
IS50s. This was not, in fact, because of their fascination with the phenomena of 'unconscious 
cerebration', but because such a state (in which the will was, in Carpenter's words of IS53, 'in 
abeyance' (Human Physiology 4th edn, p. SOO», revealed how much of our being this, the 
highest faculty, ordinarily controIled. On 12 March, IS52, in the same year in which Basil was 
published, W. B. Carpenter gave a lecture at the Royal Institution entitled 'On the Influence of 
Suggestion in Modifying and Directing Muscular Movement, Independently of Volition'. 
Building on an already established interest, on which he had been published several times,53 he 
considered the role of the will in mental life, in this case its effect, or lack of it, on learned 
muscular movements, such as those involved in walking. He suggested that although the will, 
connected to the inteIlectual, cerebral processes, ordinarily controls the movements of such 
activities, if an impression made upon the nervous system is 'anywhere interrupted' in its travel 
upwards through the higher faculties (of sensations, ideas, emotions, inteIlectual processes and 
will) 'a "reflex" action will be the result'.54 One such interruption may occur when the 'state of 
the cerebrum' is occupied, or suspended: 
This the Lecturer maintained to be the true account of the mode in which the locomotive movements are 
maintained and guided in states of profound abstraction, when the whole attention of the individual is so 
52 Basil does not explore why it is that his memory returns to him when he shades his eyes. I believe this 
may be because it acts as another example in Collins's fiction of the working of a hidden link, of which 
Basil, the narrator, is unaware. Basil had received the letter that has been lying forgotten in his pocket 
that morning, before the upsetting confrontation with his father. I would suggest that the sensation of his 
aching eyes acts as a reminder of the tears that he has shed, and has seen Clara shed that morning, and so 
carried a portion of his thoughts, of which he was unaware, back to home. Further, it may recall to him 
the look that his father gave him when he had made his confession of marriage to Margaret Sherwin - 'his 
eyes, when they met mine, had a pining, weary look, as if they had been long condemned to rest on wONI 
and revolting objects' (p. 200). There is also a sense in which, in sheltering his eyes from the sun, Basil 
also recalls to memory the fact that he himself has no bodily shelter, that he has been cast from home. 
The conscious dwelling on the letter addressed to Margaret, combined with a preoccupation with home at 
a less than conscious level, has caused the sudden return of his recollection. His shock at this speaks for 
his ignorance of his own latent mental processes, the workings of his own mind. 
53 J. Estlin Carpenter lists the following articles: an article 'on Dr. Moreau's "Psychological Studies in 
Haschisch and on Mental Derangement", British and Foreign Medico-ChirurgicaJ Review, January 1847, 
'Dr. Mayo on the Relations of Crime, Insanity, and Punishment', British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical 
Review, July 1847, an article on Todd's "Physiology of the Nervous System", British and Foreign 
Medico-Chirurgical Review, January 1850 (Nature and Man, pp. 56,57, 164). 
54 W. B. Carpenter, 'Extract of "On the Influence of Suggestion in Modifying and Directing Muscular 
Movement, Independently ofVolitionH ', in Nature and Man, pp. 169-72 (po 171). 
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completely. concentrated upon hi~ own tra~ of thought that he does not perceive the objects around him, 
although his movements are obviously gUIded by the impressions which they make upon his sensorium. 
And he adverted to a very remarkable case, in which the functional activity of the cerebrum seemed to 
have been almost entirely suspended for nearly a twelvemonth, and all the actions of the individual 
presented the automatic characters of consensual and reflex movements. (' On the Influence', p. 171) 
At times, in reading Basil, the autobiography charting little more than 'a twelvemonth' in 
the life of a young man, it may almost seem as if we are perusing the case study of the 
unfortunate individual to whom Carpenter refers at the end of this passage. In simply surveying 
his walking habits, a suspension of the intellectual activity of the cerebrum is evident. Having 
just met Margaret, Basil writes that, 'my ideas were in utter confusion, all my thoughts ran 
astray. I walked on, dreaming in full day - I had no distinct impressions, except of the stranger 
beauty whom I had just seen' (Basil, p. 32). Later in the novel, obeying a vague suspicion, he 
follows Margaret and Mannion to the hotel where they are to consummate their secret passion. 
He writes: 
StiII acting mechanically; still with no defmite impulse that I could recognise, even if I felt it, except the 
instinctive resolution to follow them into the house, as I had already fo11owed them through the street - I 
walked up to the door, and rang the be11. (Basil, p. 159) 
Basil's impulses here have not reached his higher faculties. Far from 'recognis[ing]' (an 
intellectual activity) the motive that takes him to the door of the hotel, he cannot even feel it. 
The impression has remained instinctive, below the level even of sensation; it is reflex action 
that guides his movements. Previous to this, in the cab which follows the couple, the cabdriver 
offers to hail the much faster vehicle ahead. Basil 'mechanically' tells the cabman simply to 
follow them. He writes: 'while the words passed my lips, a strange sensation stole over me: I 
seemed to be speaking as the mere mouthpiece of some other voice' (p. 158). Here Basil 
resembles certain human automata that Carpenter described in 1853. In a useful passage about 
the importance of will in defining the individual as a 'free agent' we get some sense of the root 
of Basil's lack of self-possession: 
In the control and direction which the Will has the power of exerting over the course of the thoughts, we 
have the evidence of a new and independent power, which is entirely opposed in its very nature to all the 
automatic tendencies, and which, according as it is habitually exerted, tends to render the individual a free 
agent. And, truly, in the existence of this Power, which is capable of dominating over the very highest of 
those operations that we know-of as connected with corporeal states, we find a better evidence than we 
gain from the study of any other part of our psychical nature, that there is an entity, wherein Man's 
nobility essentially consists, which does not depend for its existence on any play of physical or vital 
forces, but makes these subservient to its determinations. It is, in fact, in virtue of the Will, that we are 
not mere thinking automata, mere puppets to be pulled by suggesting-strings, capable of being played-
upon by every one who shall have made himself master of our springs of action. It may be freely 
admitted that such thinking automata do exist: for there are many individuals whose Will has never been 
called into due exercise, and who gradually almost entirely lose the power of exerting it, becoming the 
mere creatures of habit and impulse. (Human PhySiology, 4* edn., p. 800) 
Basil, the second son of the latest generation of 'one of the most ancient' English families 
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(Basil, p. 2), might be supposed to have been born with a degree of nobility. Collins, however, 
makes it clear that Basil's birthright has constituted a lack of opportunity to exercise his will, an 
easy situation that does not prepare him when this 'power' within him is called upon: 
Thus, ~ entere~ life under the fairest auspices. Though a younger son, I knew that my father's wealth, 
exclusIve of hIS. landed property, secured me an independent income far beyond my wants. I had no 
e~travagant.hablts; n~ tastes that I co~ld not gratify as soon as formed; no cares or responsibilities of any 
kmd. I mIght ~ract1se my pr~fesslOn ~r not, just as I chose. I could devote myself wholly and 
unreservedly to lIterature, know1Og that, 10 my case, the struggle for fame could never be identical _ 
terribly, though gloriously identical- with the struggle for bread. (Basil, p. 4) 
In William Willis Moseley's 1838 edition of Eleven Chapters of Nervous and Mental 
Complaints, a list is given of factors that may 'cause the brain that is healthy to sink into a 
morbid state' .55 Under the heading 'The absence of appropriate exercise and occupation' is the 
category of 'young men, whose days are entirely without the occupations of the state, church, 
army, navy, or business, and who find it difficult to kill their time' (Skultans, pp. 43, 44).56 
Freedom from responsibility, from occupation, makes the individual anything but Carpenter's 
noble 'free agent'. 
Basil from the beginning proves himself the 'creature of habit and impulse' that 
Carpenter describes in his discussion of human automata; like these automata, though seemingly 
doing whatever he pleases, he is fettered into a certain pattern of action. He describes his 
boarding of the omnibus, after banking his father's quarterly allowance to him (itself an 
independent income which makes Basil anything but), as due to an 'idle impulse of the 
moment', something that he was in the custom of doing, having done it 'often before' as a 
means of 'amusement' (p. 27). Abercrombie warns of the dangers of this sort of deceptive 
idleness: 
The mind cannot be idle, and, when it is not occupied with subjects of a useful kind, it will f10d a resource 
in those which are frivolous or hurtful, - in mere visions, waking dreams, or fictions, in which the mind, 
SS Quoted in Vieda Skultans, Madness and Morals: Ideas on Insanity in the Nineteenth Century (London: 
Routledge, 1975), p. 41. 
S6 Part of the morbidity inherent in this position no doubt lay in the amount of time these young men had 
to dwell on themselves. Michael J. Clark demonstrates in a paper detailing the history of nineteenth-
century ideas on introspection that this tendency was seen by those such as Henry Maudsley as 'a morbid 
egoism', dangerous in its implications: 'Absorption in purely "subjective" states of consciousness, they 
argued, upset the "natural" mental balance by impairing the capacity to receive and to react to external 
impressions, and by withdrawing or suspending the control habitually exercised by the will and 
judgement over the succession of thoughts and feelings. This dethronement of reason and will in tum 
favoured the development of "dominant", "imperative", or obsessional ideas or trains of thought, of 
morbid emotional states, and of mental automatism, and thus by degrees passed over into actual mental 
disorder.' {"'Morbid introspection", unsoundness of mind, and British psychological medicine, c.1830-
c.1900', in The Anatomy 0/ Madness: Essays in the History 0/ Psychiatry, Yol lII. The Asylum and its 
Psychiatry, ed. by W. F. Bynum, Roy Porter and Michael Shepherd, 3 vols (London: Routledge, 1988) 
III, 71-101 (p. 72». The fact that Basil is a writer, who in writing his historical novel pours his 'heart's 
dearest sensations' and his 'mind's highest thoughts' (Basil, p. 41) onto the page, implicates him here, but 
it is his writing of the autobiography which makes up the novel would especially be seen to encourage 
dangerous tendencies of introspection. Ironically, this introspection does Basil no good; as I have 
discussed in the last section, of anyone be seems to know himself least well. 
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wanders from scene to scene, unrestrained by reason, probability, or truth. No habit can be more opposed 
to a healthy condition of the mental powers. (Intellectual Powers, p. 424) 
Abercrombie's words, which condemn 'mere visions, waking dreams, or fictions', could in fact 
implicate the fiction writer, to whose vocation Basil attempts to elevate his sudden decision to 
board the omnibus: 
. It was something more than an idle impUlse though. If I had at that time no other qualification 
for the hter~ career on whi~h I was entering, I certainly had this one - an aptitude for discovering points 
of character ill others: and Its natural result, an unfailing delight in studying characters of all kinds, 
wherever I could meet with them. (Basil, p. 27). 
If this intellectual attribute - the only one to recommend him as a writer - was indeed Basil's as 
he boarded the omnibus, it certainly leaves him on his first sighting of Margaret Sherwin. The 
effects of this encounter are described in a way that by-passes the higher faculties - intellect and 
will. Notably, the keyword in this passage is 'influence', a word that was, especially at this 
time, strongly linked to 'power': 
Among the workings of the hidden life within us which we may experience but cannot explain, 
are there any more remarkable than those mysterious moral influences constantly exercised, either for 
attraction or repulsion, by one human being over another? In the simplest, as in the most important 
affairs of life, how startling, how irresistible is their power! ... How strangely and abruptly we become 
convinced, at a first introduction, that we shall secretly love this person and loathe that, before experience 
has guided us with a single fact in relation to their characters! 
I have said that the two additional passengers who entered the vehicle in which I was riding, 
were, one of them, an elderly lady; the other, a young girl. As soon as the latter had seated herself nearly 
opposite to me ... I felt her influence on me directly - an influence that I cannot describe - an influence 
which I had never experienced in my life before, which I shall never experience again. (p. 29) 
In the year in which he wrote Basil, Collins had already been considering issues of will 
and influence. In the spring of 1852 he wrote a series of articles entitled 'Magnetic Evenings at 
Home' in which he described a number of magnetic 'experiments' he had witnessed. In his 
account of these he writes of 'the sympathy between the magnetizer and the person magnetized 
- the limitless power of the one over the other',57 and 'effects produced by one person standing 
opposite to another ... steadily exercising the whole time a strong effort of will' .58 In these 
articles, power and will are linked; similarly in Basil. Basil, with little strength of will, is 
correspondingly powerless, and open to every passing influence, like the magnetized subject. 59 
57 W. W. C., 'Magnetic Evenings at Home. Letter H. - to G. H. Lewes', The Leader, III (14 February 
1852), 160-61 (p. 161). 
5& W. W. C., 'Magnetic Evenings at Home. Letter HI. - to G. H. Lewes', The Leader, III (21 February 
1852), 183-84 (p. 184). 
59 It is worth mentioning here something about the subjects that Collins describes in his articles. Two are 
young women, but a man is also magnetized. This has the effect of making him laugh uproariously and 
then, rather unfortunately t break into an undignified and womanly tit of hysterical screaming. In all the 
cases of magnetism it is necessarily the case that the power is on the side of the audience and the 
magnetizer rather than those who in essence are making a spectacle of themselves, and the man appears 
more obviously than the women to be powerless, utterly lacking control of his emotional responses. It is 
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The effect of Margaret's influence (as, significantly, she sits 'nearly opposite' to him) is 
immediately to suspend Basil's intellectual activity, to take away his only asset as a writer, his 
'aptitude for discovering points of character in others.' This quality the often indolent Basil 60 
relinquishes in the face of the greater power of a 'mysterious moral influenc[e]', which by-
passes the work of judgement and indicates, without trouble, what he should feel about those he 
meets. His suspension of this cerebral activity has far-reaching effects, which manifest 
themselves immediately: 
~ro?I the t~e when she entered the omnibus, I have no recollection of anything more that 
occurred. m It.. I neIther. remember what passengers got out, or what passengers got in. My powers of 
observatIon, hItherto actIve enough, had now wholly deserted me. Strange! that the capricious rule of 
chance should sway the action of our faculties! - that a trifle should set in motion the whole complicated 
machinery of their exercise, and a trifle suspend it. (Basil, p. 30) 
The beginning of this suspension of character judgement and observation is the beginning of 
Basil's inability to see what is before him in others, including certain hints that his downfall is 
approaching. Mannion later mocks him for his blindness: 
'Through all that year, daily visitor as you were at North Villa, you never suspected either of us! And yet, 
had you been one whit less infatuated, how many warnings you might have discovered ... There were 
times at which every step of the way along which I was advancing was marked, faintly yet significantly, 
in her manner and her speech, could you only have interpreted them aright'. (pp. 247-48) 
Seeing the signs, Basil fails to call up the right associations in connection with them; his 
examination of Margaret's features on the omnibus is symptomatic. Describing her full lips, he 
writes, 'to other eyes, they might have looked too full' (p. 30), a comment which would have set 
alarm bells ringing in the mind of the Victorian reader.61 
His observational sense suspended, without the pressure of pecuniary worries to spur 
him to work, the occupation that writing had appeared to be to Basil, now reveals itself as mere 
amusement: 'I slowly turned over the leaves one by one, but my eye only fell mechanically on 
interesting that Collins had witnessed in the reaction of this subject an example of what a man lacking his 
own power of will can be. In his ability to be influenced, there is a sense in which Basil's usual state is 
being equated with these unguarded moments in the life of a normally composed man - the magnetized 
subject 'had never suffered on any previous occasion' from a fit of hysterics (W. W. C., 'Magnetic 
Evenings at Home. Letter III. - To G. H. Lewes', pp. 183, 184). 
60 Basil left college, he relates, 'with no other reputation than a reputation for indolence and reserve' 
(Basil, p. 4); later, when describing how he should accompany Clara to evening parties more than he 
does, he writes: 'Sometimes I am shamed into accompanying her a little more frequently than usual; but 
myoid indolence in these matters soon possesses me again' (p. 26). 
61 An article in Household Words, entitled 'Faces' (X (16 September 1854),97-101) by Edmund Ollier, 
expressed something of the mid-century attitude to mouths - 'It may perhaps be laid down as a general 
rule, that whenever one's observation is mainly, and first of all, attracted towards the lower parts of a 
face, that face is bad ... The mouth has its legitimate part to play, and it is a beautiful feature when weD-
fonned; but the ethereal principle, whicb alone makes the buman face divine, bolds its chief evidence in 
the forehead and eyes' (pp. 100-01). Basil's portrait of his sister Clara would seem to indicate that 
Collins was well aware of this type of view, for in her 'The lower part of the face is rather too small for 
the upper' (Basil, p. 19). 
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the writing ... the fatal influence of the dark beauty remained with me still. How could I write?' 
(Basil, p. 41). In 1853, Carpenter described the Willpower that is sometimes needed, in the face 
of a 'powerful interest' which 'tends to draw-off the attention elsewhere' to enable the scholar 
to continue writing: 
The in~ellectua~ powers can only be ~ept in action upon the pre-detennined subject, by a strong effort of 
the WIll; of thIS eff~rt we are consclO~s at the time, and feel that we need to put-forth even a greater 
power than that whIch would be requITed to generate a large amount of physical force through the 
muscular system (Human PhySiology, 4th edn., p. 817). 
This is a concentrated aspect of what Carpenter had described as 'the control and direction 
which the Will has the power of exerting over the course of the thoughts'; Abercrombie, in 
Culture and Discipline of the Mind (1837) writes that the individual, with the 'power' of 
'mental discipline', 'can direct the thoughts to any subject' (cited in Skultans, p. 158). Without 
these reserves of power, developed by habit, Basil simply becomes a 'mere puppe[t] to be 
pulled by suggesting-strings, capable of being played-on by every one who shall have made 
himself master of our springs of action'; he is master neither of his mechanical muscular 
movements, nor his 'deteriorat[ed], intellectual powers (Basil, p. 43); later he is neither master 
of his marital relationship nor his destiny, which, for a time, is in the hands of Mannion. In a 
sense, he was never master of any of these things; his actions, his education, his nuptial choice 
(dictated by ancestral honour), and his story should have been such as could be read in the book 
of family history. Consequently, he is, in Abercrombie's words on those lacking a 'well-
regulated mind', 'the sport and the victim of every change that flits across the scene' (cited in 
Skultans, p. 157). And in this Basil is fundamentally the casualty of the system of association, 
which is merciless to those who cannot master it. 62 Having no control over the direction of his 
thoughts, they run, without his choice, into one of two channels, towards home, or towards 
Margaret. Idly courting all associations, he unwittingly makes fatal, unbreakable ones. I shall 
62 Jenny Bourne Taylor looks at Basil against, amongst other psychological theories, its backdrop of 
associationism, also arguing that Basil cannot make the right associations, which causes him to become a 
victim: 'Basil becomes the upper-middle-class dupe of petit-bourgeois sexual intrigue because his 
sensibility is out of line - he has no control over the codes that govern effective interpretation - and 
because he is unable to distinguish between different kinds of associative mechanisms' (Secret Theatre, p. 
79). I hope to build on Bourne Taylor's outlook by focusing on specific areas of associationism in 
relation to Basil, as I have focused on his predilection to becoming, as she puts it, a 'dupe' in tenns of his 
lack of willpower (Bourne Taylor, rather, emphasizes Basil's 'feminized' position of younger son, which 
leads to 'his lack of self-possession', p. 75). Although in my emphasis on Collins's use of the 
psychological texts and issues that surrounded him, I most nearly approach the work of Jenny Bourne 
Taylor of all critics, my focus, because of its need also to link to the frameworks and concepts that Freud 
would later adopt, is a more specific one. Whereas she keeps in frame two or three often contradictory 
psychological discourses (those she commonly mentions being phrenology, associationism and moral 
management) and discusses the way that these doctrines are interrogated, set against each other, 
emphasized and undercut by Collins in his novels, my frame is necessarily more limited. Because of her 
range, Bourne Taylor rarely has the space to engage directly and deeply with the concept of the 
association of ideas within Collins's work. Although she often mentions it, it is usually in partial 
explanation of another doctrine, or is taken as an understood underpinning of psychological thought (see 
for example, pp. 21, 31, 40, 55). By considering Collins's work in relation only to the doctrine of the 
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examine the detai1s and implications of these two aspects of the flip-side of the marvels of 
association in the rest of this section. 
Basil's dream of the light and dark women reflects the true dichotomy that has been 
created that day within his psyche, reflecting a deep recognition that he can have a true 
relationship with Clara, or with Margaret, but not with both. This absolute view stems from his 
father's exacting demands, which, on a surface, practical level, mean that he disinherits the son 
who has married the linen-draper's daughter, but also which have affected Basil from childhood 
in deeper ways. An indication of this is found in Basil's account of his father's behaviour when 
Basil or his brother had committed a fault in childhood: 
On these occasions, we were not addressed by our Christian names; if we accidentally met him out of 
doors, he was sure to tum aside and avoid us; if we asked a question, it was answered in the briefest 
possible manner, as if we had been strangers. His whole course of conduct said, as though in so many 
words - You have rendered yourselves unfit to associate with your father; and he is now making you feel 
that unfitness as deeply as he does. We were left in this domestic purgatory for days, sometimes for 
weeks together. To our boyish feelings (to mine especially) there was no ignominy like it, while it lasted. 
(Basil, p. 9) 
'You have rendered yourself unfit to associate with your father'; this sentiment is taken up on a 
psychical level later in Basil's life. On his first meeting Margaret, all homeward associations 
are made unavailable to him, with the consequence that he forgets that he has promised to ride 
with his sister, 'never had any former appointment of mine with Clara, been thus forgotten!' (p. 
33). On the morning in which Basil decides to tell Margaret of his love, he leaves the house: 
As I descended the steps, I glanced by accident at the dining-room window. Clara was looking after me 
from it ... She smiled as our eyes met - a sad, faint smile that made her look unlike herself. But it 
produced no impression on me then: I had no attention for anything but my approaching interview with 
Margaret. My life throbbed and burned within me, in that direction: it was all coldness, torpor, 
insensibility, in every other. (p. 53) 
In contrast, occasionally when with Margaret, 'a thought of Clara put away from me all other 
thoughts'. The absolute nature of this associative dichotomy is reflected on all psychical levels; 
therefore it is no surprise to learn that, 'sometimes, in the lonely London house, I dreamed -
with the strangest sleeping oblivion of my marriage ... of country rides with my sister' (p. 139-
40). Basil has little control over which channel his thoughts run into. On visiting the home of 
which he had dreamt so longingly, he writes 'it was as if my life had run into a new channel 
since my last Autumn and winter at the Hall, and now refused to flow back at my bidding into 
its old course. Home seemed home no longer, except in name' (p. 146). When he returns to 
London: 
After the first five minutes of my arrival, I adapted myself again to myoId way of life at Mr. Sherwin's, 
as easily as if I had never interrupted it for a single day. Henceforth, wherever my young wife was, there, 
association ofideu I aim to fill in the detail that Bourne Taylor's broad range has omitted. 
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and there only, would it be home for me! (pp. 146-47) 
These opposing channels into which Basil's thoughts flow, each in use in exact 
proportion to which the other is disused, anticipate the mechanisms of Freud's 1895 Project/or 
a Scientific Psychology. In The Language 0/ Psycho-Analysis, Laplanche and Pontalis discuss 
Freud's depiction of the association of ideas in the Project. They argue that this text 'sheds 
light on the Freudian use of the idea of association by showing how ... the psycho-analytic 
discovery of the unconscious gave new meaning to those associationist assumptions upon which 
Freud had leaned'. They write that Freud's system was a step on from nineteenth-century 
associationism, and original, because in it, 'the way associations function is pictured as a 
circulation of energy within a "neuronal apparatus" ... At each intersection, each excitation takes 
one particular path in preference to another'. Facilitation, 'left by preceding excitations', is 
what determines which pathway is taken. This should be understood, they write, 'as a process 
of differential opposition: a given pathway is only facilitated in proportion as the alternative one 
is not' .63 In reading Basil we encounter this sort of system, laid bare, within the individual. 
Basil himself is an illustration of 'differential opposition', which, far from being an original idea 
of Freud's in its application to the mind, was a well-known mid-century model. I have 
discussed the conservation of force in my Introduction and first chapter. By the early 1850s 
Carpenter had undertaken a large amount of work on the subject, and in 1855 discussed its 
simple application to the bodily system; 'it explains that relation between Emotional excitement 
and bodily change, which is manifested in the subsidence of the former, when it has expended 
itself in the production of the latter' (Human Physiology, 5th edn, p. 553). That Collins, as a 
mid-Victorian, accurately understood and thought according to the principle of the conservation 
of force is indicated by Basil's description of his nervous wait for an interview with his father: 
'the faculties of observation are generally sharpened, in proportion as the faculties of reflection 
are dulled, under the influence of an absorbing suspense' (Basil, p. 192). This is its application 
on a small scale; that Collins can also conceive of its implications to the whole bodily system, in 
the same way that Carpenter describes above, is demonstrated by the battle of forces that Basil 
undergoes after his wedding. First, there is his irresistible impulse to engage in a long and 
strenuous horse ride immediately after the wedding, which he knows will be unconsummated 
for a year. Assailed by 'a wild excitement of body and mind', he writes, 'I was fit for nothing 
but a gallop through the rain' (Basil, p. 97). That this exercise lacks a calming effect for him is 
interesting, since it speaks for its inability to satisfy Basil in the way that his body is demanding, 
63 I. Laplanche and I.-B. Pontalis, The Language 0/ Psycho-Analysis, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(London: Kamac Books and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1988), p. 42. This principle begins to be 
laid out in the Project, pp. 298-302, but really underpins the whole system, in which it is the supreme aim 
that Q is kept constant (IS the psyche cannot achieve its first aim of keeping it at zero, p. 297). Laplanche 
and Pontalis helpfully condense it in tenDS of differential opposition in a way that is implied but not 
specifically set out in so many words within Freud's work; it is more of an assumption that does not need 
to be explained. 
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so that when he goes to bed, he writes, 'I felt my limbs quivering, till the bed shook under me. I 
was possessed by a gloom and horror, caused by no thought, and producing no thought: the 
thinking faculty seemed paralysed within me, altogether' (Basil, p. 99).64 Here the energies of 
body and mind are mutually exclusive; all the force in Basil's being is invested in the suffering 
of the former, to the detriment of the latter, which is simply unable to function. The siphoning 
of Basil's psychical force into one channel or another is characteristic of the larger laws which 
his system obeys,65 applied to the mind in the same way that Freud in 1895 applied a principle 
of differential opposition, with its possibilities of application on a larger scale, to the pathways 
of the psyche. 
Once a channel is facilitated, made easy to traverse, however, it can be difficult to 
escape. The essence of entrenched thinking was seen mid-century in terms of such metaphors 
as channels and Locke's well-trodden path. In 1860 George Henry Lewes wrote in The 
Physiology o/Common Life about many of the disadvantages of the system of association, using 
these images: 
Habits, Fixed Ideas, and what are called Automatic Actions, all depend on the tendency which a 
sensation has to discharge itself through the readiest channel. In learning to speak a new language, to 
play on a musical instrument, or to perform any unaccustomed movements, great difficulty is felt, 
because the channels through which each sensation has to pass have not become established; but no 
sooner has frequent repetition cut a pathway, than this difficulty vanishes; the actions become so 
automatic that they can be performed while the mind is otherwise engaged; and sometimes, if once 
commenced, they must continue ... The same thing is observable in the region of ideas. Old associations, 
old beliefs, are not to be displaced. A man may be thoroughly convinced to-day by the logic of his 
opponent, and yet to-morrow he will be heard uttering his old convictions, as if no one ever doubted 
them. His mind cannot move except in the old paths. It may be noted as the peculiar characteristic of 
vigorous intellects, that their thoughts are ever fmding new pathways instead of moving amid old 
associations. 66 
Similarly, Basil's less than vigorous mind, as he finds to his distress in his delirium, 'cannot 
move except in the old paths'. He writes, 'how often my wandering thoughts thus incessantly 
64 That Freud's Project is the application to the mind of established principles of force theory, principles 
of which Collins was also aware, becomes more evident within a consideration of the mechanisms of 
satisfaction, or its lack, in Basil and Freud's 1895 work. That Basil is profoundly suffering from a lack of 
satisfaction is shown in his pointed words, 'and this was my wedding-night!' In his Project, Freud would 
describe similar effects on the individual of the sort of tensions and frustrations that Basil has had on his 
wedding day, in more technical terms: 'The filling of the nuclear neurones in '" will have as its result an 
effort to discharge, an urgency which is released along the motor pathway. Experience shows that here 
the fITSt path to be taken is that leading to internal change (expression of the emotions, screaming, 
vascular innervation). But ... no such discharge can produce an unburdening result, since the endogenous 
stimulus continues to be received and the '" tension is restored' (Project, p. 317). Basil has taken the 
temporary first path, the expression of his excitement, but this has not resulted in 'unburdening' him. 
6' The picture of forces within the individual within Carpenter's philosophy is complicated by the Will, 
which acts as another Force within the system, for, in circumstances where we consciously make an 
exertion, 'Force must be regarded as the direct expression of the manifestation of that Mental state which 
we call Will' (Human Physiology, 5'" edn., p. 552). However, I would suggest that Basil offers little such 
complication, that because of his lack of will he functions an example of a simple system of differential 
opposition. 
66 George Henry Lewes, The Physiology o/Common Lifo, 2 vols (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 
1859-60), U, 58-59. 
111 
and desperately traced and retraced their way over their own fever track, I cannot tell' (Basil, p. 
172). The unusual suffering that he endures in his dream is also due to the same law - the truth 
, 
about the night of the infidelity, which he is seeking 'with a burning rage of detennination' 
throughout his delirium (p. 170), means that he has to break his dear associations.67 It is 
significant that when the truth does emerge, there is the sound 'as of the heavy air being cleft 
asunder' (p. 173) - this could also be the sound of the final breaking of the associative chain 
that links his feelings of love to Margaret. 68 We get a waking reflection of this process in 
Basil's meditations on his forced leaving of home and his first trip to North Villa since his 
illness: 
.. We are seldom abl.e to. discov~r under any ordinary conditions of self-knowledge, how intimately 
that spmtual part of us, which IS undymg, can attach to itself and its operations the poorest objects of the 
external world around us, which is perishable. In the ravelled skein, the slightest threads are the hardest 
t~ follow. In anal~sing the associations and sympa~ies which regulate the play of our passions, the 
simplest and homelIest are the last that we detect. It IS only when the shock comes, and the mind recoils 
before it - when joy is changed into sorrow, or sorrow into joy - that we really discern what trifles in the 
outer world our noblest mental pleasures, or our severest mental pains, have made part of themselves; 
atoms which the whirlpool has drawn into its vortex, as greedily and as surely as the largest mass. 
It was reserved for me to know this, when ... my steps turned, as of old, in the direction of North 
Villa ... there was hardly a spot along the entire way, which my heart had not unconsciously made 
beautiful and beloved to me by some association with Margaret Sherwin ... Dishonoured and ruined, it 
was among such associations as these - too homely to have been recognised by me in former times - that 
I journeyed along the well-remembered way to North Villa. (pp. 209-10) 
The above passage is a consideration of the effects of association by contiguity, whose joy, and 
whose peril, lies in its very randomness, its accidental nature. Depending on what is present at 
the time that we feel certain things, or what is present in conjunction with another element, 
however strange, these things, according to the laws of association, are connected inside our 
minds forever, the later appearance of one calling up the other to consciousness.69 Associations, 
67 S. J. Wood, in 'Sickness and Sexual Ideology in the Novel, 1850-1900' (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, 
University of Leeds, 1997), writes that Basil's suffering springs from the dreamer's creation of a 
landscape 'where sensations, thoughts, and visions are stripped of their familiar meanings and in which 
the dreamer is inexorably pressed into recognising new ones. Far from being a passive mode, delirium, it 
seems, demands a great deal of intellectual toil' (p. 138). This accurate account of the process of Basil's 
delirium essentially describes the breaking of associations and the forming of new ones. 
68 Freud, in an undated insert of a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, describes how breaking associations is 
fundamentally a traumatic process: 'Uncoupling associations is always painful. There sets in an 
impoverishment in excitation (in the free store of it) - an internal haemo"hage, as it were - which shows 
itself in the other instincts and functions. This in-drawing operates inhibitingly, like a wound, in a 
manner analogous to pain' ('Draft G: Melancholia' (undated), SE, 1,200-06 (pp. 205-06». 
69 Those in the market place made the most of this: Household Words, for which Collins fn wrote in the 
year that Basil was published, was a prime example. Its aim was to be, as Dickens's 'Preliminary Word' 
in the first issue set forth, 'associated with the hannless laughter and the gentle tears of many hearths'. 
He continues, 'We know the great responsibility of such a privilege; its vast reward' ('A Preliminary 
Word', Household Words, 1 (30 March 18S0), 1-2 (p. 1». It also aspired to be associated with the words 
of Shakespeare; at the head of each issue was written 'Familiar in their Mouths as HOUSEHOLD 
WORDS." - Shakespeare'. The title of the journal was taken from Henry Y, interestingly a passage in 
which King Hany aspires to be associated forever with St. Crispin's day because of the wonders he will 
do in battle on that day (Henry Y, IV. m. SI-S9). Household Words became a fulfilment of its title. 
Many yean after its demise W. B. Carpenter in 1872 gave a Presidential Address to the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science in which he recalled attending one of its meetings, thirty six 
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once made, then, are hard to break. Although Basil's feelings of love for Margaret have broken 
away from her image, he is still her reluctant husband, she his unwilling wife, as her delirious 
request that they read the marriage service backwards, to unmarry themselves, shows.70 The 
advantage of this is that it is harder for Basil's father to relinquish him than he envisages, for 
Basil at the end of the novel is back in the bosom of his family, having been forgiven by his 
now late father. This is an outcome that is dictated by the laws of association; for even as he 
tears Basil's page from the family history and declares his new role as enemy to the family, 
Basil's father acknowledges the potency of the link between them: 'Would to God I could tear 
the past from my memory, as I tear the leaf from this book!' (p. 203). 
However, it is Basil's family ties that also form an unbreakable association with his 
rival Mannion, whose father was hanged after being convicted, with Basil's father's help, of 
forging a credit-note in his name. Basil's father's 'strict principles of honour' were what took 
him to the witness box, despite his previously friendly relationship with Mannion's father. 
Mannion, born, as he writes to Basil, 'with the hangman's mark on me' (p. 229), had a start in 
life that directly opposed Basil's; 'trusting boldly to myself to carve out my own way' (p. 230) 
he aimed, until giving it up as impossible, to 'live up to my birth-right position' (p. 233), 
attempting to battle against his father's fate, refusing Basil's father's money which was offered 
as assistance. He is the activity to Basil's passivity until the end of the book. He actively 
seduces Margaret whereas Basil waits a year for her, a marital position he describes as 'a 
passive one' (p. 101). It is on the night of the infidelity that we see Basil's passivity most 
dramatically, in an episode when he almost becomes Carpenter's 'mere puppe[t] ... capable of 
being played-upon by every one who shall have made himself master of our springs of action'. 
For Basil does not just hear the coupling of Margaret and Mannion; it is as if he, on the other 
side of the wall, is forced to enact a grotesque parody of it - 'I heard the waiter say, under his 
years previously, in his home town of Bristol: 'I enjoyed the privilege which I hold it one of the most 
valuable functions of these annual assemblages to bestow: that of coming into personal relation with those 
distinguished men whose name are to every cultivator of science as "household words'" ('Man the 
Interpreter of Nature', in Nature and Man, pp. 185-210 (p. 185». The use of quotation marks in the 
transcript of the lecture suggests a certain self-consciousness in using the phrase, as if it was a trademark. 
That Collins understood the processes and dynamics of marketing is seen in Captain Wragge's 
advertisement campaign at the end of No Name: 'Stomach and sympathy, sympathy and stomach -look 
them both fairly in the face, when you reach the wrong side of fifty, and you will agree with me that they 
come to much the same thing ... [The public] can't get rid of me and my Pill- they must take us. There is 
not a single form of appeal in the whole range of human advertisement, which I am not making to the 
unfortunate public at this moment. Hire the last new novel - there I am, inside the boards of the book. 
Send for the last new Song - the instant you open the leaves, I drop out of it. Take a cab - I fly in at the 
window, in red. Buy a box of tooth-powder at the chemist's - I wrap it up for you, in blue. Show 
yourself at the theatre - I flutter down on you, in yellow' (No Name, p. 525). That Wragge understands 
the laws of association within the human mind is shown in his comic equation of sympathy and stomach, 
advertisement and self; the first association is already there - people will therefore be predisposed for the 
artificial association he will form in their minds with his campaign, between the welcome idea of cure and 
Wragge. The chain is quickly formed from sympathy to himself, a connection that inspires his fortune. 
As he says to Magdalen, 'Don't think me mercenary - I merely understand the age I live in' (p. 529). 
70 'Ibis in a sense is like an attempt to unravel the associative chain; for it was a service that was well-
known, always read in a certain order, and therefore could become such a chain, in the manner of the 
excerpts of language recited by the servant in Coleridge's story. 
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breath, "My God! he's dying'" {Basil, p. 160}. This could be a commentary on either Basil or 
Mannion. Even as Mannion 'dies' on the other side of the wall, Basil starts to lapse into a 
death-like state. The waiter revives him, and Basil writes, 'I knew all this; and knew when the 
paroxysm passed, and nothing remained of it, but a shivering helplessness in every limb' {Basil, 
p. 161}. Again, the wording is ambiguous, referring to 'the paroxysm' rather than 'my 
paroxysm', and who the owner is of the limbs is equally unclear. While Basil recuperates 
vacantly after this dreadful night in which he then attempts to murder Mannion, the fate of his 
victim does not cross his mind until the question 'had Mannion been taken up from the stones 
on which I had hurled him, a living man or a dead?' 'suddenly and mysteriously flashe[s]' upon 
his passive consciousness {p. 179}. In contrast, Mannion has been plotting against him all this 
time: as he writes in the letter which languishes forgotten in Basil's pocket, 'I am determined to 
pursue you' {p. 251}. 
Mannion is often dubbed Basil's double by critics, such as Peters and Bourne Taylor.71 
This is a point, usually made as if it is self-explanatory, which 1 will attempt to elucidate and 
expand, by examining the associative mechanisms behind this pairing. Their relationship 
depends as much on Basil's automaton-like state of being as it does on Mannion's inability to 
dissociate himself from his enemy. 1 have discussed Basil's inability to escape certain channels 
of thought; an alternative metaphor is that of the chain, a metaphor he uses in relation to the first 
lie he tells, to Mr Sherwin's shopkeeper, in order to gain information about Margaret. In those 
words, he wrote, he forged 'the first link in the long chain of deceit which was afterwards to 
fetter and degrade me' {p. 35}. In 1832, Abercrombie described how such a process could be 
seen as equally psychological and spiritual, in a passage which is also noteworthy in its use of 
the ancient dichotomy of light and dark, which Basil's dreaming mind places of its own accord 
on the two women in his life: 
It is striking, also, to remark, how closely the philosophy of human nature harmonizes with the 
declarations of the sacred writings; - where this condition of mind is traced to its true source, in the 
corruption of the moral feelings, and is likewise shown to involve a high degree of guilt, in that rejection 
of truth which is its natural consequence; - "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, 
and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil. For every one that doeth evil 
hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved. But he that doeth truth, 
cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God." 
This condition of mind presents a subject of intense interest, to every one who would study his 
own mental condition, either as an intellectual or a moral being. In each individual instance, it may be 
traced to a particular course of thought and of conduct, by which the mind went gradually more and more 
astray from truth and from virtue ... The first volition, by which the mind consciously wanders from truth, 
or the moral feelings go astray from virtue, may impart a morbid influence which shall perpetuate itself 
and gain strength in future volitions, until the result shall be to poison the whole intellectual and moral 
system. Thus, in the wondrous scheme of sequences which has been established in the economy of the 
human heart, one volition may impart a character to the future man, - the first downward step may be 
fatal. (Intellectual Powers, pp. 437-38) 
71 Peters describes Mannion as 'not only Basil's pursuer but his double, Hyde to his Jekyll. The revenge 
plot is supported at a psychological and mythic level as Basil and Mannion repeatedly change places 
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Abercrombie then emphasizes the importance of examining 'our desires, attachments, and 
antipathies ... what is the habitual current of our thoughts; - and whether we exercise over them 
that control which indicates alike intellectual vigour and moral purity' (p. 439). This is where, 
as I hope I have made clear, Basil has made himself vulnerable. From lying, Basil follows the 
fatal chain, one link leading logically to the next, through deceiving his family, until he reaches 
the attempted murder of Mannion, this last offence committed in the same mechanistic state in 
which he follows the couple and enacts the infidelity: 
Misery, and shame, and horror, and a vain yearning to hide myself from all human eyes, and weep out my 
life in secret, overcame me. Then, these subsided; and ONE THOUGHT slowly arose in their stead _ 
arose, and cast down before it every obstacle of conscience, every principle of education, every care for 
the future, every remembrance of the past, every weakening influence of present misery, every repressing 
tie of family and home, every anxiety for good fame in this life, and every idea of the next that was to 
come. Before the fell poison of that Thought, all other thoughts - good or evil - died,., my Thought rose 
to my lips, and my speech mechanically formed it into words. I whispered softly to myself: I will kill him 
when he comes out. (pp. 161-62) 
In this climactic stage in his association with Margaret Sherwin, Basil psychologically 
resembles the rival with whom he is beginning to realize that he is linked more strongly than he 
thought. With the rising of the one, all-defeating murderous thought, Basil is feeling 'that 
stealthy, unflagging strength of purpose which only springs from the desire of revenge' (Bas;l, 
p. 245) which spurred Mannion's seduction, and not only fetters, like the links in the chain, the 
victim to the revenger, but the revenger to his victim, in a monomaniacal obsession which, as 
Mannion's doctor describes, is 'connected with some fixed idea which evidently never leaves 
him day or night' (p. 281). Mannion speaks rightly when he tells Basil, 'we are linked together 
for life; I cannot leave you if I would'; the mark of his morbidity is that the association between 
Basil and the 'horrible joy' of his pursuit cannot be broken in him (p. 354). It is his 
monomania, the inability to snap this strongest associative link in his psyche, that causes 
Mannion to attribute his urge 'horribly and supernaturally to link [him]selfto [Basil] for life' to 
something more than revenge, to something 'less earthly and apparent' (p. 252). Basil gains a 
complete insight into the exclusive nature of Mannion's monomania; in a true mirroring of his 
rival's psyche in his own life, he sees Mannion's threat come to pass: 
The infamy with which I am determined to pursue you, shall be your own infamy that you cannot get quit 
of - for you shall never get quit of me, never get quit of the wife who has dishonoured you. You may 
leave your home, and leave England; you may make new friends, and seek new employments; years and 
years may pass away - and still, you shall not escape us ... My deformed face and her fatal beauty shall 
hunt you through the world. The terrible secret of your dishonour, and of the atrocity by which you 
avenged it, shall ooze out through strange channels, in vague shapes, by tortuous intangible processes; 
ever changing in the manner of its exposure, never remediable by your own resistance, and always 
directed to the same end - your isolation as a marked man, in every fresh sphere, among every new 
community to which you retreat. (p. 25 t) 
during the course of tile story, alternating the roles of avenger and victim, substance and shadow' (peters, 
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Basil's fate, it seems, is never to make any fresh associations. His new life in Cornwall is 
ruined by Mannion's appearance and exposure of the violence done to him by Basil; as a result 
he is isolated and spumed by the previously friendly locals. Because of Mannion, he is 
destined, it seems, never to escape the channel he longs to quit, never to escape the chains of 
association forged so casually and nalvely.72 
On Mannion's death, Basil is correspondingly laid low, and news of his illness revives 
his family ties in the form of his father's forgiveness and acceptance. However, there is a sense 
in which Mannion's curse still applies to him. Reposing in the bosom of his family, with his 
'sister of old times' (p. 343), his mind, like that of Lewes's man of habit, 'cannot move except 
in the old paths'; his psyche has been too injured by the association with Margaret and 
Mannion, which in a sense he still carries with him as an agent of restriction, to make new 
associations, forge new paths: 
I have suffered too much; I have been wounded too sadly, to range myself with the heroes of Ambition, 
and fight my way upward from the ranks. The glory and the glitter which I once longed to look on as my 
own, would dazzle and destroy me, now. Such shocks as I have endured, leave that behind them which 
changes the character and the purpose of a life. The mountain-path of Action is no longer a path for me; 
my future hope pauses with my present happiness in the shadowed valley of Repose. (p. 342) 
I hope I have been able to show in this section that, because of the effect of his birthright on the 
power and discipline of his mind, 'the mountain-path of Action' was never Basil's destined 
road. With a weakness that causes him to make associations without willing them and then 
prevented him from breaking them, the best place for him is home's 'shadowed valley of 
Repose'. However, in Basil's 'contentment which desires no change' (p. 341) there is the stamp 
of death. Basil, though still young, calls his existence 'retirement'; shunning Ralph's offers of 
an entry into public life, he writes that he only wishes to help those 'in the little sphere that now 
surrounds me' and be more deserving of his sister's love. These are the only purposes he has 
left: 'Let me but live to fulfil them, and life will have given to me all that I can ask!' (p. 342) 
Collins had more ambition: he, in direct contrast to his creation, went on to write fiction that 
revealed his intellect as, in Lewes's word, 'vigorous'. His fiction, especially from the beginning 
of the 1860s, was 'ever finding new pathways instead of moving amid old associations', 
creating original and quirky characters with features or traits that often connected awkwardly, or 
strangely. This accomplishment, which I will discuss in the next section, was only one of the 
ways in which Collins proved his masterful ability to manipulate and exploit the association of 
ideas in his characters and readers. In this manipulation, he pushed his exploration of the 
doctrine of the association of ideas to begin to suggest its full implications. 
D. 120). Bourne Taylor calls Mannion, 'Basil's unsolicited Other' (Secret Theatre, p. 92). 
on It is worth mentioning here that Freud's idea of a pathogenic idea or complex was one cut otT from the 
process of association by repression. In a sense, Mannion's pursuit of Basil also makes him pathogenic; 
the discovery of his crime and previous associations causing him to be cast out of whichever society he is 
integrated into. The Freudian equivalent of this casting out in the psyche is the process of repression, as 
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The Implications ofEnchainment: The Woman in White, No Name and Armadale 
In 1863, in The North British Review, Alexander Smith published an unsigned review of No 
Name, in which he emphasized the pull of Wilkie CoIlins's fiction on the reader. On reading 
the Woman in White, Smith describes how 'the passion of curiosity is appealed to at the 
commencement' of the novel, and that the strength of this feeling 'carries one through to the 
close. The reader may dislike the book, but, once started, he is certain to go on with it'. 73 We 
gain a glimpse of the mechanics behind this seduction of the reader in Smith's choice of 
metaphor to describe the stronger effect of No Name: 
No Name possesses a simpler and more intense interest than The Woman in White, but it is a horrible and 
unnatural interest; the book enchains you, but you detest it while it enchains ... the repulsiveness of the 
matter disturbs the pleasure of the reader ... The reader is interested of course; but immediately on 
closing the book, he feels the unreality of the whole thing; he flings it off as he does the remembrance of 
a nightmare. (Cited in Page, p. 142) 
In his combination of the idea of being carried along by the narrative with that of its 
enchainment of the reader, Smith is invoking the sort of complex metaphors of associationism 
that we have seen in Basil, and which CoIlins explores more fully in his novels of the 1860s. 
Here we see a chain which binds, but which also compels the almost involuntary reader through 
to the closure of the novel in an experience which is likened to a phenomenon, the nightmare, in 
which the individual's trains of thought are particularly unrestricted and visible. In a sense it is 
as if the reader is compelled to think, to exist within the book's confines, breathlessly following 
the plot link by link, with a fascination which implicates him in some way in its undeniable 
appeal to an aspect of his lower nature.74 In this metaphor of the chain, we have a binding 
narrowness or constriction, a rivetting compulsion or entrapment, and an impelling sense of 
momentum or gravity. 
All of these characteristics of the chain also represent the possible implications of 
associationism which can be found in The Woman in White (1860), No Name (1862), and 
Armadale (1866). In the final section of this chapter I will discuss two main, related symptom-
the mind cannot fully cast anything out. 
73 Alexander Smith, Unsigned Review, North British Review, 38 (Feb. 1863), 183-8S. Cited in Wilkie 
Collins: The Critical Heritage, ed. by Nonnan Page (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 140-
42 (pp. 141-42). 
74 Peter Brooks would see Alexander Smith's breathless yet disgusted reading of Collins's novel in tenns 
of a reaction to 'n8l1'8tive desire'. His view, in Reading/or the Plot, is that the reading of a text is an act 
of desire which propels us to its end, ultimately in a search for an elusive meaning. In this he cites 
Freud's view, illustrated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle by a phrase from Goethe's Faust, of the 
driving force towards perfection, with its origin in the repressed instinc~ which, because what it aims for 
('the repetition of a primary experience') cannot any longer be attained, can never be satisfied. It 
therefore 'in the poet's words "rmgebdndigt immer vorwdrts dringf' ["presses ever forward unsubdued".' 
(Freud cited in Peter Brooks, Readingfor the Plot: Design and Imemion in Narrative (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), pp. 54-55). Seeing reading in tenns of desire rather illuminates Smith's reaction to No 
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types, psychological conditions, or mental tendencies (depending on the degree in which they 
manifest themselves) that display and compound these characteristics, within these novels. 
Both, I believe, can be seen as logical outcomes of the effects of a misfortune or weakness 
within the individual, interacting with the associationistic model. As in Basil the system of 
association is merciless to those who cannot master it, those whose predispositions or 
circumstances have rendered them vulnerable to the full force of its laws. The first 
psychological condition arising from this interaction of individual with system is that of fixed or 
dominant ideas, which make for a one-tracked, narrow mind. These thoughts encourage their 
own momentum, as all impressions made upon the individual lead by association into their one 
obsessional thought, like a series of chains ending at one point, the equivalent of what would 
become the Freudian 'nodal point', which was an important element in dream interpretation and 
symptom analysis. The second is an anxious compulsion among Collins's characters to 
associate, to find hidden links, to trace an underlying narrative from a number of visible signs, a 
need which puts them in the same position as that which Sigmund Freud unknowingly assumed 
in his therapeutic practices - that of detective.7s The difficulties which this process poses create 
symptoms in Collins's characters which range from repetitive questioning to anxiety attacks. 
In Collins's portrayal of individuals with fixed ideas, it becomes clear that he perceived 
mental symptoms somewhere on a scale, or, indeed, a chain, which stretched between the 
completely healthy psychological subject and the dangerous monomaniac. There are few 
examples of either extreme in his work. Each individual is potentially capable of holding 
dominant thoughts, a tendency which discourages the label of morbidity. In this view of fixed 
ideas Collins had much in common with a later commentator with whom Freud agreed, Daniel 
Hack Tuke, whose paper on 'Imperative Ideas' was given and published in 1894.76 Hack Tuke 
takes the words of Hughlings Jackson as a starting point: 'The slightest departures from the 
Name; after fmishing it, he disowns it, as if it were a sexual vice. 
7S In a sense we see the pinnacle of this theme of ordinary people reading the signs of life, searching for a 
hidden meaning, in the interestingly-named 'detective fever' of Betteredge in The Moonstone (p. 19S). 
It has been suggested by both sympathetic and antipathetic critics that Freud takes on a detective 
role. Jeffi'ey Masson, in Freud, The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory 
(London: Faber, 1984) writes (from the former camp) that 'Freud was like a dogged detective'. Richard 
Webster, a rather more antipathetic commentator, writes about the roles that Freud appears to take on (of 
which he himself wrote, 'one works to the best of one's power, as an elucidator ... as a teacher, as the 
representative of a freer or superior view of the world, as a father confessor who gives absolution, as it 
were, by a continuance of his sympathy and respect after the confession has been made' (Studies on 
Hysteria, p. 282». Webster has one more role to ascribe to Freud, however, 'although Freud frequently 
played the part of confessor, there are times when his attitude towards his patients is so overbearing and 
aggressive that another parallel is almost inescapable. For he sometimes sounds less like a priest and 
more like a prosecutor, an inquisitor or a policeman' (Richard Webster, Why Freud Was Wrong: Sin, 
Science and Psychoanalysis (London: Fontana, 1996), p. 197). Webster here adds to the detective role 
that Masson suggests by introducing an element of aggression in Freud's dealings with his patients, at 
which an urge to detection, however, is at the base. 
76 Daniel Hack Tuke (1827-189S). In 18S8 he published, with J. C. Bucknill, A ManualolPsychological 
Medicine. In 1880 he became joint editor of 'Journal of Mental Science' and wrote many books, 
including Illustrations olthe Influence olthe Mind on the Body (1872) and Sleep-walking and HypnotU", 
(1884) (Dictionary of National Biography, ed. by Sidney Lee (London: Smith, Elder, &: Co., 1899), pp. 
296-97). 
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standard of mental health are to be studied, and not only the cases of patients who require to be 
kept in asylums. Indeed, the slightest cases are the more important in a scientific 
investigation',17 and emphasizes the frequency of imperative ideas amongst the unconfined 
population: 'I am anxious to bring into prominent relief the absolute innocuousness and sanity 
of a large number of imperative ideas and acts. Take a few illustrations drawn from persons 
among my acquaintance, some of them being well known physicians.' (Hack Tuke, p. 181) 
From these examples, including the lady whose three raps on the bedstead allay her night fears, 
and the doctor who feels the compulsion to avoid the cracks in the pavement (p. 182), we pass 
along the scale, through Dr. Johnsons's counting mania (p. 183) to a patient who becomes 
particularly upset by an encounter with a certain word in every day life. In the context of a 
discussion of this last patient, Hack Tuke, who is informed by the work of Charcot, expresses a 
similar belief in the symbolic nature of symptoms to that which his contemporary, Freud, held; 
'a careful analysis of imperative ideas and acts will often explain their origin'. He continues, 
using terms that could be applied to The Woman in White's Anne Catherick, or No Name's 
Magdalen Vanstone, 'a complete knowledge of her history ... unravels the mystery' (Hack Tuke, 
p. 189). It is not Hack Tuke's understanding of the aetiology of symptoms that interests Freud, 
however, but his view of imperative thoughts as something common to many people who do not 
necessarily suffer a hereditary taint; nor are they degenerate. In 'Obsessions and Phobias' 
(1895), published the year after Hack Tuke's paper, Freud writes of obsessive and phobic 
symptoms, 'we are not justified in regarding them as the effect of mental degeneracy, because 
they are found in persons no more degenerate than the majority of neurotics in general'. 
Emphasizing that it is the symptoms rather than the inherently morbid patient that are being 
treated, he continues, 'they sometimes improve, and sometimes, indeed, we even succeed in 
curing them'. 78 To this point is added the note: 'I am very glad to find that the authors of the 
most recent work on this subject express opinions very similar to mine. Cf ... Hack Tuke 
(1894), (p. 74 n.) This lack of use of the terms of morbidity in viewing symptoms was Freud's 
obvious characteristic, continued throughout his career, and based on his view, which became 
stronger and stronger,79 that we all inherently carry the seeds of neurosis, of symptom-
formation. Hack Tuke was equally disinterested in pronouncing the patient morbid. Of a 
patient who compulsively washes, he writes, 'while admitting that this case more nearly 
approaches insanity than sanity, I should not dream of signing a certificate for her' (Hack Tuke, 
p. 189).80 
77 Daniel Hack Tuke, 'Imperative Ideas', Brain, 17 (1894), 179-97 (p. 179). 
78 Sigmund Freud, 'Obsessions and Phobias' (1895), in SE, 111,69-84 (p. 74). 
79 In his early papers he fleetingly entertained the idea of the influence of heredity. See' Heredity and the 
Aetiology of the Neuroses' (1896) for an early discussion of the subject. Freud is particularly descriptive 
of the inherent conflict within the psyche in his late New Introductory Lechll'es, 'Lecture XXXI: The 
Dissection of the Psychical Personality' (1933), in SE, XXII, 57-80. 
BO That Freud read Hack Tuke's article has one further interest for us. The latter, in investigating what 
causes imperative ideas, cites the 50-year old paper 'On the Reflex Functions of the Brain t by Thomas 
Laycock, generally accepted in the nineteenth century by those such as Carpenter to be a watershed in its 
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Thirty years before, in All the Year Round, in the midst of an article on the signing of 
certificates, of which there had recently been an over-zealousness that had called the whole 
t f fi . . 8) 
sys em 0 con mement mto questIon, there is an interesting passage which anticipates this 
acceptance of the symptom as a flaw in, rather than a definition of, a person: 
Th~re is no clear dividing-line between sickness and health of mind; unsoundness of mind is, no doubt, as 
vaTlOUS and common as ~soundness of body ... Every natural defect of temper is unsoundness ... But we 
do not condemn our bodIes as unfit for use when there are corns on our toes, or when the sallow tinge on 
o~r cheeks supplants the hue of health ... so it is with the mind. Every man has his weak place' his twist, ~h~~~ , 
This last phrase is particularly interesting, as the condition described suggests more than 
anything the vagaries which are found along the continuum that we see in Collins's work. At 
the one end is the sort of monomania that was portrayed in the early character of Mannion in 
Basil; at the other, however, seemed simply a universal psychological foible. Humanity's 
characteristic, it seems, is a propensity to certain favourite ideas, to a 'hobby'. The use of this 
word was constantly connected with 'horse', especially in the eighteenth century; 83 indeed, the 
phrase in All the Year Round seems to be derivative, a loose paraphrase of a similar sentiment in 
Sterne's Tristam Shandy, in which the hobby-horse features strongly. 
demonstration, drawing on physiology and comparative anatomy, that actions can be performed without 
consciousness. I have already quoted Freud as writing that 'reflex processes remain the model of every 
psychical function' (Interpretation, p. 538). Unconscious cerebration as a concept was a natural 
progression of reflex action of the brain, and so in being introduced to Laycock through Tuke (assuming 
he had not read him before) there is a sense in which Freud was meeting his ancestor. 
81 This debate is discussed in Jenny Bourne Taylor's In the Secret Theatre of Home, pp. 101-04, and 
Helen Small's Love IS Madness, pp. 184-93. 
82 'M. D. and MAD', All the Year Round (22 February 1862), pp. 510-13 (p. 513). 
83 From the end of the 1860s the metaphor of the horse became associated with the unconscious mind, as 
W. B. Carpenter in 1868 ('On the Unconscious Activity', p. 343) and Frances Power Cobbe in 1870 
('Unconscious Cerebration', pp. 36-37) described the relationship of the conscious mind to the 
unconscious mind as that of rider to a horse with the potential to run away with its rider but which could 
be controlled. In addition Carpenter describes how it may fmd its way home, i.e. provide the conscious 
mind with the answer it seeks, if its reins are dropped ('On the Unconscious Activity', p. 343). Freud also 
likened the ego and id to the rider and horse, in his New Introductory Lectures: 'The ego's relation to the 
id might be compared with that of a rider to his horse. The horse supplies the locomotive energy, while 
the rider has the privilege of deciding on the goal and of guiding the powerful animal's movement. But 
only too often there arises between the ego and the id the not precisely ideal situation of the rider being 
obliged to guide the horse along the path by which it itself wants to go' (,Lecture XXXI', p. 77). A 
comparison of Carpenter's 1874 description of the relationship between 'the Automatic activity of the 
body, and the Volitional direction by which it is utilized and directed' is quite instructive, raising issues 
about how different the Freudian and Victorian agencies can really be if they are described in the same 
metaphors. Carpenter writes that this relationship 'may be compared to the independent locomotive 
power of a horse under the guidance and control of a skilful rider. It is not the rider's whip or spur that 
furnishes the power, but the nerves and muscles of the horse; and when these have been exhausted, no 
further action can be got out of them by the sharpest stimulation. But the rate and direction of the 
movement are determined by the Will of the rider, who impresses his mandates on the well-trained steed 
with as much readiness and certainty as if he were acting on his own limbs. Now and then, it is true, 
some unusual excitement calls forth the essential independence of the equine nature; the horse takes the 
bit between his teeth, and nms away with his master; and it is for the time uncertain whether the 
independent energy of the one, or the controlling power of the other, will obtain the mastery' (Mental 
Physiology, p. 24), 
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Nay, if you come to that, Sir, have not the wisest men in all ages, not excepting Solomon himself - have 
they not had their HOBBY-HORSES; - their running horses, - their coins and their cockle-shelis their 
drums a?d the.ir trumpets, their fiddles, their pallets, ~ their maggots and their butterflies? - and so I~ng as 
a man TIdes hiS HOBB~-H~RSE peace~bly and qUietly along the King's highway, and neither compels 
you or me to get up behmd hIm, - pray, SIT, what have either you or I to do with it?84 
It was especially in the realm of the hobby-horse, the preoccupation, that the boundaries 
between sanity and insanity were traditionally most frequently blurred, and it was often writers 
who had displayed a special interest in associationism, for example John Locke and David 
Hartley, who recognized this.85 In a passage that also incorporates All the Year Round's idea of 
the 'twist,' which suggests an associative link which sits somewhat awkwardly, but cannot be 
separated from habits of thinking, Locke elaborates on his theory that the root of madness lay in 
accidental association. This, however, is 'a Weakness to which all Men are ... liable ... a Taint 
which '" universally infects Mankind' (Locke, p. 395): 
That there are such Associations of [ideas] made by Custom in the Minds of most Men, I think no Body 
will question who has well consider'd himself or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly attributed 
most of the Sympathies and Antipathies observable in Men, which work as strongly, and produce as 
regular Effects as if they were Natural, and are therefore called so, though they at first had no other 
Original but the accidental Connexion of two Ideas, which either the strength of the first Impression, or 
future Indulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that Man's Mind, as if 
they were but one Idea ... This wrong Connexion in our Minds of Ideas in themselves, loose and 
independent one of another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our Actions, 
as well Moral as Natural, Passions, Reasonings, and Notions themselves, that, perhaps, there is not any 
one thing that deserves more to be looked after. (pp. 396-97) 
With the model of scale, or chain, however, that could be applied to these particular tendencies 
incorporated in the ideas of twist and hobby, there was always an uneasy feeling of gravity. 
Collins rather exploited this on certain occasions; in particular in his portrayal of the 
characteristic of narrowness of mind, which could range from a single-minded concentration on 
a mission or inquiry, or a prejudiced view, to a life-threatening pervasion of the individual's 
physiological systems. 
Anne Catherick, the Woman in White, is ruled by fixed ideas. Walter Hartright, finding 
her tending the grave of Mrs Fairlie, describes her thus: 
The old grateful sense of her benefactress's kindness. was evidently the ruling i~ea .still in !he 
poor creature's mind -: the narrow mind which ha~ but tooJlamly opened to no other lastmg unpresslon 
since that first impressIOn of her younger and happIer days. 
84 Laurence Sterne, Tristam Shandy (1760-67) (New York: Norton, 1980), p. 8. This ~k was a 
favourite of Freud's (see Ernest Jones, The Life and Work a/Sigmund Freud, Vall: The Formatrve Yean 
and The Great Discoveries, 1856-1900, 13111 edn (New York: Basic Books, 1960), I, 16). . 
8.5 Hartley wrote, 'it is impossible to fix precise limits, and to determine where soundness ofmmd e~ 
and madness hegins' (cited in German E. Berrios, A History 0/ Men/al Symptoms: Dacrlptrve 
Psychopathology since the Nineteenth Cenhlry, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)! p. 89). 
16 Wilkie Collins, The Woman in White (1860), ed. by Julian Symons (Hannondsworth: Pengum, 1985), 
p. 121. Hereafter Win W. 
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We have already encountered Basil's lack of associative capability. Later, it would find its 
place in Freudian symptomatology, in which 'a restricted capacity for association' formed. in 
the early 1890s, part of the basis on which neurosis (in this case, hysteria) would be diagnosed.s7 
This characteristic of narrowness was also mirrored in psycho-physiological terms. Anna 0., 
for example, suffered from a restriction of vision: 'in a bunch of flowers which gave her much 
pleasure she could see only one flower at a time' (Studies on Hysteria, p. 26). A rather better-
known symptom of hysteria throughout the nineteenth century, one which I have already 
touched on in my first chapter, was a restriction of the throat. We see this in Armadale, in Lydia 
Gwilt's physiological reaction to the knowledge that she is deceiving Midwinter, the man whom 
she is to marry - 'I felt a dreadful hysterical choking in the throat when he entreated me not to 
reveal my troubles.' 88 It is in Anne Catherick, however, that we see the possibility of a 
narrowness in thought perfectly mirroring a physiological, and fatal, constriction. 
A consideration of Anne's symptoms is illuminating. Her speech, described again in 
the scene by the graveside, has a 'strange breathless rapidity of utterance' (W in W, p. 121), 
which suggests a shortness of breath, perhaps due to the heart trouble from which she later dies. 
In describing the symptom of shortness of breath in an anxiety attack, Freud makes an 
interesting comment about the term 'Angst', usually translated as 'anxiety'. 'The name "Angst" 
- "angustiae", "Enge" - emphasizes the characteristic of restriction in breathing' .89 
Interestingly the terms Freud chooses to illustrate the narrowness of the roots 'Ang' and 'Eng', 
from which 'anxiety' also comes, mean, as the editor notes, 'narrow place' and 'straits' (p. 396 
n.) These are the places that Anne could be said to inhabit, the narrow margins of life where she 
anxiously attempts to avoid those that seek to further confine her, but 'straits' also could be 
applied to her narrow round of mental activity, the associative chain along which she thinks and 
reacts. It is worth considering the possibility, therefore, that Anne's heart trouble could have 
been the constrictive condition angina pectoris (or pectoralis) which in the opinions of two 
commentators as far apart in time as Thomas Laycock (1838) and Sigmund Freud (1894),90 was 
believed to be exacerbated by the state of the mind. Anne's heart condition deteriorates when 
she is anxious. Her first 'serious symptoms' (W in W, p. 480) appeared after the public 
87 Sigmund Freud, 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1894) in SE, III, 41-68 (p. 46). 
88 Wilkie Collins, Armada/e (1866), ed. by John Sutherland (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1995), p. 490. 
Hereafter, A. 
89 Sigmund Freud, 'Lecture XXV: Anxiety' (1916-17), in SEt XVI, 392-411 (pp.396-97). 
90 This complaint, although sometimes in a non-organic, more psychosomatic form, was commonly 
associated with anxiety attacks, as Freud mentions in his 1895 paper 'On the Grounds for Detaching a 
Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description "Anxiety Neurosis"'. Top of a list of the 
types of anxiety attack that are known to him are those 'accompanied by disturbances of the heart action, 
such as palpitation' which with complications over time 'may end in serious weakness of the heart and 
which is not always easily differentiated from organic heart affection'; he then mentions in this 
connection, 'pseudo-angina pectoris - diagnostically a delicate subject!' (in SE, III, 85-117 (p. 94». 
Thomas Laycock in 1838 puts the condition under the category of 'Phenomena of Certain Diseases of the 
Nervous System' and as being a result of hysterical 'morbid affectability'. Collins, in 1860, stands almost 
equidistant between Laycock, who writes of the condition that 'it appears to be hereditary' (Thomas 
Laycock, 'On Hysteria', Edlnbrugh Medical QI'II} SrugicaJ Journal, SO (1838), 302-56 (p. 325» and 
Freud, who classes its 'pseudo', but nevertheless dangerous, form, among the symptoms of neurosis. 
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announcement of the wedding of Laura and Percival Glyde, which she wished to avert. When 
she returns from the last of a series of exhausting journeys to Blackwater Lake to speak to 
Laura, her symptoms reappear. Hartright documents, 'in this emergency, the fIrst necessity, as 
Mrs Clements knew by experience, was to endeavour to quiet Anne's anxiety of mind' (p. 481). 
Later we shall see constrictive physiological symptoms occasioned in Armada/e's Ozias 
Midwinter by extreme psychological tension. It is not, I believe, too much to relate the state of 
Anne's mind to the fate of her body. 
Anne's 'narrow' mind lies at one end of a scale that emerges as we encounter the many 
different characters in the three novels that I am considering. Hartright himself, whom Marian 
recognizes as being capable of holding 'one fIxed idea' (p. 188), is not, in fact, Anne's polar 
opposite. He accuses her of being obsessed with rmding a cab - 'That idea of shutting herself 
in, and being driven away, had now got full possession of her mind. She could think and talk of 
nothing else' (p. 53) even in the context of his trying to get her to talk, for the third time, about 
Cumberland. After she does leave, Hartright, whose narrative has just described Anne, as she 
walks as 'looking straight forward, eagerly and yet absently', until they came near to the 
Methodist College, when 'her set features relaxed, and she spoke once more' (p. 52), seems to 
copy this pattern of absence and reawakening in his own walk: 
I was still on the same side of the way; now mechanically walking forward a few paces; now stopping 
again absently ... I hardly knew where I was going, or what I meant to do next; I was conscious of 
nothing but the confusion of my own thoughts, when I was abruptly recalled to myself - awakened, I 
might almost say - by the sound of rapidly approaching wheels close behind me. (p. 54) 
His preoccupation with Anne is such that, in a diluted version of Anne's frenzy at the name of 
Percival Glyde, and of Hack Tuke's patient who violently reacts to the appearance of a certain 
word, he irrevocably associates the term 'woman in white' with her, and starts into alertness 
whenever it is mentioned. 'A chance expression ... dropped' from the lips of a schoolmaster, 
one of whose pupils had claimed to have seen a ghost, 'forced the idea' of Anne, he says, 'back 
into my mind' (p. 112). This returning idea he had already banished, suspecting it might be a 
symptom of a disturbingly obsessive pattern of thinking, after an anonymous letter sent to Laura 
had suggested Anne to him: 
While I was speaking, my eyes rested on the last sentence of the letter ... Those words and the doubt 
which had just escaped me as to the sanity of the writer of the letter, acting together on my mind, 
suggested an idea, which I was literally afraid to express openly, or even to encourage secret1y. I began 
to doubt whether my own faculties were not in danger of losing their balance. It seemed almost like a 
monomania to be tracing back everything strange that happened, everything unexpected that was said, 
always to the same hidden source and the same sinister influence. (p. lOS) 
It is clear that, by the law of association by contiguity, Hartright's first eerie encounter with 
Anne, in which he perceives her as an 'extraordinary apparition,' has given rise to his 'twist, his 
hobby,' a fixed idea, which he calls his 'old superstition' and which ascribes to her a certain 
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supernatural quality; even after her death he says to Marian, 'the woman in white is a living 
influence in our three lives' (p. 471). Later he describes her as 'the ghostly figure which has 
haunted these pages, as it haunted my life', a figure whom he can only allow to exist in peace 
'in the loneliness of the dead' (p. 576) after he has uncovered the secret of her paternity; an 
uncalled-for investigation which he undertakes solely to gratify his own psychological need to 
lay her to rest in his mind. These evidences of his personal 'hobbies' may not amount to 
monomania, but they place him, with many of Collins's characters, on a scale, at one end of 
which monomania is threateningly situated. 
In Hartright's description of his mind as 'tracing everything strange that happened, 
everything unexpected that was said, always to the same hidden source and the same sinister 
influence' there is also the suggestion of a more sophisticated associative model in operation 
than that of a single chain. Carpenter, in 1874, articulated such a model, which was in fact a 
logical progression of the associative schema, particularly as its pattern reflected natural and 
man-made channel, path or chain systems, which connect and ramify: 'our ideas are ... linked 
together in "trains" or "series," which further inosculate with each other like the branch lines of 
a railway or the ramifications of an artery' (Mental Physiology, p. 429). In Freud's 1896 paper 
'The Aetiology of Hysteria', a further development of this associative system is suggested: 
If we take a case which presents several symptoms, we arrive by means of the analysis, starting from each 
symptom, at a series of experiences the memories of which are linked together in association. To begin 
with, the chains of memories lead backwards separately from one another; but ... they ramify. From a 
single scene two or more memories are reached at the same time, and from these again side-chains 
proceed whose individual links may once more be associatively connected with links belonging to the 
main chain. Indeed, a comparison with the genealogical tree of a family whose members have also 
intermarried, is not at all a bad one. (,The Aetiology of Hysteria', p. 198) 
The implications and complications of this system are then explored; 'a single scene may be 
called up several times in the same chain', one tree may connect with another when an 
experience an individual has suffered 'belongs to both series ... in this way it constitutes a nodal 
point. Several such nodal points are to be found in every analysis' (pp. 198-99). In The 
Interpretation of Dreams Freud notes that those nodal points are to be found 'in normal mental 
life, too', where their structural role means that they 'possess a high degree of psychical 
significance' (Interpretation, p. 595). Hartright's formative experience on the road from 
London, a strikingly condensed incident, gave rise to many associative links (the ghost-like 
figure, the colour white, the distressed woman, Anne's mental state, Limmeridge and the 
Fairlies, the asylum) which means that, subsequently, whichever way he turns, he is reminded of 
the scene. This operates as the 'nodal point', in Freudian tenns, or the heart, the major railway 
station, in a logical development of Carpenter's model. 
CoIlins displays his dislike of the narrowness that is due to a thoughtless restriction of 
outlook in two of his 1850s novels. In Hide and Seek (1854) he writes 'from a great proposal 
for refonn, to a small eccentricity in costume, the English are the most intolerant people in the 
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world' (Hide and Seek, p. 182). In The Dead Secret (1857) he laments this human tendency in 
terms that suggest an animal, unquestioning ignorance, 'a man is one of a flock, and his wool 
must be of the general colour'. 91 In No Name he employs the scale of monomania which we 
have already encountered in The Woman in White to implicate those readers and critics whose 
reaction to Magdalen Vanstone is a condemnatory one. The end of the novel holds an 
audacious suggestion which forces the reader to examine his or her attitude to Magdalen, under 
the warning that if it is not accepting enough, then it is he or she that will be classed as 
'narrow': 
'Do I deserve my happiness?' she munnured, asking the one question at last. 'Oh, I know how 
the poor narrow people who have never felt and never suffered, would answer me, if I asked them what I 
ask you. If they knew my story, they would forget all the provocation, and only remember the offence _ 
they would fasten on my sin, and pass all my suffering by. But you are not one of them? Tell me if you 
have any shadow of a misgiving!' (No Name, p. 548) 
There are anum ber of terms in this passage that suggest that anyone who condemns Magdalen 
may stand dangerously near Anne Catherick's end of the scale of monomania. The word 'poor' 
before 'narrow people' suggests that, as in 'Poor Anne Catherick', the mental state of the harsh 
critic is to be pitied.92 The image of the critic fastening on Magdalen's sin suggests a neurotic 
tenacity attached to the holding of a fixed idea. But the phrase 'If they knew my story, they 
would forget all the provocation, and only remember the offence - they would fasten on my sin, 
and pass all my suffering by' implicates the reader most strongly, for one of the symptoms of 
Anne's monomania is her bad memory. She recounts to Walter some words spoken to her by 
Mrs Clements: 
'She said, "If you are ever in trouble, Anne, come to me. I have no husband alive to say me nay, and no 
children to look after, and I will take care of you." Kind words, were they not? I suppose I remember 
them because they were kind. It's little enough I remember besides -little enough, little enough!' (W in 
W, p. 123) 
Of the critics of No Name, Margaret Oliphant in her forgetfulness of the circumstances 
contributing to Magdalen's behaviour, implicated herself most strongly as a narrow reader, in a 
short review that bristled with irony, 'after all her endless deceptions and horrible marriage, it 
seems quite right to the author that she should be restored to society, and have a good husband 
91 Wilkie Collins, The Dead Secret (18S7), ed. by Ira B. Nadel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
fi ~'the Foreword to Armadale, Collins openly displays his thoughts. about such ~tics, :Read~ in 
particular', whose over-riding characteristic is to attempt to 'narrow' fiction: 'Readers m particul~ will, I 
have some reason to suppose, be here and there disturbed - perhaps even offended - by finding that 
"Annadale" oversteps ... the narrow limits within which they are disposed to restrict the development of 
modem fiction - if they can ... Estimated by the Clap-trap morality oftbe present day, th!S mar be a very 
daring book. Judged by the Christian morality which is of all time, it is only a book that IS daring enough 
to speak the truth' (A, p. S). 
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and a happy home' .93 Alexander Smith, too, in his disgusted casting aside of the novel, a futile 
attempt to disown it, his labelling of it as 'repulsiv[e],' fmds himself doubly implicated; for 
having self-confessedly been enchained by the book in a sort of monomaniacal, one-tracked 
fascination, he then, being bound by its heroine's condemnation of his disapproval, extends his 
entrapment within it beyond its ending, into a general state of narrow being and thinking. In 
this way Collins uses the discourse and the implications of the scale of monomania, a disturbing 
product of the association of ideas, as subtle weaponry against his 'readers in particular'. 
Another aspect of the association of ideas that Collins explores in The Woman in While 
is that of the effect of hidden links in the associative chain. The detective quest of Walter 
Hartright (as I have already suggested) is undertaken partly in order to assuage his own 
psychological need. Part of this need, as I have discussed, has arisen through the workings of 
the processes of association which were set in motion by his first meeting with Anne, a need he 
eventually works through by pursuing her every connection of family, friends and history, until 
he finds what is in essence a missing link, the truth of her paternity. His first meeting with 
Marian Halcombe sets up a corresponding unease, whose cause and cure could similarly be 
found in the workings of association. Hartright describes the encounter thus: 
The easy elegance of every movement of her limbs and body as soon as she began to advance from the far 
end of the room, set me in a flutter of expectation to see her face clearly. She left the window - and I said 
to myself, The lady is dark. She moved forward a few steps - and I said to myself, The lady is young. 
She approached nearer - and I said to myself (with a sense of surprise which words fail me to express), 
The lady is ugly! 
Never was the old conventional maxim, that Nature cannot err, more flatly contradicted - never 
was the fair promise of a lovely figure more strangely and startlingly belied by the face and head that 
crowned it. The lady's complexion was almost swarthy, and the dark down on her upper lip was almost a 
moustache. She had a large, finn, masculine mouth and jaw; prominent, piercing, resolute brown eyes; 
and thick, coal-black hair, growing unusually low down on her forehead. Her expression - bright, frank, 
and intelligent - appeared, while she was silent, to be altogether wanting in those feminine attractions of 
gentleness and pliability, without which the beauty of the handsomest woman alive is beauty incomplete. 
To see such a face as this set on shoulders that a sculptor would have longed to model- to be charmed by 
the modest graces of action through which the symmetrical limbs betrayed their beauty when they moved, 
and then to be almost repelled by the masculine form and masculine look of the features in which the 
perfectly shaped figure ended - was to feel a sensation oddly akin to the helpless discomfort familiar to us 
all in sleep, when we recognise yet cannot reconcile the anomalies and contradictions of a dream. (W in 
W, pp. 58-59) 
Hartright has approached this situation entirely unprepared. It is Laura who later reveals herself 
to fit Hartright's template of ideal womanhood - she is the woman 'who first gives life, light, 
and fonn to [his] shadowy conceptions of beauty' (p. 76), she is the fitting answer to the 
expectation shown in his thoughts on the night he met Anne Catherick, for he was 'idly 
wondering ... what the Cumberland young ladies would look like' when surprised by her touch 
on his shoulder (p. 47). Hartright's inexpressible 'sense of surprise', his feeling of anomaly, in 
the association of a beautiful body with an ugly head is due to his narrowness of aesthetic 
93 Mrs Oliphant, 'Unsigned review', Blackwood's Magazine, xciv (August 1863), 170, cited in Page, p. 
143. 
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outlook as much as to Marian's appearance. However, feeling this anomaly, there is an urge to 
correct it, to integrate it in some way, to neutralize the dream-like contradiction, to explain. 
William Hamilton described the experience of feeling the anomaly between virtually 
simultaneous associations in his Lectures on Metaphysics: 
!t som~times happens that thoughts seem to follow each other immediately, between which it is 
ImpO~SI?le t? detect any bond ~f association. If this anomaly be insoluble, the whole theory of 
aSSociatIOn IS overthrown. PhIlosophers have accordingly set themselves to account for this 
phrenom~non. To deny the fact of the phren omen on is impossible; it must, therefore, be explained on the 
hypotheSIs of association. (11,244) 
It is by the necessity of finding an answer to this threatening anomaly that Hamilton considers 
the theory of missing links, illustrated admirably by the model of a row of billiard balls (of 
which, when struck, only the first and the last show movement) that I have discussed in 
connection with the mental detection of Mrs Lecount in No Name: 
A and C are thoughts, not on any law of association suggestive of each other, and ... A and C appear to 
our consciousness as following each other immediately ... a thought B, associated with A and with C, and 
which consequently could be awakened by A, and could awaken C, has intervened ... A excited B, but ... 
the excitement was not strong enough to rouse B from its state of latency, though strong enough to enable 
it obscurely to excite C, whose latency was less, and to afford it vivacity sufficient to rise into 
consciousness. (II, 244) 
This model works equally well as a tool with which to consider the anomaly of Marian's 
appearance. The head which belies the body can be integrated and explained, by recourse to a 
missing link. Marian herself, no doubt from experience of reactions to her, undertakes this duty 
by introducing this 'B' element in her make-up, which lies in her paternity: 
My mother was twice married: the ftrst time to Mr Halcombe, my father; the second time to Mr Fairlie, 
my half-sister's father. Except that we are both orphans, we are in every respect as unlike each other as 
possible. My father was a poor man, and Miss Fairlie's father was a rich man. I have got nothing, and 
she has a fortune. I am dark and ugly, and she is fair and pretty. Everybody thinks me crabbed and odd 
(with perfect justice); and everybody thinks her sweet-tempered and charming (with more justice still). In 
short, she is an angel; and I am - (W in W, pp. 60-61). 
The principle here set out goes on to set a precedent for the rest of the book; in the case of the 
similarity between Laura and Anne, too, the father is the latent, missing link, a link which 
Hartright also must pursue to allay his unease. Hamilton describes the sort of relief afforded by 
such an acceptance of the existence of latent missing links in thought, writing that 'on this 
doctrine, the whole theory of association obtains an easy and natural completion' (Lechl1'eS, fi, 
245). On one level, then, it could be argued that The Woman in While (to paraphrase the novel's 
opening) is the story of a man whose resolution simply achieves the setting at rest of his own 
mind. As in Freudian therapy, it is the location and bringing to light of the hidden associations 
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that allow his symptoms to disappear.94 
Walter Hartright, however, is by no means the last character in Collins's novels to 
experience a sense of 'helpless discomfort' in the face of confusing and conflicting signs, an 
urgent need to pursue an underlying narrative. Magdalen Vanstone's question, 'Providence? ... 
Or chance?' (No Name, p. 369) is typical of this search for meaning, or rather, typical in its 
inquiry as to whether it is worth searching for an underlying meaning at all. Armada/e's Lydia 
Gwilt, on hearing of the death of Mr Brock, writes, 'It means something; I wish I knew what' 
(A, p. 505). The question 'What does it mean?' is one that, though not expressed exactly in 
those terms, haunts the pages of Armada/e. Sometimes the answer, of course, is 'absolutely 
nothing.' D. A. Miller writes of the detective genre: 
On one h.and, the fonn is ~ased on the h~othesis that everything might count: every character might be 
the cul~~lt, and every actIon. or ~p~ech. mIght be belying its apparent banality or literalism by making 
surreptItIous reference to an mcrunmatmg Truth ... Yet on the other hand, even though the criterion of 
total relevance is continually invoked by the text, it turns out to have a highly restricted applicability in 
the end. At the moment of truth, the text winnows grain from chaff, separating the relevant signifiers 
from the much larger number of irrelevant ones, which are now revealed to be as trivial as we originally 
were encouraged to suspect they might not be.9s 
It is a fundamental result of the laws of association that, though sometimes pointing the way to 
an underlying truth which connects with the surface sign, they also encourage futile searches for 
meaning - nonsensically, sometimes ideas or thoughts are simply linked, for example, because 
of their simultaneous appearance before the individual. It is instructive to follow through the 
rest of the conditions which give rise to association (apart from by contiguity) which William 
Hamilton lists in his Lectures on Metaphysics: 
If their objects are ... adjoining in space ... If they hold the dependence to each other of cause and effect, 
or of mean and end, or of whole and part ... If they stand in a relation either of contrast or of similarity ... 
If they are the operations of the same power, or of different powers conversant about the same object ... If 
their objects are the sign and the signified ... Even if their objects are accidentally denoted by the same 
sound. (II, 231) 
94 In 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' Freud talks explicitly about the relation between the ramifying systems 
of association to symptoms and their formation, and how their painstaking uncovering leads to the 
disappearance of each symptom (pp. 195-99). This process is described more succinctly, however, in The 
Interpretation 0/ Dreams, in a passage which I have quoted in full towards the beginning of this chapter: 
'Our procedure consists in abandoning all those purposive ideas which nonnally govern our reflections, in 
focusing our attention on a single element of the dream and in then taking note of whatever invohmtary 
thoughts may occur to us in connection with it'; repeating the process with each portion of the dream 'we 
cherish a confident belief that in the end ... we shall arrive at the dream-thoughts from which the dream 
originated' (Interpretation, pp. ~26-27). After considering the ~~ible ob~ections to ~i~ p~ess, ~e 
writes: 'We might also point out m our defence that our procedure m mterpreting dreams IS Identical with 
the procedure by which we resolve hysterical symptoms; and there the correctness of our method is 
warranted by the coincident emergence and disappearance of the symptoms' (p. 528). In his Introductory 
Lectures, he puts this point more succinctly still: 'Symptoms are never co~cted from conscious 
processes; as soon as the unconscious processes concerned hav~ ~me conscl~, the symptom must 
disappear' ('Lecture XVIII: Fixation to Traumas -The UnconscIous (1916-17), m SE, XVI, 273-8S (p. 
279». 
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Bearing in mind all these conditions under which thoughts are associated, it might be said that 
what the system of association in fact does, is, like the detective genre, to 'guarantee large areas 
of irrelevance' (Miller, p. 34) in the mind. In No Name we see something of the irrelevant, 
arbitrary nature of the association between sign and signifier in the signal codes which 
Magdalen and Captain Wragge establish. It is most striking in the conversation which they have 
about how she should inform him if Noel Vanstone has proposed: 
'Is there no other way but telling you?' she asked suddenly. 'I can control myself while he is 
with me - but I can't answer for what I may say or do, afterwards. Is there no other way?' 
'Plenty of ways,' said the captain. 'Here is the fITst thing that occurs to me. Leave the blind 
down o~e~ th~ window of your room up-stairs, before he comes. I will go out on the beach, and wait 
there wlthm Sight of the house. When I see him come out again, I will look at the window. Ifhe has said 
nothing, leave the blind down. If he has made you an offer - draw the blind up. The signal is simplicity 
itself; we can't misunderstand each other'. (No Name, p. 308) 
'Plenty of ways ... Here is the first thing that occurs to me'; and so the association between 
signfier and signified is established. Any symbolism in it is illusory, there is no missing link by 
which to explain it.96 
It is in Armada/e's Ozias Midwinter that we see distilled many of the implications of 
associationism that I have discussed in this section. Uncertain whether the signs in his life 
spring from an association with Providence or Chance, Fate or Coincidence, yet obsessively 
fearing that the underlying narrative is a doom-laden prediction of his future that is coming to 
pass, Midwinter becomes psychologically and physically restricted - angst-ridden, in fact. If 
his fears are correct, he will become the murderer of his dearest friend, if wrong, he finds 
himself in Walter Hartright's position, fearing the stigma of fixed ideas, the threat of 
monomania in his 'tracing back everything strange that happened ... always to the same hidden 
source and the same sinister influence.' In Freudian terms, too, whether his angst is neurotic or 
not would depend on whether or not the danger he feels is real, which involves him in further 
questioning. 
Midwinter (whose real name is Allan Armadale) suffers from anxiety about the future, 
which stems from a letter written to him by his long-dead father. In it, his father reveals that he 
murdered the father of his closest friend, also called Allan Armadale, by locking him in a cabin 
95 D. A. Miller, The Novel and the Police (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 33. 
96 Bourne Taylor's description of Collins's novels, as 'disrupt[ing] any fixed relation between the sign 
and its referent' (Secret Theatre, p. IS) is a useful one, and the more so if we consider this disrupted 
relation in the context of the full implications of associationism. For though there is no hidden meaning 
in the arbitrary, Saussurian 'language' that Magdalen and Wragge establish between themselves (although 
others would be 'unconscious' of its meaning) it is often the case with Collins's work that, two elements, 
that may perhaps jar with each other, commonly in the physical features of his characters, mayor may not 
be connected by a hidden link. Magdalen's 'incomprehensibly and discordantly light' eyes (No Name, p. 
6), Captain Wragge's 'parti-coloured' ones (p. 140) Jennings's piebald hair (The Moonstone) Miserimus 
Dexter's combination of beautiful, powerful torso and powerless legs (The Law and the Lady (1875» 
may, like Marian's appearance, be expl~ed by hidden connections,. or ~~ ~ay have no m~ing ~~d 
them they may be simply and nonsensically there because of thelT Similarity or contrast With exiStmg fea~s, or any other number of associative conditions. There is little way of knowing for sure. 
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in a sinking boat, in revenge for being defrauded of a wife. Having made firm friends with 
Allan Armadale the younger before he reads this letter, Midwinter is devasted to read the words: 
Hide yourself from ~~ under an as~umed name. Put the mountains and the seas between you; be 
ungrateful, be unforglvmg; be all that IS most repellent to your own gentler nature, rather than live under 
the same roof, and breathe the same air with that man. Never let the two Allan Armadales meet in this 
world: never, never, never! (A, p. 48) 
Having read this letter, Midwinter cannot thereafter dissociate his relationship with his friend 
from its message. The association between himself and Allan, their fathers' histories, and a 
threatening and possibly murderous future, has been strongly established. He bums the 
document, with the help of Decimus Brock (who is a clergyman, the anti-fatalist voice in the 
novel), in an attempt to break free of fate, but finds, as Basil's father found in removing the 
record of his son from the family book, the mind holds on to its associations, once made. One 
night, Midwinter and Allan become stranded at sea, while investigating what turns out to be the 
very boat on which his father murdered Allan's. Allan, who is cheerful and unsuperstitious, 
unable to see below the surface of anything, and has no idea of the history of their fathers, 
dreams what Midwinter fears is a prophetic dream, gloomy and ominous. 
After this, Midwinter cannot conceive of his life without associating it with the different 
scenes within Allan's dream. In an episode in which he encounters a view that he thinks 
resembles a scene from the dream, he experiences a marked sense of restriction: 
For a moment his mind struggled blindly to escape the conclusion that had seized it - and struggled in 
vain. Here, close round him and close before him ... was the room that Allan had seen in the Second 
Vision of the Dream. (A, p. 183) 
But whether Midwinter is actually fettered by destiny, or by his own restricted associative 
capability, in which all things find fearful reference to Allan's dream and his father's letter, is 
unclear. In the description of the shock that Midwinter suffers here, we certainly get angst in its 
original sense - in the phrase 'close round him and close before him' we witness the active 
'restriction' from which the word descends. Freud comments - 'Anxiety [Angst] has an 
unmistakable relation to expectation: it is anxiety about something. It has a quality of 
indefiniteness and lack of object' .97 Another editor's note, attached to 'about', reveals to us that 
the word Freud uses is 'vor', as Strachey translates, 'literally, "before'" ('Supplementary 
Remarks', p. 165 n.), which is even more helpful for understanding Midwinter's condition, in 
essence a superstitious dread of a destiny that mayor may not have been correctly foretold. 
With his father's words on his heart he displays angst 'vor' an indefinite but threatening future 
with which he fears he is unavoidably associated because of his unbreakable family ties which 
connect him to a murderous past. In his letter, his father writes: 
97 Sigmund Freud, 'Supplementary Remarks on Anxiety' (Addendum B to 'Inhibitions, Symptoms and 
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I see danger in the future, begotten of the danger in the past - treachery that is the offspring of his 
tr~achery, and crime.~at is the c?ild of my crime .. Is the dread that now shakes me to the soul, a phantom 
raIsed by the superstItIOn of a dymg man? I look mto the Book which all Christendom venerates· and the 
Book tells me that the sin of the father shall be visited on the child. (A, p. 47) , 
The future outlined (and it is as indistinct as that) in his father's letter is perhaps most 
frightening to Midwinter because it implies his involvement in a future crime. As the son of a 
murderer, his anxiety is that he will find himself a murderer too, and of his closest friend. 
Midwinter's tendency to feel this fear is portrayed as hereditary in itself, a result of unbreakable 
family associations - 'Say, if you like, that the inheritance of my father's heathen belief in Fate 
is one of the inheritances he has left to me. I won't dispute it' (p. 101). Midwinter feels doubly 
anxious. He feels the need to search for his hereditary 'piece of paper', his father's 'murdering 
passions' (p. 89) in outward omens, for he cannot find them within. This search is compounded 
by his father's superstitious tendency, passed down narratively (in the letter) as well as 
genetically. Midwinter's symptoms, therefore, go on to surpass a mental restriction; like Anne 
Catherick, he begins to manifest a narrow mental outlook in his physical responses. His 
condition is exacerbated by the fact that he has to keep his fears secret from Allan. The narrator 
writes of the 'cruel necessity of self-suppression' that he has to battle under daily (p. 102). 
Unlike Walter Hartright, who responds to the confusing signs that he encounters by taking on 
the job of bringing their hidden, explanatory links to light, Midwinter's plight, his constant 
questioning, must remain secret, by necessity consigned to darkness, which means that he 
manifests its symptoms. 
One morning, on the day that he and Allan are to meet the Milroys, the tenants of Allan's 
cottage, Midwinter displays a 'strange outbreak of gaiety' in stark contrast to his 'ordinarily 
quiet demeanour'. In contrast to Allan's belief that he was witnessing a new side to 
Midwinter's character, the truth is that 'it was only a new aspect of the one ever-recurring 
struggle of Midwinter's life' (A, p. 220): 
With his whole mind still possessed by the fIrm belief that the Fatality had taken one great step nearer to 
Allan and himself ... with his face still betraying what he had suffered, under the renewed conviction that 
his father's death-bed warning was now, in event after event, asserting its terrible claim to part him, at 
any sacrifIce, from the one human creature whom he loved - with the fear still busy at his heart that the 
fIrSt mysterious Vision of Allan's Dream might be a Vision realized ... with these triple bonds, wrought 
by his own superstition, fettering him at that moment as they had never fettered him yet, he mercilessly 
spurred his resolution to the desperate effort of rivalling, in Allan's presence, the gaiety and good spirits 
of Allan himself. (A, pp. 220-21) 
The chain metaphors used in this passage leave us with a striking sense of Midwinter's fettered 
mental state, his angst, in the face of the unknown (but templated) future. Later, as his false 
spirits reach a hysterical climax, Midwinter experiences a corresponding physiological 
Anxiety' (1926), in SE, XX, 164-68 (pp. 164-65). Editor's brackets. 
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restriction, which recalls Anne Catherick's breathlessness - 'He leaned against a tree. sobbing 
and gasping for breath, and stretched out his hand in mute entreaty to Allan to give him time' 
(A, p. 225). These anxious signs anticipate Freud's account of the dynamics of angst, contained 
in his 'Supplementary Remarks on Anxiety': 
The individual will have. ma?e ~ import~t ~dvance in his capacity for self-preservation if he c~ ~oresee. and expect a traumatIc sl~atIo? of th!S kmd ~hich entails helplessness, instead of simply 
waltmg ~or It. to hap~e~. L~t u~ cal~ a sItuatIon ~hlch contams the determinant for such an expectation a 
danger:sltuati~n. ~t IS m thIS sItuatIOn that the sIgnal of anxiety is given. The signal announces: 'I am 
expectI~g a sl~atlon of helplessness to set in', or: 'The present situation reminds me of one of the 
traumatIc expenences. 1 have ~ad be~ore. Therefore 1 will anticipate the trauma and behave as though it 
had already come, whIle there IS yet tIme to tum it aside.' (' Supplementary Remarks', p. 166)98 
Midwinter's 'mute entreaty' as he weakly leans against the tree is a picture of helplessness, 
which augments and physically enacts Walter Hartright's 'helpless discomfort' which arises 
from the need to feel that everything appearing before him fits neatly into an associative 
structure, that it is connected to an underlying meaning. Freud, elsewhere in his 
'Supplementary Remarks', uses the term 'psychical helplessness' (p. 166), a description which 
can be applied again and again to Midwinter who, with his 'sensitive self-tormenting nature', 
constantly struggles against the fear that he is a pawn of fate - '''What must be, will be," he 
thought once more. "What have I to do with the future, and what has he?'" (A, p. 202). This 
anxious search for meaning within a life that begins to him to resemble a collection of confusing 
signals from destiny, begins to find its way into his speech towards the end of the novel- 'What 
do you mean by that?' (p. 622), 'What does that mean?' (p. 626). 
As Miller argues, however, at the moment of truth, the irrelevant factors drop away; in 
the climax of the book, Midwinter, realizing that Allan may be the victim of a murderous plot, 
calmly swaps places with him, putting himself at risk in the process: 
Confronted by actual peril, the great nature of the man intuitively freed itself from the weaknesses that 
had beset it in happier and safer times. Not even the shadow of the old superstition rested on his mind 
now - no fatalist suspicion of himself disturbed the steady resolution that was in him. (pp. 657-58)99 
98 This idea of anticipating a trauma and behaving as though it had already come, in an attempt to master 
it, is something that Collins profoundly understood, as we see in The Moonstone, in Franklin Blake's 
enactment of the passage from Robinson Crusoe: 'Fear of Danger is ten thousand times more terrifying 
than Danger itself, when apparent to the Eyes; and we fmd the Burthen of Anxiety greater, by much, than 
the Evil which we are anxious about' (The Moonstone, p. 110). This is taking to a more practical, 
demonstrative and plot-based level what in Armadale remains symptom-based (although equally 
&hysiological as a response to danger). 
Although he has Midwinter calmly assign a Providential, benevolent meaning to Allan's dream at the 
end of the novel, Collins himself was not immune to this kind of anxious questioning when faced with 
visible and bewildering signs whose associations were unclear; he too felt a need to ascribe some 
meaning to such portents. In the appendix to the novel he recounts a startling coincidence connected with 
the denouement of Armadale that on the one hand suggests some deeper reason, sets up an urge towards 
meaning, but on the other, cannot be assigned any specific explanation: 'Persons disposed to take the 
rational view [of Allan's dream] may, under these circumstances, be interested in hearing of a 
coincidence relating to the present story, which actually happened, and which in the matter of 
"extravagant improbability", sets anything oftbe same kind that a novelist could imagine in flat defiance. 
'In November, 1865, - that is to say, when thirteen monthly parts of "Armadale" had been 
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In contrast to Alexander Smith's view of No Name, in which, he wrote, 'every trifling incident 
is charged with an oppressive importance: if a tea-cup is broken, it has a meaning, it is a link in 
a chain; you are certain to hear of it afterwards' (cited in Page, p. 141), in Armadale the search 
for some great scheme behind the signs, some monumentally significant association between 
them, is illusory. It leads not only to what is diagnosed, at the moment of truth (also the 
moment when the symptoms disappear) as an unequivocally neurotic angst, a teetering on the 
borders of monomania, but it also leads to crime. For it is Lydia Gwilt's feeling that there ought 
to be meaning in the fact that there are two Allan Annadales ('It's almost maddening to write it 
down - to feel that something ought to come of it - and to find nothing come' (A, p. 441» that 
eventually gives birth to her murderous scheme. Collins does offer a closure, an answer, the 
equivalent to an unveiling of the villain in the detective novel: 
I once believed that [the dream] was sent to rouse your distrust of the friendless man whom you had taken 
as a brother to your heart. I now know that it came to you as a timely warning to take him closer still. (p. 
677) 
As Miller suggests, however, this has the effect of leaving all the once charged signs lying 
around, all the possibly relevant associations unfulfilled by the possible hidden links the reader 
and Midwinter had assigned to them. This, for Collins, is association's result. It can lead to the 
wonderful emergence of long-forgotten memories, to creative activity in sleep, but it also 
produces a series of blind alleys, the impinging on the individual of anxious memories or 
thoughts, a network of irrelevance crowding in upon clear thought and purpose, the confusion of 
mean mg. 
Freud's view, a deeply detenninistic one, in which everything psychical is relevant, was 
very different: 
For it is demonstrably untrue that we are being carried along a purposeless stream of ideas when, 
in the process of interpreting a dream, we abandon reflection and allow involuntary ideas to emerge ... 
No influence that we can bring to bear upon our mental processes can ever enable us to think without 
purposive ideas; nor am I aware of any states of psychical confusion which can do so ... It has been 
regarded as an unfailing sign of an association being uninfluenced by purposive ideas if the associations 
(or images) in question seem to be interrelated in what is described as a 'superficial' manner - by 
assonance, verbal ambiguity, temporal coincidence without connection in meaning, or by any association 
of the kind that we allow in jokes or in play upon words ... But the true explanation of this easy-going 
state of things is soon found. Whenever one psychical element is linked with another by an objectionable 
or superfiCial association, there is also a legitimate and deeper link between them which is subjected to 
the resistance of the censorship. (Interpretation, pp. 528, 530) 
published; and, I may add, when more than a year and a half had elapsed since the end of the story, as it 
now appears, was first sketched in my note-book - a vessel lay in the Huskisson Dock, at Liverpool, 
which was looked after by one man who slept on board, in the capacity of shipkeeper. On a certain day in 
the week, this man was found dead in the deck-house. On the next day, a second man, who had taken his 
place, was canied dying to the Northern Hospital. On the third day, a third shipkeeper was appointed, 
and was found dead in the deck-house which had already proved fatal to the other two. The name of thai 
ship was liThe Ar",ada/e". And the proceedings at the Inquest proved that the three men had been all 
suffocated by sleeping in poisoned air!' (At p. 678) 
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For Freud, association was the key to all elements of mental processes, a way by which he 
would unfailingly find the pathogenic idea, the dream-thought, a system that held within it all 
the answers. In this he retained something of the faith in the system that was expressed by those 
poets who wrote of 'association's mystic power'. We see something of the intoxication and 
excitement that such a magically accessible system, with its promise of certain results, the 
revelation of a clear underlying plot which serves only to reaffinn psychoanalysis, created in 
him and his followers in his words in the Introductory Lectures of 1916-17. He comments, 'the 
analysis, interpretation and translation of neurotic symptoms proved so attractive to psycho-
analysts that for a time they neglected the other problems of neurosis' .100 To paraphrase 
Magdalen Vanstone's words about her narrow-minded critics, Freud and his followers fastened 
on the interpretation of symptoms, and passed all the other problems of neurosis by. 
Psychoanalysis fell into two contradictory traps that the doctrine of the association of ideas 
creates - the detenninistic, convenient acceptance of every sign and symptom as associated with 
something significant, and the constant treading and re-treading of the same agreeable and 
gratifying path, the following of the same chain, which leads to narrow ideas. The philosopher 
and psychologist William James sensed these qualities in Freud. Writing to Theodore Flournoy 
in 1909, he related how he had recently been to an international congress at Clark University 'in 
order to see what Freud was like'. His verdict ran thus: 'I confess that he made on me 
personally the impression of a man obsessed with fixed ideas. I can make nothing in my own 
case with his dream theories, and obviously "symbolism" is a most dangerous method' .101 
Freud himself was well aware of his propensity to obsession. In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess of 
1895, notable for its use of a tenn which I have already discussed, that of the hobby-horse, he 
wrote, 'a man like me cannot live without a hobbyhorse, without a consuming passion, without 
- in Schiller's words - a tyrant. I have found one. In its service I know no limits. It is 
psychology.'lo2 But this love of hobbyhorses, combined with an utter reliance on the system of 
association as the source of all answers, surely must lead to warped theory and therapy. James, 
in his word 'dangerous', seems to recognize that Freud's obsessive nature and his use of 
'symbolism' to interpret dreams is an unwise combination, for symbols are often overloaded 
with possible meanings, and any number of associations can be created between them and the 
wish-fulfilment that Freud believes drives the dream. t03 Symptoms display a similar propensity 
100 Sigmund Freud, 'Lecture XVII: The Sense of Symptoms' (1916-17), in SE, XVI, 257-72 (p. 270). 
101 William James to Theodore Flournoy, 28 September 1909, in The Leners 0/ William James, eel. by 
Henry James, 2 vols (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1920), II, 326-28 (p. 328). 
102 Letter &om Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 25 May 1895, in The Complete Leners 0/ Sigmund 
Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904, trans. and eel. by Jeftiey MoussaietT Masson (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 128-31 (p. 129). 
103 Richard Webster writes of Freud's method of interpreting dreams, 'Freud juggled with symbols ... so 
that even the most apparendy Uustrating, tragic or pessimistic dreams could be interpreted as secretly 
fulfilling some wish or desire of the dreamer. The English psychiatrist W. H. R. Rivers pointed to one of 
the most remarkable features of Freud's henneaeutic strategies early on in the development of the 
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to association over-load in Freudian theory and therapy, which led Freud to conclude, in Studies 
on Hysteria, 'it is very remarkable how often a symptom is determined in several ways, is 
"overdetermined'" (Studies on Hysteria, p. 290), but which also leaves them open to 
interpretation in any way that seems best to the therapist. 104 
Concerning dreams, Freud wrote 'their motive force is in every instance a wish seeking 
fulfilment' (Interpretation, p. 533, emphasis mine); association is as favourable a system as can 
be found within which to substantiate this absolutist theory. Freud wrote of dream symbols, 
which might be seen to bear fixed meanings: 
It must be c?nfessed ~hat the presence of symbols in dreams not only facilitates their interpretation but 
also ~a~es It more d~fficult. As a rule the technique of interpreting according to the dreamer's free 
assocIatIOns leaves us m the lurch when we come to the symbolic elements in the dream-content. IOS 
Yet, he continues, that the uncovering of the associations of the dreamer are still an essential 
part of the interpretations of such symbols: 
We are ... obliged, in dealing with those elements of the dream-content which must be recognized as 
symbolic, to adopt a combined technique, which on the one hand rests on the dreamer's associations and 
on the other hand fills the gaps from the interpreter's knowledge of symbols ... The uncertainties which 
still attach to our activities as interpreters of dreams spring in part from our incomplete knowledge, which 
can be progressively improved as we advance further, but in part from certain characteristics of the 
dream-symbols themselves. They frequently have more than one or even several meanings, and, as with 
Chinese script, the correct interpretation can only be arrived at on each occasion from the context. This 
ambiguity of the symbols links up with the characteristic of dreams for admitting of 'over-interpretation' 
- for representing in a single piece of content thoughts and wishes which are often widely divergent in 
their nature. (Interpretation, p. 353) 
psychoanalytic movement. Although Rivers was sympathetic to Freud's enterprise, he drew attention to 
the fact that one of Freud's rules was that only the analyst, studying the dream as a whole, was in a 
position to decide whether a particular symbol in a dream should be interpreted in one way or its opposite. 
"Such a method," wrote Rivers, "would reduce any other science to an absurdity, and doubts must be 
raised whether psychology can have methods of its own which would make it necessary to separate it 
from all other sciences and put it in a distinct category.'" (Webster, pp. 264-65; Rivers's comment is 
taken from W. H. R. Rivers, Conflict and Dream (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, TrUbner, 1923), p. 6.) 
104 In Studies on Hysteria, in the passage that leads to his conclusion that symptoms are overdetennined, 
Freud provides perhaps his most detailed and extreme account of what a model of association can be 
developed into. Freud writes: 'What I have in mind is an arrangement according to thought-content, the 
linkage made by a logical thread which reaches as far as the nucleus and tends to take an irregular and 
twisting path, different in every case ... the course of the logical chain would have to be indicated by a 
broken line which would pass along the most roundabout paths from the surface to the deepest layers and 
back, and yet would in general advance from the periphery to the central nucleus, touching at every 
intermediate halting-place - a line resembling the zig-zag line in the solution of a Knight's Move 
problem, which cuts across the squares in the diagram of the chess-board ... The logical chain 
corresponds not only to a zig-zag, twisted line, but rather to a ramifying system of lines and more 
particularly to a converging one. It contains nodal points at which two or more threads meet and 
thereafter proceed as one; and as a rule several threads which run independently, or which are connected 
at various points by side-paths, debouch into the nucleus.' It is from this rather disorientating model, 
never attempted in such detail again, simplified for 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' (which suggests that 
Freud realized its speculative nature) that Freud concludes that symptoms contain many different 
associative possibilities. He continues with the words I have cited in the text: 'To put this in other words, 
it is very remarkable how often a symptom is determined in several ways, is "overdetermined"' (Studies 
on Hysteria, pp. 289-90). 
105 This, and the passage below it, were first published in the fourth edition of The Interpretation of 
Dreams (1914), after James expressed his reservations to his mend. 
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In other words, whether the meanings of symbols are fixed to what they traditionally represent 
or change according to the unique associations that have been created in the individual, is a 
constant question which only the therapist can in essence answer. This issue is compounded by 
certain rules, for example that of 'antithesis'. The antithetic rule corresponds to one of the 
conditions, listed in Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics which can give rise to association: 'if 
their objects ". stand in a relation ... of contrast'. Freud describes it thus, 'dreams feel 
themselves at liberty ... to represent any element by its wishful contrary'; this means that 'there 
is no way of deciding at a first glance whether any element that admits of a contrary is present 
in the dream-thoughts as a positive or as a negative' (Interpretation, p. 318). I have already 
quoted Freud as asserting that 'superficial' connections between elements in dreams that are 
seemingly connected simply 'by assonance, verbal ambiguity, temporal coincidence without 
connection in meaning, or by any association of the kind that we allow in jokes or in play upon 
words' (Interpretation, p. 530) signal a much deeper and more significant connection. In this 
list Freud is providing his own version of Hamilton's view of the many and varied conditions 
under which two elements can be associated. Unlike for Hamilton, however, for Freud, the 
association of ideas, for a superficial or coincidental reason, or for no reason at all (other than 
their simultaneous appearance before the individual), is not enough; it must always signal the 
underlying motives and drives that he himself has conceived of and theorized upon. Freud 
describes the importance of the therapeutic process of free association in psychoanalysis, which 
he employs in conjunction with the analysis of symbol in dream interpretation, a therapy which 
embodies two 'basic pillars of psycho-analytic technique': 
In the psycho-analysis of neuroses the fullest use is made of these two theorems - that, when 
conscious purposive ideas are abandoned, concealed purposive ideas assume control of the current of 
ideas, and that superficial associations are only substitutes by displacement for suppressed deeper ones. 
Indeed, these theorems have become basic pillars of psycho-analytic technique. (Interpretation, p. 531) 
Free association, 'the basic method of psycho-analysis' (according to Malcolm Macmillan), was 
subject to the risk a complete reliance on association can produce, an acceptance of all the 
elements that a patient offered in therapy as supremely relevant. This is, I would suggest, once 
more combined with a narrow, fixed agenda on the part of the therapist. A result of this, as 
Macmillan suggests, is that 'free association evidently creates its data rather than recovers it' .106 
Macmillan's argument stresses that it is 'the deterministic assumptions on which the psycho-
analytic method of observation is based' which lead to the misleading results on which Freud 
relied. His thinking, theorizing and working according to these 'assumptions' signals what 
106 Malcolm Macmillan, Freud: The CompieledArc (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1991), p. 549. See also 
pp. 114-16 for Freud's detenninistic views on free association. 
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Macmillan calls Freud's 'naivete' (Macmillan, p. 2). 
It is Freud's naivete in his view of the association of ideas that sets him apart from his 
predecessor Wilkie Collins. Collins, as I have tried to show in this chapter, explored all aspects 
of the associative system, its unsettling and uncomfortable implications as well as its benefits. 
He portrayed association's ability to come up with hidden information, yet implicitly questioned 
the usefulness of that infonnation. He examined the wonderful power of the mind to make 
associations, but also the eternal, binding nature of those associations, once made. He displayed 
the possibility of unconscious cerebration in the invisible links that association's processes 
employ, yet also touched on how the possibility of the existence of these hidden links could 
become a burden to the individual who felt compelled to bring them to light. Ultimately he 
portrayed a world, in Armadale, in which association with past, future, family and friends 
became a fear, in which the possibility of hidden or secret links lurked beneath the surface of the 
life of an individual whose anxious existence was then narrowly concentrated on detecting 
them. In all this exploration of association's most intricate potentialities Collins displayed, 
above anything, the illusory nature of the belief that it was a straightforward system to be tapped 
at will. As I will discuss in the next chapter, in considering the related faculty of memory, he 
explored similarly complicated and unsettling implications. 
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Chapter 3 
'Fallacies of Testimony': The Moonstone, Victorian theories of 
Memory and Freud's Seduction Theory 
Two critical approaches to The Moonstone 
This chapter concerns the process of the reconstruction, from memory, of past scenes. With this 
emphasis in mind, The Moonstone (1868) might seem a predictably 'Freudian' text, a rather 
simple example of the prefiguration of psychoanalysis in Victorian literature. Its central 
element a scene in which a young man enters a young unmarried woman's bedroom at night, 
steals her most precious jewel and is then protected by her silence, the memory of the incident 
not emerging into the public sphere until much later, The Moonstone, unsurprisingly perhaps, 
has been the focus of a considerable amount of psychoanalytic interpretation. Jenny Bourne 
Taylor cites Albert D. Hutter's 'Dreams, Transformations and Literature: The Implications of 
Detective Fiction' as a 'sophisticated' example of such an approach, which, in her words, 
'argues for extending the dream as the paradigm for the text by moving beyond a reductive 
reading of dreaming itself purely as a form of infantile wish-fulfilment while interpreting the 
novel itself as a detailed allegory of sexual repression'" A rather more 'reductive' offering 
(labelled so by Hutter, in fact) 2 is 'A Detective Story: Psychoanalytic Observations' by Charles 
Rycroft. This essay suggests, using scant biographical evidence combined with criticism of 
Collins's novels, that: 
1, there were in [Collins's] mind certain specific constellations which compelled him in his writing to 
give symbolic expression to an unconscious preoccupation with the primal scene; 2, dissociation between 
the ideal (incestuous) and the depreciated sexual objects and projection were among the defenses he used 
in his attempts to master anxiety; 3, he was obsessed with the idea ofvirginity.J 
I emphasize these readings in order to show where I stand in relation to a major interpretative 
approach to The Moonstone, to help assert the contrast between my approach to the novel and 
psychoanalytic interpretations of it. It would also be useful at this point to locate my work in 
I Jenny Bourne Taylor, In the Secret Theatre 0/ Home: Willie Collins. sensation narrative. and 
nineteenth-century psychology (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 175. 
2 Albert D. Hutter, 'Dreams, Transformations, and Literature: The Implications of Detective Fiction', 
Victorian Studia, 19 (1975), 181-209 (p. 204 n). 
3 Charles Rycroft, 'A Detective Story: Psycboanalytic Observations', PsychoanaJytic Quarterly, 26 
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relation to the viewpoint of Jenny Bourne Taylor, who, like me, privileges the work of various 
Victorian psychologists in her criticism of the novel; in contrast to my approach, however. she 
chooses not to fully explore the possible prefiguration of psychoanalysis by these 
commentators. In her consideration of The Moonstone, Bourne Taylor offers valuable insights, 
this time in two separate critical works: her In the Secret Theatre of Home, and a more recent 
paper, 'Obscure Recesses: Locating the Victorian Unconscious,.4 In her 1988 work. Bourne 
Taylor cites psychoanalytic criticism in order to give an idea of the interpretative possibilities of 
this, Collins's most intriguing novel, but then positions herself in contrast to it, as I also aim to 
do in this chapter. She states that her intention is to discuss 'how mid-nineteenth-century 
discourses on the unconscious are appropriated in The Moonstone', and adds that these 
discourses 'do not straightforwardly prefigure later Freudian or Jungian psychoanalytic models, 
though they might contribute to their formation' (Secret Theatre, p. 176). In her later paper she 
portrays Freud's work as 'drawing on and transforming ... well-known theories of the pervasive 
influence of unconscious mental processes', although not simply reproducing the nineteenth-
century ideas which she discusses in relation to Victorian fictional texts ('Obscure Recesses,' p. 
140). In this self-location, there is a sense in which, in her interpretation of The Moonstone 
more than any other of Collins's novels (because of all of them it is this novel that most 'offers 
a powerful model of the Victorian unconscious mind' ('Obscure Recesses', p. 173)), Bourne 
Taylor is traversing a little of the ground which I cover through the rest of this thesis, although 
my belief is that the prefiguration of Freud by nineteenth-century discourses on unconscious 
mental activity is a little more straightforward and simple, a stronger connection, than Bourne 
Taylor allows. 
In this chapter, my point of concentration, however, will be slightly different from my 
usual emphasis. Instead of examining, as I do elsewhere, Freud's often unwitting development 
of certain Victorian ideas about the latent degrees of the mind, my reading of The Moonstone 
will suggest that Collins's novel acts as the manifestation of a growing awareness about the 
possibility of the fallibility of memory made by some Victorians, a realization which Freud 
himself seemed to repeat. In both cases, separated by some 30 years, there is a movement from 
a point of innocence to a wiser doubting, a pattern which I believe that Freud, allowing for 
certain complications which I will also explore, retraced, as a symptom of his ignorance of what 
had gone before him. In her later essay Bourne Taylor offers an interpretation of The 
Moonstone with which I agree, and which I hope to use as something of a starting point to 
emphasize our common ground, before I undertake my own exploration of the novel, and the 
implications of its message for Freud's work of the 1890s. Bourne Taylor's argument in 
'Obscure Recesses' is a development of her 1988 view that The Moonstone is 'a study in 
ambiguity', a text whose narrators serve to 'highlight the shifting and provisional nature of 
(1957) 229-45 (p. 238). in 
4 Jenny Bourne Taylor, 'Obscure Recesses: Locating the Victorian Unconscious', Wriling and 
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evidence, the arbitrary and unreliable nature of memory' (Secret Theatre, pp. 176, 202). She 
discusses The Moonstone in terms of an 1867 essay by Frances Power Cobbe, 'The Fallacies of 
Memory'. The metaphors Cobbe uses in describing memory in this essay will be central to my 
own interpretation of The Moonstone.s Bourne Taylor quotes the following important passage 
from Cobbe's argument: 
Memory is for ever likened by poets and rhetoricians to an engraved tablet, treasured in the recesses of 
mind, and liable only to obliteration by the slow abrasion of time, or the dissolving heat of madness. We 
venture to affIrm that s~ch ~ simile i~ not in. the remotest degree applicable to the real phenomena of the 
case, and that memory IS neIther an ImpressIOn made, once for all, like an engraving on a tablet, nor yet 
safe for an hour from obliteration or modification, after being formed. Rather is memory a finger-mark 
traced on shifting sand, ever exposed to obliteration when left unrenewed; and if renewed, then modified, 
and ma.de~ not the same, but a fre~h and different mark. Beyond the first time of recalling a place or 
event, It IS rare to remember agam actually the place or the event. We remember, not the things 
themselves, but the first recollection of them, and then the second and the third always the latest 
recollection ofthem.6 ' 
She then goes on to apply Cobbe's idea to Collins's novel: 
The Moonstone has often been read as a prototypical detective novel because it seems to be 
above all a story about remembering - about how the latent past might be brought to consciousness and 
reclaimed, about how it might be interpreted, how it might be transcribed and transmitted to future 
generations, how a stable and moral social identity is built ... But it is also the account of the hidden 
agenda which underlies this apparent coherence, and is thus equally a story about 'fallacies of memory' , 
about what is intractable, about the silencing and erasure of hidden linking narratives, about the processes 
which underlie the invention of the past. (,Obscure Recesses', pp. 167-68) 
More specifically, Bourne Taylor writes that 'the carefully regulated testimony of the central 
narrators is never completely reliable' (p. 170) and that the subsequent deaths of certain main 
witnesses to different events in the story (Ezra Jennings and Rosanna Spearman) render their 
narratives slippery and, to quote Bourne Taylor quoting Cobbe, 'not "yet safe for an hour after 
being formed'" (p. 171). Bourne Taylor emphasizes that what she has elsewhere described as 
the 'embedded chain' structure of the novel (In the Secret Theatre, p. 180) contributes to a 
warping effect 'as each narrative reinterprets the previous one' ('Obscure Recesses', p. 172), 
only compounding the unreliability of Franklin Blake's narrative as he relies on others' 
testimonies to 'reinforce his own hazy recollection of events' (p. 172). In all this she relates The 
Moonstone to Frances Power Cobbe's 1867 essay, which I will also privilege in my discussion 
of the novel. 
Bourne Taylor's valid interpretation of The Moonstone in tenns of false memory fonns 
part of a much longer essay on three different writers, and it is clear that her argument would 
have benefited from a great deal more development which only increased space would have 
rendered possible. Particularly intriguing is her passing comment that Cobbe's view of memory 
Ylctorianism, ed. by J. B. Bullen (London: Longman, ~997),.pp. 137~79. .. 
'This essay, 'The Fallacies of Memory' was first published 10 186610 the AmencanJoumal, the Galaxy. 
6 Frances Power Cobbe, 'The Fallacies of Memory', in Hours a/Work tmd Ploy (London: N. TrObner ct 
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'strikingly anticipat[es] the arguments around our own "false memory syndrome'" ('Obscure 
Recesses', p. 155). As various critics, including Richard Webster, Frederick Crews, and 
Richard Of she and Ethan Watters argue, the damaging occurrence of various incidents of this 
condition in the late twentieth century find their roots in Freud's seduction theory of the 1890s, 
a short-lived doctrine that partly grew out of his mistaken (and, as I will show, typically 
nineteenth-century) belief that, once made, a memory trace was pure and indestructible.' In 
this chapter I will try and fill in something of the gap created by Bourne Taylor's brief allusion 
to the history of false memory. I propose to offer my own interpretation of The Moonstone, not 
only in terms of Frances Power Cobbe's essay but also using various later works by William 
Carpenter, whose particular life-long interest was what he termed 'Fallacies of Testimony'. The 
issues of testimony are fundamentally linked to the vagaries of the processes of recounting and 
recalling, and also to the ideas of law and justice. As Cobbe writes, 'how large a share ... of our 
public justice, depends on our reliance upon the veracity of memory, it is needless to show' 
(,Fallacies of Memory', p. 88). With the introduction of the idea of testimony, it is possible to 
define more precisely the type of memory that was coming under question at this time. It was 
actually testimony that Cobbe and Carpenter were discussing - attempting to remember, giving 
an account of the past, as distinguished from the rare spontaneous revival of memory traces, 
which were triggered independently of the will.s As Cobbe argues, 'Memory is a coy and wilful 
Co., 1867), pp. 87-113, (pp. 103-04). 
7 See Richard Webster, Why Freud was Wrong: Sin, Science and Psychoanalysis (London: Fontana, 
1996), pp. 195-213, Frederick Crews, 'The Unknown Freud' in Frederick Crews, et al., The Memory 
Wars: Freud's Legacy in Dispute (London: Granta, 1997), pp. 33-73, Richard Of she and Ethan Watters, 
Making Monsters: False Memories, Psychotherapy, and Sexual Hysteria (London: Andre Deutsch, 1995), pp. 289-304. 
Carpenter writes in Principles of Mental Physiology, 'the doctrine of the indelibility of Memory rests on 
the spontaneous revival ... of the long dormant "traces" left by such former impressions as are referable 
to one or other of the three following categories: - (1) States of Consciousness as to places, persons, 
languages, &c., which are habitual in early life, and which are, therefore, likely to have directed the 
growth of the Brain; (2) Modes of Thought in which the formation of Associations largely participates, 
and which are likely to have modified the course of its maintenance by Nutrition after the attainment of 
maturity; or (3) Single experiences of peculiar force and vividness, such as are likely to have left very 
decided ''traces,'' although the circumstances of their formation were so unusual as to keep them out of 
ordinary Associational remembrance' (W. B. Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology: With their 
Applications to the Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study of its Morbid Conditions 4111 edn 
(London: Henry S. King & Co, 1876), p. 454. Hereafter, Mental PhySiology). It seems, then, that the 
marvels of association, whose processes are partly unconscious, remain, in some sense, sacrosanct, the 
deep physical traces they leave on the mind making them invulnerable to attrition. Cobbe also introduced 
an exception to the fallacies of memory which was based firmly on association: 'The form of memory 
most safe from such distortions is unquestionably the verbal memory, where the words to be remembered 
are arranged either in regular verse or in that special kind of rhythmical prose which answers the same 
purpose of keeping them in close phalanx. The reason why such words are remembered is plain. The 
trace they make in the memory each time they are repeated is marked precisely in the same furrow. Any 
divergence is not (as in the case of other errors of memory) an exaggeration or distortion, but a positive 
transformation, which the rhythm usually disowns, or which, if permitted by the rhythm. yet jan upon ear 
or sense. After the curious process of committing verses to memory has been achieved, we do not very 
often fmd ourselves betrayed by such unconscious transformation. We may lose the trace altogether, or 
fmd it broken here and there, but we nrely fmd a wrong word established in our minds in the place of a 
right one as we find a wrong circumstance of an event or feature of a scene. The real nature of this kind 
of mem~ remains, after all efforts to elucidate it, one of the most marvellous of all the mysteries of our 
nature. The law of association of ideas is surely here developed to the uttennost After the lapse of 
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witness, who will not be interrogated with point-blank questions, nor browbeaten by cross-
examination' (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 110). She describes the unsettling practical reality of 
the unreliable nature of this witness in a context where its implications could be crucial, the 
courts of law: 
In our Courts of Justice it is notorious how continually the most honest witnesses contradict one another 
on the simplest ~atter of fact, and t?er~~y prove the inaccuracy of memory, even when acting under the 
pressure of conSCIence, alarmed by JudICIal oaths and the tremendous results of a trial for capital offence. 
(p.96) 
The notoriety attached to the testimonies given in official judicial situations would probably 
have also struck Collins, who had studied for a short time at Lincoln's Inn, and since then had 
shown a writer's interest in legal matters.9 How much more that witnesses to a series of events 
connected with an already solved mystery, giving testimony after a gap of months, may risk 
inaccuracy, is one of the issues that this chapter will explore. Gabriel Betteredge, the first 
witness, describes the scheme of narration in the novel: 
I am acting under orders, and ... those orders have been given to me (as I understand) in the interests of 
truth. I am forbidden to tell more in this narrative than I knew myself at the time. Or, to put it plainer, I 
am to keep strictly within the limits of my own experience, and am not to inform you of what other 
persons told me - for the very sufficient reason that you are to have the information from those other 
persons themselves, at fIrst hand. In this matter of the Moonstone the plan is, not to present reports, but 
to produce witnesses. I picture to myself a member of the family reading these pages fIfty years hence. 
Lord! what a compliment he will feel it, to be asked to take nothing on hearsay, and to be treated in all 
respects like a Judge on the bench.lo 
twenty years, a few leading words will suggest to us line after line, perhaps hundreds of lines together, till 
we seem to draw out an endless coil of golden chain which has lain hidden in the deepest treasury of our 
minds. When we release it again, it furls up into so small a compass that we forget our very possession of 
it, and it may lie there, perchance, till, in extreme old age, when half our mental wealth is lost in oblivion, 
we may draw out once more the poem we loved long ago, and repeat, with faltering voice, the words we 
sang in the fresh tones of youth' ('Fallacies of Memory', pp. 107-08). 
9 William Clarke gives an idea of Collins's interest in legal cases. He cites an episode in the 1850s in 
which Dickens and Collins, in Paris, found, in an old bookstall, Maurice Mejan's Recueil des Causes 
Celebres, in Collins's own words "'some dilapidated volumes of records of French crimes, a sort of 
French Newgate Calendar ... In them I found some of my best plots'" (William M. Clarke, The Secret 
Life of Wilkie Collins (London: W. H. Allen, 1988), p. 100). 
10 Wilkie Collins, The Moonstone (1868), ed. by 1. I. M. Stewart (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), p. 
233. The 'thus far and no further' concept that we see embodied in the instructions to the narrators is also 
played out with regard to the texts which inform them, that provide the background to the novel. There is 
a nervous selectivity with regard to quotation; we see something of this in the way the Carpenter and 
Elliotson texts, the scientific theory behind the reconstruction, are presented to Franklin by Jennings. The 
fIrst is taken entirely out of context, written on a slip of paper, the second is presented marked out with 
pencil so as to ensure Franklin's reading of only what he is meant to see. Similarly with Betteredge's 
reading of Robinson Crusoe; he wants to see only so much from Defoe's novel, it is simply a collection of 
small fragmentary quotations for him. This is illustrated most strongly when Franklin and Rachel get 
mamed and Betteredge 'applied the one infallible remedy' for intoxication, Robinson Crusoe (p. SI8): 
"'With those Thoughts, I considered my new Engagement, that I had a Wife" - (Observe! so had Mr 
Franklin!) - "one Child born" - (Observe again! that might yet be Mr Franklin's case, too!) - "and my 
Wife then" - What Robinson Crusoe's wife did, or did not do, ''then,'' I felt no desire to discover. I 
scored the bit about the Child with my pencil, and put a morsel of paper for a mark to keep the place: "Lie 
you there," I said, "till the mamage of Mr Franklin and Miss Rachel is some months older - and then 
we'll seel'" (p. 519) When the imminent arrival of the heir is announced, Betteredge produces the 
marked passage proudly. However, there is still the blindness to what comes after, what the wife did 
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It is the judge's duty to sift out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses, of course; 
however, around the time that Collins's novel was written, jUdgement too was rendered 
problematical by ideas on the workings of the unconscious mind. In the same year that The 
Moonstone was published, Carpenter, in his 1868 lecture on 'The Unconscious Activity of the 
Brain', talked of the creation of an unconscious mental context into which fitting judgements 
would readily adhere, 'giving a bias to our jUdgments, of which we may be entirely unaware'. 
The source of 'this kind of perversion', he argued, lies 'deep down in that stratum of the mental 
constitution, which represents the results of those early influences for which the individual 
himself is not responsible,.l1 We see the demonstration of Carpenter's point, in fact, in the 
character of Franklin Blake, the protagonist of The Moonstone. In trying to form a jUdgement as 
to whether he should bring the diamond into the household according to Colonel Hemcastle's 
will, in wondering if by doing so he is 'serving his vengeance blindfold, or ... vindicating him 
in the character of a penitent and Christian man' (The Moonstone, p. 75), Franklin, in effect, 
becomes the sum of his education: 
'From all I can see, one interpretation is just as likely to be right as the other.' 
Having brought matters to this pleasant and comforting issue, Mr Franklin appeared to think that 
he had completed all that was required of him. He laid down flat on his back on the sand, and asked what 
was to be done next. 
He had been so clever, and clear-headed (before he began to talk the foreign gibberish), and had 
so completely taken the lead in the business up to the present time, that I was quite unprepared for such a 
sudden change as he now exhibited in this helpless leaning upon me. It was not till later that I learned -
by assistance of Miss Rachel, who was the fIrst to make the discovery - that these puzzling shifts and 
transformations in Mr Franklin were due to the effect on him of his foreign training. At the age when we 
are all of us most apt to take our colouring, in the form of a reflection from the colouring of other people, 
he had been sent abroad, and had been passed on from one nation to another, before there was time for 
anyone colouring more than another to settle itself on him frrmly. As a consequence of this, he had come 
back with so many different sides to his character, all more or less jarring with each other, that he seemed 
to pass his life in a state of perpetual contradiction with himself ... He had his French side, and his 
German side, and his Italian side - the original English foundation showing through, every now and then, 
as much as to say, 'Here I am, sorely transmogrifIed, as you see, but there's something of me left at the 
bottom of him still.' Miss Rachel used to remark that the Italian side of him was uppermost, on those 
occasions when he unexpectedly gave in, and asked you in his nice sweet-tempered way to take his own 
responsibilities on your shoulders. You will do him no injustice, I think, if you conclude that the Italian 
side of him was uppermost now. (The Moonstone, pp. 76-77) 
Commentators whom Collins respected enough to quote in his novel (in the case of Carpenter) 
and later to correspond with (in the case of Frances Power Cobbe )12 were, around the year 1868, 
then. According to the modem Penguin edition, edited by Angus Ross, she died. (Daniel Defoe, 
Robinson Cnaoe (1719) (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 298). Selective narratives therefore may 
encourage a certain selective blindness. 
II William B. Carpenter, 'On the Unconscious Activity of the Brain' (Weekly Evening Meeting, Friday 
March 27, 1868), Proceedings o/the Royal Institution, S (1868), 338-345 (p. 344). Hereafter, 'On the 
Unconscious Activity' . 
12 I have mentioned Collins's later correspondence with Cobbe in my last chapter. There is no 
biographic:al evidence to show that he knew her personally in 1868. Bourne Taylor rightly points out, 
however, that a certain part of '11te MoonstoM's landscape, near the shifting Shivering Sand, is named 
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rendering the mental landscape conditional and unstable, fundamentally vulnerable to all sorts 
of influences. Collins, as we can see in the above passage from the character of Franklin Blake 
with his 'puzzling shifts and transformations', imbibed something of this idea of psychic 
plasticity. Five years later, in 1873, Carpenter would elaborate on his 1868 argument to 
describe the effects on the individual of early influences in terms of the Structure and fabric of a 
house, and his or her beliefs as its sometimes temporary furniture. It will be my argument that 
Collins, in a sense following Cobbe's lead in the use of imagery to describe the mind's 
processes, anticipated Carpenter's 1873 elaborate metaphorical model, for translation into a 
fictional landscape seemed the natural progression of doctrines that dealt with transcription and 
retranscription, attrition and wearing out, the mind subject to the natural processes of change 
that were to be found in all panoramas, internal or external. Therefore, whereas Bourne Taylor 
largely sees the narrative structure of the novel as the main site in which Collins offers the 
possibility that memories can be false or warped, I will privilege The Moonstone's ever-
changing natural and domestic landscape as the bearer of a metaphorical richness which 
suggests the same irrevocable attrition of the traces of the past that Cobbe described in terms of 
'a finger-mark traced on shifting sand' ('Fallacies of Memory', p. 104). This particular 
metaphor is explored by Bourne Taylor with regard to the novel's area of quicksand, the 
Shivering Sand, in which Rosanna Spearman buries herself and her crucial testimony; however, 
as I will show, just as there are more types of sand in Collins's novel than Bourne Taylor 
acknowledges, there is more breadth and depth and detail in The Moonstone's landscape, more 
metaphorical suggestiveness, than previous commentators have realized. 
In all this it should be clear that my approach is opposed to 'psychoanalytic 
interpretations' of the novel. Far from offering a reductionist psychological light on Collins 
himself via Freud's ideas, in the style of Rycroft, I will in fact attempt to use Collins and the 
contemporaries who contributed to his intellectual context to offer an explanation of later 
remembering behaviour exhibited by Freud himself, which renders him, in Hans Eysenck's 
words, 'not what one might call a truthful witness' .13 Hutter's more intricate interpretation of 
The Moonstone may seem to be rather nearer my approach, in its emphasis on reconstruction 
and the transformation of history in its retelling. He writes about: 
That restatement of the past in the language of the present which transfonns the shape of a personal or 
collective history, which provides it with new meaning and coherence. The reconstructive act is essential 
to both form and content in detective stories, and it is most gripping when it is in opposition to an equally 
powerful sense of mystery - not merely the mystery of the crime, but of human experience more 
generally. Psychoanalysis undertakes a similar and broader reconstruction, and it, too, attempts to shape a 
personal history into its most complete and most convincing form. Reductionism occurs, as it occurs in 
the sterile forms of detective fiction, with an insistence on total explanation. (Hutter, p. 200) 
However, the result of reconstruction, in Hutter's view, is obviously an increased proximity to 
'Cobb's hole', which she believes is 'significan[t)' (,Obscure Recesses', p. 171). 
I' Hans Eysenck, Decline and Fall of the Freudian Empire (London: Penguin, 1986), p. 25. 
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an early truth, which he defines as the wishes and drives of infancy (Hutter, pp. 190-91). He 
writes, 'the language of analysis, the act of rete11ing, alters the apparently irreversible nature of 
chronological time; how we remember an event and how we restate it detennines for us its 
historical reality' (p. 190). This, I hope to show, represents a contrast to how reconstruction is 
viewed and how it works, in certain Victorian psychological texts, and in The Moonstone; the 
more the past is sought, is talked and written about, the more elusive it becomes. This is a move 
away from truth, not towards it. Hutter's description of the aim of psychoanalysis, 'to shape a 
personal history into its most complete and most convincing form' exposes the vulnerability of 
the therapeutic technique to abuse, to a dangerous loss of power in the patient, a break from any 
touchstone of actual reality, in favour of a 'psychic reality'. Hutter shows his awareness of this 
potential weak spot in his chosen discipline, in his words, immediately following, on 
reductionism. However, here he only serves to implicate Freud himself, for it is he, as I shall 
later discuss, who in his efforts at the psychoanalytic reconstruction of early scenes supposedly 
experienced by his patients, displayed, especially in the 1890s, 'an insistence on total 
explanation'. In their more uncertain, less absolutist vision, it was certain Victorians, as I hope I 
will make clear, who displayed a superior insight to later thinkers where the matter of the 
authenticity, or otherwise, of memories was concerned. 
Shifting Scenes: The Landscape o/The Moonstone 
'''First the inner hall," Betteredge wrote. 'Impossible to furnish that, sir, as it was furnished last 
year - to begin with.' 
'Why?' 
'Because there was a stuffed buzzard, Mr Jennings, in the hall last year. When the family left, 
the buzzard was put away with the other things. When the buzzard was put away - he burst.' 
'We will except the buzzard then.' 
Betteredge took a note of the exception. "'The inner hall to be furnished again, as furnished last 
year. A burst buzzard alone excepted." Please to go on, Mr Jennings. ' 
'The carpet to be laid down on the stairs, as before.' 
, ... Sorry to disappoint you sir. But that can't be done either.' 
'Why not?' 
'Because the man who laid that carpet down, is dead, Mr Jennings - and the like of him for 
reconciling together a carpet and a comer, is not to be found in all England, look where you may.' (The 
Aloo~tone,p.454) 
The conversation in the above passage from The Moonstone takes place as Ezra Jennings, the 
doctor's assistant, and Gabriel Betteredge, the faithful house-steward, are, after the lapse of a 
year, making preparations to reconstruct the scene of Franklin Blake's 'theft' of the diamond 
from Rachel Verinder's bedroom. The picture painted here of the changes that time imposes on 
a landscape, even an internal one, shielded from the elements, is symptomatic of Collins's 
novel. The Moonstone's landscape, as I will argue in this section, reproduces something of the 
shifting and transitory nature of Frances Power Cobbe's metaphors for the temporality of 
memory, which invoke the coastal landscape of sea and sand, but it also anticipates the images 
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used by W. B. Carpenter in his 1873 lecture about mental development and change, 'On the 
Psychology of Belief. 14 The opening image of Carpenter's paper is provided by Cobbe, in a 
seascape metaphor which illustrates the transformative process involved in the progress of 
collective thought. In the vast shift in thinking in present times, she writes, 'a whole mass of 
living thought seems steadily and slowly upheaved, and the ocean is moved to its depths' (cited 
in 'Psychology of Belief, p. 211). It is from this imagery of the sea that Carpenter evolves his 
own metaphor; our knowledge and belief is the building at risk from wave and flood: 
New m~thods o~ research, new bodies of facts, new modes of interpretation, new orders of ideas, are 
conc~rrmg to drIve .onw~rds a floo~ wh!ch will bear with unprecedented force against our whole fabric of 
doctnne; and no edIfice IS safe agamst Its undermining power, that is not frrmly bedded on the solid rock 
of truth. ('Psychology of Belief, p. 212)15 
The Moonstone's place is fittingly between these two related and intricate models of mind and 
its alterations, at a time in which, as I will suggest, the realization that memory was not an 
absolute faculty was fully dawning on Collins, as a thoughtful Victorian. Inherent in this 
realization, however, was an appreciation, consequent on even a small amount of self-
awareness, that beliefs and opinions also eroded and developed in time, as a natural result of the 
mind's processes. This would become the subject of Carpenter's 1873 paper. 
In Carpenter's lecture, thought or knowledge would resemble a fabric background in the 
mind, and beliefs the furniture that filled its recesses: 
Our beliefs must be carefully distinguished from our knowledge; and they seem to me to bear 
much the same relation to it, that our furniture has to the building in which we put it. The walls (are or 
ought to be) solid and enduring; so is everything that deserves to be called knowledge. Each stone 
supports, and is supported by, the rest; and nothing but a weakness of its foundation or a decay of its 
material can make our fabric of thought uninhabitable. But the beliefs with which we furnish it have not 
the same durability. Adapted to meet our temporary needs, they may be either poor in material, or but 
slightly put together. A carpet wears out, and, when past shifting and patching, must be replaced by a 
new one; a table or chair breaks down, and, after successive repairs, is discarded as no longer serviceable. 
14 W. B. Carpenter, 'On the Psychology of Belief (The Roscoe Lecture delivered before the Literary and 
Philosophical Society of Liverpool, November 24, 1873), in W. B. Carpenter, Nature and Man: Essays 
Scientific and Philosophical (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1888), pp. 211-38. 
15 The connection of seascape and the building at risk from its elements may naturally have been 
suggested to Carpenter through his religious belief. One of the parables in St. Matthew's gospel concerns 
the building of houses, and the importance of the nature of their foundations: 'Therefore whosoever 
heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house 
upon a rock: And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; 
and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock. And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and 
doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand: And the rain 
descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was 
the fall of it' (Matthew 7.24-27, Authorised King James Version). Both with Carpenter and Cobbe, there 
is a feeling that the only absolute can be God; with God Cobbe ends her 1867 essay, 'is it a hard matter to 
be alone in the Universe with GOD?' ('Fallacies of Memory,' p. 113). Carpenter, at the end of his 1876 
paper 'On the Fallacies of Testimony in Relation to the Supernatural', accepting that there may have been 
distortion in the gospel narratives when miracles were described, cites Locke's declaration, 'the doctrine 
proves the miracles, rather than the miracles the doctrine' (cited in 'On the Fallacies of Testimony in 
Relation to the Supernatural' (first published in Contemporary Review, January 1876), in Nature and 
Man, pp. 239-60 (p. 260). Hereafter, 'Fallacies of Testimony'). God is the only foundation; the rest at 
this time for these two commentators seems as shifting sands. 
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Or perhaps our requirements change; and some article which was at first made expressly in accordance 
with them, proves no longer suitable to our needs; so that, fmding it in our way, we wish to get rid of it. 
Some pieces of our furniture, again, originally of more substantial make, have become faded and old-
fashioned; but they may be family heirlooms, or we may have ourselves become attached to them' and so 
not liking t? .discard them altogether, we put them away in some dark comer, or perhaps consign' them t~ 
a seld?m-Vlslted lum~er-roo~, where they rest almost forgotten in their obscurity. But at last some ray of 
sunshme throws a bnghter lIght than usual upon our dark comer; or the opening of the shutters of our 
lumber-room lets into it the unwonted light of day; and we then fmd our old sofas and four-post beds so 
moth-eaten and decayed, that we turn them out of our house instanter. (' Psychology of Belief, pp. 214-
15) 
Carpenter's elaborate metaphor of the mind as the fabric of a room and of beliefs as furniture in 
it, recalls William Hamilton's statement, in Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, about the 
'obscure recesses' of the psyche, that 'the mind may, and does, contain far more latent furniture 
than consciousness informs us it possesses' .16 It forms an accurate description of the process of 
the construction, acceptance or rejection of beliefs, religious, political, social or scientific, 
which took place in the collective as well as the individual Victorian mind. Carpenter shows his 
awareness of this in a reference to the scientific hypothesis, 'now on its trial at the bar of public 
opinion' that 'if adopted as a principle of construction, will give a new shape to a large part of 
our fabric of thought' - 'the doctrine of evolution' ('Psychology of Belief , pp. 236, 237). For it 
is the case that the changing mental landscape which I believe is represented in The Moonstone, 
and which is explored anecdotally, theoretically and metaphorically in Frances Power Cobbe's 
essay 'The Fallacies of Memory', was first perceived as unstable, shifting, uncertain, as a result 
of the effects of evolutionary theory. In the conclusion of Cobbe's essay we find graphic 
reference to this doctrine: 
On our generation of mankind has come the knowledge of an isolation, such as younger races never felt, 
and perhaps could less have borne ... Science, as she marches round us in wider and yet wider circles, 
leaves ever a hard and barren track behind her, on which no flower of fancy may bloom again. And at 
this hour she tells, or threatens to tell us yet more - that if we would know the parents from whom we 
came, whose Paradise-home yet seems the ,cradle of our infancy, we must retrace the world's course not 
for six thousand years, but for ages of millenniums, and fmd them at last - not beautiful and calm, 
conversing in Eden with the sons of God - but simious-browed and dwarf of limb, struggling with the 
mammoth and the cave-bear in the howling wilderness of an uncultured world. (,Fallacies of Memory', 
p. 112) 
This uncertainty inherent in a past about which we were previously so sure is simply the 
beginning of a history that at every tum of its recording is vulnerable to distortion. The rot 
starts at individual level, as the familiar famous figures of antiquity are rendered slippery by the 
vagaries of immediate memory: 
When short, pithy sayings are universally given to certain characters, and have obtained currency, 
wherever the supposed speaker's name is known, we might justly assume that if historical memory be 
ever reliable, it would be in such a case. Yet the notorious fact is, that all sayings, and aphorisms, and 
war-cries, nay, all very striking and characteristic anecdotes of any kind, are precisely the doubtful bits of 
16 W. Hamilton, LechUes on Metaphysics and Logic (1859), ed. by H. C. Mansel and John Keith, 7· edn, 
4 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1865), 1,339. 
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the story of each great man's life. ('Fallacies of Memory', p. 92) 
As a result of such misinformation, 'immense fallacies have been imbedded for ages in the 
memory of all civilized nations' (p. 92). It is this defect of collective memory that is to Cobbe 
more painful than individual misrememberings: 
To know that ~hat we deem we recall so. vividly. is. but a poor, shifting reflex - hardly of the thing itself, 
only of our earher remembrance of the thmg - thIS IS sad and mournful. Almost more terrible it seems to 
confess the fallaciousness of the great traditions of History, and in the waste of waters over which we are 
drifting, to behold. the bar~s of past ce~turies no longer stretching their sails in our 'wake, but growing 
hazy and spectral m the mIst of doubt, tIll some we deemed the richest galleons in that mighty fleet fade 
fro~ our eyes, and are los~ for ever in impenetrable cloud ... Must we be content to know, that only the 
outlmes of the ancestral pIctures of our house are true, and all the colours which make them beautiful 
retouched and falsified? Perchance it must be so. Perchance the loneliness of human nature must need~ 
be more impressed on us as science advances in the field of historical criticism, as in the fields of 
mythology and physiology. ('Fallacies of Memory' ,pp. 111-112, 113) 
In the cases of both Carpenter and Cobbe there is a sense that, thanks to evolutionary theory, the 
collective internal landscape has changed, that the authenticity of the portrayal of the 'ancestral' 
homes that make up our view of history and the possibility of the inclusion of certain items of 
the 'furniture' of beliefs that fill those homes is now debatable. According to Carpenter, 
however, such a process, of reviewing and renewing one's mental fabric, is essential and 
healthy: 
Every one ... who recognizes his obligation to make the best use in his power of the faculties 
with which he fmds himself gifted, and who looks at the search for truth as his noblest object, the 
attainment of it as his most glorious prize, will be constantly on the watch for opportunities of improving 
his fabric of knowledge, and of perfecting its furniture of beliefs. Now in doing this, he will find that as 
his fabric is altered (or rather, alters itself), his furniture must be changed in accordance with it; ... Every 
one who has gone through a sufficiently long course of intellectual experiences, and has been accustomed 
to reflect upon them, must be conscious that this has often occurred to himself. He is surprised, on 
turning over the records of his earlier beliefs, to fmd how many of them he would now absolutely reject; 
not because they have been disproved by additional evidence, but because he has himself grown out of 
them. ('Psychology of Belief, pp. 233-34) 
Jenny Bourne Taylor's description of The Moonstone as 'of all Collins's novels ... the 
clearest case of a story "in a state of contradiction with itself" (In the Secret Theatre, p. 205) 
owes much to the fact that by 1868, Wilkie Collins himself, as a thoughtful Victorian, interested 
in the progress of science, had undergone something of this mental spring cleaning with regard 
to the concepts of psychology, the unconscious mind, and especially the nature, dynamics and 
reliability of memory. However, by setting his novel twenty years earlier, in 1848, I would 
suggest that he invited many more chronological problems than he may have realized when he 
began the project. It is often recorded that Collins was himself surprised by the ending of the 
novel; that he wrote much of it whilst dosed up with huge amounts of laudanum}' His own 
I' In 'A Note on Sources' at the end of The Moonstone, Stewart writes: 'Laudanum had a grip on 
[Collins] as he worked - to such an extent, indeed, that he seems at times to have written, or dictated, 
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preface to the 1871 edition of the novel tells of 'the responsibility of ... weekly publication' 
which 'forced me ... to dry my useless tears, and to conquer my merciless pains' (The 
Moonstone, p. 29). All this gives an impression of a story whose plot may have been decided in 
advance, but whose implications in a chronological, a historical sense, may have been 
overlooked until the immediacy of writing. I would like to suggest that it was not until Collins 
came to put pen to paper that he realized how much had changed in the twenty years since 1848, 
and that he himself was 'surprised, on turning over the records of his earlier beliefs, to find how 
many of them he would now absolutely reject ... because he hard] himselfgrown out ofthem'. 
We see something of the chronological struggle that Collins encountered in the part of 
the novel in which Jennings is giving Franklin the scientific background to his claims that it will 
be possible to reconstruct Franklin's opium-induced trance and his actions whilst he was under 
its influence. True as usual to contemporary science, Collins provides Jennings with a copy of 
Elliotson's Human Physiology, which was published in 1840, years before the date the novel 
was set. However, there is more of a problem with the extract from Carpenter: it is on a loose 
piece of paper, with no reference. This extract was in fact a leap into the future of psychological 
writing, taken from the fourth edition of Carpenter's Principles of Human Physiology (1853), 
published after the events in the novel occurred. This extract appears in The Moonstone like a 
ghost from the future, an embarrassment of accuracy, a concession to Collins's need to prove 
that respectable science backed him up, that he had done the necessary research into the theory 
behind the experiment. Carpenter, according to the piece of paper, asserts: 
'There seems much ground for the belief, that every sensory impression which has once been 
recognised by the perceptive consciousness, is registered (so to speak) in the brain, and may be 
reproduced at some subsequent time, although there may be no consciousness of its existence in the mind 
during the whole intermediate period.' (The Moonstone, p. 440) 
In contrast to Elliotson' s anecdote about the drunken porter who only remembered where he left 
his parcel when he was again intoxicated (similar versions of which are still being used to prove 
how the retrieval of memories is what is termed 'context-dependent'),18 by 1868, Carpenter's 
while in a state of dissociated consciousness. "I was not only pleased and astonished at the fmale," he 
told a friend, "but did not recognize it as my own.'" (p. 527) Catherine Peters also mentions this story 
(Catherine Peters, The King a/Inventors: A Life o/Wilkie Collins (London: Minerva, 1992), p. 303). 
II The story of the Irish Porter would come under the heading, in current psychology, of 'context-
dependent memory'. Alan Baddeley, in Human Memory: Theory and Practice (Hove: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1990), acknowledges the long tradition of his subject in the anecdotal observations of 
philosophers and psychologists by citing John Locke's story of the man who could only remember all the 
steps of a dance when a certain piece of furniture was in the room (cited in Baddeley, p. 268.; ~e st~ 
appears in John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), ed. by Peter H. Nlddltch, 4 
edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 399). Baddeley then describes the sort of experiments on the 
mechanism of retrieval that have been carried out in recent years. He writes, 'a study canied out by a 
colleague ... and I was concerned with the memory capacity of deep-sea divers. In one of our 
experiments, we had our subjects learn lists of words either on the beach, or beneath IS feet of water, and 
then recall in either the same or the opposite environment ... There was ... a very clear con/ext-
dependency effect: if they learnt in one environment and recalled in the other, our subjects remembered 
about 40% less than if learning and recall occurred in the same environment' (p. 268). Baddeley goes on 
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1853 view was an oversimplification as an account of the memory, thanks to Frances Power 
Cobbe, who was later (after Collins's novel was published) backed by Carpenter. Even before 
his mention of Cobbe's theory, in his 1874 Principles of Mental Physiology, Carpenter presents 
his fonner view as a rather limited one. Discussing what he calls 'temporary exercises of 
Memory' such as those undergone by people such as lawyers and actors, who have to learn vast 
amounts of material, only to promptly 'forget all about it' when it is no longer needed, he 
writes: 'It seems, then, to admit of question, whether everything that passes through our Minds 
thus leaves its impression on their material instrument; and whether a somewhat too extensive 
generalization has not been erected on a rather limited basis' (Mental Physiology, pp. 452, 453-
54). Jennings's piece of paper therefore becomes a ghost both from the future and from the 
outdated past. In truth, Collins's task was an impossibly difficult one. He was not to know 
which way the theory of memory was to settle; by the time The Moonstone was written, the 
statement on Jennings's piece of paper was still Carpenter's latest opinion on memory, and 
Cobbe's view at this time was rather a lone voice, though a clear, strong one. The fact that 
Carpenter's 1853 view was rendered rather limited by Cobbe should not have been a problem 
for a novel set twenty years before; but Collins, as he shows in the Preface to the first edition of 
the novel, obviously saw the premise of the reconstructive experiment as a rather progressive 
one, and would have found it difficult to reconcile the contemporaneity of the appeal to living 
authorities with a theory that was no longer valid: 
Having fIrst ascertained, not only from books, but from living authorities as well, what the result of that 
experiment would really have been, I have declined to avail myself of the novelist's privilege of 
supposing something which might have happened, and have so shaped the story as to make it grow out of 
what actually would have happened - which, I beg to inform my readers, is also what actually does 
happen, in these pages. (The Moonstone, p. 27) 
My suggestion in this chapter is that Collins tries to overcome this problem by explicitly 
agreeing, and by also implicitly disagreeing, with the Carpenter of 1853. He 'hedges his bets'. 
In Collins's very retranscription of Carpenter's words, in fact, we see what is an example of a 
symptom of this tension caused by the need he feels to compromise; it is, in addition, an 
interesting illustration, conscious or unconscious, of Cob be's argument. In the journey from the 
4th edition of The Principles of Human Physiology to Jennings's slip of paper, one of 
Carpenter's words is changed. Where on the paper there is a description of the registration of 
all impressions in the 'brain', Carpenter uses the more technical term 'Cerebrum,}9 This is a 
to discuss the effect of the 'internal environment' of the individual on his or her memory - 'Here again 
there is evidence of context-dependency. In one study Goodwin et al. (1969) looked at the effect of 
alcohol on a number of memory tasks. They used the same design as described in the diving study above, 
and found broadly the same results; what their subjects learnt when drunk, they recalled better drunk than 
sober, while what they learnt sober was best recalled sober.' Then, recounting what are in essence 
contemporary versions of the case of the Irish Porter, Baddeley writes, '[the experimenters] describe 
cases in which their alcoholic subjects secreted money and alcohol while drunk, but were unable to fmd it 
when sober, duly recalling its biding place when on their next binge' (p. 271). 
19 William Benjamin Carpenter, Principles 0/ Human Physiology: With their Chief Applications to 
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small change, but it represents the sort of modification that occurs to the original memory trace. 
perhaps in the interest of simplicity or improvement, and which begins, according to Cobbe, by 
small steps, to compromise the accurate reporting of an event or a saying: 
Thus, as in accordance with various laws of mind, each fresh trace varies a little from the trace beneath 
somet~es magnify~g ~nd beautifying it: ~ough the natural bias of the soul to grandeur and beauty; 
so~et~es . contractmg It through lan~.Id Imagination; sometimes distorting it through passion or 
preJudIce; In all and every case the ongmal mark is ere long essentially changed. ('The Fallacies of 
Memory', p. 104) 
Collins was, in a sense, right to hold a position of ambiguity, to show a gesture of support 
to both sides of the debate if he wished to be true to the latest opinions on memory. For there 
were respected commentators who still agreed with Jennings's piece of paper, and continued to 
do so. Two years after the pUblication of The Moonstone, Henry Maudsley would reiterate the 
marvels of the mind's recalling powers, both in terms which recall Carpenter's argument of 
1853, and which use a seascape metaphor such as Cobbe might have used, but to reach an 
entirely different conclusion: 
In a brain that is not disorganized by injury or disease, the organic registrations are never actually 
forgotten, but endure while life lasts; no wave of oblivion can efface their characters. Consciousness, it is 
true, may be impotent to recall them; but a fever, a blow on the head, a poison in the blood, a dream, the 
agony of drowning, the hour of death, rending the veil between our present consciousness and these 
inscriptions, will sometimes call vividly back, in a momentary flash, and call back too with all the 
feelings of the original experience, much that seemed to have vanished from the mind for ever. In the 
deepest and most secret recesses of the mind, there is nothing hidden from the individual self, or from 
others, which may not be thus some time accidentally revealed; so that it might well be that, as De 
Quincey surmised, the opening of the book at the day of judgement shall be the unfolding of the 
everlasting scroll ofmemory.2o 
Maudsley's is a fundamentally Judaeo-Christian vision - nothing is lost because all is recorded 
in a vast, absolutist tome, of which our own minds are analogues, which will be read at the end 
of time. Cobbe and Carpenter, however, though often expressing faith in a GOd,2I have, it 
seems, been more shaken, and even humbled by the implications which evolution may begin to 
suggest for our view of history. Maudsley's view would be seen by Cobbe as rendered obsolete 
and outdated; in her description of such a view she explicitly draws on the metaphors which the 
issues of evolution inspired: 
Like the old geologists who counted every fossil as an accidental deposit or relic of the Flood, we persist 
in attributing each freshly discovered error of memory, not to Nature, but to some singular chance, or 
some portentous cataclysm of the human faculties. (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 88) 
Psychology, Pathology, Therapeutics, Hygiene, and Forensic Medicine, 4111 edn (London: John Churchill, 
18S3), p. 808. 
20 Henry Maudsley, Body and Mind: An Inquiry into their Connection and Mutual Influence. Specially in 
Reference to Menial Disortle-s; being the Gulstonian Lectures for J 870, Delivered before the Royal 
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Cobbe's is not an un-Christian view. It is simply reluctant to attribute absolute qualities to 
human nature. It is, indeed, due to Cobbe's extension of the Christian view that 'we are 
"miserable sinners," and ... our natures are fallible' that she believes that 'we should recognize 
the habitual mendacity of our remembrance' ('Fallacies of Memory', p. 102). Cobbe 
acknowledges the personal discomfort involved in relinquishing the belief that our memory is 
infallible, 'so painful is the idea of the fallaciousness of one of our chief faculties, that we prefer 
to encounter the consequences of endless mistakes rather than face the humiliating truth, which 
would preserve us from them all' (p. 88). However, examining the strength of memory, testing 
it out, is a fundamental duty: 
Let us candidly admit and intelligently study the phenomena of memory, and it cannot be but that our 
corrected judgment of its veracity will avail us better than our present habitual blind reliance. The 
Present, in our lives, is ever closely bound with the Past, and the cord which unites them is all woven of 
strands of memory. When we know that on the soundness of that cord we often hang honour, love, faith, 
justice, things more precious than life itself, our reluctance to test its strength would be as senseless as 
that of Alpine travellers who should refuse to try the rope which is to support them over the abyss, lest 
perchance, in sooth, it might prove to be insecure. ('Fallacies of Memory', pp. 88-89) 
I believe that in a sense we can see the appearance of various, perhaps contradictory, models of 
mind and memory in The Moonstone as a sort of testing, reviewing process by Collins, similar 
to the way in which Carpenter (in 1873) recommends that a person 'examine into the 
foundations of his knowledge ... test the goodness of its materials, and ... try the security of its 
construction', otherwise he may be 'liable some time or other to find his fabric of thought 
overthrown, and himself buried in its ruins; and even though no wave should dash, no lightning-
flash should shatter, it may ultimately fall to pieces from sheer decay' ('Psychology of BeHer, 
p.233). 
It is not just Carpenter and Cobbe who figure in Collins's ongoing, often metaphor-
based, process of testing and review in The Moonstone. It is interesting to note that in his 1877 
adaptation of The Moonstone for the stage,22 Collins completely avoided the debate concerning 
the reliability of memory with which he felt the need to struggle in the 1868 novel. He did this 
most obviously by condensing down the events of the plot into the space of il day, thereby 
rendering unnecessary any portrayal of the natural attritional results of the passing of time. In 
contrast to the Yorkshire coast landscape of the novel, the play's events are set in Kent, and 
entirely indoors. The problem of chronology is overcome by placing the story in the present. 
Further, the authority which is relied on to authenticate the reconstruction scene is not Elliotson 
or Carpenter, but George Combe, author of A System of Phrenology (1825), the Dr. Combe 
whose story of the Irish Porter (originating with Dr. Abel) Collins cites Elliotson citing in the 
College 0/ Physicians. with Appendix (London: Macmillan and Co., 1870), p. 21. 
21 See 'Fallacies of Memory', p. 113, 'On the Unconscious Activity', p. 34S. 
22 Wilkie Collins, The Moonstone: A Dramatic Story. in Three Acts. Altered from the Novel/or 
Performance on the Stage (London: Charles Dickens cl Evans, 1877). 
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novel. 23 Collins's choice to drop Elliotson at this point raises questions about why this is, and, 
in fact, why he did not go straight to Combe in the first place. One explanation may have been 
the extra dimension which certain other related passages in Elliotson' s book add to the 
landscape of The Moonstone and the signs and tokens which pervade the novel. These are 
indirect references that would have only complicated Collins's much-curtailed play. In 1868, 
however, inviting such complication was an inherent part of Collins's engagement with issues 
of memory and consciousness. 
Among the extracts in Elliotson' s book that Collins may have encountered is an anecdote 
about an Italian nobleman, a somnambulist. It is noteworthy for its resemblance to the sleep-
walking experiences (especially the second) of Franklin Blake. The narrator, after dinner and 
games at the nobleman's house, is told by the servants that their master would sleep-walk that 
night: after examining him 'with a candle in my hand; he was lying on his back, and sleeping 
with open, staring eyes', the narrator, along with the servants, played backgammon until he 
arose. 
He then went in and out of several rooms, approached the fire, wanned himself in an annchair, and went 
thence into a closet where was his wardrobe. He sought something in it, put all the things into disorder, 
and having set them right again, locked the door, and put the key into his pocket '" He then mounted his 
horse and galloped to the house door ... After some time he went ... into a parlour in which was a billiard 
table. He walked around it several times, and acted the motions of a player.24 
Elliotson's anecdote here adds to the feeling within The Moonstone of a certain 
interchangeability of the waking and dreaming states, each with its oblivion of the other. When 
Blake leaves Betteredge to put the diamond in the bank, Betteredge hears him depart on his 
horse and then 'when I turned about in the yard and found I was alone again, I felt half inclined 
to ask myself if I hadn't woke up from a dream' (The Moonstone, p. 78). The world of The 
Moonstone is a world of signs and tokens, and these signs and tokens are clues. It is no wonder 
that its inhabitants sometimes feel as if they live in a dream-world - they are surrounded by 
symbols, each reflecting the other, and the answer to the mystery. It is something the reviewers 
sensed, that the objects in the novels signified more than the people - 'The hero has no qualities 
at all ... Such an array of dummies was never got together in any book of Mr. Wilkie Collins's 
before' ,25 'As to the various characters of the romance, they are secondary to the 
circumstances'.26 It is conceivable that Collins gained inspiration for the character of Franklin 
23 Combe's 1825 work is the second edition, (1I'5t published in 1819 as Essays in Phrenology, there is no 
first edition of A System 0/ Phrenology. The extract was probably based on this edition, referred to as 
'Combe's famous work on Phrenology' (The Moonstone: A Dramatic Story, p. 36), although the passage 
read by Rachel supposedly verbatim, from Combe's work (p. 75) is very much more colloquial and 
amusing than the language Combe uses when describing the incident (George Combe, A System 0/ 
Phrenology, 2ad edn, (Edinburgh: John Anderson, 1825), p. 400). 
24 John Elliotson, Human PhySiology, 5th edn (London: Longmans, 1840), pp. 638-39. 
25 Unsigned Review, Spectator xli (25 July 1868), in Wilkie Collins: The Critical Heritage, ed. by 
Nonnan Page (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 171-73 (pp. 172-73). 
26 Geraldine Jewsbury. unsigned review, Athenaeum, 25 July 1868, in Page, ed., pp. 170-71 (p. 171). 
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Blake, with his propensity to position 'the Italian side of him[seJf] ... uppennost' (The 
Moonstone, p. 77), from the above passage in Human Physiology. What is interesting is that. 
apart from the foray into the closet which Franklin accomplishes in his sleep, many of the other 
actions of the sleeping nobleman are attributed to Franklin when he is conscious _ the horse-
riding, the billiard playing. However, it could be said that when awake, Franklin is actually, in 
a sense, sleep-walking; he is asleep to his somnolent state and his activities while in it. 21 
Betteredge, in coming across the passage in Robinson Crusoe on the night of the loss of 
the diamond, that tells that Fear of Danger 'is ten thousand times more terrifying than Danger 
itself, when apparent to the Eyes; and we find the Burthen of Anxiety greater, by much, than the 
Evil which we are anxious about' (The Moonstone, p. 110), has the key to the mystery in his 
hands, yet does not realize it. The loss of the diamond becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
inspired by the kind of anxiety displayed by Armadale's Ozias Midwinter, anxiety which in 
seeking to take control of a situation, produces visible symptoms. Just as Betteredge 
unknowingly holds a clue in his hands in this way, so does the unwitting Franklin on the day 
before Rosanna Spearman goes missing. We have already encountered Hamilton's metaphor of 
the line of billiard balls which helps illustrate the action of hidden associations. Franklin Blake, 
therefore, in 'knocking the balls about ... trying to get this miserable business of the Diamond 
out of my mind' (p. 178), was in fact using as a distraction the very instruments that may have 
suggested to him the principles of latent memory, and the theory, established by 1848, that 
memories can be retrieved under certain conditions and with the revival of certain associations _ 
with the application of the right 'billiard-ball'. In his lack of direction in his billiards-playing, 
in which he reflects the somnambulism of Elliot son's Italian nobleman, who 'walked round [the 
billiard-table] several times, and acted the motions of a player', and in the use that he makes of 
his cue in directing attention, as he thinks, from the heart of things (when Rosanna Speannan 
appears to talk to him, he 'went on knocking the balls about, to take off the awkwardness of the 
thing' (The Moonstone, p. 178», he in fact in a strange way is drawing attention to the matters 
at hand. In the same self-reflexive way, in 'taking care"ofthe diamond, deflecting trouble away 
from it, as he thinks he is in giving it to Godfrey whilst in his trance, he in fact attracts a much 
worse calamity. By attempting to avoid, before the event, what he wrongly sees as a risk or 
problem - the theft of the diamond by the Indians, Rosanna's embarrassed guilt - he blindly, 
21 A figure called 'Dr Franklin' was cited in many articles and books on dreaming, in the first half of the 
century, including Abercrombie's Inquiries and Elliotson's Human Physiology: He was a man. who 
managed to accomplish feats worthy of consciousness, when asl~ep - accordmg to Abercrombie ~e 
managed to resolve political matters in his sleep that had b~~d hun when awake (J~ Abercrombie, 
Inquiries Concerning the Intellectual Powers and the Investigation o/Truth, 3rd edn (Edmburgh: Waugh 
& Innes, 1832), p. 284), and according to Elliotson he went for a ~wim, fell asleep ~ ~e wat~ and 
managed to keep afloat in the same position, for nearly an ~our (Elhotson, ~. 6~3~. It IS m~g !O 
speculate whether this figure influenced the naming of Frank 1m Blak~. Blake IS ~un"ar .to Dr. ~~I~ m 
that he 'resolved' the problem with the diamond in his sleep, by takmg possession of It and gtvmg It to 
Ablewhite to transfer to the bank. But with Blake there is also a sense in which he sleeps when awake; 
his intuition, his good sense, his powers of observation sleep. Things (such as Rosanna's infatuation) 
have to be revealed to him. 
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and unconsciously, causes the real trouble in the story, as he takes the diamond himself to keep 
it safe, and his apparent disregard for Rosanna sends her to her suicide in the Shivering Sand. 
Much has been written about Rosanna's grave, the Shivering Sand, as an emblem of the 
unconscious mind. Bourne Taylor writes: 
The Shivering .S~d is expressiv: bec~use it absorbs its secrets, and thus sucks energy into itself rather 
than transfonnmg It throu~ contmual mter~ction. It conceals its own past and the pasts of others, which 
have to be dragged back, pamfully, on a cham of submerged associations. (Secret Theatre, p. 198) 
The idea of the Sand sucking energy into itself fits in with the way in which Franklin, even in 
attempting to avoid trouble, creates it by seeming to attract it. These objects, the Shivering 
Sand and Franklin Blake, are the two sites of attraction that rule the life of Rosanna Spearman. 
My interest in the Shivering Sand is in what it tells us of the change of mental fabric that had 
occurred in Collins since he wrote No Name in 1862, a novel which contains a more 
straightforward and absolutist view of sand: 
Nothing in this world is hidden for ever. The gold which has lain for centuries unsuspected in 
the ground, reveals itself one day on the surface. Sand turns traitor, and betrays the footstep that has 
passed over it; water gives back to the tell-tale surface the body that has been drowned. Fire itself leaves 
the confession, in ashes, of the substance consumed in it ... Look where we will, the inevitable law of 
revelation is one of the laws of nature: the lasting preservation ofa secret is a miracle which the world has 
never yet seen. (No Name, p. 21) 
Bourne Taylor has pointed out the contrast between the Shivering Sand and No Name's 
revelatory sand (Secret Theatre, p. 198). However, there are two types of sand in The 
Moonstone: the Shivering Sand and the fmn sand on the beach, on which footprints can be 
made, and indeed, on which Rosanna's footprints are discovered. I would like to suggest that 
both these types of sand indicate a change in Collins's view of the mind by the time he wrote 
The Moonstone. 
'Light or heavy, whatever goes into the Shivering Sand is sucked down, and seen no 
more' (The Moonstone, p. 169), 'What the Sand gets, the Sand keeps for ever' (p. 198) - so 
Rosanna's fate, in direct contrast to Collins's 1862 assertion that 'nothing in this world is 
hidden for ever', is pronounced by Betteredge, and then Mr Volland, when Rosanna's 
footprints, leading to the Shivering Sand, are found. However, it then appears that there are two 
escape routes for objects, or people, that enter the Sand. The fITSt is 'a shelf of rock, about half 
fathom down under the sand ... If she slipped, by accident, from off the Spit, she fell in where 
there's foothold at the bottom, at a depth that would barely cover her to the waist' (p. 198). The 
second is the chain that Rosanna attaches to the rock on one end, and from which hangs, hidden 
in the Sand, a tin case, containing clues to the past: her confession and the stained nightshirt that 
Franklin wore on the night of the loss of the diamond. Both escape routes mean that retrieval is 
entirely possible from the Sand, if provision is made, and if consciousness wills it. The ledge 
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which saves is equivalent to Carpenter's belief, frequently expressed, as if a type of out-clause 
to his teachings on 'Unconscious Cerebration' that the conscious mind, the will, can somehow 
'direc[t] and contro[l]' the 'course' of unconscious activity and 'strengthe[n] or repres[s] its 
power' (,On the Unconscious Activity', p. 345). For a scientist who believed his mission was 
'to be of use as a mediator in the conflict which has now distinctly begun between science and 
theology,28, it was important to maintain that there was some sort of effect that consciousness 
could create on the sometimes immoral unconscious processes, involuntary as they seemed to 
be: 
And so in the pursuit of Truth, the more faithfully, strictly, and perseveringly we aim to disentangle 
ourselve~ from all s~lfish aims, all conscious prejudices, the more we shaH fmd ourselves becoming 
pr?g~essl~ely emancIpated from. those unconscious prejudices which cling around us as results of early 
mIsdIrection and erroneous habIts of thought, and which are more dangerous to our consistency than 
those against which we knowingly put ourselves upon our guard. ('On the Unconscious Activity', p. 345) 
Rosanna's early life and habits ('I was put in the prison, because I was a thief. I was a thief, 
because my mother went on the streets when I was quite a little girl' (The Moonstone, p. 362», 
were detrimental to her chances of finding the saving ledge in the unconscious depths, or of 
wanting the ledge if she had found it. Carpenter describes unconscious prejudices in his lecture 
as 'cling[ing] around us', 'dangerous to our consistency'. Betteredge's description of the Sand 
(,Patches of nasty ooze floated, yellow-white, on the dead surface of the water. Scum and slime 
shone faintly in certain places' (p. 161» seems to extend Carpenter's description of the 
properties of unconscious prejudices into a dynamic metaphor. Even if the ledge in the Sand is 
caught the person who finds him or herself waist deep will still have had an experience which is 
not only dangerous, but oozy and slimy, necessary to scrub off afterwards.29 We appreciate 
something of the disgust the Sand inspires in the episode in which Franklin Blake retrieves 
Rosanna's lost memories. 
Rosanna, then, perhaps because of the pattern her life has formed for her, avoids the 
ledge in the Sand, hides herself for ever, and thereby renders herself fundamentally a forgotten 
soul. It is her knowledge of the irreversible oblivion that lies within it that draws her to the 
Sand in the first place: 
21 W. B. Carpenter to Russell Carpenter, December 1874, in J. EstJin Carpenter, 'Introductory Memoir' in 
Nature and Man, pp. 1-152 (p. 117). This letter was written in the context of a passage about the subject 
of 'Mental Physiology', on which W. B. Carpenter, in that year, had just published a book. It ?bviously 
troubled him deeply to think of an unconscious part of the mind that was untouchable by morality, for he 
continues, '[Professor Clifford's] and H.'s doctrine of human automatism pure and simple, seems to me 
to strike at the root of all moral responsibility' (pp. 117-18). 
29 Early in the novel, Collins gives us an idea of Rosanna's propensity to attract. stains that won't 
disappear with cleaning, in her conversation with Bettered,ge, who has ~o~d her crymg abo~t her past. 
He urges her, '"your past life is all sponged out. Why can t you forget It? Her reply comes m the form 
of an illustration springing from a spot of grease that had stained 8etteredge's coat. He writes: 'The day 
before, Rosanna had taken out a spot for me on the lappet of my coat, with a new composition, warranted 
to remove anything. The grease was gone, but there was a little dull place left on the nap of the cloth 
where the grease had been. The girl pointed to that place, and shook her head. "The stain is taken otT," 
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The tide w.as on the tum,. and the horrid s,and began to shiver. The broad brown face of it heaved slowly, 
and then dunpled and q~lv~red all over: po you know what it looks like to me?' says Rosanna, catching 
me by the shoulder agam. It ~oo~s as If It had hundreds of suffocating people under it - all struggling to 
get to the surface, and all sinkmg lower and lower in the dreadful deeps! Throw a stone in M 
Betteredge! Throw a stone in, and let's see the sand suck it down!' (The Moonstone, p. 58) , r 
This is a landscape, fundamentally a mixture of flood and sand, that forms a site of condensation 
of Cobbe' s metaphorical illustration of our loss of the events of even the recent past: 
Trying to recall the past week, month, year, we shall succeed in rmding certain points here and there a 
few stepping-stones in the flood of time. Some of them stand out high and clearly ... Others are ne~ly 
submerged under the ever-rising current of oblivion; and others, again, lie far down where we only see 
them ~ strange glimps~s by day, or weird dreams by night. But when we have made the most of our poor 
memorIals, there remams always a waste of unmarked sands of life, hours and days unnumbered, over 
which the swift river eddies fast, leaving no trace behind. (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 99) 
This image finds a correspondence in the life that Rosanna Spearman led, especially in the eyes 
of the man she most wanted to be remembered by, Franklin Blake. Ordinarily, in Betteredge's 
words, 'he took about as much notice of her as he took of the cat' (The Moonstone, p. 92); it is 
her strange behaviour to him after the loss of the diamond, and when she suspects him of being 
the culprit, that marks the stepping-stones here and there in Franklin's memory - the 
conversation at the billiard-table, an encounter in the shrubbery. However, Rosanna feels these 
encounters are unmarked still in Franklin's mind through an unfortunate series of coincidences 
and breakdowns of communication. Franklin, after her buried narrative is presented, is at pains 
to explain this: 
On the Friday night, as Betteredge truly describes it, she had found me alone at the billiard-table. Her 
manner and language suggested to me - and would have suggested to any man, under the circumstances -
that she was about to confess a gUilty knowledge of the disappearance of the Diamond. For her own sake, 
I had purposely shown no special interest in what was coming; for her own sake, I had purposely looked 
at the billiard balls, instead of looking at her - and what had been the result? I had sent her away from 
me, wounded to the heart! On the Saturday again ... the same fatality still pursued us. She had once more 
attempted to meet me in the shrubbery walk, and she had found me there in company with Betteredge and 
Sergeant Cuff. In her hearing, the Sergeant, with his own underhand object in view, had appealed to my 
interest in Rosanna Spearman. Again for the poor creature's own sake, I had met the police-officer with a 
flat denial, and had declared - loudly declared, so that she might hear me too - that I felt 'no interest 
whatever in Rosanna Spearman.' At those words, solely designed to warn her against attempting to gain 
my private ear, she had turned away and left the place: cautioned of her danger, as I then believed; self-
doomed to destruction, as I know now. (The Moonstone, pp. 379-80) 
It is surely the case, however, that the gap of communication between Franklin and Rosanna 
exists because of her station in life - Franklin has no idea how to talk to her. Despite his 
protestations, he asks Betteredge to 'make it right with Rosanna' (p. 183) after the encounter in 
the shrubbery, rather than talking to her himself. Betteredge finds her sweeping, vacan~ in a 
she said. "But the place shows, Mr Betteredge - the place shows!'" (The Moonstone, p. 57). 
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state particularly common to grieving servants, according to Betteredge, who describes the low-
key reaction of himself and his daughter to the news of Rosanna's death thus, 'we learn to put 
our feelings back into ourselves, and to jog on with our duties as patiently as may be. I don't 
complain of this - I only notice it' (The Moonstone, p. 200). Rosanna, then, after her final 
humiliation, her final 'mortification', to use a word applied by more than one character to her 
reaction to Franklin's disregard/o does her sweeping 'like a creature moved by machinery', 
among objects she had looked on 'hundreds on hundreds of times' (pp. 186, 185). This is a 
short return to the scene and activity of the 'unnumbered days' of Cobbe's description, before 
Rosanna finishes the 'mortification' that Franklin dealt her, and goes to her death in the 
'unmarked sands', which, to her eyes, contain the 'hundreds of suffocating people' that recall 
Cobbe's words, 'like the faces in a great crowd, our past hours have gone by, and we remember 
only here and there a single one' ('Fallacies of Memory', p. 99). In avoiding the stone ledge she 
joins the vast number of unregistered faces, entering an oblivion that, as she believes in her 
grief, had characterized her unnoticed, unremembered life. 
However, in the narrative that she so carefully concealed with Franklin's nightshirt, 
Rosanna made a final attempt at marking her existence in the mind of the man she loved. The 
retrieval of this narrative from the Sand, another striking scene in the novel, has attracted some 
interesting commentaries. Hutter, allowing for certain reservations that he expresses about the 
reductionism of this conclusion, believes that the Sand represents 'the fear of intercourse 
expressed by the primal scene' and that this reading means that, if we are to take a limited view, 
Franklin's retrieval of Rosanna's narrative 'tells us something of Collins's deeper fears and 
desires, and something as well about what a reader might be responding to as he is thrilled, or 
fearful, or even bored by The Moonstone' (Hutter, pp. 204, 205). Jenny Bourne Taylor, again, 
nearer to my emphasis on the Victorian psychological context, writes of the Sand, as we have 
seen, that 'it conceals its own past and the pasts of others, which have to be dragged back, 
painfully, on a chain of submerged associations' (Secret Theatre, p. 198). Her account in this 
particular case, however, is not only misleading but it oversimplifies. Once, by following his 
own plan of retrieval, he has 'sounded' the chain with a stick, Blake writes 'I drew it up without 
the slightest difficulty', belying the image of a painful dragging. What is painful and laborious, 
in contrast, is the fmding of a sufficient length of chain to pull: 
In a narrow little fissure, just within reach of my forefmger, I felt the chain. Atte~pting, next, to follow 
it, by touch, in the direction of the quicksand, I found my progress ~opped by a thick gro~ of seaweed 
- which had fastened itself into the fissure, no doubt, in the time that had elapsed smce Rosanna 
Speannan had chosen her hiding-place. .. 
It was equally impossible to pull up the seaweed, or to force my hand ~gh It After ~arkmg 
the spot indicated by the end of the stick which was placed nearest to the qUICksand, I determmed to 
pursue the search for the chain on a plan of my own. (The Moonstone, p. 357) 
30 Limping Lucy, Rosanna's intimate friend, uses this word (The Moonstone, p. 227), as does Rosanna 
herself (p. 376). Penelope says to Betteredge after Franklin has announced his lack of interest in her in 
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What is stopping Blake from recovering the chain of associations is, in effect, the march of 
time. Circumstances, like the fabric background of the mind with the effects of education, have 
changed, and to find the 'past', Franklin has to employ other means, more distasteful, that bring 
traumatic and ghostly images to his mind: 
I took up the stick, and knelt on the brink of the South Spit. 
In !his ~osition, m~ face was wi~in ~ few feet of the surface of the quicksand. The sight of it so 
near me, stIlI dIsturbed at mtervals by Its hIdeous shivering fit, shook my nerves for the moment. A 
horrible fancy that the dead woman might appear on the scene of her suicide, to assist my search _ an 
unutterable dread of seeing her rise through the heavy surface of the sand, and point to the place - forced 
itself into my mind, and turned me cold in the warm sunlight. I own I closed my eyes at the moment 
when the point of the stick first entered the quicksand. (The Moonstone, p. 357) 
Tamar Heller describes this incident as 'the phallic stick penetrating the Sand's vagina dentata' 
which leads to the 'two erotic discoveries' of the nightshirt and the confession of love.31 She 
sees Franklin's detective work as the male appropriation of female secrets; I would prefer to see 
it as his misappropriation of Rosanna's Memory, and her memories. In direct contrast to the 
image Rosanna conjures up in her letter of the happy ghost she will become if he is kind to her 
after her death (' if there are such things as ghosts, I believe my ghost will hear it, and tremble 
with the pleasure of it' (The Moonstone, p. 379», the ghost that Franklin imagines her to be is 
dreadful and frightening, forces him to see her, and turns him cold. Because of the change in 
circumstance that the interval of time has created, interestingly due to the laws of nature (one of 
which the 'inevitable law of revelation' was said by Collins to be), it is harder to find the chain, 
and therefore Franklin, again going contrary to her wishes, must follow his own plan to retrieve 
the tin, which involves in essence interfering with Rosanna's grave with a foreign body, the 
stick. When he has retrieved it, 'the action of the water had so rusted the chain, that it was 
impossible for me to unfasten it from the hasp which attached it to the case. Putting the case 
between my knees, and exerting my utmost strength, I contrived to draw off the cover' (pp. 357-
58). This, another change to Rosanna's vision of the intimate moments that they will share at 
the Shivering Sand and displaying less respect to her Memory than she may deserve, is, like the 
growth of the seaweed, beyond Franklin's control; he does the best he can, under the 
circumstances, as does Jennings when the house cannot be restored to its fonner condition for 
the reconstruction of the loss of the diamond. 
However, under his control is the responsibility Franklin bears towards Rosanna to read 
the letter she has written him. The fact that both Bruff and Betteredge finish it before he does 
represents a flouting of the wishes of Rosanna, who meant only Blake to read her most personal 
confession oflove.32 The incident at the Shivering Sand is much more than dragging a chain of 
the shrubbery, 'he's been mortifying and disappointing her for weeks and weeks past' (p. 18S). . • 
31 Tamar Heller, Dead Secrets: Wilkie Collins and the Female Gothic (New Haven, Ct.: Yale Unlventty 
Press, 1992), p. I SO. 
32 This flouting of Rosanna's last wishes also occurs when Blake arrives at the Sands. He is ready to 
make the discovery with Betteredge, who has to remind him that his instructions are to 'do it without any 
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associations to the surface to find the unscathed past in the same condition in which it happened 
those many months before. Both Franklin and Rosanna come to the scene we find enacted at 
the Sand with a set of prepossessions, which means that the past retrieved, the memory, can 
never be a pure unspotted thing; rather it is coloured by the narrative that tells of it, and the 
circumstances in which it is retold. Rosanna's narrative, once retrieved from the 'unconscious 
memory' of the Sands, is biased and twisted. Carpenter describes the process behind the 
difficulty an obsessed person (such as Rosanna) faces in representing events even to him or 
herself in an impartial way, in an article he published in 1876, 'On the Fallacies of Testimony in 
Relation to the Supernatural': 
Though I have hitherto spoken of 'prepossessions' as ideational states, there are very few in 
which the emotions do not take a share; and how strongly the influence of these may pervert the 
representations of actual facts, we best see in that early stage of many forms of monomania, in which 
there are as yet no fixed delusions, but the occurrences of daily life are wrongly interpreted by the 
emotional colouring they receive. ('Fallacies of Testimony', p. 249) 
These emotional prepossessions affect how certain characters see things at the time of 
their occurrence; but their effect on the memory of past events is even more devastating: 
But every form of 'prepossession' has an involuntary and unsuspected action in modifying the 
memorial traces of past events, even when they were originally rightly apprehended. A gradual change in 
our own mode of viewing them will bring us to the conviction that we always so viewed them ... To few 
persons of experience in life has it not happened to fmd their distinct impressions of past events in 
striking disaccordance with some contemporary narrative, as perhaps given in a letter of their own. 
(,Fallacies of Testimony', p. 253) 
There is therefore a double risk to 'the interests of truth' in assembling a mass of narratives by 
those, first, who may have either an axe to grind (as in the case of Miss Clack, who also has a 
pecuniary interest), or an emotional interest in events (as in the case of Franklin), and then who 
may have to wait a year to recall past events. Betteredge's words at the beginning of the novel 
are symptomatic of the piece: 
I am asked to tell the story of the Diamond, and, instead of that, I have been telling the story of my own 
self. Curious, and quite beyond me to account for. I wonder whether the gentlemen who make a business 
and a living out of writing books, ever fmd their own selves getting in the way of their subjects, like me? 
(The Moonstone, p. 45) 
Collins's self-professed aim in this novel, 'to trace the influence of character on circumstances' 
(p. 27) is perhaps true in more ways than is immediately obvious. In The Moonstone it seems to 
be the case that the more immediate accounts (for example, those narratives, such as Miss 
person being present to overlook you' (The Moonstone, p. 354). Betteredge leaves, with the. comment 
that 'there's nothing in the letter against your letting out the secret afterwards' ~. 356). Here IS surely. 
compliance with the letter, but not the spirit of, the instructions Rosanna has gIVen. In the event, also, 
Betteredge, his curiosity getting the better of him, returns early to the scene. 
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Clack's, or Ezra Jennings's, which are taken from a journal) are actually quite highly 
emotionally coloured, and therefore hold a danger that their writers may 'ge[t] in the way of 
their subjec[t]'. Jennings's admission of the 'yearning' he has 'for a little human sympathy ... 
which has survived the solitude and persecution of many years; which seems to grow keener 
and keener, as the time comes nearer and nearer when I shall endure and feel no more', hand in 
hand with a fervent wish to 'see a happiness of others, which is of my making' (pp. 448, 449), 
suggests a worrying emotional prepossession. In the context of a consideration of the life of the 
forgotten Rosanna, Jennings's possible bias is particularly strongly suggested. He too, 
according to Mr Candy, who writes the account of his demise, had a fitting death, 'he said _ not 
bitterly - that he would die as he had lived, forgotten and unknown ... His story is a blank'; like 
Rosanna, too, his grave is unmarked, the natural processes of time only hide it more and more 
with each passing year (pp. 515, 516). However, before he dies, Jennings feels the fundamental 
need, like Rosanna, to leave some sort of final proof that he has lived. Buried with his life's 
work, his legacy therefore is the experiment that he devises. His words to Franklin on the day 
that he suggests the reconstruction of the loss of the diamond to him are significant: 'this is a 
marked day in your life, and in mine ... I believe that the vindication of your innocence is in my 
hands!' (p. 431). Here Jennings places himself firmly in the centre of events. His endeavour to 
assure himself of at least one marked day out of the countless unnumbered ones means that his 
emotional investment in the experiment is high, and raises the question of whether he should 
indeed be the one who gives an account of 'how the venture with the opium was tried, and how 
it ended' (p. 446). Conversely, Bruff's narrative, which is relatively uncoloured, is achieved by 
'tracing my way back along the chain of events, from one end to the other' (p. 312), after the 
interval of a year or more 33 and includes large sections of dialogue that could hardly have been 
remembered word for word.34 Carpenter would link both feeling and thought as eroding agents 
on memories in his description of 'the entire dissimilarity of the accounts of the same 
occurrence or conversation, which shall be given by two or more parties concerned with it, even 
when the matter is fresh in their minds, and they are honestly desirous of telling the truth': 
And this diversity will usually become still more pronounced with the lapse of time: the trace becoming 
gradually but unconsciously modified by the habitual course of thought and feeling; so that when it is so 
acted on after a lengthened interval as to bring up a reminiscence of the original occurrence, that 
reminiscence really represents, not the actual occurrence, but the modified trace of it. And this is the 
source of an enormous number of 'fallacies of testimony'. (Mental Physiology, p. 456) 
This view indicates disaster for the aim of serving 'the interests of truth', expressed by Franklin 
and Bruff (whose status as a lawyer is rendered particularly interesting in view of the 
33 Where the incidents involving John Verinder's Will is concerned, it is much more than a year. 
34 Interestingly, Carpenter later singles out a lawyer for an example of th~ tricks that m~mory can play: 
• An able lawyer told me not long since that he had had occasion to look mto a deed which he ... C?u~d 
have sworn to contain certain clauses' and to his utter astonishment, the clauses were not to be found mit. 
His habitual conception of the purpo~ of the deed had constructed what answered to the actual memorial 
161 
implications of Cobbe's, and later Carpenter's, conception of testimony for the processes of 
law); it is a warning that even this 'right way of telling' the story (The Moonstone, p. 39) can by 
no means be considered failsafe. 
Carpenter's view, with its idea of the modification of memory traces which is self-
confessedly infonned by Cobbe's work,3s also leads us to consider the traces in the finn sand, 
the marks that do not have to be dragged up from the depths to tell their tale. There appears in 
The Moonstone to be a certain amount of ambiguity attached to these, too, reflecting Frances 
Power Cobbe's metaphorical description of the models that memory mayor may not fit: 
Memory is neither an impression made, once for all, like an engraving on a tablet, nor yet safe for an hour 
from obliteration or modification, after being fonned. Rather is memory a fmger-mark traced on shifting 
sand, ever exposed to obliteration when left unrenewed; and if renewed, then modified, and made, not the 
same, but a fresh and different mark. Beyond the first time of recalling a place or event, it is rare to 
remember again actually the place or the event. We remember, not the things themselves, but the first 
recollection of them, and then the second and the third, always the latest recollection of them. (,Fallacies 
of Memory', p. 104) 
From No Name's sand which 'turns traitor, and betrays the footstep that has passed over it' we 
have the sand of The Moonstone, which is threatening to become conspirator; on which, 
according to the laws of nature, it rains. Consequently examining footprints in the novel 
becomes a matter of great urgency: 
I don't even know how long it was after the Sergeant had gone to the sands, when Duffy came running 
back with a message for me. Sergeant Cuff had given the boy a leaf tom out of his pocket-book, on 
which was written in pencil, 'Send me one of Rosanna Speannan's boots, and be quick about it.' (The 
Moonstone, p. 195) 
When the boot is delivered to Cuff: 
He snatched the boot out of my hand, and set it in a footmark on the sand ... The mark was not yet 
blurred out by the rain - and the girl's boot fitted it to a hair. 
The Sergeant pointed to the boot in the footmark, without saying a word. (The Moonstone, p. 
196) 
To ascertain the events of the past, the Sergeant, by putting a different boot in the mark, has 
changed its impression in the sand for ever, as Cobbe describes. While unrenewed, the 
memory, the symbol of Rosanna's last seconds on earth, was 'ever exposed to obliteration' from 
the rain; when renewed by Cuff the print was 'modified, and made, not the same, but a fresh and 
different mark', after which time both the first and the second impression which had changed it 
were destroyed by the elements. Both types of sand in The Moonstone's landscape render 
Rosanna Speannan ultimately a forgotten life; hidden forever by the Shivering Sand, her last 
trace' (,Fallacies of Testimony' , pp. 253-54). 
35 Carpenter, in the same paragraph as the passage I have just quoted, writes of 'Miss Cobbe, who has 
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footmark erased, her only memorial is a narrative which Franklin Blake misuses at first and 
retells later, overlaying the events that were so real to her, with his own revisionary version. 
Ultimately, Rosanna's experience raises issues about the transience of existence, the 
impossibility of true memorials, of our ability to create any record that will really capture the 
lasting essence of ourselves as we were at any given point in time.36 
The irony is that the more detection that goes on in the form of asking people to 
remember the events of June 1848, whether by Sergeant Cuff, Franklin Blake or Gabriel 
Betteredge, the more elusive and slippery the past becomes, until eventually the situation occurs 
where the witness, having remembered 'not the things themselves, but the first recollection of 
them, and then the second and third, always the latest recollection of them' 'will find himself 
constantly going over precisely what he has narrated, and no more' ('Fallacies of Memory', p. 
104). This is taken to an extreme in the example of the shattered memory of Dr. Candy, whose 
unconscious account of the past, its path having been trodden so many times in his comatose 
state, becomes a reiteration of certain words and phrases over and over: 
'That is what you heard at his bed-side?' I said. 
'Literally and exactly what I heard,' he answered - 'except that the repetitions are not transferred 
here from my short-hand notes. He reiterated certain words and phrases a dozen times over, fifty times 
over, just as he attached more or less importance to the idea which they represented .... Don't suppose ... 
that I claim to have reproduced the expressions which Mr Candy himself would have used if he had been 
capable of speaking connectedly. I only say that I have penetrated through the obstacle of the 
disconnected expression, to the thought which was underlying it connectedly all the time'. (The 
Moonstone, p. 437i7 
Candy's recollection is not only a reiteration: the fragments collected by Jennings have already 
been made into a narrative in his mind, a telling of the story, with character sketch and 
explanation of motive' ... Mr Franklin Blake ... and agreeable ... down a peg ... medicine' (p. 
436i8 (which becomes in Jennings's version of the narrative 'Mr Franklin Blake is clever and 
agreeable, but he wants taking down a peg when he talks of medicine' (p. 437)). The dialogue 
is assimilated into the narrative - 'he tells me', 'I say', 'he says' (p. 436) as if a third person is 
being informed of who is saying what in the exchange between Candy and Blake. Candy, even 
unconsciously, in his delirium, is here acting the witness in the box. 
However, after he has gathered Candy's gap-filled testimony, Jennings then imposes his 
s~cially directed attention to these "Fallacies of Memory'" (Mental Physiology, p. 457). 
3 The fact that Collins wrote part of The Moonstone while mourning the death of his mother, to whom he 
was very close, may have contributed to this feeling of transience within the book, as he was forced to 
contemplate the reality of mortality and the inadequacy of memorials, on a personal level. See Peters, pp. 
291-92, for an account of the death of Collins's mother and how it affected him. 
37 In my last chapter I discussed what I believe is Collins's prefiguration of the Freudian 'nodal point,' an 
important idea, or link in the associative chain, that connected many different chains together, in the 
manner ofa railway station connecting railway lines. Jennings's description of Candy's narrative, that he 
'reiterated certain words and phrases a dozen times over, fifty times over,just as he attached more or less 
importance to the idea which they represented' seems to be another example of this - the same idea keeps 
being encountered by Candy's delirious mind as it wanders along its chains of association, exactly in 
proportion as it bears importance. 
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own narrative preferences, his own distorting footprint (however closely it seems to 'fit') on it. 
The implication is that when we speak of our experience of the past, give our testimony, it is 
then appropriated by others into their own narratives, others who perhaps have 'woven this 
smooth and finished texture out of the ravelled skein' (The Moonstone, p. 438), but helped to 
obliterate the traces of the past in the process. Certain key phrases are kept by them and 
endlessly repeated to the extent that they become that past experience, but gaps are filled, the 
story is 'completed': 
So strong is the dramatic element in us all that few ever detail a narrative without completing it by some 
touches not ~ctually true, though conscientiously believed to explain the truth; to supply the genuine 
reason for thiS speech or the other action, or to bring into relief the real feelings of the actors. The fact is, 
we can never witness any transaction without making some theory of the motives, sentiments, and 
purposes of the agents; and, in telling the history thereof, we inevitably work out this theory in our 
description. (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 107)39 
In a sense the incident with Doctor Candy, Franklin and the laudanum on the night of Rachel's 
party has been dramatized twice by the time it gets to Franklin; once by Candy himself, whose 
sense of its inherent drama is obvious in the very plan he concocts to publicly catch Franklin out 
the morning after, and once by Jennings, who had the (self-confessedly warping) job of filling 
in the gaps in the narrative. 
Cobbe's view of memory, in the end, has the effect of applying a question mark even to 
the experiment that is conducted at the end of The Moonstone, to 'recreate' the loss of the 
diamond. It may seem that the experiment, witnessed as it is by so many, its result recorded as 
it is immediately, and its subject never having relived it before in his memory (for he cannot 
remember it), is the one sacred, provable exact reconstruction of the events of the past. But 
Collins indicates by various means that this is not necessarily the case. First, the fact that the 
house cannot be exactly restored to its fonner state of the year before means that the conditions 
for the experiment are not quite right. Before talking to Betteredge about the arrangements, 
Blake asserts that Jennings 'considered it essential to the success of the experiment, that I 
should see the same objects about me which had surrounded me when I was last in the house'. 
'It is absolutely necessary, Mr. Blake, to replace every article of furniture in that part of the 
house which may now be put away' (The Moonstone, p. 445), Jennings tells Franklin, yet 
concedes the loss of the buzzard, the change of carpets and the broken cupid's wing, on 
discussing the arrangements with Betteredge. Like the growth of the seaweed, these are the 
inevitable results of the passing of time. Despite this, however, the 'right' result is achieved. 
Here surely is the evidence that Franklin has lapsed into the same trance, and followed exactly 
31 Collins's ellipses. 
39 A very good example of someone who, an almost constant ~itness (~th~ than a p~ici~ant), 'mak[es] 
some theory of the motives, sentiments, and pmposes' of the transactions she ~s IS MISS .Clack, who 
colours everythina she witnesses with the tint of evangelicalism. Deeper down, addmg a ~arpmg agc~t to 
this religious "prepossession", and therefore complicating her view of evcnts still furthcr, IS an undcDlable 
sexual desire for Godfi'ey Ablewhite. 
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the same pattern as he did the year before, through the processes of his own unconscious mind 
dictating which actions he should take, from memory. 
What this 'memory' is made up of, though, is debatable. Franklin has spent the 
intervening year trying to picture how the diamond was taken, and then himself in the act of 
taking it. He has examined Rachel for all the details of what she saw on that night, and has 
talked about his own unconscious act to others, including Ezra Jennings. Is it conceivable, then, 
that on the night on which the experiment is conducted, he is in fact re-enacting Rachel's 
memories, and not replaying what actually happened? Could it be that Franklin is remembering 
Rachel's 'latest recollection', and these are guiding his movements under trance? It must be 
remembered that Rachel actually only saw a limited amount of the action that occurred on the 
night of her birthday. Ablewhite saw Franklin arise from his room and heard the words he 
spoke to himself in his anxiety about the diamond. Jennings's journal testifies that Franklin 
spoke the same words that Ablewhite later confesses him to have spoken the year before. 
However, I would like to suggest the possibility that Cobbe's theory applies here that Franklin, 
in replaying in his mind what he could have done, what his motives may have been, does as 
Cobbe describes - 'We begin by saying: "It might have happened so and so," till having 
realized in fancy that hypothetical case more vividly than we remember the real one, we 
suddenly and unconsciously substitute the fancy for the fact' ('Fallacies of Memory', p. 106); 
the fact that the fancy and the fact on this occasion 'fit', as Jennings's gap-filling fitted, and as 
Rosanna's boot fitted, does not mean that Franklin has not overlaid the actual past with a false 
recollection, or unconsciously remembered, as he was supposed to, part of his experience, and 
'filled in' the rest. 
There is no doubt that Franklin, like many of the witnesses to the experiment, was 
emotionally "prepossessed"; unconsciously inclined to act in a certain way, for the sake of his 
relationship with Rachel. Carpenter describes the effects of prepossession in his essay 
'Fallacies of Testimony in Relation to the Supernatural', in which he concentrates on the 
phenomena of 'Supernatural Events', which include mesmeric experiences. His view of these 
phenomena even puts the evidence of the witnesses to the experiment in doubt: 
In fact, although we are accustomed to speak of 'the evidence of our senses' as worthy of the highest 
credit, nothing is easier than to show that the evidence of anyone sense, without the ~heck afforded by 
comparison with that of another, is utterly untrustworthy ... [M]ental prepossessIons ... produce 
sensations having no objective reality ... I refer to the sensations produced by mental expectancy, a most 
fertile source of self-deception. (,Fallacies of Testimony' , p. 244) 
Even conceding that the witnesses saw Franklin take the 'diamond' on the night of the 
experiment, a question-mark also hangs over Jennings's narrative of events and his 
interpretation of them: 
I would briefly direct attention to the influence of prepossessions on those interpretations of our 
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sensational experiences, which we are prone to substitute for the statement of the experiences th I 
Of h .. . h d . emse ves. suc mlsmterpretatIons, t e recor s of sCIence are full; the tendency is one which b ts 
b d h· h th . . ese every o server, an to w IC e most conSCIentIOUS have frequently yielded· but I do not kn 
tr·k· ·11 . f· th ' ow any more s 1 mg I ustratIons 0 It an I could narrate from my own inquiries into mesmerism sp· ·tu I· t ('F II· fT· , ' In a Ism, e c. a aCles 0 estImony, 247-48) 
Jennings's description of EIliotson as 'one of the greatest of English physiologists' (The 
Moonstone, p. 440) is significant; an explicit compliment with an implicit question-mark, 
bearing in mind the ambiguity attached to the experiment. Bruff's opinion that it 'looked like a 
piece of trickery, akin to the trickery of mesmerism, clairvoyance, and the like' and 
Betteredge's original view of the proceedings as 'a conjuring trick' (The Moonstone, pp. 452, 
453), reinforce the idea of the experiment being on a par with mesmerism and spiritualism; a 
supernatural event, inspired by a mesmerist, of the type that W. B. Carpenter has spent years 
investigating: 
Circumstances have led me from a very early period to take a great interest in the question of the 
value of testimony, and to occupy myself a good deal in the inquiry as to what is scientifically termed its 
'subjective' element ... The general result of these inquiries has been to force upon me the conviction, 
that as to all which concerns the 'supernatural' ... the allowance that has to be made for 'prepossession' is 
so large, as practically to destroy the validity of any testimony which is not submitted to the severest 
scrutiny according to the strictest scientific methods. ('Fallacies of Testimony', p. 242) 
With the subject and every one of the witnesses to the experiment, including the scientist, who 
later describes the events of that night as 'my brief dream of happiness' (The Moonstone, p. 
483), wanting the same result, it is certain that that result will be produced, from the simple 
force of prepossession at each stage - in Franklin, the witnesses, and the report of the 
experiment. Carpenter asserts, 'we are liable to be affected by our prepossessions at every stage 
of our mental activity, from our primary reception of impressions from without, to the highest 
exercise of our reasoning powers' (,Fallacies of Testimony', p. 243), and in The Moonstone we 
see the whole range of this mental activity covered at each stage in the process of the 
experiment. 
I attach particular significance to this essay by Carpenter and emphasize its relevance to 
the occurrences of The Moonstone because I believe it represents the development of a section 
in Cobbe's 1867 essay, which concerns the effects of emotion on witnessing and memory. 
Cobbe writes: 
Precisely in proportion as any event involves great interest, just so f~ the memory of it is liable t? be 
obscure. The excitement of strong feelings of anger, horror, astoDlshment, fear, causes the eXCiting 
transaction to be involved to the spectators in a sort of mental blur, like the perceptions of a man drunk 
with wine. Vehement excitement, in truth, is intoxication; an intoxication often more dangerous, because 
less suspected, than that produced by any material stimulant ... The results on the senses ... and the 
subsequent distortion and partial effacement of the memory of the scene, are all parallel to the common 
phenomena we observe in the case of a drunken man. (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 97) 
Although I am not suggesting that the emotions in The Moonstone reach such a pitch as Cobbe 
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describes here, it is worth considering Rachel's description of her feelings, hours before the 
experiment, against the above passage: 'I am so interested; I am so excited ... Do you wonder at 
the interest I take in this?' (The Moonstone, pp. 466-67) By the time the experiment begins and 
Franklin begins his walk, all those who are to witness it are in a matching state of excitement. 
Jennings writes of 'the breathless interest of watching him ... the unutterable triumph of seeing 
the first result of the experiment declare itself in the manner, and nearly at the time, which I had 
anticipated'. By now, Betteredge and Bruff are no longer the impartial, emotionless observers 
that they might have promised to be. They are now 'like two boys'; 'Mr Bruff himself was 
looking eagerly through a crevice ... And Betteredge, oblivious of all respect for social 
distinctions, was peeping over Mr Bruffs shoulder' (p. 476). There is a sense in which all the 
parties, Franklin and the observers, are intoxicated, rather like shadows of the Irish Porter, so 
that those witnessing the experiment are in little more of a state to testify to what they have seen 
than Franklin himself. 
There is a strong sense in which the ambiguities and doubts that can be detected in the 
reconstruction of the scene of the loss of the diamond in The Moonstone can also be applied to 
Freud's early therapeutic work, which also concerned itself with the reconstruction of lost 
scenes. It is in the prepossession of an interested party, which is looking for and 'finds' a 
specific result, and in Cobbe's insight that 'allowing ourselves to dwell on imaginary 
contingencies till they become realities in our imagination' renders 'the successive traces of 
memory ... warped and distorted' (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 106), that we find the key not only 
to a possible reading of The Moonstone in terms of the fallacies of testimony and memory, but 
also to the birth and progress of Freud's seduction theory of the 1890s. In the final section of 
this chapter 1 will consider how the theories of Cobbe and Carpenter, and the unreliable view of 
memory and testimony portrayed in The Moonstone, could have served as a warning for the 
work of Freud. 1 will discuss how he, according to his own later version of events, entertained 
'a mistaken idea ... which might have been almost fatal to the young science' of 
psychoanalysis40 because he did not take this line of nineteenth-century thought into account; 
however, more than this I will argue that his later narratives describing the seduction theory 
episode demonstrate that Freud himself became subject to the fallacies of memory, the fallacies 
of testimony. 
40 Sigmund Freud, 'On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement', in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works o/Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by James Stracbey and others, 24 vols 
(London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953-74), XIV, 1-66 (p. 17). The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works will hereafter be referenced as SE. 
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Freud's Fallacies of Memory: the Seduction Theory and its Recall 
On 21 September 1897, Sigmund Freud wrote to his friend Wilhelm Fliess, telling him of 'the 
great secret that has been slowly dawning on me in the last few months. I no longer believe in 
my neurotica [theory of the neuroses]' .41 This' great secret' balanced the momentousness of the 
actual theory that Freud was now relinquishing, which, two years earlier, he had described to 
Fliess in the same terms: 
Have I revealed the great clinical secret to you, either orally or in writing? 
Hysteria is the consequence of a presexual sexual shock. 
Obs~ssional neurosis is the consequence of a presexual sexual pleasure, which is later 
transfonned mto [self-] reproach. 'Presexual' means actually before puberty, before the release of sexual 
substances; the relevant events become effective only as memories.42 
As Freud wrote elsewhere, this ftrst secret, the so-called seduction theory, meant that 
'everything [went] back to the reproduction of scenes,'43 and between 1895 and 1897 he 
dedicated himself to facilitating the reliving of scenes of early sexual trauma in his patients. 
The most public expression of the seduction theory occurred in 1896, in a paper, 'The Aetiology 
of Hysteria' read before 'Verein flir Psychiatrie und Neurologie' of Vienna. Freud argued: 
If we have the perseverance to press on with the analysis into early childhood, as far back as a human 
memory is capable of reaching, we invariably bring the patient to reproduce experiences which, on 
account both of their peculiar features and of their relations to the symptoms of his later illness, must be 
regarded as the aetiology of his neurosis for which we have been looking. These infantile experiences are 
... sexual in content ... I therefore put forward the thesis that at the bottom of every case of hysteria there 
are one or more occurrences of premature sexual experience, occurrences which belong to the earliest 
years of childhood but which can be reproduced through the work of psycho-analysis in spite of the 
intervening decades. I believe that this is an important fmding, the discovery of a caput Nili in 
44 
neuropathology. 
Yet some eighteen months later, this source of the Nile, which Freud had been so sure he had 
discovered, had proved illusory. Freud gave several reasons for his change of heart in the 
September letter to Fliess. The third, signiftcantly, consisted of 'the certain insight that there are 
no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and 
fiction that has been cathected with affect' (Freud-Fliess, p. 264). Over twenty years earlier, 
William Carpenter had demonstrated his own knowledge of this 'insight' in a discussion of 'the 
reproduction of ideas which have previously only passed through the mind in Dreams'. He 
41 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 21 September 1897, in ~ Complete Letters .of Sigmund Freud to 
Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904 trans. and ed. by Jeffi'ey MousS8leff Masson (Cambndge, Mass: Harvard, 
1985), pp. 264-67 (p. 264). Hereafter, Freud-Fliess. 1b~ brackets ~serted in this pass~ge are the 
editor's. It might be as well to remind the reader that thIS letter~ With .the rest of ,!,e Fbess papen 
(including the Project for a Scientific Psychology), was fITSt published m 1950, havmg been among 
Fliess's private papers for many years, and then bought by a follower of Freud's who ignored his pleas to 
bum the papers. ., 
42 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 15 October 1895, m Freud-Flless, p. 144. 
43 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 2 May 1897, in Freud-Fliess, pp. 238-40 (p. 239). 
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wrote, 'almost every one has had occasion, at some time or other, to say "Did this really happen 
to me, or did I dream it?" - the past mental experience having been as complete in the one case 
as in the other' (Mental PhySiology, pp. 455-56). 
That this realization took so long to dawn on Freud, who, according to his letters and his 
1896 paper, had for some eighteen months been treating eighteen different patients, none of 
whom, by September 1897, he had cured,45 springs from a number of different possible reasons. 
One was his nineteenth-century education, which dictated that his first instinct was to believe in 
the indelibility of memory. Some sense of this belief is given in Freud's description of the 
arrangements of the memories of his patients in Studies on Hysteria. It is, he writes, as if they 
are collected in a set of files in the mind, 'It was as though we were examining a dossier that 
had been kept in good order': 
These files fonn a quite general feature of every analysis and their contents always emerge in a 
chronological order which is as infallibly trustworthy as the succession of days of the week or names of 
the month in a mentally nonnal person. (Studies on Hysteria, p. 288) 
In my introduction I discussed the critical consensus on Freud's schooling, that it is believed 
that the psychological textbook that he would have used was Lindner's Lehrbuch. Ernest Jones 
documents that this book contains the passage: 'A result of the fusion of ideas proves that ideas 
which were once in consciousness and for any reason have been repressed (verdriingt) out of it 
are not lost, but in certain circumstances may return.' (Jones, I, 374). Bearing a similarity to 
Carpenter's theory of 1853, that 'every sensory impression ... may be reproduced at some 
subsequent time' which appears on Ezra Jennings's slip of paper in The Moonstone, this view of 
memory was typical of psychological thought at this time. I have also discussed Maudsley's 
view of 1870, that 'in the deepest and most secret recesses of the mind, there is nothing hidden 
... which may not be ... some time accidentally revealed'; this also concurs completely with 
Lindner's textbook. In 1866, in The Gay Science,46 E. S. Dallas argued for the 'indelibility' of 
memory47 in terms that are particularly interesting in view of Freud's seduction theory of 30 
years later: 
That understanding is not essential to memory we see in children who learn by heart what has no 
meaning to them. The meaning comes long years afterwards. But it would seem as if the process which 
we have all observed on such a small scale goes on continually on a much larger scale. Absolute as a 
photograph, the mind refuses nought. An impression once m~de on the sense, even unwittingly,. abid~ 
for evermore ... the memory grips and appropriates what It does not understand - appropnates It 
mechanically, like a magpie stealing a silver spoon, without knowing what it is, or what to do with it. 
(Dallas, I, 213, 216) 
44 Sigmund Freud, 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' (I~96),.in~, 111,187-221 (P: 202-03). . , . 
• 5 The flfSt reason Freud gives to Fliess for hIS rejection of the seduction theory IS the continual 
disappointment in my efforts to bring a single analysis to a real conclusion ... the absence of the complete 
successes on which I had counted' (in Frevd-Fliess, p. 264). 
46 Jenny Bourne Taylor, in In the Secret Theatre 0/ Home has succeeded in emphasizing the importance 
of this book, especially in its view of the unconscious mind . 
• 7 Eneas Sweetland Dallas, The Gay Science, 2 vols (London: Chapman and Hall, 1866), I, 213. 
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Freud's work of the 1890s would project back a rather more sinister meaning to Dallas's words 
about the delayed knowledge of the child. In 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' he argued: 
Our view ~en i~ ~at inf~tile sexu~l. experienc~s are the fundamental precondition for hysteria, are, as it 
we~e, the ~ISposltlOn for I! an~ that It IS they whI~h cr~ate the hysterical symptoms, but that they do not do 
so Immediately, but remam WIthout e~ect to begm With and only exercise a pathogenic action later, when 
they have be~n aroused after puberty m the form of unconscious memories ... the memory of infantile 
sexual experIences produces ... an enormous pathogenic effect, while the actual experience itself has 
none. ('The Aetiology of Hysteria', pp. 212-213) 
However, even more significant is Dallas's view of memory as 'absolute'. That this adjective 
could be applied to memory by a thinker who saw the faculty in much the same way as it was 
portrayed in Lindner's Lehrbuch helps us understand why this early theory held such attraction 
for Freud as a basis for the mechanism of hysteria. In 1873 Carpenter wrote: 'Absolute truth, no 
man of science can ever hope to grasp; for he knows that all human search for it must be limited 
by human capacity' ('On the Psychology of Belief, p. 238). Freud, who was reported as 
describing humankind's 'longing to be able to open all secrets with a single key',48 and, indeed, 
who replaced the source of the Nile that was seduction with what he described in a letter to 
Fliess as 'the key of fantasy',49 did not seem to share Carpenter's view. In the words of his 
early colleague, Josef Breuer, Freud was 'a man given to absolute and exclusive formulations' .50 
Dallas's view of memory as like a photograph in its absolute nature is also interesting. 
Frederick Crews writes, of the false memory syndrome epidemic in the United States, in the 
1980s and 1990s: 
The early Freud must also be awarded precedence for the cluster of ideas about memory that has landed 
so many of our fellow citizens in litigation and/or prison. I refer ... to the mind's ability to take snapshots 
of extremely early scenes and reproduce them in detail several decades later. When Lenore Terr, for 
example, uncritically accepts a man's 'memory' from babyhood of his sadistic mother having totally 
submerged him in the bathtub as he was noticing 'light gray walls all around me, a foul smell in the air' 
... she may be defying what is known about brain development, but she is perfectly in key with Freud . .51 
Crews then quotes from an 1897 letter to Fliess in which Freud claims that a patient of his 
reproduced a discussion between two adults from a scene which occurred when the patient was 
eleven months old. Likening the experience to a medium, which because of its auditory nature 
48 Masson writes in the notes to an early letter from Freud to Fliess of 29 August 1888 (in Freud-FIia8, 
pp.23-26) 'I have found a previously unnoticed source in Neuefreie Presse, 6 (1904): 10' and goes on to 
describe the article by Th. Thomas, on "Magnetische Menschen" which contains this quotation &om 
Freud. Masson goes on to write, 'Since such views are not found in Freud's published writings, I assume 
that Thomas interviewed Freud' (p. 25 n.). 
49 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 16 January 1899, in Freud-Flies~, pp. 340-42 <po 340).. . 
50 First translated by and cited in a paper by Paul Cranefield, Josef Breu~ s Evaluation ~f H.IS 
Contribution to Psycho-Analysis', The International Journal of Psycht;1na/ysu 39, 319-~2; Cited m 
Frank J. Sulloway, Freud. Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the PsychoanalytIC Legend (Cambndge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 85. 
51 Frederick Crews, et aI., The Memory Wars: Freud's Legacy in Dispute (London: Granta Books, 1997). 
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is actually more faithful in its recording than a photograph, Freud writes, 'it is as though it 
comes from a phonograph' (Cited in Crews, et. aI., p. 212). Crews continues: 
Given that Freud here accepts a 'phonographic' memory of an adult conversation recorded when the 
patient was presumably still struggling to say 'mama,' this passage must rank among his most credulous 
ever. Yet the claim being made is scarcely more inane than any number of others from the same epoch. (Crews, et. ai., p. 212) 
We now realize that there are limitations to the amount of impartial truth that a photograph, a 
young, seemingly infallible medium at the time Dallas was writing,S2 can capture. Susan Sontag 
uses an interesting metaphor to describe it: 'A photograph is not only an image (as a painting is 
an image), an interpretation of the real; it is also a trace, something directly stencilled off the 
real, like a footprint' (Sontag, p. 154). A footprint, as we have seen from Rosanna Spearman's, 
in The Moonstone, is a perishable, vulnerable trace, anything but indelible. Just as the 
photograph has fallen out of favour as an absolute record, so the stories which found such wide 
circulation to prove the marvels of infallible memory were seen as limited and simplistic as the 
nineteenth century wore on. Dallas uses Coleridge's well-known story of the German servant-
girl who recites biblical languages as a demonstration that memory is 'absolute as a photograph' 
(Dallas, pp. 2l3-15). This anecdote is perhaps the sort of 'inane' account that Crews refers to in 
the above passage. Freud therefore, by providing similar stories, which spring from the same 
principle, that a memory, created without knowledge of its meaning, cannot be destroyed, and 
may surface pristine, years later, is simply continuing to provide illustrative support to the 
principles of a popular school of nineteenth-century thought. 
Dallas writes of the German servant girl that 'whole sheets of her ravings were written 
out, and were found to consist of sentences intelligible in themselves but having slight 
connection with each other' (Dallas, p. 214). The Moonstone would contain its own more 
complex alternative to this story in the delirium of Mr. Candy, during which Ezra Jennings sat 
by his bedside and transcribed his seemingly unconnected words. I will now discuss certain 
parallels which arise between this episode in The Moonstone and Freud's attempts in the 1890s 
to reconstruct his patient's 'experiences', to suggest that Collins had a rather more sophisticated 
insight into memory and testimony than is evident in Freud's work at this time. Freud actually 
started at a disadvantage to Jennings; in his letter to Fliess which tells of his relinquishment of 
the seduction theory, he confesses that 'the secret of childhood experiences is not disclosed even 
in the most confused delirium' of his patients (Freud-Fliess, p. 265), suggesting that his 
patients, in contrast to Mr Candy, actually had no scene to remember. Before his realization of 
this, however, Freud described his technique, in 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' , thus: 
It is exactly like putting together a child's picture-puzzle: after many attempts, we become absolutely 
E· 212. 
2 According to Susan Sontag, the photograph was first patented in 1841 (Susan Sontag, On Photography 
(London: Penguin, 1979), p. 8S). 
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certain in ~he end whi~h ~iece belongs in the empty ~ap; for only that one piece fills out the picture and at 
the same tIme allows Its Irregular edges to be fitted mto the edges of the other pieces in such a manner as 
to leave no free space and to entail no overlapping. In the same way, the contents of the infantile scenes 
~m ~ut to be in~ispensable supplements to the associative and logical framework of the neurosis, whose 
msertlon makes Its course of development for the first time evident, or even as we might often say self-
evident. ('The Aetiology of Hysteria', p. 205) , , 
The metaphor that Freud uses here, and his technique, are similar to Jennings's method of 
gleaning Mr Candy's lost recollection 'without the necessity of appealing to Mr Candy himself 
(The Moonstone, p. 420). Jennings tells Franklin: 
. 'At odds and ends of time ... I reproduced my shorthand notes in the ordinary form of writing _ 
leavmg large spaces between the broken phrases, and even the single words, as they had fallen 
disconnectedly from Mr Candy's lips. I then treated the result thus obtained, on something like the 
principle which one adopts in putting together a child's 'puzzle'. It is all confusion to begin with; but it 
may be all brought into order and shape, if you can only fmd the right way. Acting on this plan, I filled in 
each blank space on the paper, with what the words or phrases on either side of it suggested to me as the 
speaker's meaning; altering over and over again, until my additions followed naturally on the spoken 
words which came before them, and fitted naturally into the spoken words which came after them. The 
result was, that I not only occupied in this way many vacant and anxious hours, but that ] arrived at 
something which was (as it seemed to me) a confirmation of the theory that] held' (The Moonstone, pp. 
423-24). 
This technique, which, according to Franklin, wove a 'smooth and finished texture out of the 
ravelled skein' (p. 438) of Candy's delirious ramblings, is self-confessedly putting words into 
the doctor's mouth. Jennings tells Franklin, 'don't suppose ... that I claim to have reproduced 
the expressions which Mr Candy himself would have used if he had been capable of speaking 
connectedly' (p. 437), whereas Freud speaks of becoming 'absolutely certain ... which piece 
belongs in the empty gap'. The attitude of the doctor's assistant to this process, which, as I have 
earlier discussed, represents the marking of his own footprint, his own narrative preferences 
onto Candy's story, a distortion of which Jennings is well aware, is in stark contrast to Freud's 
approach to the 'reproduction' of scenes in his patients. We have already encountered Albert D. 
Hutter's comment, that 'psychoanalysis ... attempts to shape a personal history into its most 
complete and most convincing form' (Hutter, p. 200). This is a description of the constant push 
in Freud's therapeutic legacy also to weave a 'smooth and fmished texture out of the ravelled 
skein'; however, there is a sense with psychoanalysis that, simply because it is possible to create 
a feasible texture, because the last piece of the child's puzzle fits, that it obviously bears the 
deep truth which has been sought, despite, even because of, any reservations on behalf of the 
patient. For the scenes of which Freud went in search within the eighteen patients he was 
treating in 1896, not only fitted into their personal case histories, they contributed towards his 
great theory, his caput Nili, which Freud believed would bring him 'eternal fame' .53 Whereas 
Jennings, who, contrastingly, wanted to die 'nameless' and 'unknown' (The Moonstone, p. 516) 
listened to all of Candy's ramblings, spending hours writing them down and piecing them 
53 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 21 September 1897, in Freud-Fliess, pp. 264-67 (p. 266). 
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together so as to arrive at 'something which was (as it seemed to me) a confirmation of the 
theory that I held' (p. 424), Freud writes in 1896, 'if the memory which we have uncovered does 
not answer our expectations, it may be that we ought to pursue the same path a little further' to 
the memory of a second traumatic scene 'which satisfies our requirements better' ('The 
Aetiology of Hysteria', p. 195). Freud's hunt took to an extreme Jennings's search for Candy's 
lost recollection 'without the necessity of appealing to Mr Candy himself'. He wrote of his 
technique: 
~efore they come for analysis the patient~ know nothing about these scenes. They are indignant as a rule 
If we warn them that such scenes are gomg to emerge. Only the strongest compulsion of the treatment 
can ~duce them to. embark on a reproduction of them. While they are recaIling these infantile 
experIences to conscIOusness, they suffer under the most violent sensations, of which they are ashamed 
and which they try to conceal; and, even after they have gone through them once more in such a 
convincing manner, they still attempt to withhold belief from them, by emphasizing the fact that, unlike 
what happens in the case of other forgotten material, they have no feeling of remembering the scenes. 
('The Aetiology of Hysteria' ,p. 204) 
There is a profound sense in which Freud is disinclined to listen to his patients, imposing 
his own narrative on their stories in what seems like an excessive caricature of Franklin's 
overlaying of Rosanna's memories with his own, more authoritative version of the events of her 
life. In a letter to Fliess of 1897, Freud wrote of a particular case, in which a woman's oral 
eczema and the feeling of having a full mouth led him to the solution that seemed to him to fit 
most comfortably, with her symptoms, but most importantly with his cherished theory, that she 
had been forced into scenes of fellatio with her father: 
When I thrust the explanation at her, she was at fIrst won over; then she committed the folly of 
questioning the old man himself, who at the very fIrst intimation exclaimed indignantly, 'Are you 
implying that I was the one?' and swore a holy oath to his innocence. 
She is now in the throes of the most vehement resistance, claims to believe him, but attests to her 
identification with him by having become dishonest and swearing false oaths. I have threatened to send 
her away and in the process convinced myself that she has already gained a good deal of certainty which 
she is reluctant to acknowledge. 
She has never felt as well as on the day when I made the disclosure to her. In order to facilitate 
the work, I am hoping she will feel miserable again.S4 
It may be useful to recall Cobbe's insight here, that, 'we begin by saying: "It might have 
happened so and so," till having realized in fancy the hypothetical case more vividly than we 
remember the real one, we suddenly and unconsciously substitute the fancy for the fact' 
(,Fallacies of Memory', p. 106); in Freud's 1890s cases it seems that he is the one that says 'it 
might have happened so and so' until his patients take on his belief and reproduce scenes, with 
the accompanying feelings, as he describes in his paper of 1896.55 In the above case, however, 
S4 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm FUess, 3 January 1897, in Freud-Fliess, pp. 219-21 (pp. 220-21). . 
55 Malcolm Macmillan's Freud EvalWlted: The Completed A.rc (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1991) IS a 
valuable work which subjects Freud's work to modem psychological scrutiny by considering it in the 
light of recent psychological experiments and trials. Macmillan writes of Freud's claim, in his 1896 
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it seems that Freud does not even get this far. It is an interesting example; because it is a private 
letter, which he never expected to be published, Freud is displaying particularly clearly the bare 
bones of his therapeutic methods and aims. In his hope that his patient will 'feel miserable 
again' Freud shows his complete willingness to sacrifice her feelings and preferences to his 
larger plan.
56 
In fact his narrative here has overlaid the memories of not one but two people, the 
father and the daughter, with whose own lives the allegations that he 'thrust' upon them most 
certainly did not fit. In the battle for narrative authority, however, it is Freud who is the 
professional, the expert, and, in contrast to Jennings's self-deprecation, which is content with an 
unassuming role, he fully engages with his own status and its possibilities of power. In the 
opening to 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' he likens himself to another type of expert, an 
archaeologist, in a metaphor that bears an interesting parallel to an illustration that Cobbe uses: 
Imag~e tha~ an expl~rer arrives in a little-known region where his interest is aroused by an 
expanse of rums, WIth remams of walls, fragments of columns, and tablets with half-effaced and 
unreadable inscriptions ... Together with [the inhabitants] he may start upon the ruins, clear away the 
rubbish, and, beginning from the visible remains, uncover what is buried. If his work is crowned with 
success, the discoveries are self-explanatory: the ruined walls are part of the ramparts of a palace or a 
treasure-house; the fragments of columns can be filled out into a temple; the numerous inscriptions, 
which, by good luck, may be bilingual, reveal an alphabet and a language, and, when they have been 
deciphered and translated, yield undreamed-of infonnation about the events of the remote past, to 
commemorate which the monuments were built. Saxa loquuntur! ('The Aetiology of Hysteria, p. 192)" 
Cobbe, in 1867, wrote of the dangers of this sort of reconstruction: 
We can never witness any transaction without making some theory of the motives, sentiments, and 
purposes of the agents; and, in telling the history thereof, we inevitably work out this theory in our 
description. Sketching on one occasion in the great temple at Baalbec, it occurred to the writer, in 
striving to give some idea of the splendid ruin, to endeavour to derme where a certain arch had once 
extended. Every stone of the arch had fallen; only the marks on the walls revealed where it had been, and 
these marks, copied in a poor, hasty sketch, would have utterly failed to convey any impression of the 
fact. Quite unconsciously, a stone or two (fallen, doubtless, a thousand years ago) were replaced in the 
sketch; just enough, and no more, to convey the desired idea of the original arch. Then came the 
reflection, 'Here is precisely what we do every day in our stories. We just add a stone, just darken a 
shadow, just double a line, to show what we very honestly believe to be true!' How large might be the 
paper, and also in Studies on Hysteria (1895), that he could not influence the recollections of his patients, 
that 'he seems not to have thought indirect, unconscious suggestive influences might be important' (p. 
211). He goes on to discuss some modem studies that investigate the influence of the thoughts and 
expectations of a figure of authority on someone in a position of less power. He writes, 'once subjects 
learn what is being demanded of them, their "recollections" adapt accordingly' (p. 218). This should 
especially be the case if Freud, as he claimed to do in his 1896 paper, warned the patient in advance of 
what he expected to emerge ('The Aetiology of Hysteria', p. 204). Indeed, in Studies on Hysteria he 
writes 'we need not be afraid ... of telling the patient what we think his next connection of thought is 
going to be. It will do no harm' (SE, II, 295). Macmillan's conclusion is precisely that this practice will 
do harm, and warp what the patient offers the therapist. 
56 We see another example of Freud's profound unwillingness to listen to his patients for the sake of the 
promotion of his theories in Studies on Hysteria: 'Some time ago I was asked to relieve an elderly lady of 
her attacks of anxiety ... Her anxiety attacks, which were of a hysterical character, went bKk to her early 
girlhood and, according to her, originated from the use of a preparation of iodine intended to reduce a 
moderate swelling of her thyroid gland. I naturally rejected this derivation and tried to fmd another 
instead of it which would harmonize better with my views on the aetiology of the neuroses' (Studia on 
!p:steria, pp. 273-74). 
S 'Stones talk!' ('The Aetiology of Hysteria', p. 192 D.). 
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falsehoods thus originat~d, how soon our theory would take in our memories the place of fact, there is no 
need to tell. ('The Fallacies of Memory', p. 107) 
The fact is that Freud suggested scenes that he 'very honestly believe[d] to be true', because 
they fitted in with what he conceived as his momentous universal theory. We see from the 1897 
case of father and daughter, described in a private letter, that the reality of his therapeutic 
method was subtly different from that he claimed to use in his 1896, very public, paper, in 
which, answering the possible objection that the doctor 'influences [the patient] by suggestion to 
imagine and reproduce' scenes, he claimed, 'I have never yet succeeded in forcing on a patient a 
scene I was expecting to find, in such a way that he seemed to be living through it with all the 
appropriate feelings' ('The Aetiology of Hysteria', pp. 204-05). In the letter, however, we see 
that not only did he force the scene upon the patient, but that even though she showed no 
reported signs of reliving it (unless the phrase 'won over', which surely suggests a conscious 
consent, refers to a reproduction) he was still convinced of its reality. As with Cobbe's own 
trust-based but inaccurate sketching behaviour, Freud was (in his own words, concerning the 
fact that he had found a sexual connection in only the eighteen cases he had examined so far), 
'prepared to let my belief of the 'universal validity of the sexual aetiology' 'run ahead of the 
evidential force of the observations I have so far made' ('The Aetiology of Hysteria', p. 200). 
These words hold a deeper truth than first appears. Freud writes: 
The singling out of the sexual factor in the aetiology of hysteria springs at least from no preconceived 
opinion on my part ... Only the most laborious and detailed investigations have converted me, and that 
slowly enough, to the view I hold to-day. If you submit my assertion that the aetiology of hysteria lies in 
sexual life to the strictest examination, you will fmd that it is supported by the fact that in some eighteen 
cases of hysteria I have been able to discover this connection in every single symptom, and, where the 
circumstances allowed, to confIrm it by therapeutic success. (p. 199) 
By the time he wrote his letter of September 1897, however, he had still failed, despite the 
weight of proof he lays on these cases, 'to bring a single analysis to a real conclusion' (Freud-
Fliess, p. 264). In an extremely comprehensive paper which tests the claims that Freud made in 
his 1896 paper against his contrasting narratives in his letters to Fliess and his later differing 
accounts of this time, Hans Israels and Morton Schatzman write that, in contrast to two of 
Freud's early case history narratives, in which in claiming success he was 'lying','· in the case 
of this premature filling-in of lines in 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' his distorting of the truth was 
due, despite Freud's protestations to the contrary, to a 'preconceived opinion on [his] part': 
S. The two cases were Anna 0., and Ernst Fleischl. 'When in the eighties Freud had presented cocaine as 
a medicine against morphine addiction, he had always declared that he knew a case ~here that therapy 
had been a success. Yet he had known perfectly well that the case (Ernst Flelschl) had been a 
catastrophe. With Anna O. Freud alleged that her treatment ended with a ~erapeutic success, alt~ough 
Freud knew that in reality the treatment had come to an end because the patient had had to be put mto a 
mental asylum.' (Hans Israels and Morton Schatzman, 'The Seduction Theory', History 0/ Psychiatry. 4 
(1993).23-59 (p. 54.» 
175 
Here, with the seduction theory, it was not so much a matter of lying but more we su f b . f' . " ppose, 0 oastmg, 
o announcmg a result as already havmg been reached which he hoped to reach soon J ] 896 F d 
fmnly believed in the truth of the seduction theory, so fIrmly that he was sure of Soon re~ch: th re~ts 
that the theory predicted, and thus believed it was safe and legitimate to announce these r~s~lts e(~::els 
and Schatzman, p. 54). 
In contrast to Jeffrey Masson, who believed that Freud gave up the seduction theory because of 
the unpopularity it caused him, and Ernest Jones, who said that his inability to find these scenes 
in his own self-analysis caused Freud to abandon his doctrine, 59 Israels and Schatzman argue 
that it was the lack of even one complete therapeutic success that caused Freud to give up his 
beloved concept. In contrast to Jennings, Freud never detected one lost recollection with his 
picture-puzzle method. 
Even if he had enjoyed a success, however, this episode in The Moonstone offers one 
last interesting perspective on the reconstructive method that Freud used. For when Franklin 
suggests that Jennings's narrative can be used to clear his name, Jennings answers that it is 
'quite useless' as evidence (The Moonstone, p. 438). For Freud to put all the burden of proof on 
his own reconstructions, even if they had been as successful as he had made out in the 1896 
paper, was tenuous, an utter imbalance, and those that listened to 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' 
realized this; Richard von Krafft-Ebing, author of Psychopathia Sexualis (1886), was one.60 
Freud's account of the reception of his paper in a letter to Fliess, with its inflated hopes for his 
theory contrasted with his peers' judgement of it, shows this imbalance: 
A lecture on the etiology of hysteria at the psychiatric society was given an icy reception by the asses and 
a strange evaluation by Kraffi-Ebing: 'It sounds like a scientific fairy tale.' And this, after one has 
demonstrated to them the solution of a more-than-thousand-year-old problem, a caput Nili! They can go 
to hell, euphemistically expressed.61 
Krafft-Ebing's evaluation was anything but strange: it captured the lack of substance, of 
evidence, indeed (despite Freud's words), of demonstration, in Freud's paper, which 
concentrated only on what was feasible, what could fit. Whereas Jennings realized the entirely 
abstract nature of his reconstructed narrative, that it is good for nothing but providing a 
background to the real business, the experiment (The Moonstone, p. 438), Freud cannot 
comprehend that his abstractions, though they add up to a smooth and finished texture, fail to 
add up to a solution. His peers did not display the same blindness and saw sharply through his 
theory. 
59 See Jeffi'ey Masson, Freud, The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression 01 the Seduction Theory 
(London: Faber, 1984); especially Chapter 4, 'Freud's Renunciation of the Theory of Seducti~', in 
which he writes 'Freud suffered emotional and intellectual isolation as long as he held to the reabty of 
seduction ... The medical community was offended by Freud ... As long as he held to the seduction 
theory, Freud was alone' (pp. 134, 136). Ernest Jones is cited by Israels and Scha~an as writing of~~ 
abandonment of the theory, 'it is very possible that the decisive factor had been hiS own self-analysIS 
Osraels and Schatzman, p. S2). 
iO Krafft-Ebing, was, according to Frank Sulloway, 'on good professional terms' with Freud - 'Freud 
regularly received autographed copies ofKrafft-Ehing's major works' (Sulloway, p. 296). 
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Leopold Lowenfeld, an influential Gennan psychologist, who corresponded with Freud, 
and to whose books Freud contributed, was another whose remarks at this time are interesting. 
He writes of the passage in Freud's 1896 paper in which Freud claims that his patients, though 
remembering nothing before or after their re-enactment of their scenes of seduction, had 
certainly experienced them: 
These remarks show two things: 1. ?te pati:nts were subje~ted to a suggestive influence coming from the 
pers~n ,":ho analysed them, by. whIch the nse of the mentIoned scenes was brought quite close to their 
Ima~matIOn. 2: !hese fantasy pictures that had arisen under the influence of the analysis were definitively 
demed recogmtIOn as memones of real events. I also have a direct experience to support this second 
concIusi?n. By chanc:, one of the pa~ients wi~ whom Freud used the analytic method came under my 
observatIon. The patIent told me With certamty that the infantile sexual scene which analysis had 
apparently uncovered was pure fantasy and had never really happened to him. It is difficult to understand 
how a researcher like Freud, who normally is very critical, despite such remarks, still could maintain 
toward his patients that the pictures that arose in their minds were memories of real events. However it is 
. . , 
even stIlI more difficult to understand that Freud thought that he could consider this assumption to be 
completely proven in each single case ofhysteria.62 
It is interesting that Lowenfeld sees this episode as rather out-of-character for Freud; my 
suggestion is that it was simply the expression of a side of his nature that was usually invisible 
to the public and that he allowed to influence his scientific thinking, in the same way as 
Carpenter had described in his writings on prepossession. Carpenter's 1876 essay 'Fallacies of 
Testimony in relation to the Supernatural', which I have discussed above in relation to the 
authenticity of the reconstruction of the loss of the diamond in The Moonstone, manages to shed 
a light where Lowenfeld is at a loss for an explanation. Surely, Freud's behaviour, which I have 
detailed, of seeing what is not there, claiming success he has not had, is due to what Carpenter 
calls 'mental expectancy, a most fertile source of self-deception' (,Fallacies of Testimony', p. 
244); where his patients reacted to the explanations of their symptoms that Freud, in his own 
words, 'thrust' upon them, he took agreement or disagreement as unequivocal proof that he was 
correct. Carpenter would have believed that this was due to 'the influence of prepossessions on 
those interpretations of our sensational experiences, which we are prone to substitute for the 
statement of the experiences themselves'. Although this is a paper whose ultimate conclusion 
concerns supernatural phenomena, Carpenter then writes, 'of such misinterpretations, the 
records of science are full; the tendency is one which besets every observer, and to which the 
most conscientious have frequently yielded' (,Fallacies of Testimony', pp. 247-48). Freud, 
usually conscientious, according to Lowenfeld, most visibly yielded to his prepossessions at this 
time. 
It is in the long-buried letter to Wilhelm Fliess of 21 September 1897, that we truly see 
what was behind Freud's adamant claims, his irresponsible treatment of patients, and indeed, the 
seeds of his recovery from this episode. We see how much in Freud's personal life was directly 
61 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 26 April 1896, in Frevd-F/iess, pp. 183-185 (p. 184). 
62 Lowenfeld, Sexual/eben und Ne";'enleiden (Sexual Life and Nervous Disease), 2- edn (1899), cited in 
Israels and Schatzmann, pp. 43-44. 
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dependent on the success and acceptance of the seduction theory: 
The expectation of eternal fame was so beautiful, as was that of certain wealth cit . d d 
I d I·ft· th . , omp e e m epen ence trave S, an 1 mg e chIldren abo~e the severe worries that robbed me of my youth. Evef)'thin~ 
depended upon whether or not hystena would come out right A Il'ttle story from II' 
, .. . my co ectlon occurs 
to me: Rebecca, take off your gown, you are no longer a bride.' (Freud-Fliess, p. 266) 
Behind Freud's words in his 1896 paper, his willingness 'to let my belief run ahead of the 
evidential force of the observations I have so far made' ('The Aetiology of Hysteria', p. 200), 
his insistence on the continuance of therapy until a scene is found 'which satisfies our 
requirements' (p. 195), lies this vast ambition, expressed here in private, which bore public 
symptoms that caused such wonder and incredulity in his peers. We have seen in Collins's The 
Moonstone how small ambitions, the 'yearning ... for a little human sympathy', in Jennings's 
case (p. 448), the need to be reunited with a loved-one, become a 'bride[groom]' in fact, in 
Franklin's, blur and problematize the reconstruction of a scene; in Freud's seduction theory of 
the 1890s we see these dynamics played out on a much larger, and potentially more damaging, 
scale. 
In fact Freud's prepossessions never changed; this was not the end of his ambition, 
despite his comment to Fliess in September 1897 that 'now I can once again remain quiet and 
modest, go on worrying and saving' (Freud-Fliess, p. 266). Within eighteen months, Freud had 
found another key, 'the key of fantasy'. According to this doctrine, what his patients 
remembered were their own previously repressed infantile fantasies, which, in connection with 
present, unsettling sexual experiences in puberty, caused shame, a remembering in the form of 
the generation of symptoms. This was not so far from the seduction theory, and we see its early 
stages in the September letter to Fliess. Freud considers it as an addendum to the words that I 
have already identified as having had resonance in the insights of Carpenter and Cobbe decades 
earlier, that fantasies or dreams can gain a mental reality which means that we can take them in 
memory for real incidents. Freud writes, then, that the third reason that he has relinquished his 
theory is 'the certain insight that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that 
one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect'. He then 
continues, 'Accordingly, there would remain the solution that the sexual fantasy invariably 
seizes upon the theme of the parents' (Freud-Fliess, pp. 264-65). A month after he wrote this 
letter, Freud wrote to Fliess of his theoretical progress, 'there is a comfortable feeling ... that 
one has only to reach into one's storerooms to take out what is needed at a particular time' ,63 
and it is clear that this new theory was, indeed, waiting, in the terms of Carpenter's 1873 
metaphor, fitting perfectly into one of Freud's already existing mental recesses, in readiness to 
be seized upon. The new key of fantasy became the basis for Freud's later theory of infantile 
sexuality, and the Oedipus complex, and, in contrast to Cobbe and Carpenter's doctrine, it is no 
63 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 31 October 1897, in Freud-Fliess, pp. 275-76 (p. 276). 
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less absolute a view than that which dictates that all that we experience can later be reproduced 
in perfect form and detail. For now Freud simply added fantasy to the memories that could be 
later reproduced in this way; there is no distinction drawn between fantasy and reality, therefore 
all mental activity became potentially reconstructible. Towards the end of his career, Freud 
claimed that the subject of 'preservation in the sphere of the mind ... has hardly been studied as 
yet'. This assertion, however, is immediately belied by the words that follow, for they closely 
echo Carpenter of 1853, Henry Maudsley, even Freud's own school text-books: 
We have been inclined to take the ... view, that in mental life nothing which has once been formed can 
perish - that everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances (when for instance 
regression goes back far enough) it can once more be brought to light.64 " 
Freud follows this with a discussion in which he concedes that, under certain circumstances, 
such as when brain tissue becomes damaged, past impressions could in theory be effaced, but 
concludes, 'it is possible, but we know nothing about it. We can only hold fast to the fact that it 
is rather the rule than the exception for the past to be preserved in mental life' (Civilization and 
its Discontents, p. 72). By now this 'past' included past fantasies; this is the only difference 
between Freud's late view of memory and his earlier, mistaken one of the 1890s. In 1914 Freud 
wrote of his reaction to the realization that the seduction theory was not feasible, that to him it 
seemed that 'the firm ground of reality was gone' ('On the History', p. 17); instead of replacing 
this ground, as Cobbe and Carpenter did, with a shifting, changing, evolving one, Freud, a man 
'given to absolute and exclusive formulations' had simply moved to an alternative finn ground 
of his own construction, which, rooted in his deterministic outlook, dictated that all mental 
experience was rea1.6S As he wrote in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), the text which was 
created on this foundation, 'the unconscious is the true psychical reality,.66 
Where testimony fits into this newall-encompassing truth is another consideration, 
however. In the remaining pages of this chapter I will consider Freud as a witness to his own 
work, in his remembrance and reporting of the seduction theory episode, in three separate 
accounts, of 1914, 1925 and 1933. According to Israels and Schatzman, it took a long time for 
Freud to admit publicly that he had been mistaken. Of his private confession to Fliess of 
September 1897, in which he wrote 'of course I shall not tell it in Dan, nor speak of it in 
Askelon, in the land of the Philistines' (Freud-Fliess, p. 265), they write: 
Freud could not say aloud that he had given up his seduction theory because this would mean admitting 
that he had boasted of successes he had not had. Instead, Freud kept silent for eight years. In 1905 he let 
his readers [of Three Essays on Sexuality] believe that he now had revised his theory somewhat, while 
64 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930), in SE, XXI, 56-!45 (p. 69).. . 
65 This new theory also had the benefit, unlike the seduction theory, ofbemg almost lDlposslble to prove 
wrong; Freud's suggestions that, with regard to a patient's early fan~i~, 'it might have h~ppen~ so and 
so' would become, as soon as they were absorbed by the patient s mmd, a mental reahty, difficult to 
distinguish from what he or she really thought or experienced in childhood. 
66 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation o/Dreams (1900). in SE. IV & V. ix-629 (p. 613). 
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only in 1914 did he start to write publicly that the theory had been a maior m· tak (I I d 
Schatzman, p. 55) ~ IS e. sra! s an 
In these public admissions, however, there is a definite distortion of the truth, and this is easily 
discernible if we set them against the claims Freud makes in his 1896 essay, in which he had 
written: 
~efore they come for analysis the patient~ know nothing about these scenes. They are indignant as a rule 
If w~ warn them that such scenes are gomg to emerge. Only the strongest compulsion of the treatment 
can m~uce them to ~m~ark on a reproduct~on of them ... even after they have gone through them once 
more m such ? convmcmg manne~, they still attempt to withhold belief from them, by emphasizing the 
fact that, . unlike what happens m the case of other forgotten material, they have no feeling of 
remembermg the scenes. ('The Aetiology of Hysteria', p. 204) 
From 1896 to 1914 it seems as if the processes of prepossession have been at work in Freud's 
memory, reflecting Carpenter's words that, 'to few persons of experience in life has it not 
happened to find their distinct impressions of past events in striking disaccordance with some 
contemporary narrative, as perhaps given in a letter of their own' (,Fanacies of Testimony', 
253).67 In fact, Freud's account in 'On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement' of 1914 
does contrast starkly with the letter of January 1897, which I have discussed, in which he 'thrust 
the explanation' of infantile sexual seduction at one of his patients, who was, initially, 'won 
over': 
Influenced by Charcot's view of the traumatic origin of hysteria, one was readily inclined to accept as 
true and aetiologically significant the statements made by patients in which they ascribed their symptoms 
to passive sexual experiences in the first years of childhood - to put it bluntly, to seduction. When this 
aetiology broke down under the weight of its own improbability and contradiction in defmitely 
ascertainable circumstances, the result at fITst was helpless bewilderment. Analysis had led back to these 
infantile sexual traumas by the right path, and yet they were not true. ('On the History', p. 17) 
Freud gives the impression here of being a passive agent - influenced by Charcot (who is 
mentioned in the 1896 paper as arguing that 'heredity alone' is the 'true cause of hysteria' 
(,Aetiology of Hysteria', 191), the innocent duped by his patients and then left bewildered. 
The onus on the patient in this sorry tale would continue to characterize Freud's accounts of this 
time in his career, strengthening, if anything, as the years passed, as 'statements' become 
'stories'. In 1925 his account of the affair ran thus: 
Under the influence of the technical procedure which 1 used at that time, the majority of my patients 
reproduced from their childhood scenes in which they were sexu~y seduced ~y some grown~up person. 
With female patients the part of seducer was almost always asSigned to theIT father. I beheved these 
67 Cobbe describes a similar scenario: 'Let us suppose that we have narrated some little incid~t at an 
interval of half a dozen years, and, at the end of that period, we chance to look at an old letter ~r Jo~al. 
written on the very day or two after the event occurred. Did it ever happen to us to do thl.S wl~t 
something very like a blush, and the exclamation "Good Heaven! how much I have been mistaken m 
telling that storyl"?' (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 100). 
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stories, and consequently supposed that I had discovered the roots of the subsequent "th 
' f I d ' , , neurosIs In ese 
expenences 0 sexua se uctlOn m chIldhood ", If the reader feels inclined to shake h' h d t d I· I I th bl ' IS ea a my cre u Ity, cannot a toge er arne hun; though I may plead that this was at a t'm h I 
' . II k' ,. I Co lew en was mt~ntlOna y eepmg my cntIca, .lacu~ty in abeyance so as to preserve an unprejudiced and receptive 
attitude towards the many novelties which were coming to my notice every day, When howev I t I bl ' d . th th ' er. was a ast 0 Ige to recognIZe at ese scenes of seduction had never taken place and that they I 
h . h' h . , were on y ~ antasles w IC my patIents had made up or which I myself had perhaps forced on them, I was for some 
tune completely at a loss.68 
This is a particularly interesting account, because at the end of it there breaks through something 
of the truth, after the initial standard story which we have seen in 1914, is recounted, slightly 
embellished. It is withdrawn quite swiftly, 'I do not believe even now that I forced the 
seduction-phantasies on my patients, that I "suggested" them' (p, 34); however, its appearance 
is intriguing because it highlights the contradictory feel that the actual presence of the truth 
gives to this paragraph. It jars with the untrustworthy patient narrative, to which Freud has 
obviously warmed. This retelling of the 1914 version reflects Cobbe's work on memory, in 
particular her view of the faculty as remembering 'not the things themselves, but the first 
recollection of them, and then the second and the third, always the latest recollection of them', 
and that with each remembering 'each fresh trace varies a little from the trace beneath, 
sometimes magnifying and beautifying it ,.. sometimes distorting it through passion or 
prejudice' (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 104). Freud's credulity is augmented, but in favour of an 
unprejudiced view (Charcot has fallen from the picture); the main change, however, also noted 
by Israels and Schatzman, is the introduction of the father as the main culprit of seduction, 
whereas in 1896 it was: 
(l) adults who did not know the child; (2) adults who took care of the child, and (3) other children. In 
the second category Freud had mentioned governesses, nursery maids, tutors, and - as a last possibility _ 
'unhappily all too often, a close relative'. 'A close relative' can be a father, but Freud had not specifically 
mentioned fathers. (Isra~ls and Schatzman, pp. 46-47) 
In the 1914 account, however, we can see where the father has sprung from, and that his 
appearance in 1925 was a natural progression of the previous version. Freud, having described 
his bewilderment at having been led up the wrong path by his patients, writes: 
At last came the reflection that, after all, one had no right to despair because one has been. deceived in 
one's expectations; one must revise those expectations. If hyS!erical.subjects trace back theIr sympto~s 
to traumas that are fictitious, then the new fact which emerges IS precISely th~t they ~ate suc~ scenes m 
phantasy and this psychical reality requires to be taken into account alongside practIcal reality ... And 
now, fro~ behind the phantasies, the whole range ofa child's sexual life came to light. ('On the History', 
pp. 17-18) 
Again the onus is on the patient - the fantasy theory triumphandy sprang from Freud's 
consideration of the wreck of his analyses, from his sensible assessment of what he actually had 
" Sigmund Freud, • An Autobiographical Study' (1925), in SE, XX, 1-74 (pp. 33-34). 
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been told. Central to Freud's fantasy theory, however, was the Oedipus complex. In 1925, 
then, as his narrative had developed so far as to include the evolution from the seduction theory 
of the doctrine of infantile sexual fantasy, the logical step occurred, which was to cast the father 
as seducer in these women's stories. In 1933, Freud actually included the seduction theory story 
in the midst of a discussion about female fantasies: 
You will recall an interesting episode in the history of analytic research which caused m 
d· . h In th . d . . e many Istressmg ours. e peno ~ whIch the main interest was directed to discovering infantile sexual 
traumas, ~lm?st all my women patIents told me that they had been seduced by their father. I was driven 
to recognIze m the end that these reports were untrue and so came to understand that hysterical symptoms 
~e d~rived from phanta~ies and not from real occurrences. It was only later that I was able to recognize 
m thiS rshantasy of bemg seduced by the father the expression of the typical Oedipus complex in 
women. 9 
Freud's changing testimony, 'gradually but unconsciously modified by the habitual 
course of thought and feeling' so that the final result is 'not the actual occurrence, but the 
modified trace of it' (Mental Physiology, p. 456), altering so as to fit comfortably with his 
changing mental landscape, provides a strong illustration of the theories of Francis Power 
Cobbe, which found metaphorical expression in The Moonstone, and William Carpenter, whose 
work was a natural progression of Cobbe's views. It acts as a demonstration of Cobbe's final 
conclusion, that 'to know that what we deem we recall so vividly is but a poor shifting reflex -
hardly of the thing itself, only of our earlier remembrance of the thing - this is sad and 
mournful', but 'almost more terrible' is the corresponding realization of 'the fallaciousness of 
the great traditions of History' (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 111). Freud's 'latest recollection[s], 
(p. 104) of the events of the seduction theory were, and are, often taken for its true history. 
Israels and Schatzman believe that 'many people have got a general idea - either directly or 
indirectly - of what the seduction theory actually is from two Freud texts: the ... passage of 
1914, and [the] passage in Freud's Autobiographical Study of 1925' Osraels and Schatzman, p. 
45). Richard Webster writes that 'Freud's fictional version of events has been accepted 
unquestioningly by countless Freud scholars' (Webster, p. 211), and that there were damaging 
results that had arisen from this 'distorted account of the seduction theory'. 'For it is 
undeniably the case that Freud's repudiation of his seduction theory has repeatedly led to real 
instances of sexual abuse being overlooked or denied by psychoanalysts intent on treating 
memories as fantasies' (p. 212). The reaction to this dismissal of memory of real events as 
Oedipal fantasy has been correspondingly damaging: 'This massive denial of the experience of 
women and children who genuinely had been victims of sexual abuse provided the essential 
conditions without which the recovered memory movement could never have grown and 
flourished in the way that it did.' (p. 512) Two important figures in this movement, Judith 
Hennan and Jeffi'ey Masson, argue their case based on Freud's later version of events, '[they] 
69 Sigmund Freud, 'Lecture XXXIII: Femininity' (1933), in SE, xxa I 12-13S (p. 120). 
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imply that Freud's early patients - those he discusses in his pape "Th A t' I f H o. 
r e e 10 ogy 0 ystena'-
came to consult him burdened with memories of incest who h th th 
IC ey en spontaneously 
disclosed'. Webster continues: 
There is no mystery about why Hennan and Masson should have as d tho b F ° 
'd h h' sume IS, ecause reud hImself 
sal t at t IS was what had happened '" It may well be that Freud had, b th to tho 
I d b '" ° Y e Ime trty years or so had e apse, come to eheve m thIS verSIon of events himself He may have 'rem b d' tho h . 
° f " . em ere IS appenmg 
But 1 thIS was Freud s memory of events then, once again, we are forced to recognise that it was a • fals~ 
memory'. (p. 516) 
Webster here, is unknowingly echoing Cobbe's work of more than a century before, and most 
notably a part of her argument that I have not yet ventured to discuss. I place it here because it 
seems to me, combined with the quite innocent, unconscious transformative processes that also 
occurred within Freud's memory, due to his preferences and prepossessions, to offer a possible 
enhancement to my existing explanation of his remembering behaviour. My suggestion here is 
no stronger than Israels and Schatzman's account of Freud's altering of two case histories to 
imply success, and I believe that they particularly shed light on Webster's argument that Freud 
may well have come to believe in his 'fictional version of events,' with the passing of time. 
Cobbe writes: 
Again, by this theory of memory, we obtain an available hypothesis, to account for the notorious 
but marvellous fact, that liars come in time to believe their own falsehoods. The warping of the original 
trace of the story, albeit voluntary and conscious, has, equally with unconscious dereliction, effected the 
end of obliterating the primary mark, and substituting a false one, which has assumed the place of a 
remembrance. (,Fallacies of Memory', p. 105) 
Webster's rather self-conscious use of the modem term 'false memory' is first used in his 
preface, where it becomes clear that his acquaintance with this concept is relatively recent. 
Describing the process of the writing of his comprehensive and detailed account of Freud and 
psychoanalysis, he writes: 
Only when my book was nearing completion did it gradually become apparent to me that for a 
number of years I had, quite inadvertently, been writing a book not only about Freud and psychoanalysis 
but also about the pre-history of a movement of whose existence I was barely aware - the recovered 
memory movement which has flourished in the United States in the last decade .. , I visited America in 
order to fmd out more about this movement and I was able to talk to a number of psychiatrists, therapists, 
psychologists and feminists about the problem of 'false memory'. (Webster, p. x) 
What I hope I have conveyed in this chapter is that 'false memory' has not simply begun to be 
understood in the last two decades, and that it did not start with Freud either, but that in fact he 
was a victim to it himself. I hope that I have shown that in fact a small group of Victorian 
thinkers deeply considered, as they tenned it, 'the fallacies of memory', with its attendant 
implications on testimony, and created elaborate metaphors by which to explain it, some of 
which seem to have been utilized and expanded by Wilkie Collins, who wrote The Moonslon~ 
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on the cusp of these new and intriguing concepts concerning the unreliability of what was often 
seen as an absolute faculty. I have tried to argue that these concepts were a product of the 
shifting mental landscape occasioned by the relatively new doctrine of evolution, and were 
portrayed as such by those early writers on false memory and testimony. Collins, as we have 
seen in the moral relativism which he advocated in Magdalen Vanstone's behaviour in No 
Name, and in his portrayal in fiction of a scale of mental health, found it difficult to imagine and 
create in terms of absolutes. In The Moonstone this philosophy extends to witnessing, 
remembering, giving testimony, within an ever-changing landscape whose consideration is 
essential to a full understanding of the novel. In The Moonstone the only possible model of the 
absolute seems to be the hard, dazzling, elusive diamond. Like the past, it can only in the end 
exist, in an unadulterated form, in its original setting, for there lies its proper meaning. It is the 
only unambiguous thing in The Moonstone/o slipping between the shifting reflexes of memory, 
and eventually sailing, like Cobbe's view of the past, from European eyes.'· 'You have lost 
sight of it in England, and ... you have lost sight of it for ever', pronounces Mr Murthwaite 
whose narrative ends the novel (p. 526). The ultimate message of The Moonstone is that there 
may be truth, there may be absolutes, but western civilization could not possess them. The 
damage caused by Freud's seduction theory and its legacy only serves to illustrate this. 
. f ertainty and ambiguity in the novel in his description of 
70 Betteredge neatly expres:es :e reelm~ ~e~~ond, so that Franklin could deliver a telegram: 'I saw 
his harnessing of a pony ~ e~ ~ ~s~ ~a1 network of mysteries and uncertainties that now surrounded 
:: r':l~e:,: am';~efio 0"';: :ow weD the. buckI~,:d: "::OC::::!::'dou~"'= 
had seen the pony backed into the sh~ of the :b-;:~  kind in our household' (The Moon.rtOM, p. 
And that, let me tell you, was becommg a trea 0 
129). . od&ey Abl bite would take the diamond to Amsterdam 10 
71 At one point .it had seemed likely ~~t2G) It is not :';:wed to get there, but instead is restored to its 
divide and sell It (11re Moonstone, p. . 
rightful place in India, beyond the clutches of Europe. 
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Chapter 4 
'The Suggestions of Experience': Motive, Mission and Inheritance 
in George Eliot's Fiction 
'Unrecognised Agents': An Introduction 
In September 1839, the young Mary Ann Evans wrote to her friend Miss Lewis 
describing her mental state at that time: 
, 
I have lately le.d so unsettl~d a life and ~ave been so desultory in my employments, that my mind, never 
of the most hIghly organIzed genus, IS more than usually chaotic, or rather it is like a stratum of 
conglomerated fragments that shews here a jaw and rib of some ponderous quadruped, there a delicate 
alto-relievo of some fernlike plant, tiny shells, and mysterious nondescripts, encrusted and united with 
some unvaried and uninteresting but useful stone. My mind presents just such an assemblage of 
disjointed specimens of history, ancient and modem, scraps of poetry picked up from Shakspeare, 
Cowper, Wordsworth, and Milton, newspaper topics, morsels of Addison and Bacon, Latin verbs, 
geometry entomology and chemistry, reviews and metaphysics, all arrested and petrified and smothered 
by the fast thickening every day accession of actual events, relative anxieties, and household cares and 
vexations. l 
This passage is a very interesting one, and worthy of discussion for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which is its illustration of the challenges posed by its author to a project such as mine. 
My thesis, which in attempting to chart prefigurations of Freudian theories and models of the 
mind in certain Victorian texts, has found an approach through what can be gleaned of the 
reading habits of the writers of these fictional works, which may reveal sources which were also 
common to Freud. In the case of George Eliot, whose letters, journals and essays clearly 
display a vast wealth of literary, philosophical and scientific reading, the challenge is not to be 
found in the gleaning; rather it is posed by the necessity of detennining which sources to 
examine out of the many that, in addition to infonning her work, may also have gone to 
contribute to the ideas embodied in psychoanalytic theory. Mary Ann Evans's self-proclaimed 
'desultory' youth, flitting through assorted subjects, developed into George Eliot's mature 
diversity of reading, which was constantly evident in her writing. Throughout her life, Eliot 
benefited from what Robert Greenberg, expressing neatly the implicit assumption of the critical 
consensus that has sought, for many years, to chart the literary, political, philosophical, 
historical, mythical and scientific sources of her fictional works, calls a 'remarkably absorptive 
I George Eliot to Maria Lewis, 4 September 1839, in The George Eliot Letle1's, ed. by Gordon S. Haigh~ 
9 vols (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954-78), I, 29-31 (p.29). Hereafter, GEL. 
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brain'.2 Evans herself gives the impression that she possesses th' ttn'b 'h ' IS a ute In er assertion that 
all she has read is still present and petrified in her 'ch t" 'd H " ao IC mm, owever, m thiS passage 
Evans also betrays her early underestimation of the t' , I ' crea Ive potentia of her readmg 
expenences, Compounding her own description, her account of the range of her reading is here 
embodied in an involved scientific metaphor which testifies to her u d tand' db' n ers mg an a sorption 
of the terms and concepts of geology, Even in her clal'm that wh t h h d" a seas rea IS In essence 
useless in its arrested and smothered state she reveals the dyn' t' r: f th 
' amlc crea Ive lorce 0 0 er 
reading that she has obviously undertaken, in her casual and playful employment of its images 
and ideas for the effective production of an involved analogy, Her choice of a geological image 
with which to illustrate her conception of her own mental processes is in itself interesting, and 
speaks, I believe, for the fundamental suggestiveness of this science to the creative mind, 
implying natural processes and occurrences that would resonate within the work of a writer who 
understood and made use of 'the infinite symbolism that belongs to all nature' ,3 
By 1839 geology was a well-established science.4 However, it had recently seen the 
publication of Charles Lyell's widely-read and influential work Principles of Geology (1830-
33). Like many of its predecessors, this book abounded with images of shells, ferns and the 
remains of various animals petrified in the earth's strata.' In its opening page, Lyell writes: 
Geology is the science which investigates the successive changes that have taken place in the 
organic and inorganic kingdoms of nature; it enquires into the causes of these changes, and the influence 
which they have exerted in modifying the surface and external structure of our planet. 
By these researches into the state of the earth and its inhabitants at former periods, we acquire a 
more perfect knowledge of its present condition ... As the present condition of nations is the result of 
many antecedent changes, some extremely remote and others recent, some gradual, others sudden and 
violent, so the state of the natural world is the result of a long succession of events, and if we would 
enlarge our experience of the present economy of nature, we must investigate the effects of her operations 
in fonner epochs. (Lyell, I, 1) 
2 Robert A. Greenberg, 'Plexuses and Ganglia: Scientific Allusion in Middlemarch', Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction, 30 (1975),33-52 (p. 33). 
3 George Eliot to Sara Sophia Hennell, 10-13 May 1858, in GEL, II, 452-56 (p. 455). Geological ideas 
were not only suggestive to Eliot; Freud spoke of the mind, early in his career, in terms of a 'stratified 
psychical structure' (Studies on Hysteria (1895), The Standard Edition 01 the Complete Psychological 
Worlcs of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by James Strachey and others, 24 vols (London: Hogarth Press 
and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953-74), II, 298-99). The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Worlcs will hereafter be referenced as SE. 
4 See Roy Porter, The Making of Geology: Earth Science in Britain /660-/8/5 (Cambridge: CUP, 1977). 
5 There are almost too many examples to mention, but see especially Chapter XV of Volume II (Charles 
Lyell, Principles of Geology, Being an Attempt to Explain the Former Changes of the Earth's Svrfacc, br 
Reference to Causes now in Operation~ 3 vols (London: John Murray, 183~33~, 0, 23.9-52, 275-76~ .. It IS 
true that Eliot here conceives of her mmd as one stratum; however, as I will discuss, m later descriptions 
of the mind she adopts the term in the plural, and this suggests a layer,ect structure that is useful in 
conceiving the character in a different way than is intend~ here. H~ aV~I~ce of the use o~ th~ plural 
term may be due to a desire not to overload her metaphor With suggestion; It IS also worth mentionma that 
one stratum in geology is sometimes conceived of as baving many layers <Oxford English Dictionary, ~ 
edn, eel. by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, ~O vols <~: .Clarendon Press, .19.89), XVI,. 8~6. 
hereafter, OED), so Evans may in fact have a stratified system m mmd, although that It IS not expliCitly 
articulated as such is interesting. 
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W~thin The Principles of Geology, Lyell fully honours his definition of this wide-ranging 
sCIence, a tracing of the origins and history of modifications l·n th tu I Id . 
e na ra wor which so 
inspired and supported Darwin's researches.6 That geology· I I I d ' IS C ose y re ate to what were then 
young ideas about evolution is displayed by Lyell's need to engage in a debate which considers 
the recent developmental ideas of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck E an h If· d· . 
. v s erse ,Imme lately pnor to 
her choice of an extended geological metaphor, possibly provides a fleeting reference to newly-
emerging ideas on the evolution of plants and animals, in her description of her mind as 'never 
of the most highly organized genus'. Using taxonomic terms and h t . h . 
, ere se agamst t e opposite 
quality of chaos, the phrase 'highly organized genus' nevertheless also evokes the concept of 
which Lyell gives account.' He writes that according to Lamarck's doctrine, animals and 
vegetables 'are gradually developed into the higher and more perfect classes by the slow, but 
unceasing agency of two influential principles'. The first was 'the tendency to progressive 
advancement in organization, accompanied by greater dignity in instinct, intelligence, & c.', the 
second was' the force of external circumstances' (Lyell, II, 13). 
Eliot's fiction would often act as a study of the influence of unceasing agencies on the 
individual whose character would consequently approach a 'higher and more perfect class' of 
being as a result of his or her experience. The urge towards 'a greater dignity in instinct, 
intellect, & c.', and the portrayal of the transformative effect of external circumstances on the 
individual would become elements in her work, and we can find the embodiment of both in such 
characters as Dorothea Brooke.8 A major factor in Lamarck's theory was the inheritance of 
acquired, even willed, characteristics; his, then, was a doctrine fundamentally based on the 
effects of experience. According to his belief, the ant-eater and woodpecker acquire longer 
6 Gillian Beer writes in Darwin's Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineleenlh-
Century Fiction (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1985:1983) that 'two books ... accompanied [Darwin] on the 
voyage of the Beagle, when he was imaginatively at his most responsive. One of them was Lyell's 
Principles o/Geology. The other ... was Milton's poems' (p. 34). 
7 Although it would be hard to say conclusively that Eliot by 1839 had read both Lyell and Lamarck, or 
the account of Lamarck in Principles o/Geology, it is worth considering Beer's account of Eliot's muted 
reaction to Darwin's The Origin o/Species when she read it in 1859: 'Initially she was misled by her very 
familiarity with contemporary debate: she had read Lamarck and commissioned an article on his work for 
The Westminster Review in the early 1850s ... She admired the work of Lyell whose expansion of the 
geological time-scale had provided a necessary pre-condition for evolutionary ideas' (Darwin's Plou, p. 
157). It is uncertain when Eliot came into contact with these writers, but her language in the passage 
under discussion would suggest that if she had not directly engaged with them by 1839, she would 
rrobably have read about them. 
It is worth reminding the reader of Eliot's letter to Joseph Frank Payne of25 January 1876, much quoted 
because of Eliot's statement within it, that her writing 'is simply a set of experiments in life', in GEL, VI, 
216-17 (p. 216). Eliot writes, 'I become more and more timid - with less daring to adopt any formula 
which does not get itself clothed for me in some human figure and individual experience' (pp. 216-17). 
'Embodiment' is therefore a helpful term in a consideration of evidence of how the fruits of Eliot's 
reading of scientific texts appear in her work. In a letter written ten years before, Eliot herself provides an 
alternative expression to describe the process in which theory is embodied. She writes of 'the severe 
effort of trying to make certain ideas thoroughly incarnate, as ~ they had revealed them~lves to me tint 
in the flesh and not in the spirit' (George Eliot to Frederic Hamson, IS August [1866], 10 GEL, IV, 300-
02 (p. 300). 
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tongues by their 'repeated efforts' to stretch them' 9 conversely snakes d t h I k f 
' " ue 0 t e ae 0 the 
use of their legs because of their preference for sliding, have lost these body parts (Lamarck, pp. 
117-18). Therefore, with the accumulation of minute changes passed d fr . 
own om generation to 
generation, experience becomes structure. This very concept, whO h .. 
IC many eTlhcs have 
recognized as a fundamental law in Eliot's work,1O is implicit in the many metaphors that she 
would use in fiction to describe the effect of experience on motive on mental d 
' processes an on 
character. The geological metaphor, which communicates the embedding of intellectual 
experience deep in the mind, is an early, and static, example of the embodiment of this concept. 
Even without the inclusion of Lamarck's theories, Lyell's volumes, as his definition of geology 
suggests, are based on a fundamental premise that the experience of the past affects the structure 
of the present. His description of 'those minute, incessant mutations, which every part of the 
earth's surface is undergoing, and by which the condition of its living inhabitants is continually 
made to vary,11 is echoed years later by Eliot who applies this idea of the form of the surface 
affecting the occurrences above it, to the character of Gwendolen Harleth, whose fleeting 
behaviour is dictated by a solid though changeable underlying structure. Eliot writes, 'there is a 
great deal of unmapped country within us which would have to be taken into account in an 
explanation of our gusts and storms' .12 
This final chapter will examine the definition and dynamics of experience and its 
consequences on individual motive and behaviour, in the fiction of George Eliot. Eliot's was a 
vastly creative mind that, from her youth, was profoundly enabled by scientific reading, which 
acted for her as intellectual experience whose dynamics could not leave her thinking 
unaffected. 13 Scientific laws and images that she encountered within her reading were 
transformed into frameworks and metaphors which she went on to use in her fiction to describe 
9 J. B. Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy: An Exposition with Regard to the Natural History of Animals 
(1809), trans. by Hugh Elliot (New York: Hafner, 1963), p. 120. 
10 Because this idea was also important in positivist thinking and found explicit expression in the work of 
George Henry Lewes, many critics have commented on how the concept of experience becoming 
structure has infonned Eliot's fiction due to its role in these major aspects of her intellectual context. 
Bernard Paris, in Experiments in Life: George Eliot's Questfor Values (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1965), ably outlines this concept as a fundamental tenet of positivism: 'The positivists ... held that 
objects have direct contact with each other; that it is this contact which produces phenomena; and, very 
important, that the contact between objects results in a change in their physio-chemical properties or laws. 
The results of their interactions are a consequence of their laws, and their laws are, to a large degree, the 
embodied history of their previous interactions' (p. 29). He later goes on to discuss how this philosophy 
impacts on Eliot's fiction, 'each new experience modifies the experiencing subject, and each new 
modification is at once the product of all previous modifications and a determinant of all subsequent 
experiences and modifications' (p. 50). Michael Mason, in 'MiddJemarch and Science: Problems of Life 
and Mind' (Review of English Studies, 22 (1971), 151-169) concentrates more exclusively on Lewes's 
work (in particular, the First Series of Problems of Life and Mind, F~/ions of a Creed (1874-7~» as 
an expression of the idea that experience becomes structure, and 'detennmes what fonn future expenence 
can take' (p. 166). 
11 Charles Lyell, Principles o/Geology, Being an Attempt 10 Explain lhe Former Changes of the Earth's 
Surface, by Reference 10 Causes now in Operation, 3 vols (London: John Mwray, 1830-~3), 111,3. 
12 George Eliot, Daniel Deronda (1876), ed. by Barbara Hardy (Hannondsworth: Pengum, 1986), p. 321. 
Hereafter, DD. 
13 In a letter written in 1849, Eliot comments on her 'chameleon' nature (George Eliot to Mr. and Mrs. 
Charles Bray, Geneva, 28 August [1849], in GEL, I, 300-03 (p. 302». 
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the forces and influences which moulded her characters and explained their behaviour. Eliot's 
career was conducted alongside that of her partner the philosopher and hi· G 
' psyc 0 Oglst eorge 
Henry Lewes, with whom she enjoyed a close, intensely valuable intellectual relationship, 
which culminated in her eventual editing of his posthumous third series of the work that had 
fonned a 'chief epoch' late in his life, Problems of Life and Mind. 14 As Eliot's career 
progressed, her ideas of what constituted experience developed in pace with those of Lewes. 
This chapter will move to a consideration of Eliot's fully developed conceptions of experience, 
most effectively embodied in Daniel Deronda (1876), which, with Middlemarch (1871-72) was 
written concurrently with Lewes's deep engagement with his Problems, an absorption which 
dated from the late 1860s. I will examine Eliot's 1876 novel in conjunction with the definition 
of experience which is argued in Problems of Life and Mind. This definition, partly informed 
by the varied theories that then existed on evolution and its processes, conceives of the idea of 
experience as including not only individual physical and psychical events, and being the 
foundation for scientific research and theory, IS but also as encompassing social influences and 
the effects of heredity on the sentient subject. Living . and working amongst these ideas, it is in 
Eliot's own sophisticated consideration of communal and ancestral experience in Daniel 
Deronda that we see the fullest possibility of the prefiguration of Freud's late-flowering theories 
on civilization and society. These are theories of which he lamented that 'in none of my 
previous writings have I had so strong a feeling as now that what I am describing is common 
knowledge,.16 There is a great deal of substance in Freud's uneasy words; not only do many of 
his social theories from the 1920s onwards resonate with Lamarckian assumptions of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, and concepts which seem to be a later version of Herbert 
Spencer's principles of evolution and dissolution, they also act as a strange echo of ideas which 
were expressed, particularly in the 1870s, by Lewes, Eliot and their friend, the psychologist 
James Sully. The voices of the latter three combined to assert a basic premise that 'man is 
distinctively a social being; his animal impulses are profoundly modified by social influences, 
and his higher faculties are evolved through social needs' (Problems, JrrI Series, 1,5-6). 
Before my ultimate consideration of these more advanced theories of social and 
ancestral experience, however, I will trace the development of ideas about individual 
experience, and its effect on motive and deed in Eliot's work. I will emphasize the importance 
14 George Eliot describes the Problems in these tenns ~ a journal entry Of. 7 Novem~r 1873 •. in 'f!'e 
Journals o/George Eliot, ed. by Margaret Harris and Judith Johnston (Cambndge: Cambridge Unlvenlty 
Press, 1998), pp. 143-44 (p. 144). Hereafter, Journals. 
15 In Problems 0/ Life and Mind the importance of ~ empirical approach to psycholo~, ~ well as to 
other sciences was constantly emphasized. Accordmg to Lewes s fundamentally positiVist approach. 
science found its bedrock in human experience, and in the experience of the scientist, and it had no place 
in attempting to theorize beyond these parameters. In the third series of ~e work, it ~ assa:'ed that as 
'sentiments are evolved from emotions, impersonal impulses from personal unpulses, science [IS evolved] 
from experience', as man increases in complexity with the advance of civilization. (George Henry Lewes, 
Problems 0/ Life and Mind, Third Series, Problem the First: The Stvdy 0/ Psychology: 11.1 Object. Scope 
and Method (London: TrObner& Co., 1879), p. 38. Hereafter, Problems, 3M Serin. I. 
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of experience as a psychical agent in Eliot's philosophy by consl·d· . tan . h . 
, enng InS ces In er fiction 
where accumulated experience builds in the individual in close co· t· ·th th 
' nJunc Ion WI 0 er natural 
laws, to inspire motives and wishes which carry the often unawa e b· t th h th. 
r su ~ec roug to elr 
inevitable fulfilment. In this sense as Eliot's own metaphors t . ffi 
' sugges, expenence a ects 
psychical structure. This is a concept that we have seen somewhat differently expressed in 
Chapter Two, in the creation of the smooth paths of association by repeated patterns of thought, 
and one that prefigures the ideas embodied in Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology of 
1895. Having examined how the accumulation of experience creates motive, which, according 
to scientific law, tends towards a fulfilment, I shall go on to consider the nature of this 
fulfilment as a satisfaction of individual desire. The second half of this chapter will therefore 
form a consideration of how the subject, taking into account his or her personal, and in some 
cases, inherited, experience, seeks and attains different kinds of satisfaction. 
One focus will be on the writing subject, writing being, to Eliot, a behaviour like any 
other, or rather, more telling than many others, for it contains the author's 'chief actions' and his 
or her 'best history,.!7 Providing a continuation of my approach in the last chapter, in which I 
analysed Freud's witnessing and remembering behaviour, with the help of commentators who 
wrote decades before he did, in the next section I will use the ideas of Eliot and Lewes on the 
dynamics of pleasure and satisfaction to try to illuminate 'unrecognised agents', hidden motives 
in Freud's writing of the Project. My aim will be to provide, in this last chapter, a final 
appraisal of this work, which has been so prominent in my thesis, in the form of an explanation 
of why its writing was so abruptly terminated, and why it was then disowned by Freud, a riddle 
which has inspired hypothesis in many previous commentators. Again it is the case that, as with 
Collins, an investigation into how Freud was prefigured by the Victorians inevitably develops 
into a discussion on how these thoughtful commentators on the basic motives and forces behind 
human character and actions offer an appraisal of Freud's own motives and explain his 
behaviour. The more minutely, in fact, that the figures I consider in this thesis examine the 
human condition, the more effective they tend to be at describing the later activities of Freud. 
Hence it is that Eliot, and especially Lewes, are particularly illuminating. 
Many commentators have already considered Eliot's writing in relation to her scientific 
reading, and also in conjunction with her relationship with Lewes.11 I have decided to focus on 
16 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and ils Discontents (1930), in SE, XXI, 56-145 (p. 117). Hereafter, 
Civilization. 
17 George Eliot to Mrs Thomas Adolphus Trollope, 19 ~mber 1879, in GEL, VII,.230-31 ~. 230). 
Interestingly this letter fonns a response to Mrs TroUope s query about whether there will be a biOgraphy 
of Lewes. Eliot answers that she should read the latest volumes of Problems 0/ Lifo and Mind, which 
would tell her as much about Lewes's mind as any biographical work (p. 230). 
II The sheer volume of critics (such as Bernard Paris, Sally Shuttleworth, Michael Mason, Kate Flint, 
Nancy Henry and many others) who have focused on Eliot's rel~tionship wi~ Lewes as a, ~ of 
inspiration for her fiction inclines me to take the approach that specifically 1I'gU!"' t.hat ~es. S Ideas. to 
whatever extent, impacted on her work, is nther ~ece~.. Shuttleworth s .VI~W IS typical of the 
present critical consensus, and captures my own opmlon: The mtellectual association ~een ~e 
Eliot and Lewes was remarkably strong. Throughout their years together, they shared their readmg and 
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the whole of Problems of Life and Mind and not' I 'fi ' 
, sImp y Its Irst senes (The Foundations of a 
Creed), at which many critics seem to stop 19 Comm tat h 
' en ors suc as Bernard Paris and Sally 
Shuttleworth also take the whole of Lewes's fascinating work of the 1870s into account and 
provide valuable and comprehensive commentari EI'" • 
es on lot s work m the process, Paris's 
emphasis, however, though giving attention to Lewes's k' I " 
wor ,IS at east equally weIghted WIth a 
concentration on philosophical influences on EI' t bl ' , , 
10, most nota y that of POSItivIsm, 
Shuttleworth weights the scales rather more on the side of Lewes wn't' th t' h'l C ' 
. , mg a w Ie omte s 
ideas of the evolution of the social organism influenced George EI' t' I 'f 10 S ear y conceptIOns 0 
social development, Lewes' theories ultimately had the more significant impact on her work' 
(GE & 19th c., p, xi), However, her concentration on Lewes is couched in the terms of 
organicist theory; therefore his ideas appear as a development oul of Comte's doctrine, Of 
course this is a valid and correct portrayal of how Lewes's ideas came to maturity (just as 
Paris's is an accurate charting of the entwinement of Eliot's thoughts and the concepts of 
positivism), Shuttleworth's strength lies in her definition and location of Lewes within wider 
theory and philosophy; however, I would seek to go some way towards freeing him and Eliot 
from the burden of such (as Shuttleworth documents, problematic) allegiances,2o and consider 
Eliot's fiction within a rather smaller (although, I accept, a remarkably loaded) intellectual 
context. 
The challenge which I described at the beginning of this chapter, of providing a 
commentary on Eliot's work in the light of the vast and varied amount of reading that she 
engaged in, is evident when surveying the extensive field of criticism that already exists on her 
fiction, There are many valid approaches to Eliot's fiction through her reading, and it can 
appear that an appraisal of her writing cannot be attempted without reference to such sources of 
influence as positivism, as well as many others such as Gennan philosophy and literature, 
classical myths and the works of Shakespeare which Eliot had portrayed in 1839 as embedded 
studied each other's work, Indeed, George Eliot was so conversant with Lewes' philosophy that, in 
preparing the fmal series of Problems of Life and Mind for publication after Lewes' death, she 
substantively rewrote some of the sections on social psychology, Her changing understanding of the 
social and psychological implications of organicist thought was .. , closely related to Lewes' own 
evolving social and scientific theory,' (Sally Shuttleworth, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Cenhlry Science: 
The Malee-Believe of a Beginning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p, 18, Hereafter, GE 
& 19th C). 
19 One notable example of this is Michael Mason, whose promising title • MiddJemarch and Science: 
Problems of Life and Mind' belies the fact that he only considers MiddJemarch in relation to the fust two 
of Lewes's five volumes of the work. It is not the case that Lewes was only researching and writing these 
two volumes while or before Middlemarch was written, for we find a note in its third series, published in 
1879, revealing that one of its chapters was fITSt written in 1868 (George Henry Lewes, Problems of Life 
and Mind, Third Series: Problem lhe Second: Mind as a Function o/the Organism; Problem the T1rird: 
The Sphere 0/ Sense and Logic of Feeling; Problem the FOIlI1h: The $phere o/Intelleel and Logic of 
Signs (London: TrObner cl Co., 1879), p. 142 n. Hereafter, Problems. r Seria, II. 
zo See in particular Shuttleworth's chapter on Daniel Deronda (GE & 19th C., pp, 17S-200), which she 
ends with the assertion that 'the persistent disjunction between the lives of Daniel and Gwendolen , .. 
exposes the social inadequacy of the metaphoric reconciliation of organicism' (p. 200). 
191 
in her psyche.21 This is why h . 
. so many ot er mfluences are balanced in criticism of Eliot by 
attentIon to the role of her circle of scientific friends It w·11 be . h 
. I my aIm, owever, to concentrate 
on this source of discussion and inspiration accepting that th· l" I 
' IS lorms on y a small part of Eliot's 
intellectual environment, but believing its influence on he' kabl b . . 
r remar y a sorptlve bram', and 
consequently, on her work, to be sufficiently significant to warrant close examination. Often in 
criticism of Eliot, because of the range of her reading which commentators feel a need to 
address, important and immediate names such as that of James Sully (,for whom', Eliot wrote 
after Lewes's death, 'we had much esteem'),22 are vaguely mentioned in passing. This is a loss 
for Eliot scholarship, for as I shall discuss, Eliot influenced Sully as much as, or more than, his 
work impacted on hers. I hope to do something towards rectifying the om ission of such 
immediate contributors to Eliot's intellectual environment, not least because certain aspects of 
the ideas of Sully and Spencer prefigure parts of Freudian theory. 
It is at this point that I believe my approach departs from the overwhelming majority of 
critics, including those such as Shuttleworth and Paris, with whom I agree on many points. The 
general reluctance of commentators to consider how Eliot and her close circle may have 
prefigured or impacted on the work of Freud robs these Victorian figures of the credit that is due 
to them. Rosemary Ashton makes an interesting comment about Herbert Spencer in George 
Eliot: A Life. On a mock biographical profile of Spencer that Eliot had written in a letter to Sara 
Hennell, set a hundred years into the future, Ashton wrote: 'Spencer's reputation has not 
survived as prophesied here. George Eliot could not have known that Freud would live. 
Spencer's evolutionary psychology-cum-social science has become outmoded' .23 In this chapter 
I hope to show that Ashton here has vastly oversimplified the situation. It is rather the case that 
Freud's profile would probably not have reached the stature that it did, had it not been for the 
theories of Spencer, whose concept of evolution and dissolution, as I have discussed in my 
Introduction, became absorbed into Freudian theory on regression and the life and death 
instincts. Of lesser stature, but nevertheless significant, is James Sully, whose ideas of the 
21 Examples of approaches to her fiction through some of these aspects of Eliot's reading include 
Rosemary Ashton's appraisal of her work in conjunction with the Gennan thinkers Strauss, Feuerbach, 
Spinoza, Kant and Goethe in The German Idea: Four English Writers and the reception 01 German 
thought I BOO-IB60 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 147-77; Felicia Bonaparte's The 
Triptych and the Cross: The Central Myths olGeorge Eliot's Poetic Imagination (New York: New York 
University Press, 1979), which takes an approach to Romola through the vast amount of research into 
ancient and Christian myth and symbol which Eliot undertook in order to write the novel; Adrian Poole's 
discussion of Daniel Derondo in conjunction with Shakespeare's A Winter's Tale ('Hidden AfTmities in 
Daniel Deronda', Essays in Criticism, 33 (1983),294-311). There are, of course. many more works of 
criticism on many more aspects of Eliot's knowledge. I have not touched on her scholarship in English 
Romantic literature, or in French and Italian literature, for example. choosing to emphasize in this note 
those traditions which are more likely to have been common to Freud, whose culture was German-
speaking, and who expressed interest in the ancient world, its myths and religi~s: and read ~ enjoyed 
Shakespeare. See Malcolm Bowie, Freud, Proust and Lacan: ~ as F,ct,on (Cambridge:. CUP, 
1987), pp. 18-37 for Freud's enthusiasm for archaeology. and the anclCDt ~orld. Ernest Jones testifies to 
Freud's admiration of Shakespeare (Ernest Jones, The Life and Work olSlgmund Freud. Vol."". I: T1te 
Formative Years and the Great Discoveries, 1856-1900, 13* edn, 3 vols (New York: Basic Books. 1960), 
1,21-22). 
21 George Eliot to Mrs Thomas Adolphus Trollope. 19 December 1179, p. 230. 
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1890s on dreaming, as I shall explore in my Conclusion were ad .. I . d b F . 
, mmng y cite y reud In The 
Interpretation of Dreams, in editions from 1914 Spencer and Sull fi h h 
. Y are Igures, ten, W 0 reach 
from the mid-nineteenth century to establish direct or indirect contact with Freud. George Eliot, 
too, spanned this distance; as Ernest Jones testifies, Freud read and enjoyed Middlemarch and 
Daniel Deronda (Jones, I, 174). To this bridging pattern, Lewes seems to prove the exception. 
There is no evidence that Freud read any of his work, and his concepts, unlike Spencer's about 
evolution and dissolution (which inspired Hughlings Jackson, whom Freud admired) did not 
stand out prominently enough to be taken up by disciples who may then have introduced them 
into Freud's early thinking. However, in a brief critique of some recent psychoanalytic 
criticism on Eliot I hope to illuminate Lewes's role in the prefiguring process. 
Opening his article, 'George Eliot: Proto-Psychoanalyst', Carl Rotenberg writes, 'while 
reading George Eliot's fiction, particularly Daniel Deronda (1876), I was impressed by 
similarities between George Eliot and Freud and began to wonder if Freud had been influenced 
by Eliot in some way,?4 Rather symptomatically of this sort of criticism, which tends to find its 
approach via an easy, straight route that leads to dangers of oversimplification in any 
consideration of issues of influence, Rotenberg goes on to write, 'there is no evidence of their 
having met' (Rotenberg, p. 257). This is a comment that, in its inherent implication that there 
was the barest possibility of its opposite having occurred, speaks for its seeking of a single-
stranded answer by a massive leap which attempts to form an immediate intellectual 
relationship between two figures whose paths would never have crossed. Later in the article, 
which considers in particular the 'therapeutic' relationship in Daniel Deronda between Daniel 
and Gwendolen Harleth,2S Rotenberg considers the possible origin of Eliot's ideas about 
unconscious mental processes, concepts which he rightly recognizes did not originate with 
Freud. More leaps are evident here, however. Rotenberg traces Lewes's reading of Eduard Von 
Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869) into his writing of Problems of Life and 
Mind, and then reasons, 'since Lewes was working on his book with Eliot's assistance at the 
time she was writing Daniel Deronda, his ideas about unconscious thinking more than likely 
influenced her narrative descriptions' (p. 262). Fraught with conjecture, generalization and 
inaccuracy (for as I shall discuss, Eliot's understanding that processes that were not 
immediately conscious affected human thought and behaviour was evident years before the 
appearance of The Philosophy of the Unconscious, the writing of Problems of Life and Mind 
and Daniel Deronda), this is the only picture of Eliot's intellectual climate that Rotenberg 
offers.26 It is from this that he goes on to discuss the relationship between Gwendolen and 
23 Rosemary Ashton, George Eliot: A Life (Harmonsworth: P,enguin, .1997), p. 112. 
24 Carl T. Rotenberg, 'George Eliot: Proto-Psychoanalyst, AmerIcan Journal 0/ Psychoanaly3is, 59 
(1999),257-270 (p. 257). . b" 
2S Rotenberg writes that what Daniel Deronda 'foresees is the interpersonal and mtersu ~ective context 
that evolved into the psychoanalytic treatment frame' (p. 2~2). . . 
26 In place of tracing the effect of Eliot's intellectual env~e.nt on her wo~, apart from m th~ ~ 
instance, Rotenberg takes an approach that is, interestingly. remmlSCCnt of Freud 5 assessment ofWalham 
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Daniel. Because of Gwendolen's reliance on Daniel for her heall·ng be I f h 
, cause a so 0 t e sexual 
tension that undeniably exists between them this relationsht·p h be h fi f 
' as en t e ocus 0 most 
psychoanalytic criticism on Eliot, inspiring a wealth of commentary th t h D . I a suggests t at ante 
may be seen as therapist, Gwendolen as patient 27 What these commentato . h . 
. rs miSS, owever, IS a 
rather more subtle prefiguration of Freud's theories by Eliot than a . I d I maglca an comp ete 
anticipation of a psychoanalytic therapeutic relationship, which triumphantly renders her 'a 
proto-psychoanalyst'. For Gwendolen's story, as many commentators have understood, is a 
progression towards citizenship, away from egoistic childhood and into self-reliant altruistic 
adulthood. 28 It is less appreciated that this progress engages with current theories of the 
development of civilization, widely based on concepts of evolution with which Freud was 
familiar. Such theories were explored and elaborated on in great detail in Lewes's Problems of 
Life and Mind, particularly in the third series, which Eliot edited and, in places, rewrote. These 
ideas about the progress of mankind, depicting as they do the child/savage becoming, with the 
experience of social pleasures and pains, the adUlt/citizen, serve as a many-stranded link 
between Gwendolen's story and Freud. I will explore this link in the fourth section of this 
chapter. 
Jensen, with which I started this thesis, in its emphasis on Eliot's intuition, rather than her cerebral 
activity and scientific reading. On p. 258 Rotenberg writes, 'George Eliot often portrayed the ways in 
which significant emotions reveal themselves in seemingly tiny, inadvertent ways, thus demonstrating her 
intuitive awareness of unconscious nonverbal expression and communication'. This, I would suggest, has 
more to do with Eliot's understanding that (as Lewes wrote in his Physiology of Common Life), 'a self-
terminating sensation is as inconceivable as a self-terminating motion' (George Henry Lewes, The 
Physiology of Common Life, 2 vols (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1859-60), II, 55; hereafter, 
Physiology), and that emotions often have to fmd their way out into some motor action simply because of 
the laws of force within the individual system. 
27 See Eugene Hollahan, 'Therapist or The Rapist? George Eliot's Daniel Deronda as a Pre-Freudian 
Example of Psychoanalysis in Literature', Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, 5 (1984), 55-68 (pp. 64-
66). Hollahan asserts that 'the relation between Gwendolen and Deronda, which determines the structure 
of the entire book, bears crucial resemblances to psychoanalytical transference' (p. 65). Echoing Freud's 
own argument that the artist realized truths which psychoanalysis was later able to confirm, Hollahan 
suggests that a transference relationship is portrayed in Eliot's novel because 'psychoanalysis ... is the 
branch of psychology most fruitful for the literary imagination ... Eliot seizes "combinations" which 
Freud "explains and justifies'" (p. 66). 
For an example of a rather reductive approach that discusses Daniel and Gwendolen in terms of 
'transference' and 'splitting and projective identification', see Meg Harris WilJiams and Margot Waddell. 
The Chamber of Maiden Thought: Literary Origins of the Psychoanalytic Model of the Mind (London: 
TavistockIRoutledge, 1991), pp. 168, 162. 
A variation on this basic psychoanalytic approach, is taken by Thomas P. Wolfe, in the 
intelligent 'The Inward Vocation: An Essay on George Eliot's Daniel Deronda' (Literary Monographs, 8 
(1976), 1-46), who builds the idea of patient and therapist to suggest that Deronda becomes a 'new father' 
to Gwendolen, to replace the one lost in childhood (p. 31). This, an example of a .v~y more subtle and 
convincing psychoanalytic interpretation than those o~ Rotenburg and Wllhams. and Wadde~l, 
nevertheless applies Freudian theory, for example the Oedipus Complex (p. 26) to certam characten 10 
Daniel Deronda without apology or any suggestion of Eliot's anticipation of Freud. That this is a rather 
risky way to approach the text can be seen in the language ~olf~ is oc~ionally f~ed. t~~. ~or 
example, of his theory that Gwendolen's defiance is s~boh~d 10 her mmd br a pa~cl~e t whl~h 
involves 'overthrowing and replacing ''the father''', he wntes: Let us assume thiS p~h~onc psych~c 
event, and see then what sort of coherence emerges from those central and enlgmatlc events 10 
Gwendolen's dramatized history' (p. 27, emphasis mine). 
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Part of the fascination and the prefiguring quality of Lewes's work lies in its 
deterministic reliance on the principles of cause and effect with regard to psychology; 
characteristics of a positivist bent, it is true, but also elements which eventually rendered his 
evolving thinking closer and closer to ideas that would later become embodied in 
psychoanalysis, which was a fundamentally deterministic science. We can gain some idea of 
Lewes's conception of the determination of human behaviour in the third series of Problems of 
Life and Mind, in a section which discusses free will: 
That we .are cons~ious of cho~s~g does not prove that our exercise of choice is equivalent to Free Will, 
when thiS term IS used to slgmfy that mental actions can go on apart from the general system of 
~equences.. All the massive evi~ence to be derived from human conduct, and from our practical 
mterpre~atIon of such conduct,. po~ts to the conclusion that actions, sensations, emotions, and thoughts 
are subject to causal determmatIon no less rigorously than the movements of the planets or the 
fluctuations of the waves. (Problems, 3m Series, I, 102) 
This was written towards the end of Lewes's life; in a letter of 1848 we see displayed a very 
similar opinion but a difference of conclusion: 
No doubt I am the sum total & exponent of myriads of influences which have preceeded me & 
my formation & nothing in this world is accidental - i.e. irrespective of any cause; and therefore in one 
sense the motive which affects me - which is strongest to me - which in fact is a motive - has been 
determined by a myriad of preceeding acts, - is but one link in the endless chain of causation. In this 
sense therefore I am a necessary product & my acts are the necessary consequences of my being. But 
within the limits of my own condition I am to all intents & purposes a Free Agent - a responsible being -
a mind which from its own energy has the power of modifying its condition & of choosing between good 
& evil. Unless the whole universe be a bungling piece of mechanism in which every thought, every 
sensation, every movement however trivial has been <already> eternally forseen & planned - then I am a 
moral agent - a Free Agent. 29 
Such debates and discussions as we see in these two opposmg conclusions over a final 
definition of what free will is and can be, do not detract from the fact that Lewes always held 
that our motives are determined by past experience, and that if we, true to human nature, choose 
according to these motives, our actions are also determined by our past. Eliot's fiction would 
display a similar philosophy, which, although deterministic, leaves enough room for debate on 
the definition, and therefore the existence, of free will to elude the limiting label of absolute 
determinism. As Lewes recognized in 1848, absolute determinism robs, and relieves the 
individual of responsibility for his or her actions. For this reason I would suggest that Eliot's 
approach is not so much determinism as a thorough tracing of determinants. It is partly the 
development of such an approach to the processes and products of the psyche which helps to 
explain something of the change that we see between 1839, when she described her mind as a 
28 See Paris, pp. 233-41, GE cI: 19th C., p. 179, and Helena Granlund, The p~ 0/ Sel(-Love: 
Christian Elements in George Eliot's Treatment 0/ Egoism, Stockholm Studies m English. 83 
(Stockholm: Almqvist &. Wiksell International, 1994), pp. 60-65. . 
29 George Henry Lewes to Rev. Geo~e Crab~, I ~ Jan~ary .1848, m The leiter! o/George Henry /.,ewa, 
ed. by William Baker, 2 vols (University ofViCtona, VlC:tona, 8. C., 1995), I, 158-61 (pp. 159-60). 
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static specimen, and the rather more dynamic metaphors that Eliot employed at the end of the 
1850s. These latter are images that testified to a belief in the effects of past experience and 
motive on individual action. 
From 1839 to 1859 Eliot became more aware of the potency of experience, not only on 
the individual character, but for the individual artist. It is interesting to contrast the static vision 
of her mind which is presented in 1839 with an account of her creative processes, also expressed 
in a letter, which she wrote twenty years later. On 11 August 1859 she wrote to Barbara 
Bodichon that' at present my mind works with the most freedom and the keenest sense of poetry 
in my remotest past, and there are many strata to be worked through before I can begin to use 
artistically any material I may gather in the present' .30 The year before this she had described 
the writing of Adam Bede, explaining that it contained no new portraits, 'only the suggestions of 
experience wrought up into new combinations' .31 The single stratum of 1839 has become a 
many-layered series of strata through which her experiences, her memories could emerge. The 
smothering, petrifying 'fast thickening every day accession of actual events, relative anxieties, 
and household cares and vexations', of twenty years earlier, which to Evans only went to 
stultify her knowledge, have in themselves become material rich with creative possibilities. 
Eliot's account of the writing of Adam Bede, recorded in her journal, demonstrates this. She 
testifies that 'the germ of "Adam Bede'" had been a story told her by her aunt during a visit, 
'probably in 1839 or 40' (,History of "Adam Bede''', p. 502).32 Further, the characters of Dinah 
and Adam were suggested by family members: 'the character of Dinah grew out of my 
recollections of my aunt ... The character of Adam, and one or two incidents connected with 
him were suggested by my Father's early life' (pp. 502-03). The petrifying stone of family life 
had transformed into something rather more dynamic, material ripe for use by Eliot's creative 
mind. 
Again the question arises, however, whether Eliot's assessment of her creative 
processes, as expressed to Barbara Bodichon, is a fully complete and accurate account. We 
recall Lewes's words, first cited in my Introduction, that 'genius is rarely able to give any 
account of its own processes': 
A vivid memory supplies the elements from a thousand differe~t sources, mos~ of w~ich are q.uite beyo~d 
the power of localisation - the experience of yesterday bem~ strangely mtenn.mgled With the ~Im 
suggestions of early years, the tones heard in childhood sounding ~u~ the diapason of sorrowmg 
maturity; and all these kaleidoscopic fragments are recomposed mto unages that seem to have a 
d· al· fth' 33 correspon mg re Ity 0 ell' own. 
30 George Eliot to Mme Eug~ne 8odichon, 11 August [1859], in GEL, Ill, 128-29 (pp. 128-29). 
31 'H· t f"Adam 8ede'" (Journal Entry for 30 November 1858), in GEL, II (1954), 502-05 (p. 503). 
32 In : ::re ~aight confinns this visit was in 1839 (,History of" Adam Bede(London"" p. 5~~t Sea d. \ 
33 George Henry Lewes, The Principles 0/ Success in Lileratrue (1865) : er tt, D. II pp. 
77-78. 
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Despite Eliot's belief that she cannot creatively use recent material, it is often the case that there 
is very little reworking of the 'experience of yesterday' in order for it to find its way into her 
work. In the rest of this section I will briefly consider aspects of three works published around 
1859, Adam Bede (1859), 'The Lifted Veil' (1859) and George Henry Lewes's The Physiology 
o/Common Life (1859-60). The phrases and concepts of Lewes's work, I will SUgges4 found 
immediate homes in Eliot's fertile psyche, and were used, with very little change, in her own 
fiction almost immediately. Certain critics would see this as a manifestation of a very 
intentional dialogue between Eliot and Lewes. Kate Flint writes that The Lifted Veil 'would 
have been impossible without Lewes's physiological researches, and in many respects [Eliot's] 
work should explicitly be seen as a dialogue with them' .34 This is a valid point, but this 
thoughtful dialogue involving scientific issues and ethics is a separate thing, existing alongside 
the sort of inspirational, metaphorical relationship that Lewes's works bear to those of Eliot. 
Eliot embodies the laws and formulations evident in Lewes's philosophy in metaphor and in the 
mental processes and behaviour of individual characters. Lewes, himself a writer of fiction,3S is 
attracted to the use of metaphor, and although Eliot tends to use a different but equivalent image 
for illustration of the same law or process, there are occasions when a metaphor is directly 
transposed into Eliot's work, and can act as a convenient shorthand for the process that Lewes 
has taken pains to explain in detail. These elements contribute to the artistic form and whole of 
Eliot's works, and the fact that she does not acknowledge this ready tum-around from these 
immediate suggestions of experience into creation in her letter to Mme. Bodichon may be a 
symptom of the fact that she is not always entirely aware of the process herself. 
One of many concepts of Lewes's from The Physiology of Common Life that Eliot 
explored in the works I will discuss in this section is often linked by critics directly with The 
Mill on the Floss, because of the metaphor Lewes employs in describing it: 'The mill-wheel, at 
first so obtrusive in its sound, ceases at length to excite any attention. The impressions on our 
auditory nerves continue; but although we hear them, we cease to think about them' 
(Physiology, II, 59). Shuttleworth rightly comments that this image is used to illustrate 
'Lewes's theory of the different levels of consciousness' and that 'it performs a similar function 
in The Mill on the Floss ... thus setting forth the two separate forms of history which are to 
govern Maggie's life and the narrative' of the novel (GE & 19th c., p. 69). However, I believe 
that the presence of 'the mill with its booming,36 does more than indicate the presence of two 
strata of consciousness; it contributes to a metaphorical picture of mental life that is fuller than 
34 Kate Flint, 'Blood, Bodies, and The Lifted Veif, Nineteenth-Century Literature, 51 (.1997), 455-7~ <!'. 
458). See also Nancy Henry, 'George Eliot, George Henry Lewes, and Comparativ~. Anatomy, m 
George Eliot and Europe, ed. by John Rignall, Warwick Studies in the European Humanities (Aldershot: 
Scolar Press, 1997), pp. 44-63, on the dialogue between Eliot and Lewes. 
3.5 Ranthorpe (1847) and Rose, Blanche, and Yiolet (1848). He also wrote drama, for example The Game 
of Speculation (1848). . 
31 George Eliot, The Millon the Floss (1860), ed. by A. S. 8yatt (Harmondsworth: Pengum, 1985), p. 93. 
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this, including the stream as well as the mill, and helps us to see the existences of George Eliot's 
characters as possessing a richer consciousness than we had perhaps appreciated. 
Earlier in his Physiology, Lewes states more explicitly the effects on consciousness of 
sounds which are unperceived. It is a passage worth quoting for its neat elucidation of Lewes's 
theory that consciousness 'more generally implies sensation than anything else' and that 'to 
have a sensation, and to be conscious of it, are one and the same thing; but to have a sensation. 
and to attend to it, are two different things' (Physiology, II, 49,53): 
While I am writing these lines the trees are rustling in the summer wind, the birds are twittering 
among the leaves, and the muffled sounds of carriages rolling over the Dresden streets reach my ear; but 
because the mind is occupied with trains of thought these sounds are not perceived, until one of them 
becomes importunate, or my relaxed attention turns towards them. Nevertheless, when unperceived, the 
sounds reached my ear, and excited sensory impressions: if these sensory impressions are not to be called 
sensations, because they were not perceived, they must have some name given to them, and a name which 
will indicate that they are affections of the sensitive organism. They were not lost; they were not altered 
in character because their subsequent effects were not manifest in Thought; they were not without their 
influence in adding to the sum of general Consciousness. It is because they were states of Sensibility that 
they must be called sensations. (II, 54-55) 
Environment has more influence on us than we realize. The booming of the mill, though it 
ceases to be perceived, constantly adds 'to the sum of general Consciousness' - is an influence 
on the individual although the individual is only occasionally aware of it. Further, it becomes 
fundamentally part of his or her identity - 'Every excitement of a nerve-centre produces a 
sensation; the sum total of such excitements forms the general Consciousness, or sense of 
existence' (II, 65). The idea of perceived or unperceived sensations helping to form the 
individual's 'sense of existence' is, I believe, a very suggestive concept that Eliot incorporated 
into her work. 
It is worth charting here what Lewes came to see as the logical conclusion of his theory 
of consciousness, a development of the idea that it 'more generally implies sensation than 
anything else'. In Problems of Life and Mind he writes of the difficulties inherent in the term 
'consciousness', that it is fraught with 'ambiguity', as it means 'both Sentience in general and a 
particular Mode of Sentience' (Problems, 3rr1 Series, I, 90). More importantly, however, its 
disadvantage is that it is 'too limited' because 'it excludes many unconscious processes which 
are indubitably mental' (p. 91): 
Consciousness is too limited a term. Experience, on the contrary, is .comprehens.ive of ~ll 
sentient facts. While there is a contradiction in speaking of 'unconscious sensatIons: th~re IS non~ m 
speaking of 'unconscious experiences;' these take their place among the mental modIficatIons acquired 
through individual history. (p. 92) 
Eliot proved to be the editor of this extract, for it is part of Lewes's posthumous legacy. In her 
early works we gain a sense of how it might be anticipated, in her consideration of childhood 
experience. Although in 1859, consciousness as a term seemed adequate for Eliot and Lewes's 
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conception of all that makes up a person's feeling of existence the· . h· h . 
, re IS a sense In W IC It 
strains slightly under the evidence of the modification of the individual b SO: tt . y lorgo en expenence 
and unperceived sensation, tending towards an exploration of processes th t . I 
a are unconsCIOus. n 
Adam Bede there is a description of the effects of childhood memories that bears a similarity to 
one of the passages in Lewes's Physiology of Common Life. While Lewes describes the 
imperceptible elements of the sum of consciousness thus: 
The. amount of light r:ceive~ fro~ the st~s may be small, but it is present. The greater glory of the 
sunlight may ren~er thIs ~tarllght mapprecJable, but it does not render it inoperative. In like manner the 
amount of .sen~atlOn received from some of the smaller ganglia may be inappreciable in the presence of 
more massive mfluences from other centres; but though inappreciable it cannot be inoperative _ it must 
fonn an integer in the sum. (Physiology, II, 66) 
Eliot describes the effects of the memories of childhood on the individual nature: 
So much of our early gladness vanishes utterly from our memory: we can never recall the joy with which 
we laid our heads on our mother's bosom or rode on our father's back in childhood; doubtless that joy is 
wrought up into our nature, as the sunlight of long-past mornings is wrought up in the soft mellowness of 
the apricot; but it is gone for ever from our imagination, and we can only believe in the joy of 
childhood.37 
Eliot takes Lewes's metaphor of sensation as light to its logical conclusion -light is an essential 
factor in ripening the fruit, as past experience is necessary for the development of personality. 
But in the metaphor of the ripening apricot there is a sense of permanence, incorporation into 
structure, which the metaphor of the stars' light does not possess. In going that step further 
Eliot is entertaining the possibility of the effect on the individual of experience which has 
become, in its forgetting, unconscious. In Lewes's work of twenty years later, it is as if he 
returns with an attempt at an even more fitting metaphor for the action of experience on the 
individual, which is reminiscent of Eliot's image of the sun's effect on the apricot, yet which 
endows light with further modificatory power: 
'I am the product of all that I have felt.' If we understand that not a sunbeam falls upon a garden wall but 
the wall is altered by that beam; much more is it comprehensible that not ~ thrill p~ses thro.ugh the ~Y 
but our Sensorium is altered by it. The alteration may be evanescent and mappreclable, or It may persist 
in a more or less appreciable modification. (Problems, 3'" Series, II, 87) 
By this time, as we have seen, Lewes had adjusted his definition of experience to include the 
possibility of processes that are unconscious. In the same volume as we find the above passage, 
Lewes outlines a model of experience towards which, I believe, Eliot was already tending in 
1859: 
37 George Eliot, Adam Bede (1859), ed. by Stephen Gill (Hannondsworth: Pengu~ 1985). p. 221. 
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While so many psychologists are inclined to limit psychical he . 
biological psychologist fmds reason to conclude that the p .nomena to states of Consciousness, the 
II ·C, • • unconscIous states play by far the greate art· menta he. As the unpresslOns become integrated and ex peri . d rpm 
the conscious to the unconscious state so that the perfect. encefs organ lise ,there is a gradual fall from 
. h· b· ' Ion 0 menta processes as of other 0 . processes, IS t err ecommg automatic. (Problems, 3,d Series, II, 17) • rganlc 
Lewes's model here seems to have been informed by He b rt S' . 
r e pencer s concept of organic 
memory, which appeared for the first time in his Principles 0/ Psychology (1855): 
Me~ory, then, pertains to all ~a~ class of psychical states which are in the process of being organ ized. It 
contmues so long as the organlzmg of them continues· and disappears when th .. f th . I . . . ' e organization 0 em IS 
comp .ete .:. By further multI~hcatlOn of experiences, the internal relations are at last automatically 
orgamzed m correspondence WIth the external ones· and so conscl·ous memory . t . 
or O
• 38 "passes m 0 unconscIous 
rganlc memory. 
It may therefore be possible to suggest that Eliot's portrayal of some sort of unconscious 
memory using the apricot metaphor may have been informed by Spencer's view of the faculty, 
established by the time that she wrote Adam Bede. In The Physiology a/Common Life there is 
no such integration and organization into a solid unconscious structure; Lewes's definition of 
consciousness, in which all the modifications of experience remained within the realms of the 
conscious, continued to remain strained. 
Such theories of consciousness and experience as Lewes held in the late 1850s had a 
theoretical potential to spell disaster for the sensitive subject, such as Latimer of 'The Lifted 
Veil', whose entire stream or sum of consciousness is made up not only of sensations, but 
sensations which are almost all of them painfully perceived. 'The Lifted Veil' is one step 
beyond Lewes's vision of the mind of 1859-60, the extension of his work in the fonn of a 
fictional experiment. It explores the issue of what would happen if we were not only conscious 
of every sensation (as Lewes asserts we are) but if we also perceived every sensation. Eliot's 
story could be seen as a symptom of the strain under which the tenn 'consciousness' is put in 
Lewes's philosophy, which accepts into itself all that the subject encounters and has 
encountered, knowingly or not. Her experimental extension of this idea results in a frightening 
vision of a miserable life, whose strange powers are significantly described in tenns of the 
auditory sense (often used by Lewes, as we have seen, to illustrate the different levels of 
perception) - 'It was like a preternaturally heightened sense of hearing, making audible to one a 
roar of sound where others find perfect stillness. ,39 In the added idea that all our experiences 
are 'wrought up' into our nature, suggested and embodied in Eliot's metaphor of 1859, 
31 Herbert Spencer The Principles of Psychology (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 
1855), p. 563. It i~ likely that Lewes was more immediately infonned by S~ncer's 2-. edition of th.is 
work, which, much expanded, was published in 1870. The model o~ organic memory IS. e~ m 
virtually identical terms in this later edition, with mo~ of an emphasIS on structural. modlfi~uon, By 
further multiplication of experiences, the internal relatio~ are at last ~cturally ~glstered m, harmony 
with the external ones· and so conscious memory passes mto unCOnsciOUS or organic memory (Herbert 
Spencer, The Princip/~ 0/ P~hology, 2ad edn, 2 vols (London: Williams and Norgate, 1870-72), I, 4S2). 
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crystallized in 1879 in Lewes's dictum, 'I am the product of all that I h fi I' h I. 
ave e t ,t ere les extra 
terror for the sensitive being. 
Latimer's sensitivity is profoundly compounded and complicated by the implications of 
Lewes's and Eliot's idea of the modifications caused by experience. His face in early adulthood 
bears 'the stamp of a morbid organisation, framed for passive suffering' ('The Lifted Veil', p. 
262), but that his inclination to morbidity may have been partly fostered by the events of his life 
so far, is seen in his narrative of childhood and adolescence. He has been modified by the 
impressions made on him by his own sickliness in childhood and youth, as well as the 
deprivation of mother love in his later childhood, as surely wrought up into his nature as its 
joyful opposite described in Adam Bede. In the name of education, unwanted facts have been 
forced upon him (,I was glad of the running water ... I did not want to know why it ran' (p. 
251»; hence his nature 'grew up in an uncongenial medium, which could never foster it into 
happy, healthy development' (p. 251). In addition to this, he is beset by his enforced experience 
of the thoughts and feelings of others - 'the obtrusion on my mind of the mental process going 
forward in first one person, and then another, with whom I happened to be in contact' (p. 26]). 
These irretrievably become part of himself. Not only this, his own future becomes a part of his 
experience; visions of what will be become 'burnt into [his] memory' (p. 270), to the point that 
he is eventually 'living continually in [his] own solitary future' (p. 293). That he is extremely 
impressible is made clear early in the story. There is a sense in which his experience has, 
because of the susceptibilities of his nature, permanently modified his consciousness. Whereas 
in Adam Bede early feelings are forgotten, Latimer writes that in thinking of his mother 'even 
now ... a slight trace of sensation accompanies the remembrance of her caress' (p. 248). 
It is my suggestion, however, that 'The Lifted Veil' is a study in morbidity that provides 
a commentary on so-called normality, raising questions about consciousness and experience in 
the rest of Eliot's characters. Commentators have often seen Latimer's experience as opposing, 
or alien to, normal consciousness. Jane Wood has emphasized the association of Latimer's 
'double consciousness' with disease.4o Beryl M. Gray has written that 'it is interesting that 
['The Lifted Veil'] was completed after The Mill on the Floss was begun, for story and novel 
have opposite destinations' ,41 which suggests that she sees it as going against the general tide of 
Eliot's fiction. Her argument concludes that the phrenological images and principles Eliot 
employs, taken from the work of George Combe (from whom she became alienated on her 
association with Lewes) were diametrically opposed to Lewes's approach, and therefore the 
story simply seems a relic of a former friendship, contradicting Eliot's present (pp. 422-23). 
Gray argues convincingly for Eliot's use of Combe's work, but I believe that to see 'The Lifted 
39 'The Lifted Veil' (1859), in Silas Marner, The Lifted Yeil, B,.othe,. Jacob (London: Blackwood and 
Sons, 1907), pp. 245-303 (p. 267). . . . . 
40 Jane Wood, 'Scientific Rationality and Fanciful Fiction: Gendered Discourse m The Lifted Jlelr, 
Women's W,.iting, 3 (1996), 161-76 (pp. 164-65). .. ft, . • 
41 Beryl M. Gray, 'Pseudoscience and George Eliot's "The Lifted Veil ,Nmeteenlh-Cenhlry FICtion, 36 
(1982),407-23 (p. 422). 
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Veil' in relation to Lewes's ideas on consciousness is equally vall'd d' d d 'II ' 
, an , m ee , I urn mates 
rather than opposes the rest of Eliot's fiction, 
The extent of Latimer's perception is significant if we look at 't' t fL' I m enns 0 ewes s 
doctrine that to 'have a sensation, and to be conscious of it, are one and th h' b 
e same t mg; ut to 
have a sensation, and to attend to it, are two different things' In ca ' L t' , 
, usmg a Imer to perceIve 
what others think of him, and perceive the future Eliot is implYI'ng that'd' 'd I 'th 
' m IVI ua s WI nonnal 
levels of sensitivity also have sensations pertaining to these things, are conscious of what others 
think, of what the future holds, but simply do not attend to them, Instead these sensations are 
not lost, but add to our general sense of existence, and influence us, hence the many cases of 
inarticulable feelings, subtle mood changes inexplicable to the individual and blind and 
obstinate behaviour in many of Eliot's characters, The laws which are exposed in 'The Lifted 
Veil' also explain Maggie Tulliver's remarkable sense of duty to her past; her characteristic of 
continually forsaking happiness to remain true to it. This repetitive behaviour suggests that the 
mill's booming, with which she has grown up, is so finnly a factor in her own stream of 
consciousness, is so 'wrought up' into her own nature, that it continually draws her back when 
out of earshot. Her last movements on earth testify to this: 
She was driven out upon the flood: - that awful visitation of God which her father used to talk of - which 
had made the nightmare of her childish dreams, And with that thought there rushed in the vision of the 
old home - and Tom - and her mother - they had all listened together. 
'0 God, where am I? Which is the way home?' she cried out, in the dim loneliness, (The Mill 
on the Floss, p. 651, emphasis mine) 
Not only would the booming of the mill be audible above Maggie's father's voice as he 
recounted the history of the floods, but also within the realms of sleep as she dreamed, or 
suffered nightmares; unperceived, yet fonning part of her sense of existence. It is this action of 
early experience, I would suggest, that ties Maggie so closely to home, family, and the past. 
Eliot's belief in the modifications caused by experience, her tracing of the determinants 
of behaviour and motive within her own characters, is more pervasive than may be immediately 
evident. Helen Small has recently pointed out the negativity and cynicism of Latimer's view, 
which, she argues, displays a fleeting suggestion from Eliot that (in Small's words) 'we should 
be loathe to see the poverty of our fellow creatures' souls'.42 It is worth considering the 
possibility that this negativity, contained within a narrative started a month before death, 
finishing as the writer's dying moments approach, is largely due to the narrator's bias, a product 
of the compounded effects of a life's wearying experience of self and others. Modifications 
compound and confmn those that are created before them, until a view of life is established, 
Although those around him are transparent to him, Latimer has his own unrecognized agents, 
half-admitted in his description of his feelings towards his brother, 'I am not sure that my 
42 Helen Small, 'Introduction" in George Eliot, The Lifted Veil. Brother Jacob (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. ix-xxxviii (p. xxix). 
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disposition was good enough for me to have been quite free firo d h" , 
m envy towar s 1m . , HIS 
envious tendencies clearly contribute to the 'intense hatred' towards Alfr d th " 
e at grows In him as 
he discerns his inner thoughts (p, 262). In relationships with others h . . '1 I d II . 
, e IS Simi ar y u to hiS 
own inner workings. Of Bertha he writes, 'to this moment I am unable to define my feeling 
towards her' (p. 263); for all his clairvoyance, his ability to read the minds of others, then, 
Latimer can get little purchase on his own. It is this that renders his narrative a symptom of his 
own jaundiced consciousness, even as he describes his perception of the underlying origins of 
the 'words and deeds' of others: 
But ~is supe~ad~ed consciousness, wearying and annoying enough when it urged on me the trivial 
expenence of mdlfferent pe~p]e, became ~ intense pain and grief when it seemed to be opening to me 
th~ ~ou]s of those who were m ~ close relatIOn to me - when the rational talk, the graceful attentions, the 
WittIly-turned phrases, and the kmdly deeds, which used to make the web of their characters were seen as 
if ~st asunder by a ~icroscopic visi~~, ,that showed all the intermediate frivolities, all the suppressed 
egoIsm, all the strugg]mg chaos of puenhtles, meanness, vague capricious memories and indolent make-
shift thoughts, from which human words and deeds emerge like leaflets covering a fermenting heap. (p, 
261). 
Even within this inherently negative view of the mind, we see the imaginative legacy of 
geology - a continually-changing underlying movement affecting the structure of a visible 
covering layer. As a symptom of Eliot's growing understanding of the dynamic effects of 
experience we see the static chaos of mind that she envisaged in 1839 becoming the inherently 
productive 'struggling chaos' of twenty years later. My suggestion is that in Latimer's case 
what this chaos produced was bitterness that pervades his world-view. Twenty years later, 
Lewes provides a description of psychical prejUdice which bears a strong resemblance to 
Latimer's portrayal of the mind. This later model combined the geological and vegetative 
metaphors of its predecessors of 1839 and 1859 while demonstrating the possibility of the sort 
of biased view of the world and of others which I have argued for in Latimer's own mind: 
In the great total of collective Experience, - as in that of the individual, - absurd perversions and wild 
fancies take their place beside exact correspondences of feeling and fact, and truths that are unshakable; it 
is a shifting mass of truth and error, for ever becoming more and more sifted and organised into 
permanent structures of germinating fertility or of fossilised barrenness. Our mental furniture shows the 
brie a brae of prejudice beside the fashion of the hour; our opinions are made up of shadowy associ~~~ns, 
imperfect memories, echoes of other men's voices, mingling with the reactions of our own senSibility. 
Thus it is that a mass of incoherent and unreasoned premisses are brought to bear on the evidence for any 
new opinion, as for any novel fact: this is the unrecognised standard by which the conclusion is 
determined. (Problems, 31d Series, I, 166-67) 
This passage takes a step back from Latimer's consciousness; the bias which colours his view is 
removed and reinserted, this time as an integral element of a full view of the determinants of 
thinking. In the next section I will discuss Freud's underestimation of the colouring of his own 
view and his consequent battles to reconcile the dynamics of motive and agenda with cognitive 
and theoretical thought. 
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At the end of the 1850s Eliot experimented with metaphor in order to explain how what 
Latimer terms the 'leaflets' of human behaviour are created; her engagement with Lewes's ideas 
helped her in this. In Adam Bede we come across an interesting metaphor which explores 
Arthur Donnithome's motivation in not confessing to Rev. Irwin his intentions towards Hetty: 
Was there a motive at work under this strange reluctance of Arthur's Whl·ch h d rt f 
b k . . fl dm' d . a a so 0 ac sta~s 10 uence, not a Itte to hImself? Our mental business is carried on much in the same way as 
t~e busmess O! the State: a ~eat deal o~ hard work is done by agents who are not acknowledged. In a 
pI~ce of mac?1Oery, too, I behev~ there IS often a small unnoticeable wheel which has a great deal to do 
With ~he motIo~ of.the large: obVIOUS ones. ~ossi~ly, there was some such unrecognised agent secretly 
bus~ 10 Arthur s m10d .at thiS moment - pOSSibly It was the fear lest he might hereafter find the fact of 
hav~g made a con~esslon to the Rector a serious annoyance, in case he should not be able quite to carry 
out hiS good resolutions? I dare not assert that it was not so. The human soul is a very complex thing. (p.172) 
This image of the soul as a machine, its larger workings, its manifest production determined by 
its smallest cogs, echoes Lewes's view of 'the organism as a mechanism - but a vital and 
sensitive mechanism' in which 'each cog is a sensation' (PhySiology, II, 196). Eliot, however, 
is elaborating on Lewes's machine image in Adam Bede. Lewes's sensation in this model is 
quite clearly for Eliot here an inner sensation, an impulse, what Freud, in his Project, would see 
as an 'endogenous stimul[us]' .43 As in the metaphor of the ripening apricot, outer sensation, the 
sight of the 'distractingly pretty' Hetty, who possesses the 'order of beauty which seems made 
to tum the heads not only of men, but of all intelligent mammals, even of women' (Adam Bede, 
p. 84) has become part of Arthur, has contributed to his inner need for sexual satisfaction, which 
in tum has created an unacknowledged motive which directly affects his behaviour. This 
behaviour in tum compounds and confirms the structure thus formed within the individual, for 
'our deeds determine us, as much as we determine our deeds' (p. 315). 
From her earliest novels, therefore, Eliot displayed a keen interest in the dynamics of 
motive, a complex force created and strengthened by the modifications caused by experience. 
The cerebral activities of writing and the conception of scientific theory do not escape the 
workings of motive; indeed, in the above passage we may find a fore-echo of Jones's 
description of Freud's writing of his Project, that he 'had a way of rather obstinately persisting 
with an idea even when he was uneasily half aware of being on a wrong track'. Jones follows 
this with a sentence which speaks much for the mechanics which often work behind such 
behaviour: 'To have to retrace one's steps is never pleasant' (Jones, I, 393). In the next section 
I will consider Eliot's philosophy of motive, a part of which is found in the human tendency to 
gravitate away from unpleasant experiences, towards pleasant ones. This philosophy, which we 
have seen exemplified in Arthur Donnithome's secret motive, is embodied particularly fully in 
Tito Melema of Romola (1862-63). I shall discuss Eliot's presentation of the processes by 
which experience and internal sensations grow into motive and deed in some of her characters. 
43 Sigmund Freud, Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950), in SE, I, 281-391 (p. 297). 
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and the role of this end deed as a type of satisfaction, a necessary outcome of the insistence of 
forces within the individual. I will then consider how these dynamics might illuminate Freud's 
slightly puzzling abandonment of his Project of 1895. 
The Dynamics of Motive and the Attainment of Satisfaction in Romola, Middlemarch and 
Project for a Scientific Psychology 
On 28 September 1861, in an entry that appears between records of the extensive reading she 
was undertaking in order to write Romola, Eliot recorded, '28 ... In the evening Mr. Spencer, 
Mr. Pigott and Mr. Redford came. We talked with Mr. Spencer about his chapter on the 
Direction of Force, i. e. Line of least resistance' (Journals, p. 102). As Harris and Johnston 
rightly point out in their note for this entry, the chapter under discussion was from Spencer's 
work, First Principles (1862) and entitled 'The Direction of Motion' (Journals, p. 440).44 In 
this chapter Spencer explores the law that 'motion ... always follows the line of greatest 
traction, or the line of least resistance, or the resultant of the two' .45 Among more seemingly 
pertinent entries such as those charting Eliot's reading of the writings of Savaronola and the 
lives of the saints, one might miss the fact that the conversation Eliot had with Spencer could be 
classed as research for Romola. In the character of Tito Melema, however, we see, in addition 
to Eliot's ideas on experience, a realization and embodiment of Spencer's principles about the 
direction of motion. These same laws, though probably not gleaned from Spencer, as they were 
also basic to motion theory, would also shape Freud's model of the mind in his Project for a 
Scientific Psychology. 
It is on remembering that 'motive' and 'motion' spring from the same Latin root, 
movere, to move (OED, IX, 1132, 1128) that we can begin to understand how Spencer's chapter 
on 'The Direction of Motion' may help to illuminate the actions of Tito Melema. That Lewes 
also understood the shared root of these words, and the implication of this, can be seen in 
Problems of Life and Mind, in a passage that forms an example of how, on occasion, his 
writings and those of Eliot can appear interchangeable. That this passage is from the third 
series, which Eliot edited, is perhaps a reason for this; the effect of a shared intellectual 
environment is a further probable contributory factor. However, it is also worth considering the 
possibility that by the end of his life Lewes had seen each stage of the conception and creation 
of all of Eliot's various experiments in life, and his own work had been impacted by them, in 
this case to the point where his writing can almost be an extension of Eliot's own commentary 
on the moral history of Gwendolen Harleth, or Tito Melema. Lewes writes: 
44 Hanis and Johnston name this as chapter 9; in fact in the first edi~?n of 1862 the chapter on the 
direction ormotion was chapter 10. It was chapter 9 in all subsequent editiOns. 
45 Herbert Spencer, First Principles (London: Williams and Norgate, 1862), p. 289. 
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The actions of men are detennined by motives but the motives are detenn' d b I . 
d d . . . .' me y motors ymg eep own m the menta] structure, the motive or Ideal Impulse receiving its momentu fr h I 
d· . . F I' . '. m om t e genera pre Isposlhon ... ee mgs seemmgly transient are as It were a gathering spawn mn' t th I . th 
. d ] I' . , es emse ves m e 
organism, an are sow y, sIlently mcubated till they at last burst tiorth m' full tio d t Til • ' - nne ac or utterance (Problems, 3 Serzes, II, 138-39) . 
Tito has escaped from slavery, having promised to do all he can to free his guardian, 
Baldassarre, who is still enslaved. Arriving in Florence, however, he does not keep his promise, 
choosing to forget Baldassarre, ultimately reasoning that he is probably dead. Eliot makes it 
clear that Tito's decision not to go on his saving mission does not spring at this stage from any 
evil motive, any active ill-wish towards his guardian, rather, that it is a decision made from the 
purely natural impulses of a pleasure-loving young man: 
But, after all, why was he bound to go? What, looked at closely, was the end of all life, but to extract the 
utmo~t sum of pleasure? And was his own blooming life a promise of incomparably more pleasure, not 
for hImself only, but for others, than the withered wintry life of a man who was past the time of keen 
enjoyment, and whose ideas had stiffened into barren rigidity? Those ideas had all been sown in the fresh 
soil ofTito's mind, and were lively genns there: that was the proper order of things - the order of Nature, 
which treats all maturity as a mere nidus for youth.46 
Tito's motives, conforming to the basic laws of the direction of motion, are guided by a 
combination of traction, the pull of the promise of pleasure in Florence, and a natural tendency 
to follow the line of least resistance. He is simply, through a love of ease, following the path he 
has started upon. Spencer testifies that, 'movement set up in any direction is itself a cause of 
further movement in that direction ... In the case of matter moving through space, this principle 
is expressed in the law of inertia' (First Principles, p. 289). Once settled in Florence, the 
thought of returning to free his guardian contradicts Tito's natural inclination and is easily 
dismissed. 
It is the unexpected arrival of Baldassarre in Florence that makes a moral emergency for 
Tito, of the kind that Lewes would describe in Problems of Life and Mind, interestingly, again 
in terms of the laws of motion: 
No moving body does move uniformly in a straight line; no man does love his neighbour as himself. All 
bodies do move in the diagonal of the parallelogram of two inci~ent ~orces; .and all ~en are ~~d to a~ 
rightly on emergencies by what is a kind of moral instinct, orgaDised m prevIous habits ofactmg nghdy. 
The most striking thing about Tito's emergency is the fact that his own actions, his words, 
surprise him, emerge from a part of himself of which he was unaware. Standing on the steps of 
a church with his friends, witnessing the escape of a group of slaves, he finds himself 
confronted by Baldassarre: 
46 George Eliot, Romola (1862-63), ed. by Andrew Brown (Oxford: Oxford Univenity Press, 1998), p. 
1,1 ~eorge Henry Lewes, Problems 0/ Lifo and Mind, First Series: The Foundations 0/ a Creed. 2 vols 
(London: TrUbner &: Co., 1874), I, 306. Hereafter, ForpIdalions, I. 
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'This is another escaped prisoner,' said Lorenzo Tomabuoni. 'Who is hId ?' 
'S d l'·d T· e, won er. ome ma man, sure y, sal ItO. 
He hardly knew how the words had come to his lips· there are moments whe . ak 
d d ·d fi . n our passions spe an eCI e or us, and we seem to stand by and wonder They carry I·n them . . t· f. 
. . . an msplra Ion 0 cnme that 
m one mstant does the work of long premeditation. (Romola, p. 209) . 
That Tito was unaware that he contained such potential for sudden betrayal speaks not for 
Eliot's conception of an unchanging eternal unconscious within the individual which reveals 
itself at such moments, but for her belief in the potency of experience to modify the deepest 
recesses of individual character. Just as Lewes would write that the moral instinct is 'organised 
in previous habits of acting rightly', Eliot writes that 'our lives make a moral tradition for our 
individual selves ... and to have once acted nobly seems a reason why we should always be 
noble' (Romola, p. 331). It is a process that has inspired Tito's behaviour; a process, what is 
more, that conforms entirely to natural laws. 'That inexorable law of human souls, that we 
prepare ourselves for sudden deeds by the reiterated choice of good or evil which gradually 
determines character' (Romola, p. 212) finds a foundation in the universal law which Eliot had 
discussed with Spencer on that night in September 1861. 
That Spencer's First Principles is a discussion of universal laws, applicable equally to 
planetary movement and the circulation of the blood, is evident in the wealth of examples that 
he uses from all aspects of the natural world. One of the examples in his chapter on 'The 
Direction of Motion' may remind us of a metaphor which Eliot uses in Romola. Spencer 
describes the motion of raindrops when they make contact with the ground: 
In the course they take while trickling over its surface, in every rill, in every larger stream, and in every 
river, we see them descending as straight as the antagonism of surrounding objects permits ... from 
moment to moment [the motion's] route is the resultant of the lines of greatest traction and least 
resistance. (First Principles, p. 293) 
The idea of raindrops becoming incorporated into larger and larger channels of water, all of 
which conform to the laws of gravity and of least resistance, seems to be a suggestive one for 
Eliot. It speaks of large movement from small beginnings, each drop contributing to the general 
movement of the rest. It is an idea we see illuminating the progress that Tito makes, in his self-
justificatory thoughts and his selling of Baldassarre's property, towards the betrayal of his 
guardian, 'the ideas which had previously been scattered and interrupted had now concentrated 
themselves: the little rills of selfishness had united and made a channel, so that they could never 
again meet with the same resistance' (Romola, p. 97). Spencer too describes this breaking down 
of resistance within a channel: 
If the obstructive action of the tissues traversed. involves any reaction upon them. deducting from their 
obstructive power; then a subsequent motion between these: two points will meet .with less ~istance 
along this channel than the previous motion met with; and Will c~nsequently take thIS. channel still more 
decidedly. If so, every repetition will still further diminish the resistance offered by thIS route; and hence 
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will gradually be fonned between the two a pennanent line of co .. . . 
surrounding tissue in respect of the ease with which force traversems l~t u(nFl~atlOpn, .dlf!etnng greatly from the 
. Irsl rmclp es, p. 299) 
By such processes, Spencer writes, reflex actions are formed (p 299) S . . fi 
. . prmgmg rom the 
colloquy he holds with himself about Baldassarre, in which he articulates the words '[ believe 
he is dead', and his investing of the money from his gems which would I h· ·1 
revea 1m as a gUI ty 
man on his guardian's return, Tito's wish, an 'adjustment of ... desires' to his actions (Romola, 
p. 97), cannot be anything other than that Baldassarre is now dead. Therefore, when Tito sees 
him, his words, destroying him as a relation, as a sane being, carry out his wish; the dynamics 
behind this process too are described in Spencer's argument. He writes, 'probably it will be 
thought impossible to extend this reasoning so as to include volitions', but 'we are not without 
evidence that the transition from special desires to special muscular acts, conforms to the same 
princip Ie' : 
To represent in consciousness certain of our own movements, is partially to arouse the sensations 
accompanying such movements ... is partially to excite the appropriate motor-nerves and all the other 
nerve~ implicated. That is to ~ay, the volitio? is itself an incipient discharge along a line which previous 
experte~ces have r~ndered a h~e of least resistance. And the passing of volition into action is simply a 
completIon of the dIscharge. (First Principles, p. 301) 
Having mentally disowned and denied his guardian for all this time, then, to see him again 
inspires the only reaction possible, the same one that has occurred psychologically every time 
Baldassarre is brought to mind - a dismissal. 
The laws regarding the direction of motion could hardly be seen as Spencer's own 
conception,48 although, perhaps more than any of his contemporaries, he expressed them clearly 
and applied them widely, tracing them to numerous examples, biological and sociological, 
within microcosm and macrocosm alike. It was according to such laws, applied on a psychical 
scale, that Freud created his model of the mind in 1895. What Spencer expounds and 
exemplifies, Freud assumes as a basic rule of motion, which he duly builds his system upon. It 
is clear, however, that in doing this Freud believes that he is performing an unusual task. He 
writes to Fliess that he was 'vexed' by the intention 'to discover what form the theory of 
psychical functioning will take if a quantitative line of approach, a kind of economics of 
nervous force, is introduced into it' .49 Spencer's universal application of the laws of the 
direction of motion, including to 'the succession of all ... nervous changes' (First Principles, p. 
299), reveals that Freud's approach was not a novel combination of two disparate elements, as 
48 Goethe, for example, had applied the law of least resistance to human habits of thought: 'Man fmds 
himself in the midst of effects and cannot resist inquiring into causes; taking the line of least resistance, 
he fixes on the nearest as the best, and this pacifies him; for this is more particularly the way of human 
reason' (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 'From Wilhelm Meister's Jovmeyman Years (I 829f, in Maxims 
and Reflections, trans. by Elisabeth Stopp, ed. by Peter Hutchinson (Hannondsworth: Pengum. 1998), pp. 
S7-107 (p. 80». 
49 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 2S May, 189S, cited in 'Editor's Introduction', Project for a 
Scientific Psychology, in SE, I, 283-93 (p. 283). 
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he had believed. Even before the writing of First Principles we see this in Lewes's doctrine 
that 'Habits, Fixed Ideas, and what are called Automatic Actions, all depend on the tendency 
which a sensation has to discharge itself through the readiest channel' (Physiology, II. 58). We 
can therefore see parts of Freud's Project as an unwitting extension of the work of Spencer and 
Lewes. As such it provides further interesting insight into the character of Tito. 
The psychical system represented in Project for a Scientific Psychology is inherently an 
inert one. The 'quantity' within it, as in Spencer's system, follows the path which, resistance 
having been lowered by previous influxes, is easiest to traverse (Project, p. 300). The German 
term for this is Bahnung, which suggests a path-making process; interestingly its English 
translation is 'facilitation', which implies an element of ease which is not immediately present 
in the German term alone but is inherent in the process it describes. A preference for the easiest 
path is not the only characteristic of inertia displayed by the system. As I first described in my 
Introduction, it is, as a whole, governed by 'the principle of neuronal inertia: that neurones tend 
to divest themselves of Q [quantity]' (p. 296). However, becaus~ of the insistence of internal 
stimuli, the needs of the organism, from which it cannot escape as it would prefer but must take 
action to satiate, the system has to keep a store of energy in reserve. This gives rise to what 
would become known as the pleasure principle, expressed in 1920 thus: 'the mental apparatus 
endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it 
constant' .50 At the end of Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud considers the pleasure principle 
in relation to the life and death instincts. He concludes that, due to its tendency to guard against 
'increases of stimulation' that 'would make the task of living more difficult', which renders it 
an unobtrusive keeper of the peace, 'the pleasure principle seems actually to serve the death 
instincts' (Beyond, p. 63). This conclusion is an interesting comment on the results of inertia; 
Eliot in her characterization of Tito, for all his initial vitality, portrays his natural tendency as 
equally destructive. She makes it clear that Tito's plan of extracting 'the utmost sum of 
pleasure' from life is (like the pleasure principle) based on a principle of avoidance, exemplified 
in his 'elastic resistance to whatever is unpleasant' (Romola, p. 146). This is particularly 
evident in his meditations after his betrayal of Baldassarre. In a passage striking for its neat 
elucidation of this trait in Tito, and its simultaneous demonstration of the fact that his intentions 
are far from actively evil, Eliot foreshadows his eventual demise by her tracing of the results of 
such a philosophy of life: 
It was a characteristic fact in Tito's experience at this crisis, that no direct measures for ridding 
himself of Baldassarre ever occurred to him. All other possibilities passed through his mind, even to his 
own flight from Florence; but he never thought of any scheme for re~ovin~ his enemy. His dread 
generated no active malignity, and he would still have been glad not to gIve pam to any mortal. He had 
'0 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) in SE, ~VIII: 1:64 (p. 9). ~. my Introduction I 
discussed how the pleasure principle was informed by Fechner s prmclple of stability. Spencer. too, 
proposed a universal law of stability, in the law of equilibration, which dictated tha! '~e tenden~ of 
every organism, disordered by some unusual influence, [is] to return to a balanced state (FlI'$t Principia, 
p.517). 
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simply chosen to make life easy to himself - to carry his human lot, 'f 'bl' h ' 
h Id . h h' . I POSSI e, In sue a way that It s ou pmc un nowhere; and the chOIce had at various times landed h' , d' . 
• " lID In unexpecte posItIons The questIon now was '., whether all the resources of lying would save him fr be' h d ' 
consequences of that habitual choice, (pp,212-13) om Ing crus e by the 
One of the consequences of Tito' s choice of an easy existence is the loss of decision-
making capability, inspiring moments when his 'passions speak and decide for [him)' (p. 209). 
This renders his psychological workings particularly basic, to the point where he seems to have 
only two reactions: an attraction to pleasure, and a strong aversion to pain. His early encounter 
with Tessa under the plane-tree is symptomatic of the dynamics that rule his life: it is a 
combination of an avoidance of unpleasantness (in this case, a walk in the sun or the endurance 
of her tears), and the inclination which desire sets up within him, Rising to leave Tessa and to 
walk to the house of Romola, he is beaten back by the heat of the day: 
Tito had an unconquerable aversion to anything unpleasant, even when an object very much loved and 
desired was on the other side of it. He had risen early ... and had been already walking in the sun: he was 
inclined for a siesta, and inclined all the more because little Tessa was there, and seemed to make the air 
softer. (Romola, p. 105) 
With Tito the nature and subtlety of Eliot's deterministic approach is nicely illustrated. He is a 
character who is ruled by his impulses; but this is as a result of the flabbiness of his will. Rather 
as Lamarck's snake has lost its legs through their lack of use, Tito's will has shrivelled in 
comparison to more active aspects of his character. Lewes, in Problems of Life and Mind, 
would write, in a discussion of freedom of will: 
No one supposes that our desires are free. Such freedom as there is consists in the conflict of 
desires, and the choice determined by the predominance of the most urgent; and this predominance is 
partly due to the strength of the immediate stimulus, and partly to the vision of possibilities and 
consequences which the desire awakens. It is here that Desire passes into Volition; so that however 
powerful a stimulus may be in exciting a desire, if it be connected in Experience with painful 
consequences we are thereby educated to resist the desire, or to avoid incurring the stimulus which 
awakens it. Because the Will is thus the abstract expression of the product of Experience, it is educable, 
and becomes amenable to the Moral Law. (Problems, Jrrl Series, I, 109) 
At each stage Tito has the opportunity to reverse his slide towards doom, to confess. But as 
Eliot writes, interestingly using a metaphor which invokes animal development, 'confession 
involved a change of purpose. But Tito had as little bent that way as a leopard has to lap milk 
when its teeth are grown' (Romola, p. 393). Despite the fact that he is likened to an adult 
leopard, Tito is rendered infantile in his uneducated responses, in his inability to exercise will in 
the face of the pull of pleasure and his disinclination for unpleasant experiences. 
In the third series of Problems of Life and Mind, Lewes wrote: 
Every organism shrinks from what is disturbing and disagreeable, and .c1.ings to w~t. is in hannony ~ith 
it. Action is • necessity; all that is in our power is the direction of aCtiVIty, and thiS IS momentiy guided 
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by neural excitations, and by sensations which are pleasurable or painful Taught by these, the individual 
learns to direct his activities. (Problems, 3rt1 Series, I, 39-40) . 
Failing to reap the benefits of a moral education, in which unpleasure is early attached to 
wrongdoing through punishment, Tito's activities remain directed by his own neural excitations. 
The attraction to pleasure and the avoidance of unpleasure are for Freud too the fundamental 
pullers and pushers within the psyche, and 'unpleasure remains the only means of education' 
(Project, p. 370). In the Project, Freud describes the dynamics of satisfaction and pain, whose 
workings are dictated by early experience. The former occurs when the child, in need of food, 
for example, cries, and is attended to: 
When the helpful person has perfonned the work of the specific action in the external world for 
the ~elp~ess on~, the latter is ?t. a position, by means of reflex contrivances, immediately to carry out in 
the mtenor of his body the activity necessary for removing the endogenous stimulus. The total event then 
constitutes an experience of satisfaction, which has the most radical results on the development of the 
individual's functions. (p. 318) 
The legacy of this experience is a psychic connection between the feeling of need and the 
mnemic trace of the object that answered to that need. The experience of pain, conversely, 
leads to a facilitation between the feeling of an 'inclination to discharge' (p. 320; a psychical 
defence mechanism which retains something of the original trend towards the flight from 
stimulus (p. 296)), and the trace in memory of the object that has caused this pain. Freud writes: 
The residues of the two kinds of experiences [of pain and of satisfaction] which we have been 
discussing are affects and wishful states. These have in common the fact that they both involve a raising 
of Q11 tension in ljTSl ••• Both states are of the greatest importance for the passage [of quantity] in 111', for 
they leave behind them motives for it which are of a compUlsive kind ... the experience of pain leads to a 
repulsion, a disinclination to keeping the hostile mnemic image cathected. (pp. 321-22, editor's brackets) 
In the words of Harold Transome of Felix Holt (1866), 'a memory [is] a nasty, uneasy thing,;S2 
Tito is disinclined to think of what gives him pain, that Baldassarre may yet be alive and 
waiting for his return. Consequently, on his return Tito's actions display the symptoms of the 
compulsive motive forces that reside in him. Freud writes that if the unpleasant memory is 
reawakened, perhaps by 'a fresh perception', then 'a state arises which is not pain but which 
nevertheless has a resemblance to it. It includes unpleasure and the inclination to discharge 
which corresponds to the experience of pain' (p. 320). It is certainly a discharging that we, and 
Tito, witness in his reaction to Baldassarre on the church steps. Eliot would see the encounter in 
tenns of the economy of forces. Elsewhere in the novel she writes of such a release of 
unwelcome pent-up force; of Romola's need to express her anger to her husband she comments, 
'she could not weigh probabilities; she must discharge her heart' (Romola, p. 427). Words like 
,. The system which contains memories. 
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'current' are also frequently used in her fiction, with regard to emotional force, such as 
enthusiasm (Romola, p. 432). In Felix Holt, Esther Lyon's need to testify at Felix's trial is 
described thus: 
Some of that ardour which has flashed o~t and illuminated all poetry and history was burning to-day in 
the bosom of sweet Esther Lyon. In thIS, at least, her woman's lot was pe~ect th t h ' 
. d h ti 111 .. • a er woman s 
passIon ~ er reverence or rarest goodness rushed together in an undivided current. And to-day they 
~ere mak.m~ one dan~er, one terror, one irresistible impulse for her heart. Her feelings were win 
mto a necessIty for actIon, rather than a resolve to act. (p. 373) gro g 
There is a sense of discharge here too; after the deed is done Eliot writes, 'the acting out of that 
strong impulse had exhausted her energy' (p. 375). Such moments in Eliot's fiction reflect 
Lewes's doctrine in The Physiology of Common Life that unites sensation and motion in a 
common set of rules, 'a self-terminating sensation is as inconceivable as a self-tenninating 
motion. The wave of force is propelled onwards, and for ever onwards, now in this direction, 
now in that' (Physiology, II, 55). Such forces must find a release of some kind. 
Such motives must find satisfaction, to rephrase. The etymological roots of 
'satisfaction' are found in two words, satis, enough, andfacere, to do (OED, XIV, 504); it is 
therefore a dynamic term, entirely fitting for the sort of action in which the forces of the psyche 
almost irresistibly manifest themselves in the deeds of Tito and Esther Lyon. In both these 
characters the action undertaken is not so much a pleasure as a psychical necessity; it is 
noteworthy that, following this term to its roots, it is a necessary fulfilment rather than a sense 
of pleasure that is emphasized here too. In the rest of this chapter I will investigate 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda as complex explorations of how humanity knowingly and 
unknowingly seeks and attains different kinds of satisfaction, for necessary release, for pleasure, 
but always as an outcome of motive. Middlemarch at times seems to be a battleground for the 
desires of its characters. What satisfies one often excludes the satisfaction of another. 
Reverend Farebrother's words to Fred Vincy about Mary Garth, 'I am sure you know that the 
satisfaction of your affections stands in the way of mine' ,'3 are symptomatic of this novel, 
which is charged with egoistic impulses, wants and wishes, all demanding fulfilment. Rarely, 
however, are circumstances conducive to the gratification of these yearnings. Events rarely fit 
expectations. Fred Vincy's encounter with Peter Featherstone, from whom he expected to 
receive sufficient money to payoff his debts, is an example of this - 'What can the fitness of 
things mean, if not their fitness to a man's expectations? Failing this, absurdity and atheism 
gape behind him.' (M, pp. 163-64) We may think that the optimistic, pleasure-seeking Fred is 
an exception; after all, his too-cheerful attitude is an invitation to disappointment. However, 
throughout the novel we encounter characters in a similar state of firm expectation and 
'2 George Eliot, Felix Holt: The Radical (1866), ed. by Fred. C. Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), p. 342. 
53 George Eliot, MiddJemarch: A Study 0/ Provincial Life (1871-72), ed. by W. J. Harvey 
(Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1985). p. 727. Hereafter, M. 
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misguided faith in the 'fitness of things'. These expectations demand' t' ~ . d' I Ing sa ISlactJon ISP ay 
themselves in a range of symptoms. But they also impact on a wl'der s h f' h p ere 0 eXistence t an 
the immediate life of the individual from which they arise. In the satisfaction of Tito's motive 
we see damage inflicted on those around him; in the satisfaction of Esther's, the beginning of 
the healing of common life in Treby Magna. Similarly in Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda the 
manifestation of motive in its satisfaction affects the wider life. In Problems of Life and Mind 
Lewes identified two major dynamic forces within humanity in a passage which goes some way 
to setting up a linked dichotomy that will infonn what follows: 
. .. M~n is n~t s~ply an Animal Org~ism, he is also an unit in a Social Organism. He leads an 
mdlvldual!lfe, whIch ~s ~lso part of a c~ll~ctIve life. Hence two classes of Motors: the personal, and the 
sympathetIc - the egOIstIc and the altruIstIC. From these chiefly issue the Animal sentient life and the 
Human intellectual and moral life. (Foundations, I, 109) , 
Although it becomes clear, on reading Eliot's fiction and Lewes's psychological writings, that 
these two motors are not mutually exclusive (suggested by the word 'chiefly' in the above 
passage, Lewes's qualifier), satisfaction will usually occur according to which of them becomes 
dominant in the individual. In the rest of the present section I will exam ine the issues of 
egoistic motives, in the next I will start to consider the satisfactions attendant on the altruistic 
impulse. That pleasure can be gleaned from altruism is often overlooked; by examining Lewes 
and Eliot's theories on the development of altruism, I will attempt to show that satisfaction from 
this source is in fact a fulfilment of both the personal and sympathetic drives, containing the 
possibility of a complete gratification for the individual. 
In George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science Shuttleworth ably explores the 
dynamic models of force that make up Middlemarch, focusing on the inhibiting labyrinth which 
is used as a metaphor by Eliot to illustrate the dispersal of energy. In her commentary on the 
relationship between Dorothea and Casaubon she speaks of the idea of the issue and effect of 
force and the need for free-flowing energy along wide channels (GE & 19th c., pp. 157-65). 
However, I believe that she does not pay quite enough attention to the concept of satisfaction, 
and its role within the novel. Free-flowing energy has to end somewhere in action. Casaubon's 
psyche does resemble a series of closed corridors; he is impotent and issueless, it is true, but 
these personal traits can also be expressed in terms of his ability to be satisfied. Early on we 
perceive that this may be a problem; when Dorothea asks on the honeymoon whether the trip 
has satisfied him academically, he says, '''Yes,'' ... with that peculiar pitch of voice which 
makes the word haifa negative' (M, p. 231). In Chapter 29, Eliot paints a picture ofCasaubon, 
some weeks after the wedding, making it clear that he was ill-equipped by habit of mind and 
physiology to enjoy the full benefits of marriage: 
To know intense joy without a strong bodily frame, one must have an enthusiastic: soul. Mr Casaubon 
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had never had a strong bodily frame, and his soul was sensitive WI'thOUt be' th'" 
I " " mg en USlastlC: It was too anguld to thrill out of self-conSCIOusness mto passionate delight, I't went fl tt' 'th 
, '" , ,o  u enng 10 e swampy 
ground where It was hatched, thinkmg of Its wmgs and never flying It I'S an I t be be 
h 11 h'gh , ,,' uneasy 0 at 51, to ~ at we ca I ly taught and y~t n~t to enJoy: to be present at this great spectacle of life and never to be 
hberated from a s~all hungry shlvermg self - never t~ be fully possessed by the glory we behold, never 
to have our conscIOusness rapturously transformed mto the vividness of a tho ght, th d f 
'h f' u e ar our 0 a pasSIOn, t e energy 0 an actIOn, but always to be scholarly and uninspired amb't' d' 'd 
I d d' , , I 10US an tlml scrupu ous an lDl-slghted, (pp, 313-14) , 
Casaubon, by nature, is excitable, but that is all. There is no result, no issue, no action, simply 
sensitiveness, stimulation without gratification, Taken in the context of Lewes's theories on 
matter and force - 'A thing is what it does' - Casaubon is an all-but-useless human being,~ 
something that he himself realizes, an awareness that causes his energy to be channelled into 
resistance rather than enthusiasm, Eliot writes that he had 'a melancholy absence of passion in 
his efforts at achievement, and a passionate resistance to the confession that he had achieved 
nothing' (M, pp. 454-55). The effect is an uncharged world, such as we see in Dorothea's blue 
room - 'the shrunken furniture, the never-read books' (p. 307). 
In frequent allusions to Casaubon's age and its symptoms (his warts, which disgust 
Celia, his legs, which Sir James Chettam derides), his own conception of his single state ('an 
affection hitherto unwasted', p. 67), and her description of his set personality ('this mental 
estate mapped out a quarter of a century before', p. 314), Eliot's implication is that after a life of 
abstinence it may be too late for him to enter into any pursuits that actively seek and achieve 
satisfaction. Casaubon's experience, unsurprisingly perhaps, finds resonance in Freudian 
theory. In his 1908 essay "'Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modem Nervous Illness' Freud 
writes: 
In general I have not gained the impression that sexual abstinence helps to bring about energetic and self-
reliant men of action or original thinkers or bold emancipators and reformers. Far more often it goes to 
produce well-behaved weaklings who later become lost in the great mass of people that tends to follow, 
unwillingly, the leads given by strong individuals.55 
This mass of 'well-behaved weaklings' could easily include Casaubon, whose maniage, after 
the initial disruptive honeymoon period, subsides into something that is well-behaved, and 
nothing else: 
Inclination yearned back to its old, easier custom. And the deeper he went in domesticity the !"ore .did 
the sense of acquitting himself and acting with propriety predominate over any other satisfaction. 
Marriage like religion and erudition, nay, like authorship itself, was fated to become an outward 
requirem~t, and Edward Casaubon was bent on fulfilling unimpeachably all requirements. (M, pp. 314-
IS) 
54 George Henry Lewes, Problems 0/ Life and Mind, First ~;es: The FoundotioM 0/ a Creed, 2 vols 
(London: TrObner &: Co., 187S), fl, 372. Hereafter, Fount/atloM, II. • . 
55 Sigmund Freud, "'Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modem Nervous Illness (1908), m SEt IX. 177-204 
(p. 197). 
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This subsidence finds its psychological explanation in Problems of Life and Mind. Lewes 
describes how in the constant fonning and refonning of neural groups within the mind. 'by 
frequent repetition some groups more readily fall into the old places after stimulation, and are 
refonned as before. They are then what we call "organised'" (Problems 3'" C'. II 140) 
, ~erles,. . 
Lewes then goes on to look at the implications this has for the individual psyche and for society: 
. . . The tende.ncy o~ ~?UpS to. refonn .in establishe~ lines is at once a source of power and a 
~lIm.tatl~n ... ~e hl~ly CIVIlIsed. socIal state IS far less easIly modified than one less organised: existing 
m~tltutlo~s WhICh gI~e the state Its powers are obstacles to the fonnation of new and better institutions. 
DIscoverIes meet wIth the fiercest opponents in men who have defmite conceptions on the subject 
without flexibility of mind. (Problems, 3rd Series, II, 141) • 
It is Casaubon's inflexible tendency of confonning to existing stale social requirements 
which causes him to immediately dismiss the unconventional but fair proposition from 
Dorothea that he should give Will his rightful inheritance. Further, he is like Freud's 
description of the sexually abstinent weakling, in that it is the strong and flexible people, such 
as Will and Dorothea, that he seems most to resent, as his will reveals, so that these two fall 
doubly victim to his traits - those weakly confonning ones in life, and those forcefully deviant 
ones in death. Casaubon, on understanding that his end is approaching, reacts thus: 
In such an hour the mind does not change its lifelong bias, but carries it onwards in imagination to the 
other side of death, gazing backward ... What was Mr Casaubon's bias his acts will give us a clue to. He 
held himself to be, with some private scholarly reservations, a believing Christian, as to estimates of the 
present and hopes of the future. But what we strive to gratify, though we may call it a distant hope, is an 
immediate desire; the future estate for which men drudge up city alleys exists already in their imagination 
and love. And Mr Casaubon's immediate desire was not for divine communion and light divested of 
earthly conditions; his passionate longings, poor man, clung low and mist-like in very shady places. (M, 
p.462) 
Casaubon's will, in fulfilling his desire of crushing Will Ladislaw in some sense, and giving 
expression to his jealousy of Will's relationship with Dorothea and his resentment of her 
questioning independence, loses him what above all things he worked towards in life - a lasting 
respected reputation. His sources of passion and therefore of satisfaction have become twisted 
and so his desires flow into inappropriate channels - 'the prevision of his own unending bliss 
could not nullify the bitter savours of irritated jealousy and vindictiveness' (p. 457). His 
suspicion is that Will and Dorothea represent, as well as a positive, vital, active force, a 
knowledge of his profound academic ineffectiveness. Unable to gain satisfaction in life, he is 
impelled towards it a sense that both twists the truth of the nature of the relationship between 
Dorothea and Will and shies from viewing the consequences. It is a perverted and shameful act 
which shocks his neighbours. The idea of slowly-gathered unconscious motive suddenly 
causing, against our better nature, actual effects that will last infinitely longer than the 
satisfaction gained, is a common one in Eliot's work. 
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Bulstrode is a study in the relations between desire habl·t and consc· d . 
, lousness, an smce 
his move towards crime in the present day is gradual we can chart the th b· 
, processes at rmg 
desires from simply being ideas into being fulfilled. It is important to understand the mechanics 
and economy of Bulstrode's psyche, and Eliot takes the utmost care to present to the reader a 
dynamic picture of all the forces at work in him. For he is, in a sense, a picture of civilized 
man. Endowed with strong passions, especially those to be 'important and predominating' (p. 
668) he attempts to rein them in, using religion to do this. For religion provides an alternative, a 
respectable channel for the instincts: 
He w~ simply a ~an w.hose des~es h~d be~n stron~er than his theoretic beliefs, and who had gradually 
explamed the gratIficatIon of hiS desrres mto satIsfactory agreement with those beliefs. If this be 
hypocrisy, it is a process which shows itself occasionally in us all, to whatever confession we belong. (p. 
667) 
Freud makes a similar point to Eliot's last about hypocrisy in his Thoughts for the Times on War 
and Death (1915), written at a time when humanity was throwing off its moral mask: 
Elsewhere the pressure of civilization brings in its train no pathological results, it is true, but is shown in 
malformations of character, and in the perpetual readiness of the inhibited instincts to break through to 
satisfaction at any suitable opportunity. Anyone thus compelled to act continually in accordance with 
precepts which are not the expression of his instinctual inclinations, is living, psychologically speaking, 
beyond his means, and may objectively be described as a hypocrite, whether he is clearly aware of the 
incongruity or not. It is undeniable that our contemporary civilization favours the production of this form 
of hypocrisy to an extraordinary extent. One might venture to say that it is built up on such hypocrisy, 
and that it would have to submit to far-reaching modifications if people were to undertake to live in 
accordance with psychological truth. 56 
And something of the nature of the breakthrough of Bulstrode's instincts to satisfaction does 
actually occur, when John Raffles, a figure from the banker's guilty past, arrives with the threat 
to reveal the truth about Bulstrode. It is no wonder that Bulstrode finds himself a mass of strong 
and immoral desires at this; to reach the religious state in which we find him he had 'taken his 
selfish passions into discipline and clad them in severe robes, so that he had walked with them 
as a devout quire, till now that a terror had risen among them, and they could chant no longer, 
but threw out their common cries for safety' (M, p. 758). Again this image finds an echo in 
later work by Freud on the dynamics of group psychology in which he describes the effect of 
the loss of the group leader: 'The loss of the leader in some sense or other, the birth of 
misgivings about him, brings on the outbreak of panic ... the mutual ties between the members 
of the group disappear ... The group vanishes in dust' .57 It is Bulstrode's lack of proper 
leadership by his conscious will that causes his passions to run loose, so that his past 'had risen 
and immersed his thoughts as if with the terrible irruption of a new sense overburthening the 
feeble being' (M, p. 667), leading to a complete unmasking of his self-preserving instinct. An 
56 Sigmund Freud, 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death' (1915), in SE, XIV, 273-302 (p. 284). 
57 Sigmund Freud, 'Group Psychology and the Analysis oftbe Ego' (1921), in SE, XVln, 65·143 (p.97). 
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image appears of the true aim that would bring satisfaction with it - 'Raffles dead was the 
image that brought release ... imperious will stirred murderous impUlses towards this brute life, 
over which wiII, by itself, had no power' (p 761) The will of God I·n tho ·tu t· be II 
. . IS Sl a lon, comes a 
but powerless - 'He knew that he ought to say, "Thy will be done", and he said it often. But the 
intense desire remained that the will of God might be the death of that hated man.' (p. 750) 
Desires and impulses, however, because of psychical processes that cannot be said to be 
conscious or direct, need little opportunity to manifest themselves, as we have seen in 
Casaubon's wiII. A layered psyche produces different strata of moral feeling, so that: 
B~lstrode shrank from a direct li~ with an intensity disproportionate to the number of his more indirect 
mIsdeeds. .But many ~f these mIsdeeds were like the subtle muscular movements which are not taken 
account of m the conSCIOusness, though they bring about the end that we fix our mind on and desire (pp 
739-40) . . 
Bulstrode's wish is fulfilled, by slow steps, and by an element of the mind that the conscious 
mind turns its gaze away from. We are taken through every step of Bulstrode's psychological 
progress from citizen with a secret to murderer. In Daniel Deronda's less straightforward 
killing, it is essential that the steps to Grandcourt's death are enumerated minutely, so that 
Gwendolen's guilt or otherwise can be assessed. In this novel the agents of cause, effect and 
cause in their tum, are even more finely linked. The method of Grandcourt's death finds its 
echo in Lewes's metaphorical style, as he expands on his doctrine that 'nothing acts by itself 
(Foundations, II, 389): 
We have already seen that the habit of fIXing on some one or two conspicuous agents as the 
cause of a change, because this addition disturbs the existing relations, is consistent with the defmition of 
force, "that which produces or tends to produce a change." On this ground we say ... "The man was 
drowned because his foot slipped in crossing the plank." No one supposes ... that the man could be 
drowned unless he fell into water of a certain depth of less specific gravity than his body, and there was 
no one at hand to assist him, or he was unable to swim; - these conditions, positive and negative, are left 
unspecified, being presupposed, and only the new conspicuous condition is specified as the cause. 
(Foundations, II, 393-94) 
The new conspicuous condition in Grandcourt's drowning is Owendolen's momentary 
hesitation in jumping in to rescue him. Contributing to this hesitation are a number of factors, 
all with an underlying motive, 'an urgent hatred dragging her towards its satisfaction' (DD, p. 
866). For as Eliot writes, 'passion is of the nature of seed, and finds nourishment within, 
tending to a predominance which determines all currents towards itself, and makes the whole 
life its tributary' (pp. 736-37). Like Tito, Owendolen has not undergone enough discipline, 
enough practice in the use of her will for her better nature, expressed later in her attempt to save 
Grandcourt, to immediately prevail. What Lewes would call her 'moral instinct' is not 
sufficiently developed to act in such a calamity; in addition, she has, by making immoral 
decisions in the past, which Eliot describes as a forsaking of her conscience (p. 867), lost a 
certain amount of her ability to instantaneously make the right decision. 
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That Eliot is aware of the sort of desires, battled with by the will, that even benevolent 
minds are subject to is emphasized by her explanation of the reaction of Rex, who immediately 
struggles 'with a tumultuary crowd of thoughts that were an offence against his better will.' 
when he hears of Grandcourt's death. Rex is an open, young character, also uninterested in 
vices, whose motive is that he blindly loves Gwendolen. Describing his triumphant feelings, 
Eliot asks, 'who has been quite free from egoistic escapes of the imagination picturing desirable 
consequences on his own future in the presence of another's misfortune, sorrow, or death?' (p. 
776). Although Will Ladislaw does not consciously wish for the death of Casaubon, it is he that 
plants the first real seeds of suspicion about the value of Casaubon 's studies in Dorothea, when 
he reveals that the Gennan scholars have already drawn the conclusions her husband has been 
groping to find. Eliot describes the act in these tenns - 'Mortals are easily tempted to pinch the 
life out of their neighbour's buzzing glory, and think that such killing is no murder' (M, p. 240). 
Constantly explaining desires to kill, of which we see the whole gamut in Eliot's 1870s 
novels, in tenns of a capability that exists within much of humanity, foreshadows Freud's later 
assertions on the instinctual selves that live beneath the civilized masks we wear. However, it 
seems that Eliot is even more extreme than Freud in her view of the effects that such wishes 
have on their target. Freud writes: 
For strangers and for enemies we do acknowledge death, and consign them to it quite as readily and 
unhesitatingly as did primaeval man. There is, it is true, a distinction here which will be pronounced 
decisive so far as real life is concerned. Our unconscious does not carry out the killing; it merely thinks it 
and wishes it. But it would be wrong so completely to undervalue this psychical reality as compared with 
factual reality. It is significant and momentous enough. In our unconscious impulses we daily and hourly 
get rid of anyone who stands in our way, of anyone who has otT ended or injured us ... 
And so, if we are to be judged by our unconscious wishful impulses, we ourselves are, like 
primaeval man, a gang of murderers. It is fortunate that all these wishes do not possess the potency that 
was attributed to them in primaeval times; in the cross-fire of mutual curses mankind would long since 
have perished, the best and wisest of men and the loveliest and fairest of women with the rest. (Thoughts 
for the Times, p. 297) 
Eliot would not say, like Freud, that the death wish for others finds its primary outlet in curses 
which are, in effect, harmless; she believes it can act as a motor towards deeds which certain 
individuals, such as Bulstrode and Gwendolen, are ill-prepared to avoid carrying out. The 
difference in the outlook, of Eliot, along with Lewes, and Freud, in this and in many other issues 
pertaining to the mind, can be found in the concept of repression. Many Victorian 
psychologists, as I have discussed throughout this thesis, conceived of unconscious mental 
processes, the 'obscure recesses' of the psyche, but they omitted the element, essential to 
Freud's theory, of virtually absolute repression, whereby what is unconscious is, simply, 
'inadmissible to consciousness' .sa Hence Eliot's characters engage in a more conscious battle 
with their desires. Owendolen's wish to kill Orandcourt, that she suddenly discovers outside 
herself, is recognized as her own (DD, p. 761). To his credit, Carl Rotenberg also 
5. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation o/Dreams (1900), SE, IV &. V. ix-629 (p. 613). 
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acknowledges this lack of repression in Eliot's portrayal of the mind, selecting a very important 
illustrative quotation from the novel (DD, p. 669) with which to support his point: 
In the EliotlLewes fonnulation, there is often no absolute distinction between consc' d ' 
• '. 10US an unconscIous 
thinkmg; rather, there are gradatIons through which the two kinds of thinking can inte ' I 'th h 
h 'F' d' h' h ' nnmg e WI eac ot er: antasles move WIt m er like ghosts, making no break in her more acknowled d . 
d fi d' b .... ge conscIOusness an m mg no 0 structIon m It: dark rays domg their work invisibly in the broad light' (R t be 263) . 0 en rg, p. 
Partly unacknowledged but recognizable, this is the sort of motive or wish that we see 
influencing the actions of Eliot's characters, rather than the all-but-inaccessible Freudian 
repressed wish, whose dynamics I am now about to explore with regard to the behaviour of 
Freud himself. Many of the satisfactions of desire that I have discussed above have been largely 
unthinking processes. However, the effects of motive can be equally manifest in much more 
cerebral productions; thinking, judging, writing, for example. In his Physiology of Common 
Life, expressing a belief that he would more and more eloquently explore as his career 
progressed, Lewes writes, 'we cling to certain ideas because they are pleasant, or interest us, or 
because some remote pain or pleasure stimulates us'; conversely, 'we repress all other thoughts 
as they arise, just as we should repress movements which disturbed a pleasurable sensation' 
(PhYSiology, II, 217). To illustrate this principle's application to intellectual processes, Lewes 
turned to a contemporary thinker for whom he had great respect, Alexander Bain.59 Bain's 
account of James Watt's mental processes as he was inventing the steam-engine is revealing, 
not least because of his connection of the highest orders of thought with the same workings of 
pleasure and pain by which the behaviour of the infant is guided: 
'When Watt invented his "parallel motion" for the steam-engine, his intellect and observation 
were kept at work, going out in all directions for the chance of some suitable combination rising to view; 
his sense of the precise thing to be done was the constant touchstone of every contrivance occurring to 
him, and all the successive suggestions were arrested, or repelled, as they came near to, or disagreed with, 
this touchstone ... The promptitude that we display in setting aside or ignoring what is seen not to answer 
our present wants, is volition, pure, perennial, and unmodified; the power seen in our infant struggles for 
nourishment and wannth, or the riddance of acute pain ... No fonnal resolution of the mind ... no special 
intervention of the "ego," or the personality, is essential to this putting forth of the energy of retaining on 
the one hand, or repUdiating on the other, what is felt to be clearly suitable, or clearly unsuitable, to the 
feelings or aims of the moment ... In all these new constructions, be they mechanical, verbal, scientific, 
practical, or aesthetical, the outgoings of the minds are necessarily at random; the e~d alone is !he thing 
that is clear to the view, and with that there is a perception of the fitness of every passmg suggestIon. The 
volitional energy keeps up the attention, or the active search, and the moment that anything in point rises 
before the mind, springs upon that like a wild beast on its prey.' (Quoted in Physiology, II, 218-19) 
This passage is very valuable, not least because of its clear message that what is being described 
here is an intellectual process which has at its base the simple seeking of satisfaction. It is 
interesting that Watt is in essence inventing a system; the juxtaposition of this invention and 
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Bain's likening of its process to 'the riddance of acute pain' looks fi d t F d' 
orwar 0 reu s account of 
a night's work on his Project for a Scientific Psychology, as reported in a letter to Wilhelm 
Fliess. It also reflects Eliot's comment on her own creative proc I· I 
esses, a so In a etter, that 
'when a subject has begun to grow in me I suffer terribly until it has wrought itself out _ 
become a complete organism; and then it seems to take wing and go away from me,.60 Freud 
writes: 
During an industrious night last week, when I was suffering from that degree of pain which b . bo t 
th t· 1 d· . fi rmgs a u e oP?Da con Itlon or my mental activities, the barriers suddenly lifted, the veils dropped, 61 and 
everyth~g became transp~ent - from the details of the neuroses to the determinants of consciousness. 
Everyth.mg seemed to fall mto place~ the cogs meshed, I had the impression that the thing now really was 
a ~achme that shortly would functlOn on its own ... Naturally, I can scarcely manage to contain my 
dehght.62 
The last word is, in German, 'Vergniigen,63 - 'pleasure, enjoyment, delight'.64 Jones's 
translation renders the last sentence as 'naturally I don't know how to contain myself for 
pleasure' (Jones, I, 382). There is, as with Eliot's description, a sense of charged pain followed 
by the pleasure of tension released, as the creation, whether a machine-like or a bird-like entity, 
becomes independent of its creator. 
As we have seen in Bain's description of Watt's creative processes, there is a sense in 
which the highest intellectual processes can be likened to very basic impulses, especially that of 
59 Alexander Bain (1818-1903), a psychologist. In the 1850s he had written a treatise composed of two 
volumes: The Senses and the Intellect (1855) and The Emotions and the Will (1859), which are his most 
famous works. 
60 George Eliot to Alexander Main, 4 November 1872, in GEL, V, 323-24 (p. 324). 
61 Freud's image of the veils dropping can be interestingly set against a comment by Lewes in 1860, in 
which he writes, having discussed the nature of voluntary and involuntary action, concluding that every 
occurrence in the body is a reaction to sensation, in some form or another, rendering nothing voluntary: 
'It is a topic on which no man will, wisely, dogmatise. The veil of mystery will never be lifted. We who 
stand before that veil, and speculate as to what is behind it, can but build systems; we cannot see the 
truth' (Physiology, II, 225). However, if we follow Lewes into the 1870s, his attitude has changed In 
Foundations of a Creed, he describes the tendency of lecturers who, having offered their scientific 
theories to an audience, then say, "'Here Science pauses. Beyond this we cannot go. Beyond this lie 
mysteries before which the wisest philosopher is no better than a child" - immediately a round of 
applause bursts forth: numerous feet stamp approval; flattered Ignorance feels at ease, and shakes its head 
significantly. "Ah! you see, Science is vain there. In spite of its proud boasts, there are mysteries it 
cannot penetrate!"'. Lewes comments, 'now surely it is no matter of exhilarption, but rather of deep 
regret, that we fmd ourselves in a universe of mystery, compelled to grope our way amid shadows ... 
Inaccessibility is relative, and science has answered questions which, to minds unfamiliar with its data 
and procedures, might seem hopelessly beyond human power' (Foundations, I, 22-23). Freud should not 
be seen as too presumptuous for seeking to draw aside the veil - his hunger to do this may have been 
connected with a trend towards a confidence in solving the mysteries of the universe of which Lewes's 
increasing boldness was a symptom. 
62 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 20 October 1895, in The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to 
Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904, trans. and ed. by Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), pp. 146-47 (p. 146). Hereafter, Freud-Fliess. 
63 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 20 October 1895, in AIlS den Anftingen tier P~hoanaJyse: Brie/en 
an Wilhelm Fliess, Abhandlungen und Notizen QIIS den Jam-en /887-/902, eel. by Mane Bonaparte, Anna 
Freud and Ernst Kris (London: Imago, 1950), pp. 139-40 (p. 140). . 
64 Langenscheidt's Condensed Muret-Sanders German Dictionary: German-English, eel. by Hemz 
Messinger and othen (Berlin and Munich: Langenscheidt, 1982), p. 1133. 
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hunger. In The Physiology of Common Life Lewes did make a direct connection between 
hunger and the need to work. Anticipating his later ideas on society he writes, 'let food be 
abundant and easy of access, and civilisation becomes impossible' (Phy'Si l I"') B.' 
o ogy, ,_. am s 
view, however, is more subtle, suggesting a gratification inherent in the very act of thinking. 
This was an idea that Lewes was to build on, as he astutely realized that any activity built on the 
mechanics of tension followed by gratification was liable to be vulnerable to the activity of 
wishes and thereby the warping of results. It is plain that he has imbibed the ideas inherent in 
Bain's account of Watt's search for the answer which would tally with his 'sense of the precise 
thing to be done', his 'touchstone', from the following passage: 
Ex/l.ectation is a state ~ which we are adapting the organism to a particular response that is dimly felt in 
deSIre, or clearly seen m thought; and hence the discomfort felt when this expectation is contradicted· the 
satisfaction, when it is fulfilled. The animal, expecting the appearance of its prey, is ready to sprin~; all 
its muscles are adapted to that spring. The mind expecting the emergence of a particular thought as the 
conclusion of its search, is also ready to spring, and will seize only such evidences as lead to that 
conclusion. (Problems, jrd Series, II, 105) 
The last sentence both reflects Bain's idea of the mind as a wild beast seizing its prey, and adds 
another element to Bain' s vision of cognitive thought. In a progression from his 1859 doctrine 
that 'our philosophy, when not borrowed, is little more than the expression of our personality' 
(Physiology, II, 68), Lewes is suggesting that our putting together of an argument or theory is, 
far from an objective scientific process, guided by the law that 'we only see what interests us' 
(Problems, 3rd Series, II, 106). Elsewhere he expresses this even more vehemently: 'Who does 
not know how the wish to find some proposition true will suppress the adverse evidence and 
intensify the favourable evidence? Cognition has here its impulse in desire, and judgment is the 
satisfaction of the impulse.' (Problems, 3rd Series, II, 101) 
In my Introduction I touched on the sort of language that Freud uses in the text of his 
hastily-written Project for a Scientific Psychology, as part of my explanation of why he may 
have wanted it to remain undiscovered. Since then, I have revealed, in my last chapter, Freud's 
deep-seated need for success, which contributed to his seizing of the seduction theory as a key 
to all neuroses, and above I have added Eliot's exploration of the fulfilment of motive in 
satisfaction, and Lewes's ideas on the inseparability of interest and desire from the processes of 
thought. We return then to Freud's language of assumption, hope and satisfaction with, it is 
hoped, a fuller idea of the processes that may be behind it. It will be my suggestion that Freud's 
own theory of cognitive thought, which emerges late in the Project, and bears resemblance to 
the ideas of Lewes and Bain on the subject, becomes an additional reason why he wished to 
bury his 1895 work. In the light of such passages as the following one, the later conclusions he 
cannot help but draw become an embarrassment: 
I know nothing about the absolute magnitude of intercellul~ stimuli; but I will ven/lU'e on the 
assumption that they are of a comparatively small order of magDltude and of the same order as the 
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resistances of the contact-barriers. This, if it is so is easily understandable WI"th th" "th 
• • ' • IS assumpllon, e 
essential sameness of the cI> and '" neurones IS saved, and their difference in respect of b'l'ty . 
I · d b' I . 11 d h' 11 pennea IllS exp arne looglca yan mec anlca y. (Project, p. 305, emphasis mine) 
As Malcolm Bowie comments of such works as Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 'desire and 
wish-fulfilment, adamantly rejected by Freud in his public accounts of scientific procedure, 
adamantly return and display themselves in his writing' .65 Bowie here is envisaging the writing 
that Freud intended for public reading; his Project, in essence a letter to a friend, though a 
valiant effort at a viable system that would explain all mental processes, is a private document, 
and therefore additionally vulnerable to the display of such motive forces. That this is so is 
evident in such passages as that above, as well as such phrases as 'I hope the hypothesis of a 
bound state of this kind will tum out to be mechanically tenable' (Project, p. 369) and 'the 
following description is still more satisfying' (p. 362); its language renders what Bowie calls 
'the wishful substratum of Freud's scientific writings' more visible (Bowie, p. 17). As a private 
document it becomes allied to more overt expressions of what Freud hopes it will achieve, for 
himself(,ifI succeed in this, I will be satisfied with everything else'),66 and for psychology: 
A man like me cannot live without a hobbyhorse, without a consuming passion, without - in Schiller's 
words - a tyrant. I have found one. In its service I know no limits. It is psychology, which has always 
been my distant, beckoning goal, and which now, since I have come upon the problem of neuroses, has 
drawn so much nearer. I am tormented by two aims: to examine what shape the theory of mental 
functioning takes if one introduces quantitative considerations, a sort of economics of nerve forces; and, 
second, to peel off from psychopathology a gain for normal psychology. 
In the description of his working habits with which Freud continues, we begin to understand the 
practical effects of such ardent wishes for his work: 
During the past weeks I have devoted every free minute to such work; have spent the hours of the night 
from eleven to two with such fantasizing, interpreting, and guessing, and invariably stopped only when 
somewhere I came up against an absurdity or when I actually and seriously overworked, so that I had no 
interest left in my daily medical activities.67 
In his 'fantasizing, interpreting, and guessing', which was only curbed by the sense of 
'absurdity' (or by exhaustion) we gain a sense of the vocabulary which lurks behind the rather 
gentler hopes and assumptions which Freud allows himself in the slightly more fonnal, but 
nevertheless private, Project. The private nature of this document, I would suggest, is also 
evident in Freud's account of cognitive thought, which allows a doubt, suggests a possibility of 
partiality, in the process of scientific theorizing, which, as Bowie testifies above, Freud would 
have hesitated to display publicly. 
6.5 Malcolm Bowie, Freud. Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), p. 17. 
66 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 17 June 1895, in Frevd-Fliess, pp. 132-33 (p. 132). 
67 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 25 May 1895, in Freud-Fliess, pp. 128-31 (p. 129). 
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Freud, like Lewes and Bain before him, realized that thought found its root in primitive 
impulses. The process of thinking starts with 'the mechanism of psychical attention' (Project, 
p. 360), akin to the expectation which fonns the beginning of thOUght for Lewes. On the effect 
of psychical attention on the mental apparatus Freud writes: 'this state has a prototype in the 
experience of satisfaction ... Tension due to craving prevails in the ego, as a consequence of 
which the idea of the loved object (the wishful idea) is cathected' (p. 361).68 There is, then, a 
process of comparison, as the ego hunts its loved object among the perceptions it receives, much 
as the mind prepares to seize its prey in the metaphors of Lewes and Bain. This process gives 
rise to thought. Having admitted the early connection of thought with the experience of 
satisfaction, however, Freud then comes across problems in trying to argue that certain fonns of 
thought are completely safe from the dynamics of pleasure and unpleasure. Unknowingly 
echoing Bain's description of Watt's thought processes, in which 'intellect and observation 
were kept at work, going out in all directions for the chance of some suitable combination rising 
to view' which fitted 'his sense of the precise thing to be done', Freud conceives of thought in 
tenns of the following of a series of paths within the mind, 'with purposive thought it is a 
question of some pathway or other and, accordingly, those to which unpleasure attaches can be 
excluded; whereas with theoretical [thought] every pathway must be cognized' (p. 383). 
However, this latter industrious and impartial following of pathway after pathway is an 
untenable one, partly because of the mechanism of facilitation, by which certain pathways will 
be much more readily chosen than others, and partly because the dynamics of pleasure (which 
attracts) and unpleasure (which repels) simply cannot be kept out of a thinking process which 
springs out of their workings. It is in the process of the following of pathways that Freud 
himself conceives the failure of impartial thought: 'The errors of cognitive thought are self-
evident. They are partiality, where purposive cathexes have not been avoided, and 
incompleteness, where every pathway has not been followed' (pp. 385-86). In another passage 
which seems to contino Lewes's doctrine that 'our philosophy ... is little more than the 
expression of our personality', Freud more than anywhere else in his argument admits the rarity 
of pure, error-free cognitive thought: 
Since in fact our ego always entertains purposive cathexes - often a number of them a! t.h~ ~e time -
we can now understand both the difficulty of purely cognitive thought and also the posslblhty, m the case 
of practical thought, of the most various pathways being reached at various times under various 
conditions by various individuals. (Project, p. 377) 
Lewes had preceded Freud particularly eloquently in his description of the pitfalls of 
theoretical thought; further, at times he seems to describe the processes of Freud's own 
"It is worth reminding the reader that the psychoanalytic term 'cath~' (BeselZ1lllg) denotes 18 certain 
amount of psychical energy ... attached to an idea or to a group of Ideas, to a part of the body, to III 
object, etc' (J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language 0/ Psycho-AnaJysu~ trans. by Donald 
Nicholson-Smith (London: Kamac Books and the Institute of Psycho-Analys~ 1988), p. 62). 
ICathected' therefore bears 8 similar meaning to 'loaded'. 
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construction of theory. In terms that could act as a description of Freud's conjectural approach 
to the building of his system, according to which he then went on to attempt to explain 'all of 
hi ,69L . psyc 0 ogy , ewes wntes: 
. A~ong ~e curiou~ fe~tures of our mental organisation must be noted that by which on all 
subjects of unmedlate practIcal Importance we always proceed at once to ve 'fy . 
. . . n any conjecture we may 
have. formed, whereas on subjects of .speculatIve Importance we are too impatient to await this control, 
and rn our eagerness for an explanatIon readily accept conjectures as truths Th t" t h f 
. . ~. e an lClpa ory rus 0 
thought prefigures qualItIes and foresees consequences' instead of pausing to ascertaIn' h th 
.. . d d ' weer our 
antIcIpatIons 0 or 0 not correspond with fact, we proceed to argue and to act on them as 'f tho tal 
. . fi I (l:' nda I IS men 
vIsIon were rna. rOU lions, 1,471-72) 
A more public, and gradual version of this process can be seen towards the end of Freud's 
career, in his construction and extension of the ideas first mooted in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle as 'far-fetched speculation' (p. 24); the forces of Eros and the death instinct. In 1920, 
Freud wrote of these ideas, in a rare acknowledgement of the motives behind thinking: 
It may be asked whether and how far I am myself convinced of the truth of the hypotheses that have been 
set out in these pages. My answer would be that I am not convinced myself and that I do not seek to 
persuade other people to believe in them ... [P]eople are seldom impartial where ultimate things, the great 
problems of science and life, are concerned. Each of us is governed in such cases by deep-rooted internal 
prejudices, into whose hands our speculation unwittingly plays. Since we have such good grounds for 
being distrustful, our attitude towards the results of our own deliberations cannot well be other than one 
of cool benevolence. (Beyond, p. 59) 
In 1923, though referring back to his attitude of 'benevolent curiosity', Freud introduces a new 
work, The Ego and the Id, in which 'an attempt is made to arrive at new conclusions from this 
conjunction' .70 Seven years later, in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), the finality of 
Freud's mental vision of 1920 is established, as Freud bases his exploration of the drives 
operating within society firmly on the life and death instincts. He writes that originally 'it was 
only tentatively that I put forward the views I have developed here, but in the course of time 
they have gained such a hold upon me that I can no longer think in any other way' (Civilization, 
p. 119). Lewes's description of theoretical thought, then, is demonstrated by Freud, who in time 
seems to forget his public acknowledgement that deep-seated motives are rarely absent from the 
speculative process, founding his later theories on such tentative beginnings. 
We have seen a similar pattern before, of course, in Freud's use of aspects of his Project 
as a basis (this time, an invisible one), for later work, including Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
Freud's rejection of it, therefore, is all the more intriguing. Not long after his acknowledgement 
that the ego very rarely lacks 'purposive cathexes' in any of its processes, the Project ends with 
very little warning, and no conclusion. Critics have argued over why Freud abandoned his 
69 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 16 August 1895, in Freud-Fliess, pp. 135-36 (p. 136). Freud writes 
of the Project: 'All I was trying to do was to expl.ain defense, but ... I had to work my way through the 
~roblem of quality, sleep, memory - in short, all of psychology. ' 
Sigmund Freud, 'The Ego and the Id' (1923), in SE, XIX, pp. 3-66 (p. 12). 
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work. Many believe that the reason is because of its old fash' d I' I 
- lone neuro oglca approach. 
Jones writes, 'we may regard the feverish writing of the "Pro.iect" ltd &r 
J as a as esperate euort to 
cling to the safety of cerebral anatomy', an allegiance which was ultimately untenable (Jones, I, 
384, 393). Frank Sulloway believes its rejection is to do with the fact that it was intended as an 
exploration of repression and failed in its aim.71 These are valid reasons, but I believe that it is 
worth considering the possibility that despite his best efforts, Freud suddenly realized that he 
had argued himself into the work; he sees a portrait of his own partial, hasty intellectual habits 
in his description of the 'errors of cognitive thought' and by this time can do very little about it. 
Beginning with words like 'satisfaction' and 'assumption', because he had only a hazy idea of 
where his argument would end, he displayed symptoms of partiality and wishful ideas from the 
first few pages, and in the last few found that he had described himself. Having theoretically 
and, what is more, demonstrably annihilated his own system (as it was for all to see a result of 
this partiality, the discharge of his 'purposive cathexes') all he could then do was dismiss it as 'a 
kind of madness' 72 and try to forget it. That events would prove this impossible is a gain for 
commentators, such as myself, who find in the Project a transparency which illuminates the 
motives behind Freud's other work. 
'Joint Pleasurable Action ': Satisfaction and Society 
We now tum to a consideration of the motives that lay behind Eliot's fiction. These seem to 
have developed with her career; or rather, as she attained a level of satisfaction in one sphere of 
life whose longings and tensions had previously inflected her fiction, she began to seek it more 
actively from another source. It was this second search for satisfaction that inspired and shaped 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. More specifically, a certain awareness of the complexities 
inherent in such searches for gratification, and what they can achieve for self and others, found 
expression in the fictive experiences of various characters within these novels. 
I have already touched upon the creative pain, akin to Freud's, which Eliot endured in 
order to write her fiction. In her journal entry of Sunday, 18 September 1859, however, we can 
discern something of what might have contributed to this inner tension, this need for a 
successful completion of a work: 'A volume of devotional poetry from the authoress of 
"Visiting my Relations", with an inscription admonishing me not to be beguiled by the love of 
money: In much anxiety and doubt about my new novef (Journals, p. 80). The emphasis is 
Eliot's; significantly, her expression of anxiety comes directly after, and (suggesting its natural 
development) is separated only by a colon from the noting of an appeal to her to avoid an 
71 Frank J. Sulloway, Freud, Biologist 0/ the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend (Cambridae, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 123-24. . 
72 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 29 November 189S, in Frnd-Fliess, p. IS2 .. Freud wntes: 'I no 
longer understand the state of mind in which I hatched the psychology; cannot conce!ve how I could,have 
inflicted it on you. I believe you are still too polite; to me it appean to have been a kmd of madness. 
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attachment to money. Elsewhere in the journal it becomes clear that ak' . 
m 109 money IS not 
unimportant to Eliot. On 28 November 1860, she writes, 'I have invested £2000 in East Indies 
Stock, and expect shortly to invest another £2000 so that with my oth h 
' er money, we ave 
enough in any case to keep us from beggary' (Journals, p. 87). The journal entry for 18 
September 1859, however, also gives a suggestion of why this might be. Not only did the 
appeal against a love of Mammon come from someone who wrote "Visiting my Relations", but 
the novel Eliot was anxious about was The Mill on the Floss, whose brother-sister relationship 
is surely partly a product of the tendency of Eliot's mind to work 'with the most freedom and 
the keenest sense of poetry in [her] remotest past'. Critics have commented on the likeness 
between the law-loving Tom Tulliver and Eliot's brother Isaac Evans,73 who had, on Eliot's 
union with Lewes, cut off all communication with his sister. Anxieties about being cast adrift, 
not least financially, from her family, could be seen as one root of Eliot's need to make money 
at this point in her career. Interestingly, it is out of her family (in the writing of The Mill on the 
Floss) that Eliot is effectively planning to make financial capitaI.'4 
Another journal entry of ten years later, however, reveals a more contented Eliot, 
although her very expression of happiness is surrounded by indications of an unease which 
herald a search for a new kind of satisfaction. She writes, on 31 December 1870: 
The papers tell of still harder weather about Paris where our fellow-men are suffering and inflicting 
horrors. Am I doing anything that will add the weight of a sandgrain against the persistence of such evil? 
... In my private lot I am unspeakably happy, loving and beloved. But I am doing little for others. 
(Journals, pp. 141-42) 
It is not simply the news of the Franco-Prussian War that inspires such a thirst to contribute to 
the general good. There is a sense, in the 1870s, that Eliot has, after many years, achieved a 
level of personal satisfaction which comes as much from a sense of acceptance of circumstances 
as from success, for she writes on 1 January 1874, 'as to all my unchangeable imperfections I 
have resigned myself (Journals, p. 144). Having reached this point, a language of benefit, 
value and result, with regard to the effects of her work on its readers, becomes more prominent 
in Eliot's journals and correspondence. On 1 January 1873, regarding Middlemarch, she writes 
73 See Kathryn Hughes's recent work, George Eliot: The Last Victorian (London: Fourth Estate, 1999), 
on this relationship and how it found its way into Eliot's work, including into the character of Tom 
Tulliver (p. 272). 
74 Other critics have speculated on family-based motives behind Eliot's work. Thomas P. Wolfe 
discusses Eliot's defiance of 'the authority of the father and the religious community for the drama of the 
great world' in the 1850s, and agrees with U. c. Knoepflmacher's suggestion that the voice of the 
Princess Halm-Eberstein is in fact Eliot's, crying 'Had I not a rightful claim to be something more th~ a 
mere daughter and mother?' (Wolfe, pp. 40-41). He cites Eliot's (then Mary Ann Evans's) words, wntten 
in a letter after her father's death 'what shall I be without my Father? It will seem as if a part of my 
moral nature were gone' (cited U; Wolfe, p. 41 n.). Wolfe's argument gro',"s from his observ!ti~ t!'at 
'the parts of Eliot's fiction that carry the ethical burden - that em~ doctrines of lo.ve or the Reb~~ 
of Humanity" - usually seem the most egoistical part of her work (p. 4) and he consl~ the J»O:Uiblbty 
that this is because she is compensating in some sense for her early defiance of her father s authority. For 
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'I have received many deeply affecting assurances of its influence for good on individual minds' 
(p. 143). On 10 November 1877 she writes 'there have been multiplied signs that the spiritual 
effect of "Deronda" is growing' (p. 148). That Eliot invested a great deal of hope in the 
'spiritual' results of this particular novel is clear in the language she uses in replying to David 
Kaufmann's favourable book 'George Eliot und das Judenthum' (George Eliot and judaism), 
which was written in response to it.7s She writes: 'Hardly, since I became an author, have I had 
a deeper satisfaction, I may say a more heartfelt joy, than you have given me in your estimate of 
"D . I D d " ,76 H h' . ante eron a . owever, t IS IS not a completely selfless satisfaction. Later in the letter 
there comes an indication that although Eliot's thirst to do good at this time helped others, it 
also seems to have answered to a deep-seated requirement in Eliot herself. She writes of his 
praise, 'such a response holds for an author not only what is best in "the life that now is," but 
the promise "of that which is to come"'. It is clear that Eliot is not here referring to any sort of 
religious after-life, for she elaborates, 'any instance of complete comprehension encourages one 
to hope that the creative prompting has foreshadowed, and will continue to satisfy, a need in 
other minds', whereas a 'narrow perception' of one's work 'impresses one with the sense that it 
must be poor perishable stuff without roots to take any lasting hold in the minds of men' (GEL, 
VI, 379). It is a sense of immortality that Eliot needs; she seeks to do good because it 
counteracts, in some sense, the approach of death. This is most eloquently expressed in her 
famous letter to Clifford Allbutt of 1868: 
Never to beat and bruise one's wings against the inevitable but to throw the whole force of one's soul 
towards the achievement of some possible better, is the brief heading that need never be changed, 
however often the chapter of more special rules may have to be re-written. I use that summary every day, 
and could not live without repeating it to myself. For even with the most perfect love to cheer one, there 
is still a past which widens more and more in the consciousness as a wasted good, and there is the visibly 
narrowing future. 77 
Just as the higher intellectual faculties find root in the primitive impulses which draw us 
to pleasure and discourage us from pain, altruism fmds its source in our animal inheritance. 
Lewes and Eliot both deeply understood this. In Foundations of a Creed, Lewes wrote: 
As the Aggressive Instinct springs from the Nutritive, so the Sexual ~tinct springs. fro~ the 
Reproductive. It is the fIrst of the sympathetic tendencies, the germ of ~1~lsm. Love, which IS the 
social motor, has this origin. Thus modified, the tendency to Dommati.on beco~es the love of 
Approbation: it is the sympathetic fonn of the egoistic impulse. The love of Wife and children extends to 
relatives and friends, to the tribe, to the nation, to Humanity. (FoundatiOns, I, 176) 
an alternative exploration of Eliot's relationship with her father and how it shaped her fiction, see 
Dorothea Barrett, Vocation and Desire: George Eliot's Heroines o.:ond~n: Routledge, 1989), pp. 94-97. 
75 See William Baker, George Eliot and Judaism (Salzburg: UnlVersltlt Salzburg, 1975), pp. 4-5, 011 
Kaufinann's praise of Daniel Deronda. 
76 George Eliotto David Kaufinann, 31 May 1877, in GEL, VI, 378-80 (p. 378). . . 
77 George Eliot to Clifford Allbutt, 30 December 1868, in GEL, IV, 499-500 (p. 499), emphasis Mme. 
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K. K. Collins has produced an invaluable study which compares parts of L ' " I 
ewes s ongma 
manuscript for the third series of Problems of Life and Mind with the published version, edited, 
and in places, rewritten, by Eliot. A section that Lewes had written on the emotions, 'The 
Affective States', which Collins reprints alongside Eliot's revisions in the paper's appendi~ is 
very similar in parts to the above passage: 'The tendency to domineer here takes the modified 
form of desire for Approbation', 'the tenderness & sympathy felt for mate and offspring is 
extended to relatives, friends, & all small and helpless creatures, finally to all men and 
animals' .78 Partly because of its likeness to the earlier passage, perhaps, Eliot feels the need to 
revise it. She writes: 
Appetite is the ancestor of tyranny, but it is also the ancestor of love. The Nutritive instinct, which urged 
the search for prey, has ended in producing an industry and ingenuity of device which is its own delight, a 
conversance with the external universe which is sublimely, disinterestedly speculative; the Reproductive 
instinct has ended in producing the joys and heroism of devoted love, the sacred sense of duty towards 
offspring; and both instincts have been at work together in the creation of the sentiments which constitute 
our moral, religious, and ~sthetic life. (Problems, 3M Series, II, 387; cited in 'G. H. Lewes Revised', p. 
492) 
In Eliot's motives for writing, then, we can see, according to this philosophy, both the nutritive 
instinct, in her earlier worries about her financial state, and the reproductive instinct, in her 
concern for the good her work will do in individual minds, and also in her need to leave some 
sort of legacy. This yeaming to leave an inheritance is a natural response in a woman who, 
alienated from her family, was, in her fifties beginning to feel herself impinged upon by the 
narrowing of her future. 
In his fifties, Freud too began to write about the problems of society and civilization. 
This was an interest that had manifested its first shoots in the 1890s, in his 1898 paper 
'Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses', which discussed the detrimental effects of 
civilization's curbing of the sexual instinct. The tentative ideas in this early paper found much 
more strength in the 1908 work "'Civilized" Sexual Morality and Nervous Illness', which 
expressed an interest in man as a social being that continued until the end of Freud's life, 
inspiring such works as The Future of an Illusion (1927) and Civilization and its Discontents 
(1930). These papers demonstrated his mature understanding that: 
Individual psychology is concerned with the individual man and explores the. paths by. which he ~ks ~o 
fmd satisfaction for his instinctual impulses; but only rarely and under certain exceptional ConditionS IS 
individual psychology in a position to disregard the relations of this individ~ to othen. In the 
individual's mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an obJ~ ~ a ~elper, as III 
opponent; and so from the very first individual psychology, in this extended but entirely Justifiable sense 
of the words, is at the same time social psychology as well. (Group Psychology, p. 69) 
71 Cited in K. K. Collins, '0. H. Lewes Revised: Oeorge Eliot and the Moral Sense', Victorian StIIIJIa, 21 
(1978),463-92 (p. 492). 
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These words echo Lewes's argument, decades before for an app . t thod I .. 
, ropna e me 0 ogy within 
psychology which would take into account the idea that 'it is in the development of Civilisation 
that we trace the real development of Humanity The soul of man h th d bl 
. as us a ou e root. a 
double history'; therefore 'Human Psychology ... the science of psychical phenomena. has to 
seek its data in Biology, and in Sociology' (Foundations, I, 125, 109). 
In the late 1860s and 1870s, a period which coincided with Freud's fonnative years, to 
which he traced back his later interest in what he called 'cultural problems',79 social psychology 
(as Eliot described it, 'the supremely interesting element in the thinking of our time,)80 became 
widely debated. As with the fiction of Eliot at this time, there was increased emphasis on the 
good that such thinking could do. Herbert Spencer's conclusion to The Study of Sociology 
(1873), though it advocates 'letting social progress go on unhindered' (which suggests a rather 
passive attitude to the workings of universal laws) nevertheless argues that 'erroneous 
conceptions' of the way in which, and the speed at which, society develops will inhibit such 
progress: 'And thus, notwithstanding first appearances to the contrary, there is a very important 
part to be played by a true theory of social phenomena' .81 As well as its aims to contribute to 
the common good, however, the interest in society and civilization that was expressed in 
scientific writings of the 1870s frequently acted as a response to or a development of important 
and universal theories such as Darwin's work on heredity and natural selection.82 Further mid-
century theories that provoked response and discussion were encapsulated in the vast and 
popular Philosophie des Unbewussten, ('Philosophy of the Unconscious', 1869), by Eduard 
Von Hartmann. Inspired by the philosophy expressed in Schopenbauer's Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung (The World as Will and Idea, 1819) which posited, among other things, that the will 
of the unconceived child is the force which unites the most genetically compatible parents, 
Hartmann developed Darwin's theory of natural selection to include an infallible 'organising 
Unconscious' which encourages the development of each species in a certain way. In the social 
sphere it is the Unconscious that has willed history to be shaped as it has been, since events are 
79 In the 1935 postscript to his 'Autobiographical Study' (1925) Freud writes of his late-flowering interest 
in social issues: 'this circumstance is connected with an alteration in myself, with what might be 
described as a phase of regressive development. My interest, after making a lifelong detour through the 
natural sciences, medicine and psychotherapy, returned to the cultural problems which had fascinated me 
long before, when I was a youth scarcely old enough for thinking' ('An Autobiographical Study' (1925), 
in SE, XX, 1-74 (p. 72». 
80 George Eliot to Frederic Harrison, 10 June 1879, GEL, VD, 161. 
8. Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology (1873) (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1961), p. 366. . 
82 For Lewes's assessment of Darwin's theory of natural selection see The Physical Basis of MInd, With 
Illustrations Being the Second Series of Problems of Life and Mind (London: TrObner and Co., 1877), pp. 
105-12. H~ takes issue with Darwin's belief that only the varieties of species that are favourable are 
selected: 'I conceive that all variations which survive are by that fact ~f survival, selff;Ctlons,. whether 
favourable or indifferent' (p. 108). Lewes would take a more c~usal V1e~ ~an ~m, ~I ~~ 
attention to conditions which prompt selection (p. 110), and favOUl1lll the pnnclP~ of Organic Affmlty. 
which detennines the organism's suitability to its environment, ~ natural selectIon (p. I" 1). ~ar &om 
dictating what was believed about heredity and evolution J?arWm often act~ as a. start~I·POUlt fi'om 
which theorists explored their own alternative ideas. This wall become clear m my dISCUSSion of Samuel 
Butler's work, below. 
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fonned by the individual strivings of people which are beyond any conscious thought and which 
unite to fonn the trends and tendencies ofhistory.83 
Such theories, developing as they seem to do out of ideas about natural selection and 
unconscious cerebration that were in finn existence by the late 1860s, would inevitably attract 
attention from psychological commentators of the time. Although there is a rather neutral 
reference to Von Hartmann's work in a footnote in Lewes's Problems of Life and Mind with 
regard to how far-reaching the actions of the unconscious are, Lewes on the same page warns 
against attempting to examine 'the personified negation, a mystic Unconsciousness', preferring 
to place unconscious experience within the realms of objective science (Problems, 3'" Series, I, 
91 n., 91). More direct criticism, however, can be found in Pessimism: A History and a 
Criticism (1877) by James Sully, who, only two years after his book was published, would be 
called upon to help Eliot edit the third, posthumous series of Lewes's Problems of Life and 
Mind. From around 1876 he paid frequent visits to The Priory, Eliot and Lewes's home.84 
Sully'S 1877 work deals with certain issues that I would like to examine in relation to Eliot's 
psychological and social views, on the nature of individual satisfaction and on whether society 
can progress and improve. In certain other ways, in his own arguments about the nature of 
instinct and self-repression in society, Sully engages in the same debates touched on in Freud's 
essays on civilization and society, and as such he provides a useful link in considering the 
possibility of Eliot's prefiguration of Freud. 
Starting with the ideas of pessimism in Greek philosophy and the Bible, and moving 
onto eighteenth-century literary figures, Sully then attends to Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's 
view of personality depends on the idea of a structure of mind below consciousness, a region 
which consists of strata, or more precisely an inner layer and a kernel. Sully describes his 
philosophy thus: 
It follows from Schopenhauer's doctrine of will that our inmost personality, our very essence, 
lies deeper than consciousness ... This factor cannot undergo any modification from the various 
influences under which we may fall in our course of development ... This fIXed will or character is the 
real foundation of our actions, external motives being merely the special conditions for its various 
particular manifestations. . . 
Yet this intelligible character of the individual is not his deepest essence or reahty. The mmost 
kernel of our nature is the one universal will, which must be conceived as somehow distinct from, though 
including in itself, this substratum of intelligible character. (Pessimism, pp. 89-90) 
The will underlying everything, Schopenhauer asserts, is 'will to live (der Wille zuni Leben). 
Life is that for which everything pants and labours' (Pessimism, p. 92). It is not simply one's 
own life for which one strives: 'This ultimate reality of our being appears to manifest itself both 
in actions which tend to the conservation of the individual and in those which serve to prolong 
13 See James Sully, Pessimism: A History and a Criticism (London: ~enry S. King cl Co., 1877). pp. 106-
14S, for an account of Von Hartmann's philosophy. Hereafter, PessImism. 
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the life of the species' (p, 90), This however, is only a part of the pl'cture, 
What follows is what 
earns Schopenhauer the title of pessimist. Sully writes: 
If, then, life is what we are all striving after, with this vehemence of im . , su~h earne~tness of pursuit? Is that for which the will is ever craving fitted toP;il:fd ~to;:a~~;~~ J~tJ~ 
ThIS questIon Schopenhauer answered by an unqualified 'No' Th' d '. IS ac I~n. 
. . f" . IS ar ent PUrsUIt spnngs out of blmd 
mstmct, not out 0 ratIonal chOice. Men do not seek to live because they kn th be h 
think th b h b " , ow ey can appy' they 
ey can e appy ecause an IrresistIble pressure urges them to live. (pp. 92-93) . 
Real long-lasting satisfaction, then, is never gained by humanity "'No sat' ~ tj' • d' 
. ISlac on IS en unng, 
it is rather the starting-point for a new striving." Our nature is thus a perpetual striving, and 
may be compared in every respect with an insatiable thirst' (p. 93). 
In my Introduction I discussed Freud's late realization that Schopenhauer's ideas had 
prefigured the psychoanalytic concept of repression. Schopenhauer foreshadowed Freud in 
wider ways, however; Freud himself in 1925 acknowledged 'the large extent to which psycho-
analysis coincides with the philosophy of Schopenhauer', and identified, as anticipations, along 
with his understanding of repression, the philosopher's assertion of 'the dominance of the 
emotions and the supreme importance of sexuality' (,Autobiographical Study', p. 59). In 
Schopenhauer's description of the inner strata of the personality which do not change with 
experience, he had also prefigured elements of Freud's unconscious.as Similarly, his concept of 
humanity's perpetual striving finds something of an echo in Freud's views on the effects of 
civilization on the psyche, particularly those expressed in '''Civilized'' Sexual Morality and 
Modem Nervous Illness', In this essay Freud describes how the sexual impulse, which under 
normal civilized conditions cannot be fully satiated, must therefore be channelled into other 
activities, or indeed neurosis. This is especially the case with single men and women, who look 
forward to marriage as their opportunity of satisfaction. Freud considers 'whether sexual 
intercourse in legal marriage can offer full compensation for the restrictions imposed before 
marriage', and continues, 'there is such an abundance of material supporting a reply in the 
negative that we can give only the briefest summary of it' (p. 194). 
In the visions of both Schopenhauer and Freud, then, what above all we are striving for, 
sometimes with a force almost beyond conscious control, is ultimately not worth the effort - the 
return is much less than the investment. Sully reveals that Von Hartmann too holds a belief in 
84 See James Sully, My Life and Friends: A Psychologist's Memories (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd, 
1918), pp. 164-65, for a description of an early visit, which seems to have been in about 1876, as he refen 
to the recent fIrst edition of Mind . 
., In 'Schopenhauer and Freud', Christopher Young and Andrew Brook discuss the ways in which Freud 
is anticipated by Schopenhauer: 'Schopenhauer's concept of~e will contains th~ fo~~ons of what in 
Freud became the concepts of the unconscious and the Id. Sc~openhauer 5 wr:ttmas 011 madn~ 
anticipate Freud's theory of repression and his fIrst theory of the aetiol~ of neurosIS. Scb~auer s 
work contains aspects of what become the theor:>' of tree assoclatio~. , And most ~~tJy. 
Schopenhauer articulates major parts of the Freudian theory of ~xuality. They continue, these 
correspondences raise some interesting questions about Freud's denial that be even read Scbopenbauer 
until late in life' ('Schopenhauer and Freud', InlemtJtiona/ JOlI11'IQ/ of Psycho-Analysis, 75 (1994), 101· 
118 (p. 101». 
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an imbalanced psychological and social economy - 'he argues th t' th . 
a smce e sum of pam must 
always exceed that of pleasure, non-existence is better than . t d 
eXls ence, an so the world the 
result of an act of blind folly' (Pessimism, p. 131). The effect f V H ' '" 
o on artmann s pessimistic 
colouring on the idea of society's progress and future is equall d . Th 
Y epressmg. e most we can 
hope for from social progress, is release from pain The spread of kid I 
. now e ge on y serves to 
highlight man's woes: 
Social and political. ~rogress '" simpl~ improves the negative conditions of happiness, but does nothin 
!o au~ent the POSltlV~ ~l.easu.res of hf~. ~ the ~ther h~d, it must be remembered that the growth o~ mtelhg~nce and SenSI?lhty m ~ankmd . l~ rapidly ~rmging about a clearer recognition of the predomm~ce of suffe~g: ~d thIS recogmtIon, amountmg, as it does, to an increase of pain, far more 
than outweighs the few mSlgmficant benefits of progress. (p. 137) 
After his account of the history of the philosophy of pessimism, Sully attempts to 
remedy the psychological and social economic imbalance portrayed by Schopenhauer and Von 
Hartmann by conveying his own vision of the forces and values that exist in modem 
civilization. In response to the assertion that the will that drives us is a constant overwhelming 
and unsatiated thirst, he writes, 'any given state of society acts as a training influence for the 
individual will ... As members of society we are trained and disciplined by a number of ... 
forces', such as 'education, the pressure of family or public sentiment, the restraints of the law, 
and so on' (p. 360). This social control is not a deadening process, muffling the individual to 
delight, but it brings rewards with it: 
Progress, then, implies an advance in those social influences which serve to develop the 
individual intelligence, emotions, and will. It is continually substituting a higher for a lower kind of 
intelligence, supplying the external conditions of a larger, more varied, and more refmed type of 
knowledge, sentiment, and action. 
Now, so far as it does this, it clearly tends to deepen and to heighten the individual's capacity for 
happiness. (p. 361) 
Sully in a note lets the reader know that he is making use here of Herbert Spencer's definition of 
development. 86 Spencer himself, in his discussion of the outcome of evolution, in his second 
86 Sully does not name a particular work by Spencer from which he takes this unspecified definition of 
development. This is symptomatic of the fact that Spencer applies the laws of development in many 
different works, in countless different ways. In the second edition of First Principia (1867) Spencer 
devotes four chapters to the outlining of a theory of what evolution is, even before disaassing its 
implications (First Principles, 2nd edn (London: Williams and Norgate, 1867), pp. 307-96}. His 
conclusion is that 'Evolution is an integration 0/ mailer and concomitant dissipation 0/ motion; during 
which the molter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite. coherent heteropnelty; 
and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation' (First Principia, ~ edn. p. 
396). We can see Sully's application of Spencer's ideas of the increased heterogeneity and definition 
attendant on development in his assertion that society becomes 'more varied, and more refined'. It is in 
Spencer's wide applications of his often rather complex laws that they are most !'dly ~d~ood. In Fi?' 
Principia he attempted to apply the law of evolution to every aspect of physical, biological and social 
life, but for specific applications to psychology see also The Principia 0/ PSJ'C,hoiogy, ~ edn. ftom 
Volume I, Part 01, and for his argument for the application of the laws of evolution to socaety see also 
ThtI Str«Jy o/Sociology, especially chapter XIV (pp. 298-323). 
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edition of First Principles (1867),87 would suggest that progr t '1 d . 
. . " ess en al e reward, definmg 
evolutIOn m thIS mstance as representing 'a gradual advance to d h be 
war s annony tween man's 
mental nature and the conditions of his existence' He concludes that'ts t h t:: • 
• I ou come t ere. ore IS 
'the establishment of the greatest perfection and the most complete happiness' (First Principles 
2~ d ' e n, p. 517). 
In the process of his argument, Sully goes on to touch on a point later made by Freud in 
Civilization and its Discontents. Sully writes that it may be argued, although in a way that is 'a 
good deal forced', that the civilizing process he has outlined 'necessarily involves a refinement, 
and consequently an attenuation, of feeling. The enjoyments of the boor, if few, are far more 
intense than those of the polished man' (Pessimism, p. 362). This is an idea that Freud 
expresses in his 1930 work. In talking of the process of attempting to control our instinctual 
life, he weighs up the forces of desire and satisfaction and again finds civilization wanting: 
Here ~e a.im of satisf~ction is not by. any ~e~s relinquished; but a certain amount of protection against 
suffermg IS se~ured, m that n~n-~at .. sfactl0n IS not so painfuJJy felt in the case of instincts kept in 
dependence as m the case of uninhibIted ones. As against this, there is an undeniable diminution in the 
potentialities of enjoyment. The feeling of happiness derived from the satisfaction of a wild instinctual 
impulse untamed by the ego is incomparably more intense than that derived from sating an instinct that 
has been tamed. (Civilization, p. 79) 
Sully's sums balance much more readily than Freud's, because of his exploration of alternative 
sources of gratification in society, which, far from being channels, outlets or substitutions for 
the desires of the inner self, become individual valued sources of delight - 'It is needless as it is 
vain to try to enumerate the many new elements of gratification which advancing civilisation 
has already brought us' (Pessimism, p. 368). He goes on to convey some of the highlights of 
civilized society, and under this head is the benefit of the social medium. This is made up of 
elements such as the moral character of its members, its laws, its knowledge, 'the number and 
force of the ideas and sentiments which bind the members of the society in sympathy and c0-
operation', and inherent in the definition of progress is that it causes the conditions for 
happiness within a civilization to increase (p. 369). He continues: 
More than this social progress is constantly providing new and larger areas of pleasurable activity for the 
individual. The growth of science and art means the addition of new intellectual and aesthetic interests; 
and political progress, by throwing open the sphere of politic~ actio~ t? a larger and I~er ~~ber of 
citizens provides an additional region of agreeable and elevatmg activity. More especially It IS to be 
noted that the development of mutual confidence and sympathy, which is a distinct element in social 
progress, renders possible more numerous and larger projec~. of jo~t pleasurable ~on .. Whether the 
object be a beneficent alleviation of others' wants, or the conJomt attaiJUneD! ~f certain ~bc adv~tages 
... all unified action of these kinds supplies a wide field of pleasurable activity, the dehght of which is 
intensified and completed by the element of sympathy. (pp. 369-70) 
17 The second edition of First Principles contains much more material on evolution and its implications 
than the rust edition of 1862. Eliot records reading First Principles in her journal of 1867 (21 December, 
JOlU'nais, p. 131). It is likely that she was looking at this second edition, published .in this ~: For these 
reasons I will be priVileging this edition in my consideration of Eliot's 18705 fiction and itS Intellectual 
context. 
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In this passage we taste something of Eliot's creed, displayed throughout her work. Her belief 
in the pleasure found in science and art can be traced in her 1870s I . II nove s, most especia y 
Middlemarch. It is the idea of sympathy, leading to social progress and joint action, that I 
would like to emphasize here. The figure that most immediately springs to mind with relation 
to this is Dorothea Brooke. Her experience of this kind of 'action' is not always wholly 
successful or unambiguous - however, what remains important with Dorothea is her creed of 
meliorism, famously expressed to Will: 
'By desiring what is perfectly good, even when we don't quite know what it is and cannot do what we 
would, we are part of the divine power against evil - widening the skirts of light and making the struggle 
with darkness narrower.' (M, p. 427) 
Sully's positive VISIon of social progress that is neither pessimism, nor unrealistic over-
optimism, has become more and more transparently based on a certain philosophy, and in a 
matter of pages he names it: 
Our line of reasoning provides us, then, with a practical conception which lies midway between 
the extremes of optimism and pessimism, and which, to use a term for which I am indebted to our fIrst 
living woman-writer and thinker, George Eliot, may be appropriately styled Meliorism. By this I would 
understand the faith which affIrms not merely our power of lessening evil - this nobody questions - but 
also our ability to increase the amount of positive good. It is, indeed, only this latter idea which can really 
stimulate and sustain human endeavour ... By recognising the possibility of happiness and the ability of 
each individual consciously to do something to increase the sum-total of human welfare present and 
future, meliorism gives us a practical creed sufficient to inspire ardent and prolonged endeavour. Lives 
nourished and invigorated by this ideal have been and still may be seen among us, and the appearance of 
but a single example proves the adequacy of the belief. (Pessimism, pp. 399-400) 
'Ardent and prolonged endeavour', 'Lives nourished and invigorated by this ideal have been 
seen and still may be seen among us' - these phrases could almost be Eliot's about Dorothea. 
Dorothea's relation to this philosophy and the driving force behind her commibnent to it is what 
I would like to touch on now; however, I believe that in Daniel Deronda, Eliot created a 
character who even more perfectly (if perhaps less realistically), confonns to Sully's ideals of 
melioristic social action, and the key to his added success, apart from the important factor of 
social opportunity arising from his gender, is his full and profound understanding of the 
dynamics of sympathy and the pleasure that can be taken in joint action. 
Freud's conception of the development of civilization would suggest a necessity. rather 
than a delight, in such joint action as Sully and Eliot advocate. He would claim that we have no 
choice but to direct the forces of our impulses into civilized or cultural activity. because 
otherwise the fabric of society would break down: 'it seems ... that every civilization must be 
built up on coercion and renunciation of instinct'. U Elsewhere, Freud talks of 'the instinctual 
U Sigmund Freud, The FuhU'e 0/ an Illusion (1927), in SE, XXI, I-S6 (p. 7). 
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repression upon which is based all that is most precious in human civilization' (Beyond, p. 42), 
which acts as an assertion that society is built on the conflicts of the psych H . h· e. owever, In IS 
idea of the development of directed instinct from an egoistic to an altruistic standpoint. Freud's 
views bear comparison to Eliot and Lewes's suggestion that our most selfless impulses spring 
from our animal nature. In his Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, responding to the 
atrocities of the First World War, he examines what makes humanity civilized: 
Th~ influences of civil~zation cause ~n ever-increasing transformation of egoistic trends into altruistic and 
social o~es by ~n admlx~e of erotl~ elements. In the last resort it may be assumed that every internal 
c~mpulslon whl~h makes Itself felt m the development of human beings was originally - that is, in the 
history of mankmd - only an external one. Those who are born to-day bring with them as an inherited 
?rg~ization so~e .degr~~ of. tend~ncy .( disposition) towards the transformation of egoistic into social 
mstmcts, and thiS dispOSItIon IS easIly stImulated into bringing about that result. (Thoughts for the Times, 
p.282) 
Although Freud's concept of human nature, with its primal and destructive instincts constantly 
placing an upward pressure on the repression that restricts and silences them, could be argued to 
be a more pessimistic one than Eliot's melioristic standpoint, Eliot clearly shows in her novels 
of the 1870s that the progress from egoism to altruism is not as 'easily stimulated' as Freud 
implies in the above passage - the road that leads to it is not easily travelled, and consequently 
altruism is a hard-won quality that must be prized. Altruism is, as Sally Shuttleworth points out, 
a fundamental concept and aim in Middlemarch - it is the end of Dorothea's long process of 
suffering (GE & 19th c., p. 170). But, and this is not emphasized enough by Shuttleworth, it is 
also a reward. 
If we remind ourselves of Lewes's rooting of altruism within the sexual instinct, it 
becomes clearer that though far removed from its origins, it is nevertheless an impulse whose 
action in itself brings gratification;89 in forsaking the satisfactions of egoism, Dorothea is 
actually embracing those of altruism. It is a survival technique which, like the highest of human 
achievement, finds its roots in its very proximity to the animal unthinking side of life, the 
'involuntary, palpitating life' that exists in her and around her (M, p. 846). As she says to Will 
after her great crisis, 'I can hardly think how 1 could have borne the trouble, if that feeling had 
not come to me to make strength' (M, p. 868). In surviving in this way she is echoing, but in a 
melioristic way, Schopenhauer's idea of the desire that drives humanity, the thirst to live. For 
she says to Will of her belief, 'It is my life. 1 have found it out, and cannot part with it' (p. 427), 
a statement that bears a striking resemblance to Eliot's description of the importance to her own 
existence of the philosophy of striving towards a better state of things: 'I use that summary 
every day, and could not live without repeating it to myself. 
19 In the light of this idea that altruism springs from the sexual instinct, Casaubon's ~yin~ ~wa~ .from 
f ood h· h beyond the call of duty can be seen as bound up With hIS Inability to spontaneous acts 0 g W IC are 
receive satisfaction along 'nonnal' lines. 
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Lewes's Problems of Life and Mind contains a passage that echoes Eliot's description of 
the state in which we enter the world, contained in her narrative of Dorothea' s personal 
development - 'We are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed 
our supreme selves' (p. 243). In Lewes's more sociological version of this statement he shows 
that, just as Sully would later claim, truly civilized man finds satisfaction and contentment in 
deeper and higher ways than his more egoistic contemporaries and predecessors. This is an idea 
that is manifested in the character of Will Ladislaw, urbane and civilized man, who finds 'many 
different threads' (p. 239) in his appreciation of art; the fruits of intelligence and the intellect, 
according to Lewes, succeed in 'filling life with infmite and subtle joy ... aggrandising [man's] 
capacities and aims. This is man's spiritual being; who would renounce it for the comparative 
calm of the most fortunate brute?' (Foundations, I, 168). Altruism needs more intellectual 
effort to attain, but this very thinking is a form of gratification: 
The animal life has sympathy, and is moved by sympathetic impulses, but these are never 
altruistic; the ends are never remote. Moral life is based on sympathy: it is feeling for others, working for 
others, aiding others, quite irrespective of any personal good beyond the satisfaction of the social impulse. 
Enlightened by the intuition of our community of weakness, we share ideaJly the universal sorrows. 
Suffering humanises. Feeling the need of mutual help, we are prompted by it to labour for others. The 
egoistic impulses are directed towards objects simply so far as these are the means of satisfying a desire. 
The altruistic impulses, on the contrary, have greater need of Intelligence to understand the object itself in 
all its relations. Hence so much immorality is sheer stupidity. (Foundations, I, 166-67) 
In a letter to Annie Crow of 1876, Emily Davies describes an interview that she had had with 
George Eliot, in which the education of girls was discussed. In Davies's recounting of this 
conversation, Eliot's views on the subject of stupidity are neatly represented. To Eliot it clearly 
means that personal potential is not fulfilled, as the higher faculties are dead: 
She hoped my friend would explain to the girls that the state of insensibility in which we are not alive to 
high and generous emotions is stupidity, and spoke of the mistake of supposing that stupidity is only 
intellectual, not a thing of the character - and of the consequent error of its being commonly assumed that 
goodness and cleverness don't go together, cleverness being taken to mean only the power of knowing.
90 
However altruism may open up a new dimension of sensibility, however fulfilling it 
may be, at the time that Dorothea chooses it, it is her only choice for her psychological and 
moral survival. In this she is rather like the Freudian citizen, whose civilized state is a 
necessity, compelled by repression. Eliot makes it clear with her Prelude and Finale to the 
novel that Dorothea is, in a way that is severely restricted by nineteenth-century English 
civilization, treading in the footsteps of St. Theresa, a figure who, of all those we encounter 
within the pages of Middlemarch, demanded and attained the most fulfilment from her 
existence. Aiming for 'some illimitable satisfaction ... She found her epos in the reform of a 
religious order' (M, p. 25). But Dorothea's satisfaction is, unlike Theresa's, limited by 'the 
90 Emily Davies to Annie Crow, 24 September 1876, in GEL, VI, 28S-87 (p. 287). 
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conditions of an imperfect social state' (p. 896) which is her medl·um d L 
, an ,as ewes asserts, • an 
organism lives only in relation to its medium ' (Foundations I 119) Fre d' f 
" . u s many accounts 0 
the twisted and diverted paths and outlets that civilization provides for the instincts to pour into, 
that result in substitutive satisfactions and neurotic symptoms,91 go to construct a comparable 
dynamic model to the one Eliot uses to describe the passages of impulsive and ardent energy 
inhibited by a society that doesn't 'fit' with its members' deepest desires (selfish, selfless or 
mixed). This lack of fit means that those desires 'tremble off and are dispersed among 
hindrances, instead of centering in some long-recognizable deed' (M, p. 26). In Eliot's society, 
and in Freud's, both of which are unequal to the demands of certain individual psyches, 
satisfaction is constantly limitable and limited. 
In such a situation, however, there is a tendency to pour one's energies into whatever 
structure is present. The psyche, as Freud would later suggest, has an inclination to find its 
satisfaction using the most convenient framework, which is all the better if it hides the fact that 
it is providing egoistic gratification behind an appearance of selflessness. It is the tendency that 
religion has to place the believer at the centre of the universe, or rather to encourage the believer 
in their egoistic assumption that they are at the centre of the universe, that is a contributory 
factor to many of the self-seeking desires (which in tum work to inspire self-seeking events) 
that occur in Middlemarch. Casaubon, 'the centre of his own world' (po 111), believed that 
'Providence, in its kindness, had supplied him with the wife he needed ... Whether Providence 
had taken equal care of Miss Brooke in presenting her with Mr Casaubon was an idea which 
could hardly occur to him' (p. 313). Rosamond Vincy, whose egoism in relation to events Eliot 
famously likens to a candle's effect on a scratched pier-glass, believed that she had 'a 
Providence of her own who had kindly made her more charming than other girls, and who 
seemed to have arranged Fred's illness and Mr Wrench's mistake in order to bring her and 
Lydgate within effective proximity' (po 297). The word 'Providence', denoting as it does 'that 
which is provided' (OED, XII, 714) is the perfect word to use to identify the power on which 
both Casaubon and Rosamond rely. Religion, often a structured embodiment of this shadowy 
Providence, proves for Bulstrode to be the perfect 'mould' for his existing egoistic tendencies 
(M, p. 668). Eliot writes that 'the egoism which enters our theories does not affect their 
sincerity; rather, the more egoism is satisfied, the more robust is our belief (po 565), and so with 
Bulstrode, this constantly self-perpetuating process of aif1J1llation creates a religion that is 
eventually entirely fused with egoistic wants. His prayers only go to express his underlying 
nature, which is fuelled by his instincts: 
His belief in these moments of dread was, that if he spontaneously did something right, God would save 
him from the consequences of wrong-doing. For religion can only change when the emotions whiclt JUIIt 
91 In "'Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modem Nervous Illness', Freud writes: 'The dammed-up hbido is 
now put in a position to detect one or other of the weak~ s~ts w~ich ~ seldom ~t ~ ~e structure 
of sexual life, and there to break through and obtain subsbtutive satiSfaction of a neurotic kind m the form 
of pathological symptoms' (p. 194). 
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are changed; and the religion of personal fear remains nearly at th I I f th 
emphasis mine) e eve 0 e savage. (pp. 668-69, 
Dorothea, too, simply fills her religion with herself her own gl·rllosh d· d C". • 
, esrres an lantasles. She 
starts with the disadvantage of not being able to act or think like other girls; to use Eliot's image 
in the Prelude to the novel, she is a cygnet amongst swans, and is therefore excluded from 
ordinary, petty satisfactions: 
From such contentment poor Dorothea was shut out The intensl·ty of he I·· dO . . th o 0 0 0 0 r re IglOUS IsposltJon e 
coercIOn It exercIsed over her hfe, was but one aspect of a nature altogether arde t th to' d 
. t 11 tu II Th·· n , eore IC, an 
m e ec a y consequen~ 0.. . e thmg whIch seemed to her best, she wanted to justify by the completest 
knowledge; and not to hve m a pretended admission of rules which were never acted on. Into this soul-
hunger as yet all her youthful passion was poured. (p. 51) 
Religion here is subject to disposition, only one aspect of the nature, and takes on the 
personality of the believer; it is, ultimately, a vehicle for the passions. For Dorothea, it was part 
of 'her usual eagerness for a binding theory which could bring her own life and doctrine into 
strict connection with that amazing past, and give the remotest sources of knowledge some 
bearing on her actions' (po 112); for an ardent yet unknowingly egoistic nature, looking for 
meaning and a sense of inheritance, which in itself throws the present into a place towards 
which all things have aimed,92 religion is an easily found psychological shelter, an answer to the 
economic requirements of the psyche. 
Discussing religion, 'perhaps the most important item in the psychical inventory of a 
civilization' (The Future of an Rlusion, p. 14), Freud would write (echoing the work of 
Victorian thinkers such as Carpenter and Sully), 'what is characteristic of illusions is that they 
are derived from human wishes' (The Future of an Illusion, p. 31). 93 In this essay, Freud 
approaches religion from a different direction than Eliot, asserting that humanity created 
religion to answer to its various psychological and social needs, rather than that, religion being 
there, we can and do use it as a self-serving channel, or a self-mirroring construct. In the end, 
however, their views on the way forward seem to be remarkably similar. Freud writes of those 
that find themselves able to break free from the 'illusion' of religion: 
92 For humanity's previous tendency to see itself at the pinnacle of creation and the centre of the universe, 
an assumption challenged by Darwin and Lyell, se.e Gillian ~r, ~in's Plo~, pp. 1.9-22, 16". 
93 In my last chapter I discussed Carpenter's Ideas on F~la~les of Testimony m Rela~lon to the 
Supernatural', in which expectation and wish enco~e the sighting of p~eno'?e.na .. Interestingly Freud 
uses the example of spiritualists to emphasize the pomt that what we see m religion IS only the re~ex of 
our own minds - 'the appearance and utterances of their spirits are merely the produc~ of their own 
mental activity' (Future 0/ an Illusion, p. 28). This echoes James Sully's words m !lIl11iOll.f: A 
Psychological Study, which is a work based on the premise that we se~ w~ mental expectatiOO, .~~ 
habit, fear or desire, dictates: 'The state of awe which the sWTO~ding c~ of a spiritualist 
seance inspires produces a general readiness of mind to perceive what IS strange, mystenous, and 
apparently miraculous' (Illusions: A Psychological Study (1881),4* edn, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench. 
TrObner & Co., 19O5), p. 103). 
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They will, it is true, fmd themselves in a difficult situation They will have to adm"t t th I th fu 
f th . . " " "" I 0 emse ves e II extent 0 elf helplessness and thelf mSlgmficance in the machinery of the un I" " th I 
b h . verse. ey can no onger e t e centre of creatIon, no longer the object of tender care on the part of a benefi t Pr"d Th 
·11 b . h . . . Icen OVI ence ey WI e m t e same pOSItIon as a chIld who has left the parental house where h "d 
ti bl B 1 · Co ·1·· . e was so warm an com orta e. ut sure y mlantI Ism IS destmed to be surmounted Men cannot re " h"ldr fi 
h . . , . ., . mam c I en or ever; t ey must m the end go out mto hostIle hfe. We may call this' education to reality'. (p" 49) 
This education to reality is something that comes to many of the characters in Middlemarch, and 
especially, through the obstinate misfitting of circumstances, to Bulstrode. Rosamond (if 
temporarily), Lydgate and Dorothea. To Dorothea's famous waking experience, these words, 
and Freud's image of the quitting of the comfortable, infantile house, are particularly apt: 
She .opened her curtains, and looked out towards the bit of road that lay in view, with fields beyond, 
outsIde the entrance-gates. On that road there was a man with a bundle on his back and a woman carrying 
her baby; in the field she could see figures moving - perhaps the shepherd with his dog. Far off in the 
bending sky was the pearly light; and she felt the largeness of the world and the manifold wakings of men 
to labour and endurance. She was a part of that involuntary, palpitating life, and could neither look out on 
it from her luxurious shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her eyes in selfish complaining. (M, p" 846) 
Writing of the subject in relation to the Universe, Lewes states that 'the Object is not 
the other side of the Subject, but the larger circle which includes it' (Foundations, I, 195). This 
is Dorothea's realization in this waking process. Also noteworthy in this passage is the far off 
'bending sky' with its pearly light - if we convert 'bending' into its Latin equivalent, we reach 
'reflexive' or 'reflective' 94 - the light it is reflecting is Dorothea's own, and no matter what her 
personality is, has been or will progress to, the furthest point she can see will always reflect 
herself back to her. We see an example of this very quickly in her supreme effort to go and 
comfort Rosamond, which is reflected back on herself in Rosamond's sudden confession of the 
relation between herself and Will - it is, Eliot writes, 'a reflex of her own energy' (M, p. 857). 
Following that, Dorothea's life becomes a parable illustrating this concept, as eventually she 
gets her own Will, which she sees before her for the rest of her life. Springing from the same 
question that Lewes asks -
Is this figured Cosmos figured in Feeling through the adal!tation of~e. ~ntient ~rgani~ to.the extea:nal 
Real, or is it simply a subjective construction - the figuratIon of SensIbility - whIch we IllUSively project 
outwards and receive back again in reflection? (FoundatiOns, I, 184-85) 
_ the experience of the Middlemarchers, perfected in Dorothea, is an affinnative one. This is 
illuminated yet more by Lewes's further discussion, which serves to almost completely break 
down the barriers between self and other: 
I regard the Subject in no such alienation from the Obj~; and ~g~. Perception as ~e assimilation o~ the 
Object by the Subject, in the same way that Nutrition IS the assImIlation of the Med!UID by the .OrganISm. 
Out of the general web of Existence certain threads may be detached and rewoven mto a Special group -
94 ReJltaio means 'a bending or turning back', reJlecto is 'to bend or tum back or backwards' (Charlton T. 
Lewis and Charles Short, If Lalin Dictionary (1879) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). pp. 1547. 1 546). 
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the Subject - and this sentient group will in so far be different from th I . whateve~ different arrangement the threads may take on, they are always ~c::: :;C:;:P -. ~e Object; but 
are not dIfferent threads. (Foundations, I, 188-89) e ongmal web, they 
Notably, just as Freud, like Eliot, expounds his belief that religion is but a reflection of 
our deep selves, he goes on, in his discussion of the future of religion and civilization. to put 
forward a theory of progress that may seem to us familiar: 
By withdrawing their expectations from the other world and concentrating all their II'berated .. t 
h . I' &". h [ ] . . .. energies 10 0 t elf be on eart , men wIll probably succeed 10 achlevmg a state of things in which life '11 b 
t I bl &". d . '1' . WI ecome o era e lor everyone an clvllzatJon no longer oppressive to anyone. (The Future of an illUSion, p. 50) 
Lewes paints a more detailed picture of the way he believes things are progressing, leaving the 
fears and superstitions of religion behind, and moving towards a scientific knowledge (that, 
contrary to the view of Von Hartmann) can only be good. This is a passage from the Third 
Series of Problems of Life and Mind, and its imagery of the dawn, its language and outlook 
serve to pose an unanswerable question about which, of Eliot and Lewes, had the most influence 
in its production, for if Eliot did not write it herself, it is certain that she would have fully agreed 
with it: 
But there are dawn-streaks of a brighter day. Mental development has, in a small minority 
which daily enlarges its circle, transformed these Invisible Powers into visible Properties and intelligible 
Relations. Fear is replaced by the desire to know. Experiment displaces intercession; for reliance on 
prayer is substituted obedience to ascertained laws. The hope of modifying the Invisible by ceremonies 
and sacrifices gives way to the hope of adapting the properties of things to our needs; and where this is 
impracticable the conviction teaches resignation and the effort to adapt our impulses to agencies that are 
inexorable. (Problems, 3M Series, 1,40-41) 
Logically, then, for Lewes, Freud and Eliot, it is an obvious step forward, if it is in the nature of 
humanity to project ourselves onto our civilization and its constructs, onto the things that we see 
and the people with whom we interact, that we should concentrate, in Dorothea's words, not on 
praying ('now I hardly ever pray', p. 427), but on broadening our horizons, and 'desiring what 
is perfectly good' for this earth, and using this attitude as a starting-point. For, as these writers 
believed, desires have a tendency to find their way to a sort of fulfilment, even if only by small 
contributory steps. 
This principle, of the achievement of progress through small steps, is applied by Herbert 
Spencer to the evolution of society in a passage from The Study of Sociology, which is valuable 
in linking some of the threads within this chapter so far with what is to come. Spencer employs 
metaphors of geology and light that we have seen used to illustrate the modifications caused by 
experience, but of greater importance is his description of a dynamics of communal experience, 
and, further, his inclusion of the fruits of ancestry and inheritance within it: 
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As between infancy and maturity there is no shortcut by which the . 
of growth and development through insensible increments. so th re ~ay be aVOIded the tedious process 
social life to the higher, but one passing through small suc~essiv:r~~~~o w.ay from the lower fonns of 
order of nature, we see that everywhere vast results are brou t abo~catlons. If we ~ntemplat~ the action~. The surface of the E~h has been sculptured by forces~hich ~ ~ accumulatIOns of mmute 
alteratIons scarcely anywhere VIsible ... Light, falling upon a c tal' bel coursf e o~ a ~ear produce '. rys ,IS capa e 0 altermg Its molec 1 arrange~e~ts, but It can do thIS only by a repetition of impUlses almost innumerable S"I I be; ar 
there anse m human nature and human institutions changes havm' g that ... h.lffih l ar y, ore 
. d inh' fi ' pennanence w IC makes them 
an ~cqurre ~tance or t?e human race, there must go innumerable recurrences of the thou hts and 
feelmgs, and actIons, condUCIve to such changes. (The Study o!Socio[ogy, pp. 366-67) g, 
In the next section of this chapter I will consider Daniel Deronda as a text profoundly informed 
and enabled by this sort of vision of progress, this widened definition of experience. As I shall 
discuss, the concept of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, organic and social, was by no 
means unusual by the 1870s; rather, it was a view shared by many, including Lewes and Eliot. 
That these two thinkers subscribed to this theory is wholly fitting; if experience becomes 
structure, then logically it can be inherited.9s In Daniel Deronda we see the embodiment of this 
logical outcome of Eliot's philosophy of experience. 
Binding Theories: Daniel Deronda and Ideas of Organic Memory 
Daniel Deronda is a protagonist who, like Dorothea Brooke, longs to fulfil some sort of 
mission for humanity. His childhood and youthful experiences, leading to an 'early wakened 
susceptibility', have, in Eliot's language of forces, 'given a bias to his conscience, a sympathy 
with certain ills, and a tension of resolve in certain directions' (DD, p. 215). Deronda's various 
inclinations, not strong enough to be called drives, need to be united and defined in order to 
fonn 'a definite line of action, and compress his wandering energy' (p. 413). With Eliot's 
elaboration on her hero's malaise it becomes clear that it is communal experience of some kind 
that he is lacking. His satisfaction, the attainment of contentment, does not depend on himself 
alone: 
But how and whence was the needed event to come? - the influence that would justify partiality, and 
making him what he longed to be yet was unable to make himself - an organic part of social life, instead 
of roaming in it like a yearning disembodied spirit, stirred with a vague social passion, but without fixed 
local habitation to render fellowship real? To make a little difference for the better was what he was not 
contented to live without; but how make it? (pp. 413-14) 
There is a sense in which Deronda's experience is inadequate until he discovers his ancestry. 
Embracing it, he can then engage with society as he yearns to do. In Problems of Life and Mmd 
there is a passage which illuminates the source of his malaise in its identification of the sort of 
experience that completes the subject, 'individual experiences being limited and individual 
spontaneity feeble, we are strengthened and enriched by assimilating the experiences of others'. 
It is clear that by 'others', Lewes means our ancestors as well as our peers: 
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A nation, a tribe, a sect is the medium of the individual mind The t' fli th 
. d"d I . .. . '. ... na Ion a ects e sect, the sect the 
In IVI ua. Not that the mdlvldualls passive, he IS only directed' he t th . 
helping to create the social life of which he partakes The law~ of'Hoo, reaNcts on e se~t and natl~n. 
M h · I . .. . uman ature constitute a SOCial ec amsm ana ogous to that mdlvldual Mechanism which is modified by Ex' C' .). . . 
I · f' .... penence, IVI Isatlon IS the accumu atlon 0 expenences; and smce It IS thiS accumulated wealth whl'ch I'S th tr d' . f th 
h h ' e a Itlon 0 e race, we may say ... t at t e Past more and more dommates the Present precI'selyas m' th ' d' 'd I " 
. d . . , m IVI ua case It IS the 
reglstere expenences which more and more determine the feelings and opinions (P hi 3N S . 165-66) , ro ems, eries, I. 
Deronda's discovery is the extent to which 'civilisation is the accumulation of experiences', 
how far 'the Past ... dominates the Present', and, ultimately, that it is precisely this social and 
ancestral experience which enables the cutting of future paths.96 
In theories of evolution we see this connection between past and future development. 
In this section I will discuss the ways in which Daniel Deronda is profoundly enabled by 
theories of evolution, particularly of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. In doing so I 
am avoiding Darwinian theory, which has already been comprehensively considered in relation 
to Eliot's fiction by Gillian Beer, in favour of Lamarckian and Spencerian ideas. These, I hope 
to show, were also extremely prevalent in Eliot's intellectual context. Often it was the case that 
Darwin's theories functioned as a trigger for hypotheses on the nature of inheritance; more 
precisely, what, of our physical and psychological make-up could be transmitted. Samuel 
Butler's Unconscious Memory (1880), though rather eccentric in style and theory, is an insight 
into the sort of ideas that gathered around Darwin's theories, not only because it propounded its 
own rather extreme alternative evolutionary theories, but because it traces the origin of ideas 
about the development of species to thinkers such as Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. Butler 
believed his concepts had succeeded in improving on those of Charles Darwin, claiming that his 
thesis 'puts the backbone, as it were, into the theory of evolution'. 97 In fact, Butler's theories, 
shared with Professor Ewald Hering of Prague, were in essence a development of Lamarck's 
theories, with increased emphasis on memory in inheritance. Butler suggested that we resemble 
our parents because of the memories contained within each atom of ourselves: 
We grow our limbs as we do, and possess the instincts we possess, because we remember having grown 
our limbs in this way, and having had these instincts in past generations when we were in the persons of 
our forefathers - each individual life adding a small (but so small, in anyone lifetime, as to be hardly 
appreciable) amount of new experience to the general store of memory. (Unconscious Memory, p. 82) 
We are our ancestors. In theory, the baby can say to his or her parents, 'I was you a few months 
ago'; Butler indefinitely extends this idea to include every living thing, so that 'each living fonn 
now on the earth must be able to claim identity with each generation of its ancestors up to the 
primordial cell inclusive' (p. 26). The repetition of certain patterns of growth and the inclusion 
95 Logically, in a world which had not yet benefited from the implications ~fth~.d~Very ?fDNA. 
96 Describing Deronda's lack of direction as a young man, the narrator wntes, It IS one thlDg to see your 
road, another to cut it' (DD, p. 414). 
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of certain instincts in the sum of ourselves are not the onl . I' t' h . Y Imp Ica IOns t at this theory has for 
humanity, however. It means that we are almost never able to be " I' . 
ongma m our action or 
thought, 'ideas and actions seem almost to resemble matte d ~ . 
r an lorce m respect of the 
impossibility of originating or destroying them' nearly all that ar . f . 
, e, are memones 0 other Ideas 
and actions, transmitted but not created, disappearing but not perishing' (pp. 256-57).98 The key 
to development lies in random action, Butler's theory suggests, which then gets incorporated 
into the memory of the organism as ancestor of the next generation, and so evolution occurs. 
However, this is a very slow and haphazard method of development, and for all of us there is a 
history in our very atoms that we cannot escape, Butler in the following passage is describing 
the effects of inherited instincts on the individual, in this case a hungry one. He directly quotes 
from his 1878 book Life and Habit: 
It is one ag.ainst legion when a ~an tries to differ from his own past selves ... [they] are living him at this 
moment WIth the. ac~~mulated bfe of cen~es. 'Do this, this, this, this, which we too have done, and fo~nd our profit m It, cry the souls of hiS forefathers within him. Faint are the far ones, coming and 
gomg as the sound of bells wafted on to a high mountain; loud and clear are the near ones, urgent as an 
alarm of fire. (Unconscious Memory, pp. 28-29) 
Butler's idea of the souls of the forefathers within the individual should be a familiar 
one to us. In my first chapter I discussed Freud's concept, expressed in The Ego and the Id 
(1923), that the experience of the ancestor is incorporated into the id of the subject: 'in the id, 
which is capable of being inherited, are harboured residues of the existences of countless 
egos' .99 This theory, it should now be clear, is one based on the premise of acquired 
characteristics, echoing Lamarckian principles, but also reproducing ideas which were discussed 
by both eminent and more eccentric thinkers around the time that Daniel Deronda was written. 
In fact, Freud was conversant with the ideas of Butler, but particularly admired those of his 
acquaintance Ewald Hering, of whose lecture of 1870, 'Ober das Gediichtnis als eine 
allgemeine Funktion der organisierten Materie' ('On Memory as a Universal Function of 
Organized Matter'), Unconscious Memory is partly a translation, and on whose concepts 
Butler's work is squarely based. Freud regarded Hering's work as 'a masterpiece' .100 As Laura 
Otis has discussed, theories of the inheritance of acquired characteristics were essential to 
97 Samuel Butler, Unconscious Memory (London: David Bogue, 1880), p. 82. 
98 This last idea, of memories and ideas not being able to be originated or destroyed, only being 
transmitted rather than created, not perishing but disappearing, recalls the concept of the immortal 
unconscious which we see in Von Hartmann's philosophy, and later in Freud's - it also describes the 
Jewish natio~a1 identity as Mordecai pictures it. Significantly, the group of Jewish thinkers that meets in 
the local London tavern are labelled 'Transmitters' by him. 
99 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, in SE, XIX, 3-66 (p. 38). . 
100 'Appendix A: Freud and Ewald Hering', 'The Unconscious' (191S), in SE, XIV, 205. Freud's ~ 
quotes from a footnote which Freud wrote in the translation of a section of a boo~ '1'he ~ncOlUC'ou.r 
(1923) by Israel Levine. The book was translated. in 1926. by ~a ~reud, but, mteresung)>:, F~ 
himself translated the section on Samuel Butler. Levme mentions Henng s lecture, aDd Freud writes m I 
footnote' 'German readers familiar with this lecture of Hering's and regarding it as a masterpiece, would 
not, of ~urse, be inclined'to bring into the foreground the considerations based on it by Butler' (cited in 
'Appendix A', 'The Unconscious', p. 205). 
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Freudian theories of neurosis and regression (in which an I' f . 
. ear ler stage 0 development IS 
remstated), and Freud recognized them as such 101 As h . 
. s e pomts out, what was remarkable 
about Freud's extensive use of these ideas was that by the t' th . lme ey were employed as basic 
premises in psychoanalysis, they were no longer generally believed to be tenable (Otis, p. 355). 
Otis discusses a passage from Moses and Monotheism (1939), written at the end of Freud's life, 
and from which I quote, to illustrate Freud's perception that he was going against the tide of 
biological theory: 
My position, no. dou~t, is made mo~e difficult by the present attitude of biological science, which refuses 
to hear of the inherItance of acqurred characters by succeeding generations. I must, however in all 
modesty confess that nevertheless I cannot do without this factor in biological evolution. 102 ' 
In defying modem biological science, Freud is returning to the ideas inherent in Eliot's 
immediate intellectual context of the 1870s, of organized tendencies and ancestral memory, and 
also to Lamarckian theory. Indeed, as Otis testifies, Freud entertained plans to write a book on 
'Lamarckism and psychoanalysis' with Sandor Ferenczi (Otis, p. 367). 
Freud's 'position' in Moses and Monotheism is the discussion of the possibility that 'if 
we assume the survival of ... memory-traces in the archaic heritage, we have bridged the gulf 
between individual and group psychology: we can deal with peoples as we do with an individual 
neurotic' (p. 100). This echoes Freud's ideas on communal symptoms of more than twenty 
years before, in Totem and Taboo (1913), that 'the sense of guilt for an action has persisted for 
many thousands of years and has remained operative in generations which can have had no 
knowledge of that action' .103 In Daniel Deronda we see a more positive version of this, in 
Deronda's 'inherited yearning - the effect of brooding, passionate thoughts in many ancestors -
thoughts that seem to have been intensely present in my grandfather' (p. 819).104 But just as, in 
101 Laura Otis, 'Organic Memory and Psychoanalysis', History of Psychiatry, 4 (1993), 349-72 (pp. 355-
56). Neurosis and regression are subjects that cover a vast area of Freudian theory. Otis looks at, among 
other things, Freud's views on aphasia (pp. 362-63), on sexual behaviour (pp. 364-65), on dream-
fonnation (p. 368) and on the compulsion to repeat in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (p. 369). She 
concludes that Freud 'shared with nineteenth-century organic memory theorists ... the conviction that the 
individual was a history text' (p. 372). 
102 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays (1939), in SE, XXIII, 1-137 (p. 100). 
103 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (1913), in SE, XIII, vii-162 (p. 158). 
104 It is worth reminding the reader here of Freud's letter to Martha Bemays, in which he wrote of his own 
experience of the inheritance of ancestral passion, 'I have often felt as though I had inherited all the 
defiance and all the passions with which our ancestors defended their Temple and could gladly sacrifice 
my life for one great moment in history' (Sigmund Freud to Martha Demays, 2 February 1886, in Letters 
o/Sigmund Freud (1960), ed. by Ernst L. Freud, trans. by Tania Stem and James Stem (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1992), pp. 200-04 (p. 202). The fact that Freud had read and been impressed by Daniel 
Deronda four years earlier (Jones, I, 174, 411 n.) raises an interesting, though unanswerable, question, 
about the origin of this feeling, and whether, in fact, it found a part of its root in Eliot's eloq~e~tJy 
expressed vision of the possibilities of the inheritance of past Je~~ greatness by the Jew no~ hvmg. 
This study has touched on the fact that Freud may have unWIttingly, through the mech8D1SlDS of 
cryptomnesia, reproduced past reading in present theory. It is just as possible to su~est that such 
penonal inspiration as Freud describes in his letter to Martha Bernays may have been triggered by 1ft 
earlier identification with the character of Daniel Deronda, though by 1886 the fact that he was a source 
for such feeling would have been forgotten. 
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Freudian theory, communal inherited symptoms become manifiest I'n th 'd' 'd I ' e In IVI ua neurotic, 
Deronda has to make the choice to activate his own history, The situation is nicely summed up 
in Totem and Taboo: 
Unless psychical processes were continued from one generation to another 'f h ' 
bl ' d ... . ,I eac generation were o Ige to acqurre Its ?ttltu~e to hfe anew, there would be no progress in this field and next to no 
development '" [T]he inhentance of psychical dispositions .. , however need to be gl'v f 
. . th l'~ f h . " , n some sort 0 Impetus m e he 0 t e mdlvldual before they can be roused into actual operation, 
Freud then quotes from Goethe's Faust, a passage which translates as, 'what thou hast inherited 
from thy fathers, acquire it to make it thine' (Totem and Taboo, pp. 158, 158 n.). 
The logical result of inherited experience is the idea of a largely inaccessible 
unconscious area in the mind - a mainstay of Freudian theory, and a realization that reached 
maturity in the 1870s for Eliot and Lewes. Freud's education in inherited tendencies was 
approached from a different angle to Eliot and Lewes. Where they, I would suggest, 
incorporated inherited tendencies and memories into the structure of their existing ideas about 
the modifications and dynamics of experience, Freud was, according to Ernst Kris, taught about 
unconscious processes through the principles of organic memory, 'when older authors spoke of 
unconscious mental processes (as did, for instance, the physiologist Hering, who in 1884 had 
invited the young Freud to become his assistant), they stressed the phylogenetic, the 'racial' 
aspect of unconscious memory' .IOS It becomes clear that the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics goes hand in hand with ideas of a place in the mind which we are all born with, 
and are only vaguely or intermittently aware of, if at all, which can have an affect on 
consciousness in various ways, through symptoms, through a sense of yearning, or of malaise. 
In what follows, I will examine Daniel Deronda in conjunction with Lewes's theories 
of inherited tendencies which were informed by his contemporaries. In a section which expands 
on his premise that, 'we learn by individual experiences, registrations of feeling, rendered 
possible by ancestral experiences' (Foundations, I, 239), he writes, that although he has 'argued 
the question in my own way', he is indebted to 'some modern physiologists, and above all Mr 
Herbert Spencer', who shows that 'the constant experiences of the race become organised 
tendencies which are transmitted as a heritage' (pp. 244, 245). Spencer emphasizes this heritage 
in terms of memories that have become organized within the individual through an 
accumulation of experiences, which become 'structurally registered' in the organism, 'and so, 
conscious memory passes into unconscious or organic memory' (Principles of Psychology, 2-
edn, I, 452). As memories are structurally registered, the organism can deal with more and 
more complex propositions, which themselves become gradually organized. Development 
occurs. Organization is a fundamental characteristic of evolution for Spencer, whose complex 
defmition of the process stressed 'integration of matler', which passes 'from an indejiniJe, 
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incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity' (First Principles, 2nd edn, p. 396). 
Lewes shows his own fundamental understanding of the equation of organization and evolution 
in a passage on the development of mind which is particularly reminiscent of Spencer's work: 
In its evolution we trace an increasing predominance of ... innerness the combination and recombm' at' 
f · .. . d ' Ion o unpresslons mto expenences, an of experiences into groups, which in tum become the elements of 
?igher. gr?Ups: Experiences become org~ised as Instincts, and generalised as Knowledge; Knowledge 
Itself, m I~ hIghest ~tages, becomes o~anised as Intuitions and Logical Forms, which have the facility 
and necessity ofInstmct. (Problems,3 Series, 11,89). 
Elsewhere Lewes writes that 'Instinct, although in the organism it precedes Experience, is a 
product of what was Experience in the ancestral organisms from which the individual has 
inherited his structure' (Foundations, I, 227). If something as strong as instinct is evolved from 
the experiences of our ancestors, surely this is even more true of unfocussed drives and 
yearnings. In this way we can start to see Daniel Deronda as informed by the evolutionary 
theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
Central to Eliot's portrayal of Deronda, as I have discussed, is a sense of malaise, of 
undefined yearning whose source is obscure. Freud's theories were based on the premise that 
there are forces and drives within us, of whose existence we know little, that nevertheless affect 
our sense of being. As Bruno Bettelheim observes, 'Dos Unbehagen in der Xu/tur', which has 
been translated as 'Civilization and its Discontents', would be better rendered as 'The 
Uneasiness Inherent in Culture' .106 This illuminates the idea within Freud's 1930 paper that it is 
our inherited instincts, our drives that, inevitably lacking fulfilment in our social environment, 
create this unease. Such is Deronda's state before his inheritance is discovered. He shares his 
plight with another of Eliot's characters, Fedalma from The Spanish Gypsy (1868). That this 
poem is a consideration of the effects of inheritance, and of what we inherit from our ancestors, 
is seen in the fact that Lewes uses part of this poem in Foundations of a Creed to emphasize his 
points that 'like the body, the Mind is shaped through its history' and that 'Thought is an 
embodied process, which has its conditions in the history of the race no less than in that of the 
individual' (Foundations, I, 219, 220): 
What! shall the trick of nostrils and of lips 
Descend through generations, and the soul, 
That moves within our frame like God in worlds, 
Imprint no record, leave no documents 
Of her great history? Shall men bequeath 
The fancies of their palates to their sons, 
And shall the shudder of restraining awe, 
The slow wept tears of contrite memory, 
Faith's prayerful labour, and the food divine 
Of fasts ecstatic - shall these pass away 
Like wind upon the waters tracklessly? 
10' Ernst Kris 'Freud in the History of Science', The Lutener, 55 (1956), 631-33 (p: 632). Kris suggests 
that 'there is ~ven a slight, as it were residual, similarity between Butl!" and Freud hunself (p. 632). 
106 Bruno Bettelheim, Freud tlIIIl Man's Soul (Hannondsworth: Pengum, 1991), p. 99. 
246 
(quoted in Foundations, 1,219 n.) 
The Spanish Gypsy showed Eliot's interest in the influence of family and race on the 
individual. Fedalma, unknowing daughter of the Gypsy King, is drawn away from her 
betrothed and others she is close to, because she feels a profound need, anticipated by her 
discovery and strange attraction to a gypsy pendant which she had played with when tiny, to 
honour her father once he declares himself to her. In this process issues of unconscious memory 
arise, simply because of the suggestion that, on a deep level, Fedalma must have remembered 
playing with her father's jewellery, although she cannot bring this memory to conscious 
recollection: 
And these twisted lines -
They seem to speak to me as writing would, 
To bring a message from the dead, dead past 
What is their secret? Are they characters? 
I never learned them; yet they stir some sense 
That once I dreamed - I have forgotten what. 
Or was it life? Perhaps I lived before 
In some strange world where fIrst my soul was shaped, 
And all this passionate love, andjoy, and pain, 
That come, I know not whence, and sway my deeds, 
Are old imperious memories, blind yet strong, 
That this world stirs within me; as this chain 
Stirs some strange certainty of visions gone, 
And all my mind is as an eye that stares 
Into the darkness painfully.l07 
On a yet deeper level, however, Fedalma displays her inheritance, in the yearnings and instincts 
that sometimes possess her; a restlessness that makes her dream of flying away from her home, 
and an impulse that makes her dance, and, dancing, brings her to some sense of a spiritual 
home, a sense of 'feeling and action flowing into one': 
The joy, the life 
Around, within me, were one heaven: I longed 
To blend them visibly: I longed to dance 
Before the people - be as mounting flame 
To all that burned within them! Nay, I danced; 
There was no longing: I but did the deed 
Being moved to do it ... 
Oh! I seemed new-waked 
To life in unison with a multitude -
Feeling my soul upboroe by all their souls 
Floating within their gladness! Soon 1 lost 
All sense of separateness: Fedalma died 
As a star dies and melts into the light 
I was not, bu; joy was, and love and triwnph. (pp. 265-66) 
107 George Eliot, The Spanish Gypsy (1868), in Collected Poenu, ed. by Lucien Jenkins (London: stoob 
Books, 1989), pp. 201-456 (pp. 280-81). 
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That this need to dance goes deeper than longing finding root in the th I . I 
' ra er ess emotJona , 
rather more mechanical stimulus of 'being moved', suggests, like the allied motives that I have 
already explored in this chapter, the operation of unconscious processes. This drive to blend her 
outer and inner life, the yearning to feel a union with humanity, can only be fulfilled when 
Fedalma unites what her father calls 'a double life fed from my heart' (p. 296) by acting 
according to her inherited tendencies. It is her ancestral impulses that cause her to escape home 
and visit the town festival, and this leads her father, a slave in chains, to notice her and later 
claim her for the Zincala race - 'more outcast and despised than Moor or Jew' (p. 299). 
Springing, I believe, partly from the same instinct that caused Eliot to portray brother-sister 
I t · . h 108 d' ;II""ll h re a IOns In er poetry an m lY.l.l on t e Floss, that of examining her own roots, The Spanish 
Gypsy acts as a foreshadowing of Daniel Deronda, which, by the time she came to write it, had 
the extra backing of Lewes's completed inquiries into the dynamics of inheritance, and the 
added poignancy that enriches a work whose childless writer is meditating on the effects of 
death and the ways in which we may leave our legacy on this earth, rather than by living on in 
any illusory heaven. 
Before the discovery of his true inheritance, Daniel Deronda is, like Fedalma, an 
incomplete, a divided person, who, like her, finds a strange resonance within himself to certain 
experiences and events in his life. Inspired by his discovery of the Jewess Mirah, when abroad 
he visits a synagogue: 
[T]he very commonness of the building and shabbiness of the scene where a national faith, which had 
penetrated the thinking of half the world, and moulded the splendid forms of that world's religion, was 
rmding a remote, obscure, echo - all were blent for him as one expression of a binding history, tragic and 
yet glorious. He wondered at the strength of his own feeling; it seemed beyond the occasion - what one 
might imagine to be a divine influx in the darkness, before there was any vision to interpret. (DD, pp. 
416-17) 
The image at the end of this passage is similar to that Fedalma uses when she feels something 
inside herself answering to her father's necklace, without knowing why - 'And all my mind is as 
an eye that stares! Into the darkness painfully.' In Lewes's Third Series of Problems of Life and 
Mind, there is a description of the nature of unconsciousness, which too makes use of this 
metaphor of darkness: 
We must fix clearly in our minds that unconscious and insenti~nt are not equiva.Ient ter;ms. 
There is a marked antithesis between conscious and unconscious, as there IS betw~ the fee~mg of l~ght 
and the feeling of darkness; and we have negatives to exp~ss them. ~~. IS an ~caI feelmg. 
which, qua sensation, is as positive as that of light, but in relation to that of bght It IS negative. (Problem.J 
of Life and Mind, Third Series, II, 1 SO) 
101 'Brother and Sister' (1869) is one such poem: 'But were another childhood-world my sbareJ I would 
be born a little sister there', in Collected Poem.J, pp. 84-90 (p. 90). 
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In both the cases of Fedalma and Daniel, it seems that they are straining to see their own inner 
kernel, their own inherited unconscious. It is certainly true that Daniel is divided according to 
certain strata. He is recognized as a Jew by Mirah, Mordecai, and Joseph Kalonymos, a friend 
of his grandfather, before he has any idea of his ancestry, but in Mordecai's words, 'our souls 
know each other' (DD, p. 633). He says one thing and does another. When Mordecai hails him 
as his 'prefigured friend' (p. 550), who will 'take the sacred inheritance of the Jew', Deronda 
protests that he is not of Mordecai's race, but in doing so reassures him otherwise by his 
actions: 
With exquisite instinct, Deronda, before he opened his lips, placed his palm gently on Mordecai's 
straining hand - an act just then equal to many speeches. And after that he said without haste as if 
. , , 
conSClOUS that he might be wrong -
'Do you forget what I told you when we first saw each other? Do you remember that I said I 
was not of your race?' 
. 'It can'~ be true,' ~ordecai w~ispere~ immediately, with no sign of shock. The sympathetic 
hand stll1 upon hlm had fortified the feelmg whlch was stronger than those words of denial. (p. 558) 
It is Daniel's 'exquisite instinct' that realizes that he is Jewish, whereas on a more conscious 
level he can still deny it. The realization becomes, to use a phrase of Casaubon' s, subauditum, 
and, conversely, when he does receive news of his ancestry, there is a compulsion to speak out 
about it, fulfilling Mordecai's prophecy, 'it will be declared' (p. 559). We see his revelations to 
Mirah and Mordecai, an unnecessary announcement to Hans, who was already aware of his 
news, and the disclosure to Gwendolen that so disrupts her sense of herself and her world. He 
discusses his mission with his mother, with Sir Hugo, and with Joseph Kalonymos, and this use 
of speech is a vital element in forming the plan for his life, brought forth under necessity, in 
answer to the questions posed by his grandfather's friend: 
It happened to Deronda at that moment, as it has often happened to others, that the need for 
speech made an epoch in resolve. His respect for the questioner would not let him decline to answer, and 
by the necessity to answer he found out the truth for himself. (p. 792) 
He demonstrates the truth of Lewes's theory of language and its relation to consciousness: 
'Without Language there can be no meditation; no theory; no Thought' (Foundations, I, 167); 
before his declarations, Daniel's knowledge of his ancestry and his mission was on a less than 
conscious level. 
Deronda's relationship with Gwendolen, most of which occurs before he knows the 
truth about his roots and is still a divided man, is not a symptom of his division, but another way 
that he shows an affmity with the signs of his ancestry. He saves Gwendolen for the same 
reasons that he has rescued Mirah, although Mirah' s rescue brings forth his motive further into 
the light because she creates a more obvious image of fallen womanhood: 'The agitating 
impression this forsaken girl was making on him stirred a fibre that lay close to his deepest 
interest in the fates of women - "perhaps my mother was like this one.'" (p. 231) However, 
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although Mirah is more immediately needy it is Gwendolen who actual I . th 
' Y approximates to e 
person of his mother, and this, I would suggest, is why Deronda is strangely attracted to her and 
fascinated by her, his inward debate on whether she was beautiful or not being a symptom of the 
fact that he cannot fully understand the fact that she draws hl'm so 109 G d I . h h 
. wen 0 en, Wit er 
desire for power, her strange superstitious awe which acts as a deterrent from rebellion, the 
difficulty she has in giving love to others, finds a resonance within Deronda. because she 
displays similar traits to the Princess Halm-Eberstein,IIO and although he cannot save his mother 
from her vices, he can and does save Gwendolen. 
To Gwendolen, Deronda is, quite literally, a civilizing influence. Her appearance in the 
novel as 'The Spoiled Child' is significant; she is a mixture of whim and desire that is 
profoundly anti-social. Eliot examines where she is lacking, and it is her upbringing and lack of 
early habit that are to blame: 
A human life, I think, should be well rooted in some spot of a native land where it may get the love of 
tender kinship for the face of earth, for the labours men go forth to, for the'sounds and accents that haunt 
it, for whatever will give that early home a familiar unmistakable difference amidst the future widening of 
knowledge: a spot where the defmiteness of early memories may be inwrought with affection ... At five 
years old, mortals are not prepared to be citizens of the world, to be stimulated by abstract nouns, to soar 
above preference into impartiality ... The best introduction to astronomy is to think of the nightly heavens 
as a little lot of stars belonging to one's own homestead. (p. 50) 
Gwendolen, instead of love of her native spot, has 'a native love of homage' (p. 467). Her 
environment as a child lacking the 'blessed persistence in which affection can take root' (p. 50), 
Gwendolen is stuck in her five-year-old state, as she finds as the novel progresses that she 
herself is not prepared to be a citizen of the world. Unlike Mirah, whose mother acts as a 
conscience, and who feared becoming wicked, for then 'I should lose my world of happy 
thoughts where my mother lived with me' (p. 254), Gwendolen is master of her ineffectual 
mother, and has therefore no such internalized conscience figure. Eliot constantly describes her 
in infantile terms - as 'girlish' (p. 477), and after her marriage, as a 'sick child' (p. 467); and 
this leaves her profoundly unprepared to understand the sheer magnitude of the world and its 
events, which included, at the time the novel is set, the catastrophe of war. Her waking and 
becoming a citizen, however, is of the utmost importance. In this novel, more than any of the 
others, there is a universal vision of humanity, and Gwendolen is part of it, whether she realizes 
this or not: 
Could there be a slenderer, more insignificant thread in human history th~ this consci~ess ~f a girl, 
busy with her small inferences of the way in which she could make her b~e pleasB?t? :- m a time, t~, 
when ideas were with fresh vigour making annies of themselves, and the uniVersal kmshlp was dec:lanng 
itself fiercely: when women on the other side of the world would not mourn for the husbands and sons 
109 In its inability to settle on a conclusion, Daniel's questioning is ~ a SFptom of his profound unrest 
and unease, caused by his rootlessness, and his consequent lack of satisfaction. 
110 It is significant that both Owendolen and the Princess are haunted by the fa~ ~f those ther have 
sinned against - the Princess by her father, whose face she hopes to replace by Daniel s by fulfilhng her 
duty to reveal his ancestry to him (DD, p. 704) and Owendolen by Grandcowt's dead face (p. 7S3). 
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w?~ died bravely in a c~mmon ~ause, and men stinted of bread on our side of the world heard of that 
wdlmg loss and were patIent: a tune when the soul of man was waJcing to puis h' h h d&:' 
b b . . h' nh d . . es w IC a lor centunes een e~tmg m . un u ear, ~td theIr full sum made a new life of terror or of joy. 
What m the mIdst of that mighty drama are girls and their blind vl'sl'ons? Th th Y N f 
h . '. . ey are e ea or ay 0 t at good for which men are end~g and fightmg. In these delicate vessels is borne onward through th 
ages the treasure of human affectIons. (pp. 159-60) e 
Gwendolen's story is in some senses a psychological bildungsroman; we chart her progress 
from childhood to womanhood, in the space of a year or so. Deronda is key in this process, for, 
quite simply, he becomes her conscience; in the Freudian terms which we encountered in 
Chapter 1, her super-ego. In her case, put simply, and in Freudian terms, 'love alone acts as the 
civilizing factor in the sense that it brings a change from egoism to altruism' (Group 
Psychology, p. 103). In her own words to Deronda, 'getting wicked was misery - being shut out 
for ever from knowing what you - what better lives were' (DD, pp. 760-61). 
In Gwendolen's progress we see reflected the growth both of the individual mortal, and 
that of humanity. For Gwendolen follows a certain pattern in her awakening to citizenship. She 
does display a primitive kind of innate conscience to begin with, and this is gradually 
transformed. As Eliot describes, in a neat picture that sums up the infantile elements of 
Gwendolen's personality: 'Gwendolen's will had seemed imperious in its small girlish sway; 
but it was the will of a creature with a large discourse of imaginative fears: a shadow would 
have been enough to relax its hold.' (p. 477) Indulging to the full her love of homage, she 
simultaneously is victim to fears and superstitions, as when she performs in front of the small 
audience at Offendene, and is rendered powerless with shock when the cabinet swings open to 
reveal the painting of the dead face. For Gwendolen is divided into different strata, and the 
visitations of this sort of terror for her are at first a 'brief remembered madness, an unexplained 
exception from her normal life' (p. 94). Like the bow and arrows she uses to such pretty effect, 
now 'freed from associations of bloodshed' (p. 134), these fears are an inherited relic, 
dissociated from their original role. Like the other experiences we accumulate in our lifetime, 
and the inherited experience handed down to us, these fears are what Lewes calls 'residua' left 
'in the modifications of the structure' of the individual (Foundations, I, 120). Eliot gives an 
idea of Gwendolen's fear-filled moral instinct as an inheritance as much as material goods, 
when she describes her thoughts about the spiritual side of her life: 
She had no pennanent consciousness of other fetters, or of more spiritual restraints, having always 
disliked whatever was presented to her under the name of religion, in the same way that some people 
dislike arithmetic and accounts: it had raised no other emotion in her, no alarm, no longing; so that the 
question whether she believed it had not occurred to her, any.more than it had occurred to her to ~uire 
into the conditions of colonial property and banking, on whIch, as she had had many OpportunitieS of 
knowing, the family fortune was dependent. (DD, p. 94) 
But although she doesn't inquire into her religious instinct, which remains, like much of her, 
'unmapped' it is nevertheless present in her in the fonn of superstition, 'which lingers in an 
intense personality even in spite of theory and science' (p. 321). The word 'lingers' adds to the 
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idea that the sort of fears and dreads that Gwendolen is prone to is an outdated symptom of the 
primal in her. Lewes, anticipating Freud's view that 'each individual somehow recapitulates in 
an abbreviated form the entire development of the human race', III writes, in the second series 
of Problems of Life and Mind, 'we know that the mental development of a civilised man passes 
through the stages which the race passed through in the course of its long history, and the 
psychology of the child reproduces the psychology of the savage' (Physical Basis of Mind, p. 
87). Stuck in a state of immaturity, Gwendolen reflects the state of development in which she 
feels a 'forecasting tendency, germinal in animals and savages, conspicuous in the civilised 
man', (Problems, jrrl Series, I, 40) which manifests itself in her fIxation on the dead face that 
she encounters in the painting. This corresponds to what Von Hartmann calls 'presentiment' or 
'clairvoyance', one of the characteristics of the unconscious, which is displayed by animals 
which are ruled by instinct. After listing various examples of this presentiment, such as the fear 
for the chimpanzee of the poisonous snake it has never before encountered, Von Hartmann 
(rendered by Butler) continues, 'even among ourselves a Gretchen can often detect a 
Mephistopheles' (Unconscious Memory, p. 179). In Daniel Deronda Eliot likens Orandcourt, 
who is very dull-witted in his ideas of what others want or need, to that very fIgure - 'There is 
no escaping the fact that want of sympathy condemns us to a corresponding stupidity. 
Mephistopheles thrown upon real life, and obliged to manage his own plots, would inevitably 
make blunders.' (p. 658) It is Gwendolen's feeling of foreboding that causes her to flee 
Orandcourt in the fIrst place and escape to Europe - it is at her peril that she later accepts him. 
From the presentiments of children and savages, according to Lewes's developmental 
model, then spring 'vague and agitating images of Invisible Powers supposed to originate all 
visible changes' (Problems, jrrl Series, I, 40); this is the origin of the awe Owendolen originally 
feels before what she sees as Daniel's judging eyes, which cause her to lose her luck at the 
casino, a feeling that is akin to 'a superstitious dread' (DD, p. 374) and which later inspires her 
feeling that her husband has 'a ghostly army at his back, that could close round her wherever 
she might tum', meaning that to defy him would be equivalent to defying 'the texture of her 
nerves and the palpitation of her heart' (p. 503). This is the origin of her terror of the furies 
which will descend upon her when she dreams of killing Grandcourt. 
The superstitious dread she feels about Deronda however, unlike the feelings of dreaded 
awe she has for her husband, move towards something much more positive and transfonning: 
'in some mysterious way he was becoming a part of her conscience' (p. 468); 'without the aid 
of sacred ceremony or costume, her feelings had turned this man, only a few years older than 
herself, into a priest' (p. 485), so that whenever she was tempted to leave her husband 'always 
among the images that drove her back to submission was Deronda' (p. 665). But he is still an 
'outer conscience' (p. 833) at this point, a priest who it is important to act correctly in front of, 
III Sigmund Freud, 'Lecture XIII: The Archaic Features and Infantilism of Dreams' (1916-17), in SE, 
XV, 192-212 (p. 199). 
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and to behave well before if possible so one's confession may be free from vice. Eliot describes 
his relationship with Gwendolen as a mission: 
It is hard to say how much we could forgive ourselves if we were secure from J' d t b th 
h '" th b tho . u gmen y an 0 er w ose opmlOn IS e rea mg-medlUm of all our joy - who brings to us WI'th I d 
. d' th . . '. c ose pressure an 
Imme late sequenc~ at Judgme?t of the InVIsIble and Umversal which self-flattery and the world's t~ler~c~ woul~ easIly m.elt and dIsperse. In this way our brother may be in the stead of God to us, and 
hl~ ~pmlOn whIch has pIerced even to the joints and marrow, may be our virtue in the making. That 
mlss~on of Deronda .to Gw~ndolen had begun with what she had felt to be his judgment of her at the 
gammg-~ble. He ,ml~t ~asIly .have sp?iIed it: - much of our lives is spent in marring our own influence 
an~ tu~~g others. behe! m us ~to a wIdely concluding unbelief which they call knowledge of the world, 
whIle It IS really dlsappomtment m you or me. Deronda had not spoiled his mission. (p. 833) 
Gwendolen's conscience is powered now by what Eliot describes as 'the infused action of 
another soul, before which we bow in complete love' (p. 840). But she has not yet become a 
citizen of the world; she is still at that moral stage which Freud describes as 'fear of loss of love, 
"social" anxiety' (Civilization, p. 125). The most essential part of Deronda's mission is yet to 
come; to leave Gwendolen on her own in the world, to make it necessary for her to internalize 
him as her permanent conscience. Freud describes this process, which initiates man into the 
civilized world: 
A great change takes place only when the authority is internalized through the establishment of a 
super-ego. The phenomena of conscience then reach a higher stage. Actually, it is not until now that we 
should speak of conscience or a sense of guilt. At this point, too, the fear of being found out comes to an 
end; the distinction, moreover, between doing something bad and wishing to do it disappears entirely, 
since nothing can be hidden from the super-ego, not even thoughts. (p. 125) 
Gwendolen's reliance on Deronda is an egoism which she must be shocked out of; she believes 
he will always be with her, 'for we are all apt to fall into this passionate egoism of imagination, 
not only towards our fellow-men, but towards God'. In order to be good, she felt 'she would be 
continually assimilating herself to some type that he would hold before her' (DD, p. 867). The 
effect of his revelation, a declaration that forces her to see with his eyes, and within his much 
larger boundaries, makes her see for the first time 'her horizon was but a dipping onward of an 
existence with which her own was revolving' (p. 876) which Eliot likens to a sudden personal 
experience of the war that is occurring at the time when the novel is set. Gwendolen has finally 
shed her blindness and stupidity; knowledge, for her, is an essential building-block in her moral 
self, and, having possession of all the facts, the right vision, her awaking is found in the words 
'I shall live. I shall be better' (p. 879), her equivalent to Dorothea's dawn. She is now a 
civilized being; in Freud's words: 
It is in keeping with the course of human development that external coercion . gradually bec~es 
internalized ... Such a strengthening of the super-ego is a most precious cultural ~ m !he ~sychol~":B1 
field. Those in whom it has taken place are turned from being opponents of clvJiazatlon mto bemg Its 
vehicles. (TM Future 0/ an 1lllISion, p. 11) 
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It is the role of such a vehicle to 'make others glad that they were born' (DD, p. 882). This is 
now Gwendolen's aim. 
The other part of Daniel's mission springs from his own history and the discovery of his 
ancestry. Here he closely follows theories of inheritance in the 1870s, that the individual was a 
combination of nature and nurture. Contradicting John Locke's famous statement that the infant 
is born as a blank sheet, Lewes creates an alternative metaphor to describe the psyche's 
development: 
Th~ sensitive mechanism is not a simple mechanism, and as such constant, but a variable mechanism 
which has a history. What the Senses inscribe on it, are not merely the changes of the external world· bu~ 
these charact~rs. are commingled with the characters of preceding inscriptions. The sensitive subject is no 
tabula. rasa: .It IS not a blank shee~ of paper, but a palimpsest ... the Organism brings with it inherited 
ExperIence, I. e., a mode of reaction antecedent to all direct relation with external influences which 
necessarily determines the results of individual Experience. (Foundations, I, 162) , 
We are not the beginning, or indeed the end, of our own lives. Deronda's life, like Mordecai's, 
becomes a bridge from past to future, the 'in medias res' of the opening epigraph to the novel. 
Mordecai, this man who lived 'an intense life in an invisible past and future' (DD, p. 593) tells 
Daniel, 'the generations are crowding on my narrow life as a bridge: what has been and what is 
to be are meeting there; and the bridge is breaking' (p. 557). This view of time, in a sense a 
making positive and useful Schopenhauer's topsy-turvy view of the un conceived child choosing 
his parents, is not only inherent in the Jewish race as Eliot portrays it, but is a factor in what 
causes Deronda to search for his roots, and once he has found them, to embrace them. His own 
grandfather, Daniel Charisi, 'was satisfied with no sight, but pieced it out with what had been 
before and what would come after' (p. 791), desiring most of all to have 'a grandson who shall 
have a true Jewish heart' (p. 726). This occurs despite the preventative action of Deronda's 
mother, prompting Deronda to observe: 
'No wonder if such facts come to reveal themselves in spite of concealments. The effects prepared by 
generations are likely to triumph over a contrivance which would bend them all to the satisfaction of self. 
Your will was strong, but my grandfather's trust which you accepted and did not fulfil ... is the expression 
of something stronger, with deeper, farther-spreading roots, knit into the foundations of sacredness for all 
men. You renounced me ... as a son ... But that stronger Something has determined that I shall be all the 
more the grandson whom also you willed to annihilate.' (p. 727) 
Grandson to a dead grandfather, inheritor from a dying Jew, Deronda's new role is in part 
backward looking - he is for a time as the children that stretch their anns out to Mordecai in his 
vision ('the future stretches towards me the appealing anns of children' (p. 587-88». His 
mission, mostly uncharted, beyond the present of the novel, will intend to rectify the past and 
justify all the work that has gone to make him what he is, a fulfilment of wishes. In this way, 
Deronda can fully said to be in medias res. 
Deronda's embracing of his Jewishness is not only due to his nature, however, as 
Mordecai tells the philosophers, 'the strongest principle of growth lies in human choice. The 
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sons of Judah have to choose that God may again choose them' (p. 598). Deronda, in Lewes's 
tenns, 'is not a passive recipient of external impressions, but an active co-operant' 
(Foundations, I, 162), although Deronda's tendencies will have inspired him to choose rightly. 
For the subject is a mixture of nature and nurture: 
All sensations, perceptions, emotions, volitions, are partly connate, partly acquired: partly the evolved 
~ro~~cts of the accumulated experiences of ancestors, and partly of the accumulated experiences of the 
mdlvldual, when each of these have left residua in the modifications of the structure (Lewes 
Foundations, I, 120) . , 
But the combination of nature and nurture leads to many subtle questions about Deronda's path 
to his inheritance, as Eliot is well aware. His rescue of Mirah is partly due to questions burning 
in him about his mother, which will be a mixture of these two influential elements of his life' his , 
decision not to run from Mordecai's alarming claims is partly due to his deep and perhaps 
instinctive need of a like-minded friend, and his 'struggling conscience ... enlarged by his early 
habit of thinking himself imaginatively into the experience of others' (DD, p. 570). Eliot meant 
to create such complex mixtures of motive for Deronda's actions; for the exact tracing of each 
source of influence within us is impossible: 
How much of anyone mental manifestation is due to ancestral feelings registered in the modified 
structure inherited, and how much is due to the individual feelings and their modifications acquired 
through the direct relation of the Organism to its stimuli, cannot accurately be detennined. It is like the 
wealth which a merchant acquires through his own efforts, by employing the accumulated results of the 
efforts of previous generations. (Foundations, 1,212)112 
Lewes frequently uses the metaphor of a plant to illustrate the difficulty of defining the sources 
of growth and characteristic in the individual. The seed (or in his analogy of the oak-tree, the 
acorn) represents ancestral experience, the soil, atmosphere and temperature the life experiences 
of the individual: 'No one now supposes that the oak is ready fonned in the acorn, lying there in 
miniature. The oak is quite as much in the atmosphere and soil; it really is in neither, but will 
be evolved from both' (Foundations, I, 239). Here there are implications not only for Deronda, 
whose ancestral experiences detennine his being as much as his upbringing by Sir Hugo, but for 
Gwendolen too. Deronda significantly tells her, that 'once beginning to act with ... penitential, 
loving purpose ... there will be unexpected satisfactions - there will be neWly-opening needs ... 
You will find your life growing like a plant' (DD, p. 839). It is experience of the life around her 
and beyond her that Owendolen requires in order to grow; she needs, in Eliot's words to Emily 
112 This image of the wealth of merchants recalls little Jacob in Daniel Dero~ w~o seems ~o tx: aIm?S' 
all nature; this may be because he is a child, and ancestry may ~ the dommant ~~uenc.e m hun ~1I~: 
'Have you got a knife?' says Jacob, coming closer. His small VOice was hoarse m ~ts glibness, as If It 
belonged to an aged commercial soul, fatigued with bargaining through many gen~~.' (DI? p. 441~. 
However, if little Jacob had Dot lived in an environment that encouraged thIS mamfestatlon of his 
inheritance, it would Dot have been so strong in him. The debate continues. 
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Davies, to be 'alive to high and generous emotions', in order to avoid the stunting stupidity and 
blindness from which she was suffering in her moral immaturity. 
Deronda uses an alternative image to illustrate the interaction of inherited and life 
experience, in a passage in which he explains to Mordecai the factors which contributed towards 
evolving him into the man that he has become, 'the heart and brain ofa multitude': 
. 'It is through your inspiration that I have discerned what may be my life's task. It is you who 
have glve.n shape to what, I believe, was an inherited yearning - the effect of brooding, passionate 
thoughts 10 many ancest~rs - thoughts that seem to have been intensely present in my grandfather. 
~upp?se the ~tolen 0n:sp~mg of some mountain tribe brought up in a city of the plain, or one with an 
mhented gemus. for pamtmg, an.d born blind - the ancestral life would lie within them as a dim longing 
for unknown objects and sensatIOns, and the spell-bound habit of their inherited frames would be like a 
cunn~gly-wr?u~t ?Iusical instrument, never played on, but quivering throughout in uneasy mysterious 
moanmgs of Its mtncate structure that, under the right touch, gives music. Something like that, I think, 
has been my experience.' (p. 819) 
In the place where this image fmds an explanation in Lewes's Foundation of a Creed, what is 
conveyed, apart from an idea of what it is that is inherited, is the huge complexity of the 
influences on the individual organism by heredity. We get a glimpse here of what forms the 
musical instrument, and that it is 'cunningly-wrought' is no understatement: 
Every modification of structure is the issue of many complex experiences ... each experience is not only 
complicated by prior experiences, its transmission is complicated by the influence of the other parent. A 
musical aptitude will be inherited, but no particular melody ... There are no innate ideas, no innate truths, 
no thoughts having a metempirical source - simply innate tendenCies, congenital aptitudes, which cause 
us to respond in certain ways to certain stimuli; but if the stimuli differ in kind, or in degree, or in their 
order of presentation, the responses must proportionately differ. (Foundations, I, 164-65) 
This passage was published before Daniel Deronda was written, and it seems to act as the 
underlying theory behind Daniel's long journey towards accepting and fulfilling his 
inheritance. Il3 His progression is, in a sense, towards creating a music inspired by the state of 
his race; a repetitive tune, played in different parts of the world. It is perhaps worth mentioning 
that Deronda's name shows a likeness to the construction 'de rondo,;1l4 a rondo being a musical 
term meaning 'a piece of music having one principal subject, to which a return is always made 
after the introduction of other matter' (OED, XIV, 71). This suggests recurrence, a cyclical 
pattern, although containing a progression. There are many musical themes and episodes 
113 Music was often used in the same way in which Lewes uses it here, to illustrate issues of inheritance, 
at this time. James Sully mentions some approaches in his essay, 'On the Nature and Limits of Musical 
Expression', in Sensation and Intuition, 1874, writing of the recent '~ttempts of Mr. Spencer and Mr. 
Darwin to connect musical effects with a long series of ancestral expenences, human and, probably, pre-
human the results of which are now transmitted to the new-born individual as deeply organized associ~tions' (Sensation and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and £Stbetia (London: Henry S. King cl 
Co., 1874», p. 221. . 
114 William Baker points out the most likely source for Daniel's surname, 'Ronda is in Andalusia near the 
centres of medieval Spanish Jewish life, Granada, Cordoba and Malaga' (~eotp. Eliot and Jvdai3"" p. 
182), but this musical connection may also have steered Eliot to choose thiS particular place-name as a 
basis for the surname of her protagonist 
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connected with Daniel's emerging racial inheritance - Mordecai's speeches sound 'chord[s)' (p. 
561); Deronda's mother, having defied her father to become a singer, suddenly, and for no 
apparent reason, loses her ability to stay in tune, but the most striking perhaps is the first contact 
Deronda has with Mirah, for it is his singing that enters her consciousness and begins her 
rescue. It is only to her ear 'that the low vocal sounds came with more significance than if they 
had been an insect-munnur amidst the sum of current noises' (p. 227), a description of an 
awareness that echoes Lewes's ideas of twenty years before, of those sensations which the 
individual perceives within the great sum of consciousness. Mirah, standing on the river bank, 
'might have been an impersonation of the misery [Deronda] was unconsciously giving voice to'. 
His unconscious vocalization, which 'enter[s] her inner world' (p. 227) seems another example 
of the 'exquisite instinct' that I discussed earlier, by which Daniel, unaware, manifests his 
affinity with those of this race. 
That Daniel is used as an instrument (like his unwilling mother before him - 'I have 
after all been the instrument my father wanted', p. 726) is a yearning fulfilled; his life which 
needed 'the complete ideal shape of that personal duty and citizenship which lay in his own 
thought like sculptured fragments certifying some beauty yearned after but not traceable by 
divination' (pp. 570-71), is made complete by duty, and he finds personal satisfaction in his 
union with Mirah. Another part of his fulfilment is his ability to satisfy Mordecai, for before he 
knows of his true inheritance he says to him 'it is my wish to meet and satisfy your wishes 
wherever that is possible to me' (p. 561). In Mordecai we see the purest, most energy-filled 
example of satisfaction that we encounter in Eliot's 1870s novels. And it is a satisfaction that 
springs from meliorism. In Judaism Eliot finally found a framework not just through which to 
discuss current scientific ideas, such as those of hereditary influences on the individual, but a 
pattern for active meliorism. Daniel describes Mordecai, the most fervent Jewish mind we 
encounter in the novel, thus: 'Mordecai is an enthusiast: I should like to keep that word for the 
highest order of minds - those who care supremely for grand and general benefits to mankind.' 
(p.628) 
Fittingly, it is in this mind of the highest order that we see most strikingly demonstrated 
the principle, reiterated, as I have discussed, in different parts of Problems of Life and Mind, 
that the selflessness of altruism is embedded in the animal instincts. For it becomes 
increasingly clear that Mordecai's longing for a better future for his people is a development of 
sexual desire. His yearning for another soul to join himself with is described by Eliot thus: 
Reverently let it be said of this mature spiritual need that it was akin to the boy:s and girl'~ picturing of 
the future beloved' but the stirrings of such young desire are feeble compared WIth the passionate current 
of an ideal life stniliting to embody itself, made intense by resistance to imminent dissolution. (p. S31) 
Eliot's use of the word 'dissolution' here springs, I believe, from her fundamental understanding 
of the principles of evolution, set out by Spencer, discussed and employed by Lewes, and her 
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. wish to apply them to Daniel's mission. Dissolution fonns the antithesis to evolution in 
Spencer's system; within the universal process which dictates 'a differential progress towards 
either integration or disintegration', it fonns the second half. It is the movement towards 'a 
diffused imperceptible state' (First Principles, 2Dd edn, pp. 284, 285). Notable in Mordecai's 
reaction to his understanding that this is the process which he is undergoing, is the urgency that 
his need for his vision to 'embody itself in Daniel takes on. In her portrayal of Mordecai's 
feelings about his approaching demise, Eliot uses the concepts of evolution and dissolution to 
suggest something that would later become Freudian theory: that union with another serves to 
counteract the approach of death. 
On this occasion fonning something of an echo of Spencer's tendency to apply 
universal processes to all fonns of life, from the most primitive to the highest, Freud uses a 
biological phenomenon, that 'the temporary coalescence of two unicellular organisms, has a 
life-preserving and rejuvenating effect on both of them' (Beyond, p. 50), to iHustrate his 
thoughts on what would become fundamental elements in his later theories, the life and death 
instincts. The urge towards a union, for the purposes of the rejuvenation of his ideals, is 
something of what we see in Mordecai. Interestingly, Freud cites Ewald Hering as the 
proponent of the idea of evolution and dissolution, in a passage which demonstrates his 
understanding of these opposed universal processes: 
According to E. Hering's theory, two kinds of processes are constantly at work in living substance, 
operating in contrary directions, one constructive or assimilatory and the other destructive or 
dissimilatory. May we venture to recognize in these two directions taken by vital processes the activity of 
our two instinctual impulses, the life instincts and the death instincts? (p. 49) 
Hering's theory, it hardly need be said, was also Spencer's. On this theory, as I have discussed 
above, entertained tentatively at first, Freud based much of his later work, incorporating it into 
individual and group psychology as basic governing drives. 
As Freud equates the life instinct with the urge to union, the sexual instinct, Eliot in 
Daniel Deronda explicitly links Mordecai's need for his vision to be transmitted with sexual 
desire. This is an entirely fitting connection, for just as sexual union creates descendants, 
Mordecai's wish, in essence, is to create a united Israel of the future, the 'appealing arms of 
children' of his vision. To link this even more fumly with his biological urges, Mordecai 
cannot physically create descendants, aid the development and evolution of the Jewish race, to 
remedy his own dissolution, so he wishes to unite with Deronda, who is in essence an 
evolutionary agent. Mordecai's yearning, I would suggest, bears a similarity to Eliot's urge, 
particularly prevalent in the late 1860s and 1870s, to feel that through her writings she had done 
some sort of good, that her ideas could be passed through the generations, that they bore 'roots 
to take ... lasting hold in the minds of men', as she described it to David Kaufinann. In 1867 
this need was manifested in a short poem (whose theme only serves to strengthen the link that I 
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have discussed between music and inheritance), '0 May I Join the Choir Invisible'. It began, 
'0 may I join the choir invisible/ Of those immortal dead who live again! In minds made better 
by their presence'. In this possibility Eliot sees her chance of paradise: 'So to live is heaven: To 
make undying music in the world' .11S It is this wish, rooted in biological urges, that motivated 
Eliot's fiction and her melioristic vision, towards the end of her life, as her 'visibly narrowing 
future' became shorter, and her own dissolution became imminent. 
Hence her enthusiastic expression of satisfaction when she received assurance from 
David Kaufmann that her work was not 'poor perishable stuff'. There is satisfaction too for 
Mordecai. The scene in which Daniel reveals his heritage and his intention to take on the 
mission that Mordecai has to leave behind him is very interesting in its very physical 
manifestation of his sense of gratification. When Mordecai first hailed Daniel as deliverer, after 
spotting him -from Blackfriars bridge, 'obstacles, incongruities, all melted into the sense of 
completion with which his soul was flooded by this outward satisfaction of his longing' (DD, p. 
550). Part of his feeling, however, was anticipation of the complete answering of his thirst; he 
says to Daniel - 'I was thirsty, and the water is on my lips.' (p. 561)116 In the scene after 
Deronda returns from Genoa, however, there is a sense of complete satisfaction. Deronda 
outlines what he means to do with the knowledge of his inheritance, and here he reveals 
something of his role as evolutionary agent. In his intention 'to bind our race together in spite 
of heresy' (p. 820) we see embodied the process of development which Spencer described in the 
second edition of First Principles as attaining a state whereby 'component matter has passed 
from a more diffused to a more concentrated state - has contracted' (First Principles, 2nd edn, p. 
286). Daniel's aim, to facilitate the 'union' of the Rabbanites and the Karaites (DD, p. 820), as 
he later tells Gwendolen, to make the Jews 'a nation again, giving them a national centre, such 
as the English have, though they too are scattered over the face of the globe' (p. 875), is one of 
concentration, to encourage the contraction of a widely scattered people. This nation may attain 
the equivalence of what Spencer's idea of organic evolution achieves, 'the continued 
incorporation of matter previously spread through a wider space' (First Principles, 2nd edn, p. 
311). Spencer himself goes on to apply these principles to societies that start, aptly, as 
'wandering families', and become organized, through the greater and greater union of 
component elements, and united into one. In the discussion of this principle in its application to 
land Spencer writes that the process of aggregation which makes 'feuds into provinces, 
provinces into kingdoms, and fmally contiguous kingdoms into a single one, slowly completes 
itself by destroying the original lines of demarcation' (p. 317). Mordecai could not ask for 
more. 
The act of union which Deronda plans to undertake is an extension of those ideas which 
Mordecai had previously strained to embody. For Deronda says to him, 'I mean to work in your 
m George Eliot, '0 May I Join the Choir Invisible' (1867), in Collected Poems, pp. 49-50 <po 49). 
116 This image is a refutation of the pessimistic belief that man lives in a constant state of thin!. 
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spirit. Failure will not be ignoble, but it would be ignoble for me not to try' (DD, p. 820). 
Mordecai's words and physical reaction to this proof that the dissolution of his ideas will be 
reversed, that, as he puts it elsewhere, the 'seed of fire' will be successfully transmitted (p. 596), 
is extremely significant: '''Even as my brother that fed at the breasts of my mother," said 
Mordecai, falling back in his chair with a look of exultant repose, as after some finished labour' 
(p. 820). This very physical image that Mordecai conjures up, his use of the word 'breasts' 
rather than the rather more neuter term 'breast' creating an image of actual drinking, of need 
satisfied, is supplemented by his own action - the falling back, the contented expression on his 
face.
117 
This is the climax of his altruistic search; he in a sense 'dies' here and Daniel becomes 
his descendant, in spirit and action. He also becomes the soul to which Mordecai's is bonded in 
a sort of 'marriage' - 'It has begun already - the marriage of our souls' (p. 820). In a sense 
what we are witnessing, after vows exchanged, is its consummation. We are also, according to 
the doctrine of the Cabbala, in which 'souls are born again and again in new bodies' (p. 599), 
witnessing a rebirth, and so the image that is invoked of the mother's breasts is additionally 
fitting. William Baker gives an insight into this image in Jewish tradition, in a citation of the 
work of Christian David Ginsburg, whose book, The Kabbalah, its Doctrines, Development and 
Literature (1863) Eliot had read in preparation for writing Daniel Deronda. Describing what 
Baker calls the 'process of the transmigration of the soul into another body' (George Eliot and 
Judaism, p. 161), Ginsburg writes that a soul that has been isolated and made weak 'chooses a 
companion soul of better fortune or more strength'. This stronger soul then acts as a mother, 
'she carries the sickly one in her bosom & nurses her as a woman her child' (cited p. 161). 
Mordecai's physical reaction to Daniel's news also foreshadows a comment by Freud, when he 
is discussing the sexuality of children, 'when children fall asleep after being sated at the breast, 
they show an expression of blissful satisfaction which will be repeated later in life after the 
experience of a sexual orgasm'. 118 The fulfilment of a deep and melioristic yearning, born in his 
inherited instinctual life, is what has taken place in Mordecai, and he can finally say, 'my soul is 
satisfied' (p. 821).119 
In his death scene, however, we see something of the breakdown of the boundaries of 
Mordecai's ego which is to happen when he enters Daniel's soul. Freud, in Civilization and its 
Discontents, discusses the possible origin of the sort of experience Mordecai is having, for, 
117 One of the things that Dorothea is missing in her marriage to Casaubon is 'repose': 'She was always 
trying to be what her husband wish~d, and never ab!e to ~se on ~is d~light in what ~e was'. There is 
a sense of ceaseless striving here, perpetual effort , as Eliot descnbes It (M, p. S 16), an contrast to the 
word 'repose', which seems to signal a sense of energy discharg~ o~ satisfaction .. 
118 Sigmund Freud, 'Lecture XX: The Sexual Life of Human Bemgs (1916-17), m SE, XVI, 303-19 (p. 
313). 
119 In Freud's Ne'II1'ologicaJ Education and its Influence on PsychoanDlytlc Theory, Peter Amacher traces 
the image of the baby at the breast as an illustration of satisfa~on in ~~ work of f~u~'s teachers and 
then Freud himself. Freud's use of this image is therefore qUIte unongmai, even wlthm the realms of 
psychology. See Peter Amacher, Freud's Neurological Education and its Influence on PsychoanDlytic 
Theory, Monograph 16, PsychoiogicalIssutlS, IV (International Universities Press, New York, 1965),33-
36,38-41. 
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sitting between Daniel and Mirah, connected physically by touch, he is for a time silent, but 
looks meaningfully at them, 'as if to assure them that while this remnant of breathing-time was 
difficult, he felt an ocean of peace beneath him'. His fin a] words to Daniel are, 'is it not begun? 
Have I not breathed my sou] into you? We shall live together' (p. 882). In Freud's 1930 work, 
he relates how, after sending a friend of his The Future of an lliusion, he received a reply: 
He answered th~t he entirely agreed with my judgement upon religion, but that he was sorry I had not 
properly a~prec18t.ed the tru~ source o~ religious sentiments. This, he says, consists in a peculiar feeling, 
~hlch he ~ImSe"f.ls never WIthout, whIch he fmds confmned by many others, and which he may suppose 
IS p~esent m mtlho~s of.p~ople. It is a feeling which he would like to call a sensation of 'eternity', a 
feelmg as of somethmg lImItless, unbounded - as it were, 'oceanic'. (Civilization, p. 64) 
Freud, having never felt this, finds it a difficult phenomenon to understand, but concludes that it 
involves the breakdown of the boundaries of the ego; he has already discussed this in Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego as an event that certain commentators believe occurs in 
a group - 'it is a pleasurable experience for those who are concerned, to surrender themselves so 
unreservedly to their passions and thus to become merged in the group and to lose the sense of 
the limits of their individuality' (Group Psychology, p. 84). In Civilization and its Discontents, 
he identifies a state of emotional life where this loss of the limits of self occurs - 'At the height 
of being in love the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt away. Against all the 
evidence of his senses, a man who is in love declares that "I" and ''you'' are one, and is prepared 
to behave as if it were a fact.' (Civilization, p. 66) Mordecai's feeling for Daniel, based on 
those animal instincts that lead us to fall in love, create above anything else a possibility of 
profound and eternal unity, which is confirmed by his fmal blessing before death: 'Slowly and 
with effort Ezra, pressing on their hands, raised himself and uttered in Hebrew the confession of 
the divine Unity, which for long generations has been on the lips of the dying Israelite' (DD, pp. 
882-83). 
In Judaism Eliot found a multi-purpose frame, within which to discuss and illustrate 
scientific theories of heredityl20 and the ideals of meliorism. The importance of this discovery 
should not be underestimated; the heritage of Judaism provided Eliot with metaphors which 
served her in suggesting a descriptive way into theories of the mind that approached those of 
psychoanalysis. One of these ideas was that of the path, a metaphor that Eliot frequently 
employs in her work, but in Daniel Deronda she uses it to suggest something new that sprang 
from ideas of heredity. Lewes had, in Foundations of a Creed, followed the idea of inherited 
experience to its logical end: 
Descending from these preliminaries, we see that the true questi?n Psychology has t~ ~ermine 
concerning the origin of knowledge is w~ether over and above th~ reco~ avenues of Sensibility there 
are other avenues, in no one respect alhed to them, through whIch ConSCIOusness may be affected, and 
120 William Baker writes that according to Jewish philosophy 'the fimdamental laws by which all life is 
influenced are heredity and environment' (George Eliol and JwJaIs"" p. 171). 
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thus . revelatio~s reach the mind which, having no sensible origin, are not amenable to the canons of 
senSible Expenence. (Foundations, 1,213) 
I would suggest that this is a short, and hesitant move towards the idea of an unconscious in the 
way that Freud would conceptualize it later in his career. Although little is made of it in 
Lewes's 1870s work, the acknowledgement that something inaccessible and unrelated to 
sensible experience may exist in the human psyche is briefly given; in Daniel Deronda, 
Mordecai's constant refrain to Daniel, 'we know not all the pathways' forms the hint, supported 
by the sense of complexity we encounter when we try and unravel the strings of nature and 
nurture, that there may be something equivalent to what Lewes glimpses, in the human frame. 
Mordecai's certainty that Daniel is the deliverer he takes him to be on Blackfriars bridge, cannot 
be easily explained, and so he resorts to this metaphor: 
Man finds his pathways: at first they were foot-tracks, as those of the beast in the wilderness; now they 
are swift and invisible: his thought dives through the ocean, and his wishes thread the air: has he found all 
the pathways yet? What reaches him, stays with him, rules him: he must accept it, not knowing its 
pathway. (DD, pp. 560-61) 
In the Ego and the Id Freud describes the evolution of the id through the experiences of 
generations of mankind. This is an important passage, as it illustrates the fact that organic 
memory theory leads to a realization that there is a part of the mind, intimated by Lewes and 
Eliot above, that is not formed wholly by our life experiences but that is already inherent in us 
when we are born. For Freud this part of the psychical apparatus was the id, 'the dark, 
inaccessible part of our personality', 121 the 'core of our being ... which has no direct 
communication with the external world and is accessible even to our own knowledge only 
through the medium of another agency'!22 Freud's conception of the id, more than his previous 
view of the unconscious, emphasized and reiterated the importance of inherited material in its 
make-up, such as instinctual drives, or a sense of guilt which our ancestors had eamed. For 
although the id could accept repressed wishes and memories, the life experiences of the 
individual, it was not constructed entirely from them:123 
The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but, when they have been repeated 
often enough and with sufficient strength in many individuals in successive generations, they transform 
themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by heredity. 
(The Ego and the Id, p. 38) 
121 Sigmund Freud, 'Lecture XXXI: The Dissection of the Psychical Personality' (1933) in SE, XXII, 57-
80 (p. 73). 
122 Sigmund Freud, An Outline o/Psycho-Analysis (1940), in SE, XXIII, 1~9-207 (p: 197). 
123 See Laplanche and Pontalis, entry for 'Id', pp. 197-99. In discussmg the ddfe~ce between, the 
unconscious and the id, which emerged as part of Freud's 'second thcoJ?: of the psychical a~tu.s (p. 
197), they write: 'In the last analysis, we are best able to grasp the tranSition from the unCOO.SCIOUS an ~e 
first topography to the id in the second by considering the difference in the genetic perSpectIVeS to which 
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In this passage Freud's voice seems to form an echo of Spencer's, or Lewes's, in their writings 
on the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Through a shared common ground then, the 
doctrine of organic memory, which seemed for Eliot to be clarified and confirmed by the ideas 
and images inherent in Judaism, Eliot and Lewes approached a view of the mind that would 
later be propounded by psychoanalysis. 
In Eliot's last book, Impressions of Theophrastus Such (1879), she takes on a more 
urgent, didactic tone to champion the cause that she explores through fiction in Daniel Deronda 
- the lack of a national centre for the Jews. In 'The Modem Hep! Hep! Hep!' she looks into the 
past and points out that although we have persecuted the Jews, 'their memories nevertheless are 
the very fountain to which the persecutors trace their most vaunted blessings', that Jewish ideas 
'have determined the religion of half the world, and that the more cultivated half, 124 and that it 
was the Jews that gave us the word 'Amen' with which to end our prayers, and indicate a sense 
of positive consent (Theophrastus, p. 191). As Daniel Deronda says to Mirah, between Jews 
and Christians 'there is not really such a separation - deeper down, as Mrs Meyrick says. OUf 
religion is chiefly a Hebrew religion' (DD, p. 424). The same idea is expressed in a letter to 
Harriet Beecher Stowe of 29 October 1876; that the roots of our religion and culture are found 
in Jewish history and faith, and that not to realize this is 'stupidity': 
Towards the Hebrews we western people who have been reared in Christianity, have a peculiar debt and, 
whether we acknowledge it or not, a peculiar thoroughness of fellowship in religious and moral 
sentiment. Can anything be more disgusting than to hear people called 'educated' making small jokes 
about eating ham, and showing themselves empty of any real knowledge as to the relation of their own 
social and religious life to the history of the people they think themselves witty in insulting? They hardly 
know that Christ was a Jew ... To my feeling, this deadness to the history which has prepared half our 
world for us ... lies very close to the worst kind of irreligion. The best that can be said of it is, that it is a 
sign of the intellectual narrowness - in plain English, the stupidity, which is still the average mark of our 
culture. 125 
We are produced from past experience, which includes that of our ancestors. In essence, 
according to the evolutionary idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, Judaism is our 
ancestry. Like Deronda, we should gain as full a knowledge as possible of the past, of our past, 
what has gone to make us up, in order to progress most effectively, and a step we can make 
towards moving forward, according to Eliot, involves acknowledging the possibility of a Jewish 
nation. This recognition is the polar opposite of stupidity, in her view, for she writes that a 
Hebrew nation would be able to 'contribute some added form of national genius' to the rest of 
humanity. (Theophrastus, p. 191). 
An idea of what may arise from such genius can be found in a speech given in Daniel 
Deronda by Mordecai: 
they belong', that while the unconscious 'owed its fonnation' to repression, the fonnation of the id wu 
more of an emergence &om an evolutionary process (p. 199). 
124 George Eliot, 'The Modem Hep! Hep! Hep!' (1879), in Impressions ofTheophrostru Such. EutIyJ and 
Leaves from Q Note-book (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Son, n. d.), pp. 168-93 (p. 174). 
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'The Shemah, wherein we briefly confess the divine Unity, is the chief devotional exercise of the Hebrew; 
and this made our religion the fundamental religion for the whole world; for the divine Unity embraced as 
its consequence the ultimate unity of mankind. See, then - the nation which has been scotTed at for its 
separateness, has given a binding theory to the human race ... in this way human life is tending toward the 
image of the Supreme Unity: for as our life becomes more spiritual by capacity of thought, and joy 
therein, possession tends to become more universal, being independent of gross material contact'. (DD, 
p. 802) 
This idea of unity through progress is fundamental to the ideas of evolution with which Eliot 
was surrounded in the 1870s, but again, these concepts seem to have been rendered particularly 
significant to Eliot by their relevance to Judaism, their resonance within already existing Jewish 
thought. This should not be surprising to us, considering Eliot's self-professed need to embody 
theory, to render ideas 'incarnate'. In Judaism, these theories were in a sense already embodied; 
Eliot therefore engaged with them all the more readily. That Freud was Jewish;26 and on 
reading Daniel Deronda professed his amazement that Eliot should know about Jewish ways 
that 'we speak of only among ourselves' (cited in Jones, I, 174), serves to pose an interesting 
question about the influences that impelled him towards adopting the idea of Eros, a unifying 
power which finds such resonance in Jewish mythology, but which also acts according to the 
characteristics of Spencer's theory of evolution and Hering's theory of the assimilatory process 
in nature. In 1930 Freud wrote, 'civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose 
is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, 
into one great unity, the unity of mankind' (Civilization, p. 122). This idea appears as part of 
his attempt to counteract the feeling that he describes, pages before, that 'what I am describing 
is common knowledge' (p. 117). A familiarity with the theories of evolution and social 
progress held by Eliot and her contemporaries proves that Freud's ideas here still have not 
moved out of the realm of the already-known. 
125 George Eliot to Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe, 29 October 1876, in GEL, VI" 30".0: .(pp: 301-02). . 
126 Freud was a member, for many decades, of the Viennese b~h of ~e. B ~ B rith, an order which 
represents Jewish interests, cultural, intellectual and charitable. Freud Jomed, ~ 18.95" and he ~ f,!" 
many years to be a regular attendant at its meetings on alternate Tuesdays (Editor s Introduction , 
'Address to the Society ofB'nai B'rith', in SE, xx, 272). 
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Conclusion: 'A Common Fund' 
Towards the end of my last chapter I considered how the psychoanalytic ideas of id and Eros 
may have been prefigured by Eliot and her immediate circle of scientific friends, who. 
theorizing within the same traditions as Freud, therefore drew comparable conclusions. Now I 
will turn to some implications of the ideas of evolution and organic memory, from which these 
conclusions developed, for Freud himself as a thinker. In this thesis I have considered texts 
which seem to offer a commentary on Freud, his theories and his writing and remembering 
behaviour, decades before his time. These are often texts about which one is inclined to feel 
that if Freud had read them and taken heed, he might not have encountered certain problems. 
The writings of Cobbe and Carpenter, and Collins's The Moonstone, which consider false 
memory and testimony, and sound a warning bell for the seduction theory, come under this 
category. However, this thesis has also explored subtler ways in which the premises and 
assumptions on which psychoanalysis would be based were displayed as complicated or 
problematic by Victorian thinkers and fiction writers. Collins's interrogation of the concept of 
the association of ideas, which revealed it as an overdeterministic model of thought processes, 
and the portrayal in Le Fanu's work of an ambiguous psychical or spiritual force, which found 
its ancestry in a religious tradition from which Freud so strenuously tried to separate himself, 
serve to question, not only the extent of Freud's originality, but the safety of the foundations 
and building-blocks of psychoanalysis. If Freud had engaged with his nineteenth-century 
predecessors, therefore, their ideas and discussions may have aided a more sophisticated 
theorizing, and instilled in him an understanding of the real history and origins of 
psychoanalysis. This process, however, would have entailed the sacrifice of the Freudian 
legend that portrays psychoanalysis as a watershed, an original creation. 
As I first discussed in my Introduction, Freud's lack of reading was, as he himself 
admitted, due to a wish to be original, not to be 'stint[ed] ... of the satisfaction of discovery'} 
He enjoyed his early period of 'splendid isolation', because then he 'did not have to read any 
publications, nor listen to any ill-informed opponents,.2 It is therefore doubtful that such 
warning texts as I have considered in this thesis would have reached him, in a physical or a 
psychological sense. For Freud, as we have seen, understood and employed the concepts of 
organic memory and evolutionary theory, but he failed to recognize the extent of his own 
intellectual inheritance. To conclude this thesis, I will build on the fmdings of my last chapter 
I Cited in Paul Roazen, Freud and his Followers (London: Allen Lane, 1976), p. 212. 
:z Sigmund Freud, 'On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement', in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freu~ trans. and ed. by James Strachey and othen, 24 vols 
(London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953-74), XIV, 1-66 (p. 22). 1Jte Standard 
Edition oftM Complete Psychological Works will hereafter be referenced as SE. 
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by briefly considering what ideas about evolution and the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, held by Eliot's immediate circle, and the intellectual relationships within this 
group of friends, could suggest about Freud's prizing of what Ellenberger has identified as the 
'two main features' of the Freudian legend - isolation and originality. 3 
'It is the great human privilege to assimilate the experiences of others', it is written in 
the third series of Problems of Life and Mind, 'our feelings are products of our personal 
stimulations, and of the residua of ancestral stimulations. Our knowledge is the product of our 
own experiences, and of the stored-up experiences of our fellows,.4 This statement is from a 
text which, although Lewes originally wrote it, was subsequently edited and revised by Eliot, 
who was helped by James Sully. The group of thinkers which I have considered in the last 
chapter could be said to have worked according to their own theories, which stressed, as Freud's 
did, a tendency towards unity as a characteristic of civilized society. I discussed Lewes's use of 
Spencer's idea of evolution in his own work, and Sully's citation of Eliot to suggest a way 
forward for society, Lewes's citation of Eliot's poetry to help illustrate the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics, Spencer's discussion with Eliot of his ideas on the direction of motion, 
and Eliot's use and development of the concepts of Lewes and Spencer in her fiction. There 
was an interdependence within this group which tended to blur the boundaries of science and 
literature. This blurring was partly due to the ideals of each discipline. According to Lewes, 
science 'postulates unity of Existence' ,5 and the aim of knowledge in Spencer's view, is to 
'unit[e] ... past, present, and future histories into a whole', 'unification being ... the 
characteristic of developing thought of all kinds,.6 Literature too was a unifying medium, and 
as such, was perceived as a contributor to, and a symptom of, social progress. Lewes wrote in 
The Principles of Success in Literature: 
Literature is at once the cause and effect of our social progress. It deepens our natural 
sensibilities, and strengthens by exercise our intellectual capacities. It stores up the accumulated 
experience of the race, connecting Past and Present into a conscious unity; and with this store it feeds 
successive generations, to be fed in tum by them.' 
In Problems of Life and Mind we gain another sense in which these combined disciplines might 
contribute to 'a slow process of moral and intellectual education' which, according to Lewes, 
was the only way to 'reconstruc[t] society'. For this process 'a knowledge of actual and 
possible human motives is required, and a knowledge of psychological laws is as necessary here 
3 Henri Ellenberger, The Discovery o/the Unconscious: The History and Evolution o/Dynamic 
Psychiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 547. . 
4 George Henry Lewes, Problems 0/ Life and Mind, Third Series, Problem the First: The Study of 
Pqchology: Its Object, Scope and Method (London: Tr11bner &. Co., 1879), p. 177. Hereafter, Problems, 
r &ria, I. 
S George Henry Lewes, The Physical Basis 0/ Mind, With Illustrations, Being the Second Series of 
Problems of Lifo and MInd (London: Tr11bner and Co., 1877), p. 4. 
6 Helbert Spencer, Fint Principia, 2" edn (London: WiUiams and Norgate, 1867), pp. 278, SS3. 
7 George Henry Lewes, T1te Principia o/Success in Literature (1865) (London: Walter Scott, n.d.), p. 2. 
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as the knowledge of physical laws in any practical or theoretic efforts to modify the external 
world' (Problems, 3m Series, I, 46). In the last chapter we saw Eliot and Lewes's ideas of the 
accumulation of experience leading to motive, and Eliot's use of Spencer's laws of the direction 
of force for her own portrait of motive. With this issue, as with so many others I have 
discussed, there is a pattern of working together which approximates to Lewes's ideal of 
thought and theory: 'each worker brings his labours as a contribution to a common fund, not as 
an anarchical displacement of the labours of predecessors' (Problems, 3m Series, I, 5). 
This idea of the common fund fonns an interesting contrast to Thomas Mann's 
description of Freud, which bears repeating: 
Actually we know that Sigmund Freud ... trod the steep path alone and independently, as physician and 
natural scientist, without knowing that reinforcement and encouragement lay to his hand in literature ... 
By his unaided effort, without knowledge of any previous intuitive achievement, he had methodically to 
follow out the line of his own researches ... And we think of him as solitary - the attitude is inseparable 
from our earliest picture of the man.8 
It is truer to say that Freud did not wish to know that reinforcement and encouragement lay to 
his hand in literature, or in any other texts, scientific or philosophical, for, in his own words in 
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), 'it is painful to be requested ... to surrender 
one's originality'. If we recall, this was Freud's comment on his forgetting that what he 
represented as an idea of his own, actually originated with his friend Fliess. That he had 
completely forgotten the conversation in which Fliess had offered this idea, Freud had put down 
to 'the tendency to forget what is disagreeable'. As a sort of aside to his account of this 
incident, Freud makes an interesting comment, 'but since then I have grown a little more 
tolerant when, in reading medical literature, I come across one of the few ideas with which my 
name can be associated, and find that my name has not been mentioned,.9 It is not clear 
whether Freud means present or past medical literature, but as he is discussing the disconcerting 
experience of thinking one has had an original idea and then being infonned otherwise, it is 
likely that he means past literature. Even if it is plagiarism Freud is describing, his assumption 
here that he only should have the rights to a certain idea, diametrically opposes the idea of 'a 
common fund', and Eliot's attitude to the issue of originality, which was evident on her being 
asked by Sully about where the tenn 'meliorist' originated from: 'I don't know that I ever heard 
anybody use the word "meliorist" except myself. But I begin to think that there is no good 
invention or discovery that has not been made by more than one person' .10 Freud's thirst, 
• Thomas Mann, 'Freud and the Future', from Essays 0/ Three Decades, trans. by H. T. Lowe-Porter 
~ew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 411-28 (pp. 412-13). 
Sigmund Freud, The Psychopathology 0/ Everyday Life (190 1), SE, VI, p. 144. . 
10 George Eliot to James Sully, 19 January 1877, in The George Eliot Leuers, ed. by Gordon S. Haight, 9 
vols (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954-78), VI, 333-34 (p. 333). 
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betrayed to Fliess, for 'eternal fame ... certain wealth, complete independence,1l suggests above 
all that he refused to simply be a contributor to a common fund of knowledge, for such a role 
does not bring with it glories. We recall his panicked reading of a recent book by Janet, his 
contemporary, in order to check that he had not discerned 'the key', 12 as if there was only one 
discovery to be exclusively made by one person. In avoiding union with his fellow scientists, 
Freud was encouraging dissimilation, not assimilation, dissolution rather than evolution, within 
the fund of knowledge. 
That Freud did not appreciate the 'great human privilege' of 'assimila[ting] the 
experiences of others' did not debar him from it, as I hope this thesis has made clear. His 
subscription to the theory of organic memory, whose fundamental message is that past 
experiences of other people suggest thought and action in the present, should have given him 
some warning of this. In his education, in his thinking, studies and simple existence within the 
framework of Western civilization, Freud would not have been able to help imbibing others' 
experience. For, as Lewes put it, 'civilisation is the accumulation of experiences', which means 
that 'the Past more and more dominates the Present, precisely as in the individual case it is the 
registered experiences which more and more determine the feelings and opinions' (Problems, 
3m Series, I, 166). 
William Grove, whose ideas on the movement, conservation and correlation of force 
informed Victorian ideas of the energies within the universe and the individual, and were 
adopted as self-evident by psychoanalysis, wrote, in the Introductory Remarks to the Sixth 
Edition of his Co"elation of Physical Forces, about the issue of originality. In the time that had 
lapsed between his first publication of the work, in 1846, he had discovered more and more 
writers whose writings, previous to his, prefigured certain parts of his system, and necessitated 
acknowledgement in the present edition. Commenting on this, Grove wrote: 
The more extended our research becomes, the more we fmd that knowledge is a thing of slow 
progression, that the very notions which appear to ourselves new, have arisen, though perhaps in a very 
indirect manner, from successive modifications of traditional opinions. Each word we utter, each thought 
we think, has in it the vestiges, is in itself the impress, of antecedent words and thoughts. As each 
material form, could we rightly read it, is a book, containing in itself the past history of the world; so, 
different though our philosophy may now appear to be from that of our progenitors, it is but theirs added 
to or subtracted from, transmitted drop by drop through the filter of antecedent, as ours will be through 
that of subsequent, ages. The relic is to the past as is the germ to the future. 13 
Containing the history of our ancestors, we therefore cannot help reproducing the vestiges of the 
thoughts and theories of our intellectual forefathers; it is therefore folly to attempt to separate 
ourselves from them by insisting too much on our own originality. 
II Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 21 September 1897, in '0e Complete Lellers .o/Sigmund Freud 10 
Wilhelm Fliess, /887-/904, trans. and ed by Jeffrey M0USS81eff Masson (Cambndge, Mass: Harvard, 
1985), pp. 264-67 (p. 266). Hereafter, Freud-Flien. 
12 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 10 March 1898, in Freud-Fliess, pp. 301-02 (p. 302). 
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With The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud had an equivalent experience to 
Grove. The third edition of 1911, and the fourth edition of 1914 were much extended, for the 
reason that they had to incorporate all the scholarship that Freud had not originally taken into 
account. One of the writers whose ideas he acknowledged in this fourth edition was James 
Sully, whose 1893 article 'The Dream as a Revelation' prefigured Freud's idea of regression 
within dreaming. The note in which Sully is acknowledged is very interesting. Freud starts 
with an extremely combative comment, written for the second edition of 1909, in which he 
speaks of the 'obstinacy with which readers and critics of this book shut their eyes' to and 
'overlook' the truth of his ideas. This is not an annoyance at their disagreement, more at what 
Freud obviously sees as an ignoring of his much-prized theories. This is followed by the section 
added in 1914, 'on the other hand, nothing in the literature of the subject comes so near to my 
hypothesis as a passage in James Sully's essay "The Dream as a Revelation'" .14 Elsewhere, 
Freud writes that Sully 'was more firmly convinced, perhaps, than any other psychologist that 
dreams have a disguised meaning' (Interpretation, p. 60). The passages that Freud quotes to 
support his argument are those that suggest that in dreams 'it is [a] temporary withdrawal of the 
pressure of the newer experiences which allows the overlaid strata of old experience to come to 
light again',1S such as Sully's comment that 'we may say that, like some palimpsest, the dream 
discloses beneath its worthless surface-characters traces of an old and precious communication' 
('The Dream', p. 364; Interpretation, p. 135 n.). Sully's essay charts the results of the 
modifications of experience on the individual, claiming that they lead to 'changes of 
personality': 'when we sit down and quietly glance back over the succession of our years, we 
may see that by making the interval wide enough we confront what is, in a large part of its 
characteristic modes of consciousness, a new, a foreign personality'. Freud quotes Sully's 
conclusion to this idea, 'our dreams are a means of conserving these successive personalities', 
and introduces it thus, 'we have been able to accept entirely as our own what Sully has written' 
('The Dream', p. 362; Interpretation, p. 591). In his original claims that his contemporaries 
refused to hear his voice, followed by his use of Sully'S essay as nothing but a support for 
psychoanalysis (rather than that psychoanalysis might in some sense build on Sully's ideas) we 
see two manifestations of Freud's disinclination to blend in with his intellectual peers. We also 
find that the second half of the footnote, the citation of Sully, illuminates and explains the farst 
half, the lack of response to Freud's work. 
Sully's article was a product both of its author's early intellectual context, among the 
thinkers whose work I have discussed in the last chapter, and of the progress undergone in 
psychology from the 1870s to the 1890s. It is offered as an account which springs from 'the 
13 W. R. Grove, The Correlation o/Physical Forces (1846),6* edn (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1874), p. 4. 
14 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation 0/ Dreams (1900), in SE. IV &; V, ix-629 (p. 135 n.). Hereafter. 
Interpretation. 
IS James Sully. 'The Dream as a Revelation', The Fortnightly Review, 53 (1893). 354-65 (p. 361). 
Hereafer. 'The Dream' . 
269 
modem scientific theory of dreaming' ('The Dream', p. 354), and is based on ideas of evolution 
and dissolution: 'according to the common hypothesis senility is the first stage of cerebral 
dissolution, in which, reversing the order of evolution, that which is last acquired is the first to 
disappear ... Sleep does for us temporarily what old age does permanently' (p. 361). Spencer's 
concept of evolution, which Sully had used in his description of social progress in 1877 is 
evident here; so is Hughlings Jackson's development of Spencer's theory into the concept of 
functional retrogression, which, as I have discussed in my Introduction, informed Freud's work 
on aphasia. Sully takes the models of the accumulation of experience and the strata of 
personality, and applies the laws of dissolution to them, to create a reversal, a stripping-back. 
He also uses the theory of the layers of consciousness that Lewes propounded in 1859-60, 
'when asleep we may be said to go back to [a] primitive animal immersion in bodily sensation 
... we hear the heart beat, and feel the incoming and outgoing of the breath' (p. 359). Lewes 
had written, that although we are conscious of these feelings, we do not attend to them, except 
in rare circumstances, when 'we may feel the heart beat, the intestines move, the glands secrete; 
anything unusual in their action will force itself on our attention' . 16 
Sully, therefore, draws on the wealth of knowledge that he and others have 
accumulated, in order to progress. His ideas, finding their root in the mid-nineteenth century 
were instantly recognized by Freud as akin to his own mechanism of regression, which 
represents a return to what is 'more primitive in form' (Interpretation, p. 548). Sully also 
approaches something of the fundamental Freudian idea of dreams as wish-fulfilment. Again a 
development of ideas of the 1860s and 1870s that I discussed in my last chapter, which trace 
wish and motive into action by physical laws, Sully writes that 'half-formed psychical 
tendencies, relieved of all restraint, work themselves out to their natural issue' in a dream, 
which can act as 'the expansion and complete development of a vague fugitive wish of the 
waking mind' ('The Dream', p. 358). Small wonder, therefore, that The Interpretation of 
Dreams did not bring Freud the reaction he was expecting on its publication in 1900; had he 
read current literature on dreams he would have realized that he was building on what had gone 
before, as Sully himself had done. I will now briefly consider something of the reception of The 
Interpretation of Dreams in Austria and Germany, and the earlier reaction to Studies on 
Hysteria (1895) in late-Victorian England. This will, I hope, make two things clear: flJ'Stly, the 
extent to which Freud was seen as a contributor, in his early writings at least, to the common 
fund of psychiatry, and, secondly, the extent to which he resisted this acceptance by his fellows. 
The reaction to The Interpretation of Dreams was profoundly disappointing to Freud. 
In a telling passage from one of his letters to Fliess, he complained, 'not a leaf has stirred to 
reveal that the Interpretation of Dreams has had any impact on anyone. It was only yesterday 
that a rather friendly article in the feuilleton of a daily newspaper, Wiener Fremdenblatl, caught 
16 George Henry Lewes, The Physiology o/Common Life, 2 vols (London: William Blackwood and Sons. 
18S9-60), II, 66. 
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me by surprise' .17 Evidently it was not friendly articles that Freud was expecting, or, indeed, 
content with. It is hard to know what proof of 'impact' he wished for. Until the 1960s it was 
traditionally believed that The Interpretation of Dreams was ignored or castigated by his 
fellows. Freud himself gave this impression in his accounts of his time of 'isolation', which. 
according to him, had lasted from the mid-1890s to the mid-1900s: 'my writings were not 
reviewed in the medical journals, or, if as an exception they were reviewed, they were dismissed 
with expressions of scornful or pitying superiority' ('On the History', pp. 22-23). More 
recently, however, the actual reviews of Freud's work have been carefully examined, and 
studies have appeared to suggest that Freud's words in 'On the History of the Psychoanalytic 
Movement' were rather exaggerated.18 Nonnan Kiell documents that Freud expected (as he 
wrote to Fliess) a 'stonn' to occur on the publication of The Interpretation of Dreams, and that 
this then became 'a self-fulfilling prophecy' .19 Freud took umbrage against what were often 
respectful, muted words from a relatively small number of critics: 'he [was] cool to words of 
praise he receiver d], he translate[ d] silences (lack of interest or knowledge, often enough) into 
furious disapproval' (Kiell, p. 89). There were words of praise in many of the reviews. Freud's 
book was described as a 'significant contribution to the solution of emotional problems'. 20 
Frank J. Sulloway records that Paul Nacke, 'a psychiatrist of international reputation and a 
veteran reviewer in the Gennan-speaking medical world', wrote in 1901 that 'the book is 
psychologically the most profound that dream psychology has produced thus far' (cited in 
Sulloway, pp. 450-51: Nacke's emphasis). The psychologist William Stem's review of 1901 
commented that it contained 'extraordinarily rich material of very exactly recorded dreams, 
which must be highly welcome to every worker in this field' (cited in Sulloway, p. 450). In 
these phrases, however, describing a contribution, the presence of other workers in the field of 
dream theory, which is presented as the context out of which The Interpretation of Dreams 
emerged, and which might yet better him (note Nacke's words 'thus far') we begin to see why 
Freud felt that his book had failed to create an impact, that he was being ignored. His work was 
being taken here as a contribution to the common fund, and this did not satisfy him. This was 
not the way to 'eternal fame' and 'complete independence'. 
The Interpretation of Dreams did not initially generate much interest abroad; it was 
translated thirteen years after its first publication. Studies on Hysteria, however, perhaps 
because of the greater interest in this field, provoked quite a swift response in Britain. Again 
17 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, II March 1900, in Freud-Fliess, pp. 402-04 (pp. 402~3). . 
II See The Discovery 0/ the Unconscious, pp. 783-84 and Frank J. Sulloway, Freud, BIologISt 0/ the 
Mind: Beyond the PsychoanaJytic Legend (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 448-
64, for comments specifically on the reception of The Interpretation 0/ Drea~, and ~~ah S .. Decker, 
'The Medical Reception of Psychoanalysis in Germany, 1894-1907: Three BnefStudle5 , Bullet", of the 
History 0/ Medicine, 4S (1971), 461-81 for an idea of the reception ~f other early works ~y F~d ~ 
contemporaries such as Leopold LGwenfeld, who was very encouragmg, frequently agreemg With hIS 
arguments and ideas (pp. 467-73). . . 
19 Norman Kiell, Frnd Without Hindsight: Reviews 0/ his Work (1893-/939) (Madison: internatiOnal 
Univenities Press, 1988), p. 88. 
20 Review by Friedrich Eckstein (1900), Arbeiter Zeilllng, in Kiell, pp. 128-32 (p. 132). 
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Freud's contribution to an already existing field was emphasized. In Brain of 1896 there was a 
long review of Studies on Hysteria by J. Michell Clarke, which describes the book as 'an 
original and valuable contribution to the theory of hysteria' ,21 and describes the theories and 
case studies of Breuer and Freud in great detail. Other figures, such as Pierre Janet (Clarke, p. 
414) are broUght into the discussion, to support or offer alternatives to points in Breuer and 
Freud's book. In 1898 the English sexologist Havelock Ellis published a complimentary article 
in The Alienist and Neurologist, 'Hysteria in Relation to the Sexual Emotions', which conducted 
a historical survey of ideas on the sexual aetiology of hysteria, including the work of Charcot, 
and then moving on to favourably consider Freud and Breuer's Studies on Hysteria in some 
detail, before concluding that it 'cannot be regarded as a final and complete account' of 
hysteria.
22 
Clarke's article of 1896 could be seen to be rather on the cusp of the start of Freud's 
period of isolation,23 but Ellis's, published as it is in 1898, serves more definitely to belie 
Freud's words in his 'Autobiographical Study' of 1925, that 'for more than ten years after my 
separation from Breuer I had no followers. I was completely isolated ... abroad no notice was 
taken of me' .24 In contrast to this picture of isolation is a letter from Freud to Fliess, describing 
the article: 
Something pleasant about which I had meant to write you yesterday was sent to me - from 
Gibraltar from a Mr. Havelock Ellis, an author who concerns himself with the topic of sex and is 
obviously a highly intelligent man because his paper ... begins with Plato and ends with Freud; he agrees 
a great deal with the latter and gives Studies on Hysteria, as well as later papers, their due in a very 
sensible manner.25 
Ellis's is an article that failed to find its way into Freudian myth, disregarded, like 
Clarke's, as a form of 'notice,.26 Freud's account of this period in 'On the History of the 
Psychoanalytic Movement' makes particularly clear the reasons for this. Again strikingly 
illustrating the dynamics of false testimony that Cobbe and Carpenter elucidated in the 1860s 
and 1870s, Freud insists on his role at this time as a 'lonely discovere[r]' (,On the History', p. 
23). He traces, in this account, the start of his isolation as his presentation of the paper which I 
discussed in Chapter Three, 'The Aetiology of Hysteria'. Freud describes 'the silence which 
my communications met with, the void which formed itself about me' as a result of this paper, 
'I understood that from now onwards I was one of those who have "disturbed the sleep of the 
21 J. Michell Clarke, 'Reviews and Abstracts', Brain, 19 (1896), 401-14 (p. 401). 
22 Havelock Ellis, 'Hysteria in Relation to the Sexual Emotions', The Alienist ~nd Neurologist, 19 (1898), 
599-615 (p. 614). The part of the article which deals with Studies on Hysteria IS PP: 609-14. . 
23 This seems to have started in 1896 for a combination of two reasons; the separation from Breuer which 
Freud describes below (see Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, February 13, 1896, in Freud-FIie&J, pp. 
172-73), and the reactions of Freud's peers to 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' (1896) that 1 discussed in 
Chapter Three, which caused Freud offence. 
24 Sigmund Freud, 'An Autobiographical Study' (1925), in SE, XX, 1-74 (p. 48). 
2S Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 3 January 1899, in Freud-Fliess, pp. 338-39 (p. 338). 
26 Interestingly, Freud does mention this article, earlier in 'An Autobiographical S!Ddy' (p. 24), but d~ 
not connect it with his period of isolation. It is Freud's editor who has to provide the date of Elha a 
article (p. 24 n). 
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world", as Hebbel says, and that I could not reckon upon objectivity and tolerance' (pp. 21-22). 
But objectivity and tolerance are exactly what he received from Havelock Ellis, who quotes at 
length from this very paper in his article (Ellis, p. 613). The world was already awake, aware 
and active. However, it was not in Freud's interest to acknowledge this, for it did not fit with 
his role as lonely discoverer. He writes of this time in his life in quite remarkable terms: 
I pic.tured the future as follows: - I should probably succeed in maintaining myself by means of 
the therapeutIc success of the new procedure, but science would ignore me entirely during my lifetime. 
some dec~des later, some~ne else wo~l? infallibly come upon the same things - for which the time w~ 
not now rIpe - would achIeve recognItIon for them and bring me honour as a forerunner whose failure 
had been inevitable. Meanwhile, like Robinson Crusoe, I settled down as comfortably as possible on my 
desert island. (p. 22) 
Such isolation was Freud's choice, not that of his contemporaries, who accepted him as a 
contributor to their established disciplines at home and abroad. But Freud did not want 
colleagues; as he betrayed in his 'Autobiographical Study', he wanted 'followers'. In the above 
passage he takes care to assert that he was ahead of his age; if this were really true, there would 
be no call for a 'History of the Psychoanalytic Movement', 'An Autobiographical Study'; there 
would have been minimal interest in Freud and his theories. The isolation would have 
continued, because, as Lewes pointed out, one cannot be truly original, and be heard. In 
Foundations of a Creed, he wrote, reflecting the context in which he lived, thought and worked: 
The laws of intellectual progress are to be read in History, not in the individual experience. We breathe 
the social air: since what we think, greatly depends on what others have thought. The paradox of to-day 
becomes the commonplace of to-morrow. The truths which required many generations to discover and 
establish, are now declared to be innate. Even discovery has its law, and is only an individual product 
inasmuch as the individual voice articulates what has been more or less inarticulate in the general thought. 
The great thinker is the secretary of his age. If his quick-glancing mind outrun the swiftest of his 
contemporaries, he will not be listened to: the prophet must fmd disciples. If he outrun the ma~ority of his 
contemporaries, he will have but a small circle of influence, for all originality is estrangement. 7 
Freud attempted to suggest his own estrangement from his intellectual context, which, he tried 
to assert, was unripe for him, but he did not run as much ahead of his contemporaries as he 
hoped. The extent to which his ideas eventually permeated Western culture does not prove his 
originality, rather it identifies him the more strongly as the secretary of his age. 
Frank J. Sulloway writes, at the beginning of his impressive chapter on 'The Myth of 
the Hero in the Psychoanalytic Movement' that, 'the traditional account of Freud's 
achievements has acquired its mythological proportions at the expense of historical context 
Indeed, historical "decontextualization" is a prerequisite for good myths, which invariably seek 
to deny history' (Sulloway, p. 445). I have sought in this thesis to do something to 
recontextualize Freud, to counter the traditional psychoanalytic denial of history, particularly 
27 George Henry Lewes, Problems 0/ Life and Mind, First Series: The Formdalions 0/ a Creed, 2 vols 
(London: TJ1lbner & Co., 1874), I, 174. 
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that of the extent to which Freud's theories were a progression of British nineteenth-century 
psychology, a rich discipline which was reflected and discussed in the literature of the time. 
Lewes argued that 'literature ... stores up the accumulated experience of the race'. In this thesis 
I have tried to explore something of the embodiment of scientific and cultural experience in 
certain Victorian texts, and then, inevitably, in psychoanalysis. The three fiction writers I have 
discussed were not chosen for any traits that set them apart from their peers, rather they were 
chosen because of their existence and operation within the 'common fund' of their time, which 
impacted in different ways on each author's work. This fund could not help but be a conscious 
or unconscious influence on Freud's theories and models of the mind. Ideas of evolution and 
organic memory, used as frameworks for psychoanalytic theory, served in the Victorian period 
to emphasize and deepen the truth that Freud insisted on ignoring: the past forms us, we emerge 
from our ancestors. 
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